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Liability insurance concerns an insured’s insurance of its legal liability towards 
a third party for the latter’s loss. This specialised type of insurance is rather neglected 
in South African insurance law. There is a lack of understanding of the intricacies of 
liability insurance and its unique challenges. This flows primarily from its complex 
nature as third-party insurance, which involves legal obligations between multiple 
parties, and a lack of statutory regulation of the distinctive contractual aspects of 
liability insurance. Furthermore, limited authority exists on contentious legal aspects 
as a result of the relatively small number of judicial decisions in this field of law.  
It is also evident that liability insurance constantly evolves as new grounds of 
liability emerge and new insurance products develop in response to the changing 
demands of society. The rise of consumerism and the increase in third-party claims 
amplify the economic significance of the law of liability insurance in South Africa. A 
substantial knowledge gap remains in our jurisprudence, irrespective of the recent 
introduction of new statutory instruments aimed at regulating insurance practice in 
general. These reforms have not as yet been applied critically to liability insurance, 
and no specialised legislation in South Africa regulates aspects of this branch of 
insurance as is the case with microinsurance.  
The focus in this thesis is on two main issues: the insurer’s duty effectively to 
indemnify the insured, and the insurer’s defence and settlement of third-party claims 
brought against the insured. As a subsidiary theme, this thesis analyses legal 
uncertainties that may persist during pre-contractual negotiations, the liability 
insurance contract lifecycle, and even after the expiry of the contract. Legal 
challenges can be addressed by novel and creative application of the national law. 
Potential solutions can be gleaned from the other progressive jurisdictions reviewed – 
English and Belgian law. It is evident that this research may prompt Parliament to 
develop specific rules and regulations for liability insurance contract law. This thesis 
includes a check list of some of the most important disclosure duties for procuring 








Claims-made policy; Duration of liability cover; Disclosure; Duty to indemnify; 
Hybrid Policy; Indemnity insurance; Insured defendant; Legal liability; Liability 
insurance; Liability insurance contract; Liability insured; Liability insurer; Right or 
duty to defend or settle; Third-party insurance; Third-party plaintiff; Third-party 
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CHAPTER 1:  




1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY1 
 
Risk is the possibility (uncertainty) of unforeseen harm as part of everyday 
life.2 A person exposed to risk may protect itself by transferring the risk of loss to 
another party, an insurer, in exchange for an undertaking to pay a premium.3 This is 
the essence of an insurance contract – to protect an insured against the financial 
consequences of the realisation of the risk insured. 
There are several classifications of insurance; the most common is the 
distinction between indemnity and non-indemnity insurance. With indemnity 
insurance, the insurer indemnifies the insured for loss or damage suffered as a result 
of the happening of the uncertain event insured against.4 First-party insurance and 
third-party insurance are examples of indemnity insurance. The distinction between 
these two types of insurance centre on the nature of the object of the risk and the 
object of insurance.5 First-party insurance (such as property insurance) concerns 
assets in the insured’s estate. Third-party insurance (such as liability insurance)6 
concerns the liabilities of the insured’s estate.7 
  
                                                 
1 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 1.1-1.59 and 25.24-25.45. 
2 Ibid para 5.20 summarise the essence of an insurance contract as ‘a transfer of a risk of loss from the 
insured to the insurer’ and they opine that it is unclear whether there should be an additional duty on 
the insurer to spread the risk over a community of exposed persons under South African law. See para 
2.2 below for further detail on the possible essential elements of an insurance contract under South 
African law. 
3 In the event of insurance for gain. 
4 This is referred to as the ‘indemnity principle’. The indemnity principle does not apply to non-
indemnity insurance where the insurer undertakes to pay a specified sum of money to the insured on 
the occurrence of an insured event. Further differences between indemnity and non-indemnity 
insurance may lie in the nature of the object of the risk and the object of insurance, but further 
discussion of non-indemnity insurance falls beyond the scope of this study as liability insurance is a 
form of indemnity insurance. See para 2.2.2.1 below for further detail on the classification of liability 
insurance as indemnity insurance. 
5 The object of insurance is the insured’s insurable interest. 
6 See para 1.2 below for further detail on the reason for liability insurance and an example applied to 
the study. 
7 See para 2.2.1 below for further information on the terminology used in the thesis; and paras 2.2.2 
and 2.2.3 below for further detail on parties involved in liability insurance.  
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1.2 WHY IS THERE LIABILITY INSURANCE? 
 
One of the founding legal principles is that loss lies where it falls: res perit 
domino:8 ‘The first principle of the law of delict, which is so easily forgotten and 
hardly ever appears in any local text on the subject, is … that everyone has to bear 
the loss he or she suffers.’9  The law recognises instances in which the loss is 
transferred from one party to another (such as by statute, or at common law (mainly 
by contract or delict)).10  
As explained above,11 a person exposed to potential harm may, as an insured, 
protect itself against the adverse consequences of such harm by the transfer of the 
risk to an insurer in terms of an insurance contract.12 Here, we are concerned only 
with liability insurance.13 
As mentioned earlier,14 liability insurance is third-party insurance. It concerns 
an insured’s insurance of its potential legal liability towards a third party for the 
latter’s injury, damage, or loss. 
To illustrate the reason for liability insurance: Say that a motor-vehicle 
collision occurs between two parties, the third-party plaintiff and an insured 
defendant. Assume that the insured defendant is legally liable in delict to the third-
party plaintiff for all of the latter’s damage to its vehicle (the accident that was 
caused solely by the insured defendant’s negligent driving). Although loss lies 
where it falls, the third-party plaintiff may successfully claim its loss from the 
insured defendant.  
If the insured defendant has insurance that covers its liability towards the 
third-party plaintiff, the insured defendant may also claim its loss 15  from the 
liability insurer. Depending on the liability insurance contract and the facts of the 
case, the liability insurer may conduct the insured defendant’s defence or settlement 
(if any) against the third-party plaintiff in the name of the liability insured. 
                                                 
8 Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 3-7.  
9 Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 (1) SA 
461 (SCA) 468.  
10 See paras 3.2.2.1(a), 4.2.2.1(a) and 5.2.2.1(a) below for further detail on these causes of action under 
South African, English and Belgian law. 
11 See para 1.1 above. 
12 Hartlief & Tjittes Verzekering & aansprakelijkheid paras 1.2.1 and 1.2.5. 
13 See para 2.2.2 below on classifying liability insurance for further detail. 
14 See para 1.1 above. 
15 Again: the insured’s legal liability for the third-party plaintiff’s loss, is the insured’s loss for the 
purposes of liability insurance. See para 2.2 below for further detail. 
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Note that the insured defendant’s liability towards the third-party plaintiff is 
in principle independent of any insurance. The insured’s liability arises irrespective 
of whether the defendant is insured or its liability to the third party is covered.16 
Even though the defendant may not have any insurance, or may not be covered 
under its liability insurance contract against the risk of liability it incurred towards 
the third-party plaintiff, the defendant may still be liable for the loss incurred by the 
third-party plaintiff. 
 
1.3 THE RESEARCH IN CONTEXT 
Liability insurance was, generally, not recognised in Roman-Dutch law.17 This 
type of insurance first emerged in England in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Shortly afterwards it spread to the United States of America.18  Liability 
insurance was introduced to South Africa only in 1942.19 
Historically, insurance against the consequences of an insured’s conduct, both 
intentionally and negligently, in the context of first- and third-party insurance was 
regarded to be against public policy. Such insurance was seen to create excessive 
moral hazard20 – insurance may cause an insured to be less careful.  
Abraham convincingly argues that it is more difficult to combat moral hazard in 
liability insurance.21 As an insured may, in principle, incur unlimited legal liability to 
third parties, an insurer cannot efficiently minimise moral hazard merely by placing a 
limit on the amount of cover it provides (the sum insured).  
Traditionally, public policy was against liability insurance as a way to ‘avoid 
responsibility’.22 Public policy changed gradually23 in favour of the recognition of the 
validity of liability insurance, and acknowledged its social and economic benefits.24 
Liability insurance serves an important social function in that it is socially 
responsible to have such cover.25 A successful claim by the liability insured against 
                                                 
16 See generally, Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.34-25.40 
on the quantification of the insured’s loss with reference to the quantification of the liability it incurred. 
17 Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 408-409. 
18 (‘US/USA’). Abraham Liability Century 28; Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 573; and Abraham 
(2001) 87 Virginia LR 86-87. 
19 Van Niekerk (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 453-463. 
20 Abraham Liability Century 14 and 17; and Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 86. 
21 Abraham Liability Century 16-17. 
22 Ibid 15.  
23 Ibid 21; Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 576 and 578; and Scales (2008) 94 Virginia LR 1261. 
24 Paragraph 2.3 below on the historical development of liability insurance explores these aspects and 
provides further detail on the role and function of liability insurance. 
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the insurer indemnifies the insured against its legal liability towards the third-party 
plaintiff. It ensures that a wrongdoer, or insured defendant, is able to compensate the 
innocent victim, as third-party plaintiff (the ‘deep-pocket’ principle). 26  From the 
perspective of the insured defendant, a liability insurer’s assistance in defending, or 
settling the third-party claim, also provides the liability insured with access to justice. 
Honouring a liability claim bolsters the concept ‘social justice’.  
Liability insurance plays an economic role in the allocation of risk. There is a 
nexus between the imposition of civil liability and liability insurance.27 Currently, less 
emphasis appears to be placed on the ‘punishment’ of the wrongdoer, the insured 
defendant in the context of liability insurance, than was the case historically.28 More 
emphasis is placed on the protection of the victim, as third-party plaintiff, in 
developed societies with technological developments, industrialisation, and advanced 
commercial activities that increase the risk of third-party damage.29  
The first forms of liability insurance were aimed at indemnifying the liability 
insured against third-party claims.30 Third parties, generally, did not have a direct 
claim against liability insurers. However, third-party rights under liability insurance 
became increasingly important. There has been a growing emphasis on the interests of 
third-party plaintiffs to ensure that they obtain the benefits of the insured defendant’s 
liability cover.31 Some of the legal systems canvassed in my thesis provide extensive 
statutory rights and protection to the third-party plaintiff as against the liability 
insured.32 
As such, liability insurance protects not only the insured as consumer, but also 
the third-party as a participant in the social and economic life of a society. 
                                                                                                                                            
25 See para 2.3.1.1 below for further detail. 
26 As explained in para 1.2 above, there may be a shortfall between the indemnity that the insured 
defendant receives from the liability insurer and the compensation that it must pay to the third-party 
plaintiff – eg, if the sum insured under the liability insurance contract is less than the amount that the 
insured defendant is legally liable to pay towards the third-party plaintiff.  
27 Clarke Policies and Perceptions 308-316; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 73 para 
1; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 666-669; and Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 86-87.  
28 Abraham contends that liability in tort still has a deterrent function. See Abraham ibid 86. However, 
Birds argues ‘that deterrence and punishment should have no place in the civil law’. See Birds Birds’ 
Modern Insurance Law 279 para 14.4. See again para 2.3.1.1 below for further detail on the position 
from an historical perspective. 
29 Hartlief & Tjittes Verzekering & aansprakelijkheid paras 1.2.1, 1.2.3 and 1.3. 
30 Welford Accident Insurance 428 as to liability insurance under English law at the beginning of the 
20th century.  
31 See, eg, the review hereof in paras 3.2.3, 4.2.3 and 5.2.3 below dealing with South African, English 
and Belgian law respectively. 




1.4 WHY DOES THE LAW CONCERN ITSELF WITH LIABILITY 
INSURANCE?  
In the first instance, the economic relevance of the liability sector is 
undeniable. Baker & Siegelman33 surveyed theoretical and empirical literature on the 
law and the economics of liability insurance. Their findings may be summarised as 
follows: (a) there is some ex ante ‘moral hazard’ (reduction in care by insured 
defendants) as a result of liability insurance which has negative effects on an 
insured’s precautionary measures to avoid or limit loss, but the advantage of liability 
insurance as a risk-spreading tool likely outweighs the former adversities; 34  (b) 
liability insurance has mechanisms to reduce ex ante ‘moral hazard’. They include 
underwriting practices and screening a potential insured, experience rating based on 
claims history, and non-renewal, cover design that relates to exclusions, limits on 
cover, and excess payable, loss control and loss prevention advice, ex post auditing 
to enforce the former techniques, and insurance regulation and legal rules;35 and (c) 
the effects of liability insurance on ex post ‘moral hazard’ (the increased tendency of 
the third-party plaintiff as victim to sue the wrongdoer (insured defendant) because it 
has insurance), and the consequence of any probable increase in litigation is 
inconclusive.36 
Secondly, liability insurance depends not on only one basic legal obligation 
between an insurer and an insured, which is the case in ordinary property or life 
insurance.37 There are at least two distinct legal obligations that underlie third-party or 
liability insurance: the obligation between the insured defendant and the third-party 
plaintiff leading to the legal liability for which insurance cover is obtained, on the one 
hand; and the insurance obligation between the insured defendant and the third-party 
plaintiff providing cover for such legal liability, on the other. As explained earlier,38 
third-party rights under liability insurance, and even a direct claim or right against the 
                                                 
33See Baker & Siegelman https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0dab/46f804b159b2755b336a91fc560292a6 
f3b0.pdf?ga=2.228972063.245882686.1574204988-1286220863.1574204988 (accessed on 20 Nov 
2019).  
34 Ibid 35. 
35 Ibid 36. 
36 Ibid 37. 
37 See paras 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 below on liability insurance and the reference to different jurisdictions. 
38 See para 1.3 above on the research in context. 
7 
 
liability insurer, have become increasingly important. Each of these obligations is 
governed by its own rules of law.  
The liability insurance contract is a particular type of contract. It follows, 
therefore, that liability insurance contracts are subject to the general law of contract. 
Then they are subject to some special legal rules pertaining to general insurance, and 
more specifically to liability insurance.39  
The common law and judicial decisions form the bulk of liability insurance 
contract law in South Africa.40 Although legislation is of increasing importance, it has 
had limited effect on the contractual aspects of liability insurance. Rather, it is more 
concerned with prudential and regulatory matters.41 
Insurance contracts have been exempted from the Consumer Protection Act.42 
Consumer protection measures for the insurance industry are in the main introduced 
by the Replacement of the Policyholder Protection Rules 43  which focus on the 
conduct of the insurer, its treatment of the insured, regulation of communications, and 
the format of policies, such as the duty to use plain language, transparency, and 
disclosure. These rules apply generally to all types of insurance contract.44 
 
1.5 RESEARCH STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of the study is to analyse selected legal aspects of liability 
insurance, with particular focus on the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its 
insured, and on the liability insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement of 
claims by third-party plaintiff’s against the insured defendant. The legal 
relationships between the different parties in liability insurance are evaluated to 
determine the ambit of their respective rights and duties towards each other. Legal 
uncertainty is rife as regards these two main aspects of liability insurance. 
                                                 
39 This is the focus of the study and not general aspects of the law of contract or insurance. See para 1.9 
below on the limitations and delineation of the study. 
40 See para 3.1 below for further detail on the sources of liability insurance law in South Africa. 
41 Insurance regulatory and supervision regimes fall beyond the ambit of this thesis. See para 1.9 below 
on the limitations and delineation of the study. But insurance regulation exists and is referred to briefly 
in the discussion of sources.  
42 Act 68 of 2008 (‘CPA’).  
43 In terms of the Short-term Insurance Act of 53 of 1998 (‘SIA’) as amended by the Insurance Act 18 
of 2017, promulgated as GN 1433 in GG 41329 of 15 December 2017 and operational from 1 January 
2018, unless provided otherwise (‘PPRs’). A few amendments were made to the PPRs. The 
amendments were promulgated as GN 996 in GG 41928 of 28 September 2018 and came into effect on 
1 October 2018. Previous versions of the PPRs fall beyond the ambit of this study. 
44 Except for more detailed rules in respect of microinsurance. 
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In the first instance, as to the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured, 
legal uncertainty may exist as to the scope of the insured defendant’s liability 
covered. The insured’s legal liability to the third party is the insured’s loss in terms 
of the liability insurance contract. My thesis considers, the types of legal liability 
that may be covered by a liability policy; when, and how, an insured may become 
legally liable to a third-party plaintiff; and how prescription45 operates in liability 
insurance.  
A highly technical aspect of liability insurance, that gives rise to many legal 
disputes, is that the duration of liability cover may extend beyond the currency of a 
particular liability insurance contract. I review the different types of insured events 
that may bring a matter within the scope of a particular liability insurance contract 
(generally the insured’s negligent conduct; the occurrence of the third-party loss; or 
the third-party claim). I then analyse the duration of liability cover under different 
types of liability policies: act-committed, loss-occurrence, and claims-made 
policies, and also what are known as hybrid policies. 
I also explore limitations on, exceptions to, and exclusions that are particular 
to liability cover. I review the consequences of the conduct of the insured defendant 
on liability insurance.  
I specifically emphasise the exceptional direct claim, or more extensive (and 
direct) rights that a third-party plaintiff may have against the liability insurer by way 
of legislation.  
Secondly, the liability insurer may conduct the defence and settlement of the 
third party’s claim against the insured defendant in the name of the insured. The 
liability insurer, generally, has a contractual right to defend and settle such claims. I 
explore the scope and extent of this right.46  Some legal systems extend to the 
liability insurer a statutory right and a duty to conduct the defence of third-party 
claims on behalf of the insured.47 I investigate the viability of legal reform in this 
area.  
I also analyse defence costs, conflict of interest, and waiver or the defence of 
estoppel as an integral part of an insurer’s conduct of the defence. I distinguish the 
                                                 
45 The prescription of the third-party plaintiff’s claim against the insured defendant and of the insured 
defendant’s liability claim against the liability insurer are at the core, but many further legal scenarios 
that may arise are considered. 
46 This is the position in South African law. See Chapter 3 below for further detail. 
47 For example, Belgian law in particular. See para 5.3.1.1 below for further detail. 
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conduct of the defence of third-party claims by liability insurers in terms of liability 
insurance contracts from subrogation. 
 
1.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
I acknowledge that although the area of the law of liability insurance has 
received substantial attention in academic circles internationally, liability insurance 
has been somewhat neglected in South African law.48 In South African law there 
appears to be a lack of appreciation of the intricacies of liability insurance, 
limited authority on the topic, and a relatively small number of reported legal 
decisions on liability insurance contracts. 
Liability insurance has been addressed only broadly in a handful of local 
textbooks or reference works on insurance law generally. 49  A small body of 
academic and popular writing addresses random selected legal aspects of liability 
insurance. 
There is a substantial knowledge gap. 
In the first instance, the former publications are limited in scope and deal with 
fragmented areas of the law of liability insurance. Some aspects of the law of 
liability insurance have been researched; others not. 
Secondly, recent statutory reform has impacted on liability insurance contract 
law and the former publications generally predate these reforms. 
I am to address this knowledge gap in my thesis. 
Apart from my thesis, there is no other comprehensive50 and current South 
African commentary on the law of liability insurance at present which critically 
analyses the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured and the liability 
                                                 
48 Note, eg, the following critical commentaries devoted to the law of liability insurance in a number of 
other jurisdictions: Hilliker Liability Insurance in Canada for Canada; Derrington & Ashton Law of 
Liability Insurance on the law of liability insurance in Australia; and Maniloff & Stempel General 
Liability Insurance on insurance coverage issues in the different states of the US. Liability insurance 
has also received substantial academic attention in English and Belgian law which have been chosen 
for the comparative study in this thesis. See Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
49 See, eg, Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.24-25.83; and 
Millard Modern Insurance Law 30, 42 and 45. 
50 Selected legal aspects of liability insurance implies that only a limited number of the most relevant 
and carefully selected sub-topics on the former can be reviewed due to the potential unlimited extent of 
the topic. See para 1.9 below on limitations and delineation of the study. 
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insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement, and that also includes substantial 
legal comparison.51 This distinguishes my thesis from existing research.  
 
This research is further relevant and necessary for the following reasons: 
 
In the first instance, liability insurance is a complex branch of the law of 
insurance. The complexity results from the multiple legal relationships involved,52 
and in the sometimes complicated or lengthy chain of events that may occur when 
liability insurance comes into play.53  
Secondly, it is also evident that liability insurance is constantly developing as 
new grounds of liability are imposed and new forms of liability insurance are 
developed in response to the growing demands of society.54 Since the introduction 
of statutory consumer protection measures in the age of consumerism, the 
importance of the law of liability insurance in South Africa has increased.55 
Thirdly, although liability insurance is a specialised branch of insurance, no 
specialised legislation is in force in South Africa to regulate the contractual aspects 
of this form of insurance and there is room for research that may prompt Parliament 
to develop specific rules. 
Fourthly, I hope that my conclusions and recommendations will contribute 
towards the future development of the law of liability insurance under South 
African law, with particular focus on the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the 




                                                 
51 See Chapters 4-6 below. 
52 There are at least three parties involved in liability insurance: the third-party plaintiff, the insured 
defendant, and the latter’s liability insurer, but many other parties may be involved, for example, the 
third-party plaintiff’s insurers, co-defendants and their insurers. See, eg, para 2.2.2 below on the 
classification of liability insurance. 
53 There may be a considerable time lapse between the negligent conduct of the insured defendant, the 
occurrence of third-party loss, and the institution by the third-party of a claim on the liability insured. 
54 Chapter 2 below considers the development of liability insurance. 
55 The CPA, which came into operation on 31 March 2011, eg, introduced strict product liability, that 
in turn underlines the growing importance of product liability insurance. It is again important to note 
for the international reader in particular, that insurance does not fall within the general consumer 
legislation in South Africa. For further detail on the discussion of the sources of South African liability 
insurance law, see para 3.1 below. 
56 Chapter 6 below. 
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1.7 THESIS STATEMENT 
 
 My thesis statement is: South African insurance law should be amended and 
developed to fill the voids, meet the unique challenges, and iron out the 
impracticalities relating to liability insurance. 
 I consider this statement with reference to: (a) essentially, issues that arise in 
respect of the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured, and in relation to the 
liability insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement of third-party claims brought 
against the insured defendant; and (b) as subsidiary theme, the legal uncertainty that 
may precede the liability insurance contract (including contract negotiation), endure 
for the entire subsistence of the contract (including claims management), and continue 
after the expiry of the contract.57 
 
1.8 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
1.8.1  Literature review 
 The research method is a desktop, in-depth literature study of the South African 
and other jurisdictions dealing with selected legal aspects of liability insurance.58 My 
study includes a review of primary and secondary sources of law.  
Primary sources 59  consulted are, in the main, the common law, 60  judicial 
decisions, and legislation and legislative instruments.61 The relative importance of 
these sources depends on the legal system under review.  
In addition to the primary sources, I also review secondary sources62 such as 
commentaries, treatises, reference works, textbooks, articles, case discussions, reports 
and electronic material drawn from various internet sites. 
                                                 
57  My focus is only on the law relating to liability insurance contracts. For example, as ‘claims 
management’ is a very wide concept, this study is limited to how a claim should ideally be managed 
under the provisions of the specific liability insurance contract. See para 1.9 below on the limitations 
and delineation of the study.  
58 Liability insurance from an overall jurisdiction-neutral perspective (para 2.2); the historical 
development of liability insurance from an Anglo-American perspective, with some references to 
European legal systems (para 2.3); South African law of liability insurance (Ch 3); English law of 
liability insurance (Ch 4); and Belgian law of liability insurance (Ch 5). 
59 Custom and trade usage are primary sources of South African and English insurance law, but they no 
longer appear to be of great relevance.  
60 As opposed to ‘civil law’. 
61 For example, the PPRs. 
62  The most recent secondary sources that could be accessed via the Unisa library and via other 
reasonable means, were consulted. If older editions had to be used, attempts were made to update the 
content with reference to other sources. At times content required that previous editions had to be 
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1.8.2 Legal Comparison63 
I have selected English and Belgian law for purposes of legal comparison. 
English law is a natural choice for historical reasons. South African insurance 
practice, and the South African insurance industry, has strong ties to its British 
counterpart as their fons et origo. It follows that South African insurance law would 
follow suit and seek guidance, to put it mildly, from English insurance law. Although 
the then Appellate Division issued a declaration of independence, of sorts, in Mutual 
and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality,64 English law remains 
strongly relevant for purposes of comparative analysis and continues to still influence 
the development of South African insurance law.65  
Importantly, the English common law, like the South African, is uncodified and 
consists of subsidiary rules.66 
Moreover, England fairly recently adopted legislation to reform its law relating 
to insurance. The most important (and relatively recent) pieces of legislation under 
English law that regulate the contractual aspects of insurance law generally, include 
the following: the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 201267 
that reforms aspects of the English law of consumer insurance relating to pre-
contractual disclosure and misrepresentation; the Insurance Act 201568 that reforms 
the duty of disclosure in non-consumer contracts;69 and the Consumer Rights Act 
201570 that controls unfair terms where the insured is a ‘consumer’ in a contract.71 
Also, the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 72  applies to liability 
insurance only, as it provides the third-party plaintiff with a direct claim against the 
insolvent estate of an insured defendant with liability cover.  
                                                                                                                                            
referred to, eg, on the nature, history, and sources of insurance law and in respect to some general 
principles of the law of liability insurance. 
63 See Van Zyl (1972) 35 THRHR 17-43; and Venter et al Regsnavorsing 206-244 for further detail on 
comparative legal research. 
64 1985 (1) SA 419 (A). 
65 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 2.15-2.30.  
66 See paras 1.1 and 1.8.1 above. 
67 Chapter 6; the ‘2012 Act’ or also known as ‘CIDRA’. The 2012 Act came in force on 6 April 2013 
and only applies to contracts entered into or renewed after that date. It has been said to ‘represent the 
first real reform of insurance contract law since the principles were first developed, especially by Lord 
Mansfield in the eighteenth century’. See Birds, Lynch & Milnes MacGillivray on Insurance 
(Centenary Ed) ix Preface.  
68 Chapter 4; the ‘2015 Act’. The 2015 Act came into force on 12 August 2016.  
69 Part 2 of the 2015 Act.  
70  Chapter 15; the ‘Consumer Rights Act’. From 1 October 2015, the Act replaced the previous 
regulations on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
71 The ambit of the Act is wider than insurance consumer contracts. 
72 Chapter 10; the ‘2010 Act’.  
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Unlike South African and English law, Belgian law is codified. On 4 April 
2014, Belgium enacted the Insurance Act.73 It contains a separate part on the law of 
liability insurance. In particular, Chapter III of Title II of the former Land Insurance 
Contract Act of 25 June of 199274 on liability insurance contracts, was repealed and 
re-enacted almost unchanged as Chapter 375 of Title III of Part 4 of the 2014 Act.  
Although traditional comparative connecting factors may suggest other civil-
law legal systems for comparison, I have chosen Belgium as it has, fairly recently, 
adopted innovative and progressive legislation relevant to my study.76 For example, 
the legislation amplifies the third party’s statutory right to claim directly from the 
insurer. This right is not limited to the insolvency or sequestration of the liability 
insured, as is the case in South Africa, and offers greater protection to the third-party 
plaintiff.77 Also, in Belgian law a liability insurer has a statutory duty to defend its 
insured against a third-party claim, and not merely a contractual right to conduct the 
defence as is the case in South Africa.78 
Note that judicial decisions in Belgium, generally, bind only the parties to the 
particular dispute; put differently, unlike in England and South Africa, there is 
generally no doctrine of stare decisis (save in a few instances, such as when the 
Belgian Supreme Court annuls the decision of a lower court, the court that has to 
review that case is bound by the decision of the Belgian Supreme Court).79 As a result 
of this absence of a doctrine of judicial precedent, I shall focus less on Belgian 
judicial decisions than I shall on English and South African case law.  
 
1.9 LIMITATIONS AND DELINEATION OF THE STUDY 
In the first instance, my thesis concerns selected legal aspects of liability 
insurance, with particular focus on the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its 
                                                 
73 ‘Wet betreffende de verzekeringen van 4 april 2014’ (briefly ‘Wet Verzekeringen’; or ‘WVerz’), 
Belgian State Gazette of 30 April; hereafter referred to as the ‘Insurance Act of 2014’. 
74 ‘Wet van 25 juni 1992 op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst’ or ‘WLVO’, Belgian State Gazette of 
20 August 1992; hereafter the ‘LIC Act’, read with Royal Decree (‘Koninklijk besluit’) of 24 
December 1992; hereafter ‘Royal Decree of Dec 1992.’ 
75 Chapter 3 of the Insurance Act of 2014 is entitled ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen’ and it 
comprises of ss 141-153. 
76 Insurance legislation in the Netherlands, eg, dates from 2006. See Wansink Algemene 
aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (3 ed) at 3 on the statutory position in Dutch law. 
77 See para 5.2.3.1 below on the third-party plaintiff’s direct right against the liability insurer. 
78 See para 5.3.1.1 below on Belgian law and the extensive protection that Belgian insurance legislation 
provides to both the liability insurer and the insured. 
79  The decisions by the Belgian Supreme Court are still relevant for the interpretation of legal 
provisions. My study refers to those decisions where relevant.  
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insured, and the insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement of claims by third-
party plaintiffs against the insured. As liability insurers in South Africa merely have 
a contractual right80 (as opposed to a duty) to conduct the defence and settlement, 
the analysis of the defence and settlement in my thesis is of more limited scope than 
that of the insurer’s duty to indemnify. 
Secondly, my focus is only on the law relating to liability insurance contracts. 
I leave aside the general aspects of the law relating to insurance, reinsurance 
contracts, contract, delict, enrichment, agency, civil procedure, microinsurance, 
consumer insurance, insurance intermediaries, and insurance regulation and 
supervision.81 
Thirdly, my thesis focuses on liability insurance contracts, generally. I exclude 
from consideration a detailed analysis of the species of this genus, for example: 
employers’ liability insurance, product liability insurance, directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance, and marine liability insurance. In some instances, however, I 
draw examples from specific forms of liability insurance contracts. 
Fourthly, my thesis is limited to private liability insurance contracts as distinct 
from social ‘insurance’ schemes such as third-party compensation schemes, pension 
funds, medical and health insurance, and unemployment insurance. 
Fifthly, save for some brief references to marine insurance in my discussion of 
the sources of insurance law, marine insurance law is entirely excluded from my 
study. 
Sixthly, jurisdiction, conflict of laws, and the enforcement of judgments fall 
outside the scope of my study.  
Seventhly, a detailed discussion of the laws of the European Union falls 
outside the scope of my thesis. 
Eighthly, although I refer to the Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill82 in 
passing, I do not discuss it extensively as wide-ranging change is expected before 
its enactment and its focus is on regulatory matters that fall outside the scope of my 
thesis. 
Finally, this thesis states the law up to August 2019. 
                                                 
80 Which is generally part of an express term in the insurance contract. 
81 Insurance regulatory and supervision regimes fall beyond the ambit of this thesis, but the thesis makes 
recommendations on the regulation of selected aspects relevant to liability insurance contract law. 




1.10 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
Chapter 1 contains the introduction to the thesis. 
Chapter 2 consists of two parts. The first part investigates the nature of 
liability insurance from a general perspective. This part of my thesis provides a 
theoretical background and identifies generic legal rules and principles applying to 
liability insurance. The second part of chapter contains a concise summary of the 
historical development of liability insurance from mainly an Anglo-American 
perspective, with some references to European legal systems.  
Chapter 3 consists of a synopsis on the relevant aspects of the South African 
law of liability insurance. It identifies some of the legal uncertainties and 
unresolved problems in respect of the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the 
insured, and its conduct of the defence and settlement. It marks the issues for 
comparative study in the next two chapters. 
Chapters 4 (on English law) and Chapter 5 (on Belgian law) follow. The 
insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured, and the insurer’s conduct of the defence and 
settlement, are analysed with reference to the legal relationships between the parties 
in the liability insurance context.  
Chapter 6 contains my conclusions and recommendations. It includes a 
checklist of some of the most important duties of disclosure for liability insurance 
contracts, their operation, and claims processes. 
16 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
 
THE NATURE AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT  
OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 THE NATURE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ........................................................... 18 
 2.2.1 Defining Liability Insurance ............................................................................ 19 
 2.2.2 Classifying Liability Insurance  ....................................................................... 21 
  2.2.2.1  Liability Insurance as Indemnity Insurance ......................................... 21 
  2.2.2.2  Liability Insurance as Third-Party Insurance ...................................... 23 
 2.2.3 Liability Insurance Contracts and Contracts in Favour of Third Parties ... 24 
 2.2.4 Liability Insurance Contracts and Reinsurance Contracts .......................... 25 
 2.2.5 Different Types of Liability Insurance ............................................................ 26 
  2.2.5.1  Private or Social Insurance and Voluntary or Mandatory Insurance ... 26 
  2.2.5.2  Profit or Non-Profit Insurance ............................................................. 27 
  2.2.5.3  Examples of Liability Insurance .......................................................... 27 
2.3 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE ..................... 29 
 2.3.1 The Delay in the Introduction of Liability Insurance .................................... 29 
  2.3.1.1 From ‘Moral Hazard’ to Responsible Behaviour ................................ 30 
   2.3.1.1(a) The Validity of Insurance against Loss Caused by an  
    Insured’s (or its Employees’) Negligent Conduct in 
    First-Party Insurance .................................................... 32 
   2.3.1.1(b) The Enforceability of Exclusion/ Limitation-of- 
    Liability Clauses ............................................................. 34 
   2.3.1.1(c)  The Legality of ‘Benefit-of-Insurance’ Clauses ........... 40 
  2.3.1.2  The Rising Demand for Liability Insurance ....................................... 45 
   2.3.1.2(a) The Expansion of Civil Liability.................................... 45 
   2.3.1.2(b) Changes in Society: Industrialisation ........................... 51 
 2.3.2 Mutual Marine Insurance:  Possible Precursor of Liability Insurance ....... 53 
 2.3.3 The Legal Recognition of Liability Insurance ................................................ 55 
  2.3.3.1 Employers’ Liability Insurance ........................................................... 56 
   2.3.3.1(a) The Pioneering Insurance Companies .......................... 56 
   2.3.3.1(b) The Validity of Employers’ Liability Insurance ........... 57 
  2.3.3.2 Public Liability Insurance .................................................................... 58 
   2.3.3.2(a) The Pioneering Insurance Companies .......................... 58 
   2.3.3.2(b) The Validity of Public Liability Insurance .................... 59 
  2.3.3.3  Early Liability Policies and Some General Principles of Liability  
   Insurance.............................................................................................. 60 





CHAPTER 2:  
 
THE NATURE AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT  
OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 2 is in two parts and comprises a study of the nature and historical 
development of liability insurance. The first part investigates the nature of liability 
insurance and is considered supra-nationally – ie, from a jurisdiction-neutral 
perspective – for the reasons advanced below.1 Liability insurance can be clearly 
defined, classified, and distinguished from other forms of contract2 such as a contract 
in favour of a third party (stipulatio alteri). Liability insurance can further be 
distinguished from other types of insurance, such as first-party insurance or 
reinsurance. This part of the chapter also provides a theoretical background and 
identifies legal rules and principles generic to liability insurance irrespective of the 
applicable legal system or jurisdiction.3  The section concludes by setting out the 
different forms of liability insurance contract. 
The second part of the chapter provides a concise summary of the historical 
development of liability insurance from an Anglo-American perspective with some 
references to European legal systems. These sources form the basis of our national 
insurance law and introduced liability insurance to the realm of insurance. From the 
sources consulted, liability insurance originated in England during the second half 
of the nineteenth century and shortly afterwards spread to the United States of 
America (‘US/USA’) and other jurisdictions.4 However, the origin and development 
of liability insurance cannot be attributed to a single country or jurisdiction as the 
continuous development in liability laws such as delict or tort affect the insurance 
risks and products which provided the impetus for the introduction of this type of 
insurance to the market. The primary role of the historical overview is to provide a 
                                                 
1 Paragraph 2.2 below. 
2 It is pertinent to explore the nature of liability insurance before discussing the history of liability 
insurance in para 2.3 below. The nature of liability insurance assists scholars to identify the origin and 
analyse the development of liability insurance. 
3 Chapter 3 (on South African law), Chapter 4 (on English law) and Chapter 5 (on Belgian law) below 
provide further detail on liability insurance under those systems. See paras 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 below. 
4  Abraham Liability Century 28. Liability insurance was in general not possible or recognised in 
Roman-Dutch law. See Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 408-409. 
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context for the research study on our national position and to facilitate a 
comparative review.5 
The history, origin, and development of liability insurance have a role to play 
in, for instance, answering questions as to what ‘legal liability’ means, and how the 
conduct of the insured (eg, as regards the elements of fault or wrongfulness) 
impacts on its liability cover.  
2.2  THE NATURE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE  
It appears that there is no common, supra-national, working definition of 
‘insurance’.6 This is because the essential elements that qualify contracts as contracts 
of insurance may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. An analysis of all possible 
definitions of insurance7 falls beyond the scope and focus of this thesis which is 
limited to liability insurance.8 
As an introduction to a definition of liability insurance, it suffices briefly to 
state the possible9 essential elements of an insurance contract under South African 
law.10  
An insurance contract must: 
– provide for the payment of a premium by one party, the insured; 
– require the payment of a sum of money, or its equivalent, by the 
insurer in exchange for the premium; 
                                                 
5 Venter et al Regsnavorsing 162. This historical overview cannot and does not purport to cover all the 
phases of development of liability insurance in South Africa. See Venter et al ibid 161-205 for further 
detail on the historical method of legal research in South Africa. 
6 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 1.2.1 states that ‘[c]onvincing definitions of insurance do not 
exist’, and therefore concludes that in England ‘[a]n insurance contract is usually not defined but 
described’. He is of the view that the position is the same in Germany. Cf, Birds Birds’ Modern 
Insurance Law para 1.6 at 8-9, who ventures a definition of an insurance contract under English law for 
regulatory purposes. In the past, the definition of an insurance contract was primarily important for 
fiscal and regulatory purposes of insurance business. See, eg, Birds, Lynch & Paul MacGillivray on 
Insurance para 1.001 on the English law of insurance.  
7 In the South African case, Lake v Reinsurance Corporation Ltd 1967 (3) SA 124 (W) 127, the court 
ventured a definition of an insurance contract, but it is criticised for being incomplete. See Reinecke, 
van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 5.14. Some jurisdictions provide statutory 
definitions of insurance, eg, under Belgian law. See para 5.1 below. 
8 As pertinently stated by Derrington & Ashton Law of Liability Insurance in para 1.1, concerning 
liability insurance, that ‘[i]t is inappropriate in a text on a specialised branch of insurance to enter upon 
a discussion of more general topics of insurance law other than in a general way’. 
9 There is even some uncertainty as to the essentials of an insurance contract under individual legal 
systems. 
10  See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 5.1-5.113 on the 
essentials of a contract of insurance under South African law. 
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– the insurer’s performance must depend on the outcome of an uncertain 
event; and 
– the insured must have an interest in the outcome of the event.11  
The element of uncertainty or risk, and the transfer of that risk of loss from the 
insured to the insurer are central to the definition of an insurance contract12 under the 
South African and most other legal systems. 13  The terms ‘insurance policy’ and 
‘insurance contract’ are used interchangeably in the study due to common usage in 
insurance practice and literature to that effect and the terms are assumed to bear the 
same meaning, except if the context provides the contrary.14 
 
2.2.1 Defining Liability Insurance  
The lack of a common supra-national working definition of ‘insurance’suggests 
that the formulation of an all-encompassing, jurisdiction-neutral definition (or 
description) of liability insurance may be challenging.15 
Without attention to all possible detail or variation, the following may provide 
an apt generic basis for defining a liability insurance contract: 
Deze is een overeenkomst, waarbij de verzekeraar zich tegen het genot van premie 
tegenover de verzekerde verbindt om laasgenoemde schadeloos te stellen wegens 
                                                 
11 See, eg, the criticism of insurable interest as essential element under South African law: Reinecke, 
van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 5.22-5.48. However, insurable interest is an essential feature of 
valid insurance under English law: Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 1.2.1. On 20 June 2018, the 
English Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission published an updated Insurable Interest Draft 
Bill that focuses on life and other insurance relating to human life, such as accident and health cover. 
See https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/updating-the-law-of-insurable-interest/(accessed on 4 Nov 2019). 
There was no demand for reform in the area of indemnity and non-life insurance and further detail falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
12 Insurance contracts should be distinguished from other risk-bearing transactions, like contracts of 
suretyship or guarantees relating to products or workmanship. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber 
ibid paras 1.11 and 1.17-1.21. 
13 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 5.20 summarise the essence of an insurance contract as 
‘a transfer of a risk of loss from the insured to the insurer’. They opine that it is unclear whether under 
South African law there must also be a duty on the insurer to spread the risk over a group of exposed 
persons. Under English law, the transfer of the risk of loss is also an essential feature of insurance. See 
Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 1.2.1. However, in the USA, both the transfer of the risk of loss 
and its distribution across a group of persons having similar risks, are primary elements of an insurance 
contract. See Jerry & Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 10[d].  
14  Theoretically, there is a difference between an insurance contract and an insurance policy: an 
insurance contract is the intangible agreement while the policy is the reduction of that agreement to a 
tangible form. 
15 See para 3.1 below on South African law; para 4.1 below on English law; and para 5.1 below on 
Belgian law for further detail on the relevant definitions or descriptions of liability insurance under 
those systems.  
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een … schade …, die deze door een onzeker voorval zou kunnen lijden. Immers 
verzekerd is de schade, die de verzekerde in zijn vermogen lijd als gevolg van het 
ontstaan van een schuld tegenover een derde door een onzeker voorval.16  
 
Loosely translated it states that the insurer (‘liability insurer’) undertakes to 
indemnify the insured (‘insured defendant’) in return for the undertaking to pay a 
premium by the insured. The transfer of risk of loss from the insured defendant to the 
liability insurer is implicit herein. The insurer’s performance depends on the outcome 
of an uncertain event – the insured’s risk of incurring legal liability towards third 
parties (‘third-party plaintiffs’).17 
Section 11(7) of the Australian Insurance Contracts Act, 1984, may also be a 
suitable starting point in defining liability insurance.18 A contract of liability insurance 
under that Act is defined as, ‘a contract … that provides insurance cover in respect of 
the insured’s liability for loss or damage caused to a person who is not the insured’.  
From the definitions above, this form of insurance may be classed as indemnity 
insurance;19 and as so-called ‘third-party insurance’.20 At its core, liability insurance 
is insurance against the insured defendant’s legal liability, as opposed to general 
liability, towards third parties.21 This aspect forms an integral part of the nature of 
liability insurance. 22 
  
                                                 
16  Wansink Algemene aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (2 ed) 8 commenting on general liability 
insurance under Dutch law) and Wansink Algemene aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (3 ed) 3 on the new 
statutory position under Dutch insurance law. 
17 This thesis used the following terminology: ‘insured defendant’, ‘liability insurer’, and ‘third-party 
plaintiffs’. The insured may not always be a defendant, and the third-party may not always be a 
plaintiff (eg, due to possible different factual scenarios, or if there are no formal legal proceedings 
involved). See paras 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.3 below for further detail on parties involved in liability insurance. 
18 Derrington & Ashton Law of Liability Insurance para 2.16 commenting on liability insurance under 
Australian law and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 1.2.2. 
19 See para 2.2.2.1 below. 
20 See para 2.2.2.2 below. 
21 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.27. Derrington & Ashton 
Law of Liability Insurance para 1.10, point out that ‘liability insurance cannot easily be classified other 
than as relating to the legal liability of the insured to another party’. In the US, eg, the Commercial 
General Liability (‘CGL’) Policy’s insuring clause contains the phrase ‘legally obligated to pay as 
damages’. See Jerry & Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 65[c][2]. In Canada, the insuring 
clause in commercial liability policies refers to ‘liability imposed by the law on the insured to pay 
damages’, or alternatively to ‘damages which the insured is legally obligated to pay’. See Hilliker 
Liability Insurance in Canada 168.  
22 The enquiry concerns whether there is ‘legal liability’ covered under the scope of risk in the policy. 
The thesis explores the concept ‘legal liability’ (and its variations) in further detail. See, eg, para 
3.2.2.1 on South African law; para 4.2.2.1 on English law; and para 5.2.2.1 on Belgian law below, on 
the types of legal liability that may be covered, as well as when and how the insured defendant may 




2.2.2 Classifying Liability Insurance 
As stated above,23 the thesis addresses the general aspects of liability insurance 
contract law focusing specifically on: first, the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the 
insured; and second, the liability insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement of 
claims by third-party plaintiffs against the insured defendant. Liability insurance, both 
as indemnity insurance and as third-party insurance, is analysed throughout the thesis. 
A few brief notes on these classifications suffice to describe the nature of liability 
insurance grom a jurisdiction-neutral perspective.  
 
2.2.2.1 Liability Insurance as Indemnity Insurance  
In indemnity insurance the insurer indemnifies the insured for loss or damage 
suffered as a result of the risk insured against. 24  Liability insurance is generally 
accepted as a form of indemnity insurance25 (as opposed to non-indemnity insurance 
                                                 
23 Paragraphs 1.2-1.4 above. 
24 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 8.1. There may be different ways to categorise and scrutinise 
the following distinction, but the study describes it as follows: The insured’s legal liability towards the 
third-party plaintiff is the insured’s loss in terms of the liability policy and should be distinguished 
from the ‘insured event’ that brings the matter within the temporal scope of a particular period of cover 
designated in the liability insurance contract. Such an event may be the incidence of the loss itself, ie, 
the insured’s legal liability towards the third party, or it may be an earlier occurrence that merely lead 
to the insured’s legal liability, such as an act of negligence on the insured’s part, or another occurrence 
which marks a significant stage in the process leading to the insured’s legal liability. The insured event 
in the insuring clause determines the type of liability policy. It further depends on the type of insurance 
cover in question, whether occurrences that take place, or whether claims that are made, before, during 
or after the duration of the contract are covered. Acts-committed, occurrence-based, claims-made and 
hybrid liability insurance contracts may be distinguished in this regard. This relates to whether an 
insurance claim can be brought under a particular policy, or put differently: which policy is ‘triggered’? 
If cover under a policy is triggered, the insurer may be on risk, but it still does not guarantee a 
‘successful claim’: the latter depends on many other requirements such as timely notice and disclosure 
by the insured. This is an extremely complex aspect of liability insurance that gives rise to many 
insurance cover disputes and is analysed in detail in paras 3.2.2.2, 4.2.2.2, and 5.2.2.2 below. It should 
be noted that the terminology of the respective legal systems under review should not simply be 
equated.  
25 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 1.39 and 25.34; Derrington & 
Ashton Law of Liability Insurance para 1.4; Jerry & Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 
[13][e]; and Wansink Algemene aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (3 ed) 199. Liability insurance should 
be distinguished from other contractual arrangements where a party undertakes to indemnify another 
party, eg, an undertaking of indemnification by a lessee towards a lessor. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & 
Nienaber ibid para 25.28 n 58. The presence of the undertaking to pay a premium and in addition the 
undertaking to indemnify against liability as the primary, and not merely as a subsidiary element of the 
parties’ agreement, may point to the existence of liability insurance. See also Derrington & Ashton ibid 
paras 1.12 and 1.22 for distinctions between liability insurance and other forms of indemnity insurance. 
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such as life insurance) 26  in that the liability insurer undertakes to indemnify the 
insured defendant against the latter’s legal liability in damages to third parties.27 The 
‘indemnity principle’ applies to liability insurance in that the amount recoverable is 
determined by the insured’s financial loss28 and the insured defendant may not be 
enriched.29  
As liability insurance is indemnity insurance, subrogation applies, although it is 
exceptional.30 Subrogation involves the insurer enforcing the insured’s claims against 
third parties.31 The liability insurer may, for example, be subrogated to the insured 
defendant’s claim for a contribution against others, for example, the insured’s co-
liable joint wrongdoers.32  
Liability insurance contracts invariably deal with the defence and settlement of 
the third party’s claim against the insured defendant in the name of the insured. The 
liability insurer generally has a contractual right to defend and settle such claims.33 
The right to conduct the defence and settlement involves the insurer’s right to take 
charge of the insured’s defence to a claim brought by the third-party plaintiff. 
However, some legal systems are more advanced in that the liability insurer has a 
right and a duty to conduct the defence of third-party claims on behalf of the 
insured.34 Due to the differing positions across different legal systems, this aspect is 
                                                 
26 In non-indemnity insurance the insurer undertakes to pay a specified sum of money to the insured on 
the happening of an insured event. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 1.40; and Hilliker 
Liability Insurance in Canada 4-5.  
27 See, eg, para 3.2 on South African law; para 4.2 on English law; and para 5.2 on Belgian law below 
for further detail on the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its liability insured.  
28  Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.36 explain that the 
insured’s loss is usually quantified with reference to the quantification of the liability incurred by the 
insured, which may again involve a quantification of the third-party plaintiff’s loss or damage.  
29 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 25. 34; and Derrington & Ashton Law of Liability 
Insurance para 1.22. 
30 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 25.40; and Derrington & Ashton ibid. See Van Niekerk 
Subrogasie passim on an insurer’s right to subrogation.  
31 Other than the third-party plaintiff, and therefore referred to ‘fourth parties’. 
32 See paras 3.2.4, 4.2.4 and 5.2.3.2 below for further detail on subrogation in liability insurance.  
33 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.57-25.67 and 18.139; and 
Derrington & Ashton Law of Liability Insurance para 1.7. See, also, para 3.3 on South African law and 
para 4.3 on English law below, for further detail on the insurer’s right to conduct the defence and 
settlement. Derrington & Ashton ibid para 1.8 point out that this right is primarily aimed at the 
protection of the insurer due to its duty to indemnify the insured.  
34 See, eg, para 5.3 below on Belgian law where the insurer has in fact both a duty and a right to 
conduct the defence. When the liability insurer has a duty towards the insured to conduct the defence, it 
is one of the rights of a liability insured against its insurer. See Maniloff & Stempel General Liability 
Insurance 1-3 for commentary on general liability insurance cover in the US on a state-by-state basis. 
They explain that the CGL Policy is the dominant general liability policy in the US and that it includes 
a duty to defend by the insurer. American state law can differ on the policy interpretation of cover. The 
authors opine at 111 that ‘[i]f coverage issues were stocks, the duty to defend would be Blue Chip’. See 
Maniloff & Stempel ibid 111-156 for further detail on the duty to defend on a state-by-state basis.  
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considered further in the survey of South African law and the other jurisdictions 
below. 
 
2.2.2.2 Liability Insurance as Third-Party Insurance 
Liability insurance is often referred to as third-party insurance.35 Third-party 
insurance addresses an insured’s insurance of its potential legal liability towards a 
third party for injury, damage, or loss suffered by that third party. The insured’s 
liability for the third party’s injury, damage, or loss is the insured’s loss or damage for 
the purposes its liability insurance. In third-party insurance, the insured is the ‘first’ 
party, the liability insurer the ‘second’ party, and the party towards whom the insured 
is liable, the ‘third’ party.  
Under property or first-party insurance an insured insures against its own injury, 
damage, or loss. While property insurance involves the positive elements of an 
insured’s estate,36 liability insurance involves the negative elements – the liabilities 
that an insured may incur toward third parties.37 In liability insurance, the object of 
insurance38 is the insured’s interest in not incurring liability towards third parties. The 
object of the risk39 in liability insurance (as opposed to property insurance) is not 
embodied in a particular object but may be the insured’s estate generally. Where 
liability insurance does involve a specific object of risk, it is merely a way in which 
the insurer limits its liability by circumscribing the risk, for example, where the 
insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured if it becomes liable towards third parties 
as a result of using a particular object (such as driving a specific motor vehicle).40 
                                                 
35 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 1.46 n 54; Derrington & 
Ashton Law of Liability Insurance para 1.4; and Jerry & Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 
13A[e].  
36 For example, assets. 
37 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 1.47-1.48.  
38 The object of insurance refers to the interest that the insured wishes to protect and is an intangible 
interest, not a physical object. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 3.6.  
39 Ibid. If the insurance, eg, property insurance, is concluded with reference to a physical object, the 
latter will be the object of the risk.  
40 Liability insurance may be regarded as insurance without a specific object of risk, even if the object 
of risk may be instrumental in causing the loss, eg, where the insured incurs a liability by driving a 
particular motor vehicle: Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 13.31, and Wansink Algemene 
aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (3 ed) 199. 
24 
 
As a rule, there is no immediate contractual relationship between the third-party 
plaintiff and the insured defendant’s liability insured, unless created specifically by 
statute or agreement.41 
 
2.2.3 Liability Insurance Contracts and Contracts in Favour of Third 
Parties 
Although liability insurance is third-party insurance, it must be distinguished 
from contracts or stipulations in favour of third parties (third-party contracts).42  
In terms of a third-party contract, 43  one party (the stipulator)44  agrees with 
another party (the promisor), 45  that the promisor will render a performance to a 
beneficiary.46 The parties must intend to provide the third party with a benefit – eg, a 
claim or insurance cover – and the benefit must (as a rule) be accepted by the third 
party.47  
Liability insurance is generally not a contract in favour of a third party as there 
is no intention between the insured defendant and its liability insured to the confer a 
benefit (such as insurance cover or an insurance claim) on the third-party plaintiff.48 
Liability insurance is aimed at covering liability against a third party, not the liability 
of a third party.49 
However, in exceptional circumstances liability insurance may contain a 
specific clause in the form of a stipulatio alteri that a benefit falls directly to the third 
                                                 
41 Under South African and English law, the third-party plaintiff generally does not have a direct claim 
against the liability insurer, save for statutory exceptions: see paras 3.2.3 and 4.2.3 below. However, 
some legal systems provide the third-party plaintiff with a direct right to claim an indemnity from the 
insured defendant’s liability insured: see para 5.2.3.1 below on Belgian law. 
42 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law in paras 25.77-25.80. The authors 
in para 19.3 opine that contracts in favour of third parties are known and enforced in most legal 
systems.  
43 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 19.6.  
44 The first party. 
45 The second party. 
46 The third party, who is not a party to the conclusion of the contract. 
47 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 19.1-19.117 on third-
party contracts under South African law generally. Further detail falls beyond the scope of the present 
discussion.  
48 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 25.77-25.78. Despite the introduction of the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the third-party plaintiff cannot claim directly from the insured 
defendant’s liability insurer as there is no intention to confer a benefit on the third party under English 
law. See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 12.7, and para 4.3.2.1 below in the chapter on English 
law. 
49 A third-party plaintiff can only be regarded as a beneficiary of a liability insurance contract in an 
indirect and abstract sense, namely that the liability cover may assist the insured defendant to be better 




party – eg, when the liability of a third party is also insured by way of an authorised-
driver clause in a comprehensive motor-vehicle insurance contract. In terms of such a 
clause, the insurance contract provides liability cover to a specified insured50 and 
another party who drives the insured’s vehicle with its permission (‘authorised 
drivers’).51 Generally, the insured defendant will claim from the liability insurer on 
behalf of the authorised driver.  
 
2.2.4 Liability Insurance Contracts and Reinsurance Contracts52  
A reinsurance contract is an insurance contract53 in terms of which an insurer 
transfers the risk (either in whole, or in part) it has taken over under one or more 
insurance contracts to other insurers.54 The reinsurer receives a premium in exchange 
for assuming the risk from the primary insurer (‘reinsured’).55 
As to the nature of reinsurance, a specific contract of reinsurance may take the 
form of first-party indemnity insurance, third-party indemnity, or liability insurance.  
If reinsurance takes the form of first-party indemnity insurance, it takes on the 
nature of the primary insurance. The reinsurance is then a fresh contract covering the 
same object of the risk covered by the direct insurance.56 If reinsurance is a third-
party indemnity or liability insurance, reinsurance is a distinct form of insurance 
covering the primary insurer’s liability. 
 
                                                 
50 The insured defendant. 
51 The authorised driver is a third-party (unnamed) insured and those to whom the latter incurs liability, 
are third-party plaintiffs (or fourth parties). See: Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African 
Insurance Law para 25.79 n 134. For further detail on extension clauses in motor-vehicle policies, see 
Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 19.118-19.140.  
52  See generally Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 23.67-23.79; Merkin, Summer & 
Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance ch 18; Birds, Lynch & Paul MacGillivray on Insurance ch 35; 
and Jerry & Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 150.  
53 Merkin, Summer & Hodgson ibid para 18.007 opine that reinsurance is by the common law a 
contract of insurance under English law, but refers to difficulty to classify reinsurance in some 
jurisdictions where legislation does not make mention of reinsurance. In South Africa, the class 
reinsurance is included under the Insurance Act 18 of 2017 (‘Insurance Act of 2017’) Schedule 2 of 
tables 1 & 2.  
54 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 23.67. Birds, Lynch & Paul 
ibid para 35.004 refer to the following as a useful definition of reinsurance as a contract ‘whereby for a 
consideration one agrees to indemnify another wholly or partially against loss or liability by reason of a 
risk the latter has assumed under a separate and distinct contract as the insurer of a third person’.  
55 There are two main categories of reinsurance, namely facultative reinsurance and treaty reinsurance. 
Both these are main categories and may be written on a proportional or non-proportional basis. These 
distinctions are irrelevant for purposes of the present discussion, on the distinction between liability 
insurance and reinsurance. 
56 This appears to be the preferred view for purposes of regulation: see Reinecke, van Niekerk & 
Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 23.75. 
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2.2.5 Different Types of Liability Insurance57 
Liability insurance may be provided in a separate insurance policy (eg, if an 
insured requires liability cover only). Alternatively, liability insurance and property 
insurance may be combined under separate sections in a comprehensive policy (eg, 
motor-vehicle insurance). Liability cover may also be provided as part of ‘insurance 
against all risks’,58 in which case the risk taken over by the insurer is not qualified by 
reference to an event or peril insured against (eg, in householders’ insurance where 
the insured house is covered against all risks).  
 
2.2.5.1  Private or Social Insurance and Voluntary or Mandatory Insurance59 
Liability insurance may be classified as either private or social, and may be 
effected on either a voluntary basis or on the basis of a statutory obligation.  
Private insurance covers the individual interests of the insured and is based on 
an insurance contract. It may either be contracted on a voluntary basis or be required 
by statute. For example, legislation may impose a duty on certain persons – eg, certain 
categories of professional, notably in the medical fields – to insure themselves against 
liability they may incur in certain capacities, especially when they perform potentially 
dangerous activities. The aim of compulsory statutory liability insurance is to ensure 
that the liability insured is able to meet third-party claims.60 
In contrast to private insurance, social insurance schemes serve the general 
interests of society and are required to be implemented by statute. The South African 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act61 is an example of a social 
insurance (compensation) scheme that uses liability insurance.62  
 
                                                 
57 Reinecke, van Niekerk en Nienaber ibid 25.26; Wansink Algemene aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (3 
ed) 199; Derrington & Ashton Law of Liability Insurance para 1.24; and Jerry & Richmond 
Understanding Insurance Law para 13A[e]. 
58  Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 13.54-13.63. All-risks insurance is not entirely 
unlimited. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 13.56; and Clarke Law of Insurance 
Contracts in para 17.3A1.  
59 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 1.57-1.59; 25.30-25.31; Derrington & Ashton Law of 
Liability Insurance para 1.25; and Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 
21.001-21.005.  
60 See also paras 3-5 below for further detail and examples. 
61 130 of 1993 (‘COIDA’).  
62 The scope of this thesis is limited to private liability insurance contracts and further detail falls 
beyond the ambit of this discussion.  
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2.2.5.2  Profit or Non-profit Insurance63  
Most modern liability policies qualify as insurance for profit. For-profit insurers 
are, in the main, owned by shareholders who do not necessarily have to be 
policyholders. In the case of profit insurance the contract is concluded between the 
insurer and the individual insured. The purpose of such insurance is to generate a 
profit for the insurer through the premiums paid, and to distribute that profit between 
the insurer’s shareholders. 
Non-profit insurance is, in the main, a vehicle for mutual insurers which are 
owned by their policyholders. However, mutual insurance is not aimed at making a 
profit for the insurer. If the premiums collected exceed the amount required to cover 
the losses, the balance must be returned to the insured. When there is a shortfall in 
premiums, a ‘call’ may be made to the insured to contribute towards the shortfall. 
Mutual marine insurance against liability for oil pollution is an example of this type of 
insurance.64  
 
2.2.5.3 Examples of Liability Insurance  
In this second part of the chapter we consider how the economic circumstances, 
social conditions, moral norms, and legal principles have changed and how this has 
enabled liability insurance to evolve and develop.65 Interesting examples of earlier 
forms of liability insurance include liability insurance in respect of horse-drawn 
vehicles towards the end of the nineteenth century, and liability insurance against 
poison.66  
  
                                                 
63 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 1.31-1.36; and Jerry & 
Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 13B[a].  
64 Reinecke et al General Principles of Insurance Law para 576. The scope of this thesis is limited to 
for profit-insurance and further detail falls beyond the ambit of this discussion.  
65 Paragraph 2.3 below.  
66 This insurance was aimed to cover pie makers against liability towards third parties for rash caused 




Liability insurance may take different forms.67 For example, as the insured may 
incur liability in different capacities and/or for different activities,68 the type of third-
party loss or damage in respect of the liability cover may differ, and the insured may 
be covered against liability to different categories of third parties. This may restrict 
the scope of liability cover.69 
The following sub-classes of liability insurance are set out in the South African 
Insurance Act of 2017: 70  directors and officers; 71  employers;72  product liability;73 
professional indemnity;74  public liability; aviation; engineering; marine; 75  motor;76 
rail; transport;77 personal; and others.78 Note that the list also provides for other forms 
of liability insurance not listed in the Act.79 
                                                 
67 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.32; Wansink Algemene 
aansprakelijkheidsverzekering (3 ed) 11; and Atkins Are You Covered? 105-106. Hilliker Liability 
Insurance in Canada 4 opines that ‘liability insurance contracts are generally written according to the 
nature of the business, professional or personal risks undertaken by the insured’ and then provides 
examples under each category. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 1.37 for further detail 
on the distinction between commercial (or business) insurance and consumer (or individual/personal) 
insurance generally. The latter distinction became very important under English law in view of recent 
consumer legislation that also applies to (liability) insurance contracts. See para 4.1.2 below for more 
detail. 
68 See, eg, Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.035-21.039; and 
Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux Supplement 120-121 ad paras 21.36, 21.28 ad 21.39 for more 
detail on cover under liability insurance based on the insured’s activities. 
69 Maniloff & Stempel General Liability Insurance 1-3 explain that the CGL Policy is the dominant 
general liability policy in the USA and that it was developed in response to fragmented insurance 
policies and cover. 
70 See Schedule 2 of Table 2 on the classes and sub-classes of non-life insurance. Number 10 concerns 
the class ‘liability insurance’ and its sub-classes.  
71 See, eg, Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.139-21.158; and 
Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux Supplement 126-127 ad paras 21.149 and 21.152 on directors’ 
and officers’ liability cover under English law.  
72  See, eg, see Birds, Lynch & Paul MacGillivray on Insurance in paras 30.110-30.117; Merkin, 
Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.116-21.131 and Merkin, Summer & 
Hodgson Colinvaux Supplement 126 ad paras 21.122 and 21.126 on employers’ liability insurance law 
under English law. 
73  See, eg, Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.132-21.138 and 
Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux Supplement 126 ad paras 21.133, 21.134, and 21.135 on 
product liability policies under English law.  
74  See, eg, Van Schoubroeck Professionele aansprakelijkheidsverzekering passim. See also Birds, 
Lynch & Paul MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.083-30.109; and Enright & Jess Professional 
Indemnity on professional indemnity insurance law under English law. 
75 On ‘zeeverzekering’ (that has its own ambit and cannot merely be equated to ‘marine insurance’ in 
other jurisdictions) and the law of liability insurance under Belgian law, see para 5.1.1 below. 
76 See, eg, Birds, Lynch & Paul MacGillivray on Insurance ch 31; Merkin, Summer & Hodgson 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance ch 23; Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux Supplement 151-202 ad 
ch 23 on the law of motor vehicle insurance under English law. A 12th edition of Colinvaux’s Law of 
Insurance is set to analyse major changes as to the law of motor-vehicle insurance. 
77 The law relating to liability insurance contracts pertaining to transport is a thorny issue under Belgian 
law. See para 5.1.2 below. 
78 As the scope of the study focuses on liability insurance generally, further detail falls beyond the 
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New forms of liability insurance continue to develop in response to changes in 
law and liability, new technology, and growing societal demand. 80 More novel forms 
include liability insurance for private drone operators, medical clinical trials, 
autonomous driverless vehicles, social media, and cyber activities. 
 
2.3 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
The historical development of liability insurance is divided into three stages. 
First, possible reasons for the delay in the development of liability insurance; 81 
second, mutual marine liability insurance in England, including mutual hull clubs and 
protection and indemnity clubs82 as possible precursors to liability insurance;83 and 
third, the legal recognition of liability insurance in the main in the form of employers’ 
liability insurance.84 
 
2.3.1 The Delay in the Introduction of Liability Insurance 
From the sources consulted, and from an Anglo-American perspective in 
particular, liability insurance first emerged in England (‘UK’) during the second half 
of the nineteenth century and shortly thereafter spread to the United States of 
America.85 Until then marine and fire insurance were the main forms of insurance,86 
                                                                                                                                            
ambit of this discussion. As to liability insurance in general, it may be noted that the American Law 
Institute (‘ALI’) recently adopted a Restatement on the Law of Liability Insurance. The purpose of a 
Restatement may be explained as follows: ‘Restatements are primarily addressed to courts. They aim at 
clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it 
presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court’ (see ALI Restatement on the Law of 
Liability Insurance Proposed Final Draft No 2 of April 2018 at x). This is particularly relevant in 
America, where insurance law is regulated on a state-by-state basis. An entire Restatement may be 
accepted as the law of a state in that subject matter. The reason why this was not included in this study 
is because it was to date of this thesis not adopted by states. The final Restatement on the Law of 
Liability Insurance was published in 2019 and covers the law of contracts in the liability insurance 
context, liability insurance cover, and the management of insured liabilities. See 
https://www.ali.org/publications/show/liability-insurance/ (accessed on 4 Nov 2019).  
79 See, eg, Kuschke Insurance against Damage Caused by Pollution passim on environmental damage 
against pollution, as far as it concerns liability insurance.  
80 See also Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 1.007. 
81 Paragraph 2.3.1 below. 
82 Known as ‘P&I clubs’. 
83 Paragraph 2.3.2 below. 
84 Paragraph 2.3.3 below. 
85 Abraham Liability Century 28; Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 573; and Abraham (2001) 87 
Virginia LR 86-87. 
86 Abraham Liability Century 15-16. For an historical overview of these insurances in England, see 
Cockerell & Green British Insurance Business 3-60; and Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s 
Law of Insurance paras 1.001-1.004.  
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followed by life and accident insurance. In Europe, liability insurance also emerged in 
industry late in the nineteenth century.87 There are at least three reasons why liability 
insurance took longer to develop than other forms of insurance.88  
First, at common law insurance against the consequences of an insured’s 
negligent conduct (for loss or damage of own property – first-party insurance – or for 
liability to another – third-party insurance) was regarded as contrary to public 
policy. 89  Second, the imposition of civil liability was limited which reduced the 
demand for cover.90 Third, society was not organised to create a viable demand for 
liability insurance.91  
This section describes how the economic circumstances, social conditions, 
moral norms, and legal principles changed so enabling liability insurance to develop.  
 
2.3.1.1  From ‘Moral Hazard’ to Responsible Behaviour92 
Insurers, both in first- and in third-party insurance, must guard against ‘moral 
hazard’, which is the possibility that, because it is insured, the party insured may 
exercise less care to avoid the occurrence or consequences of loss.93  
                                                 
87 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 11. Fontaine, in his commentary on Belgian insurance law, 
eg, mentions an historic Parisian decision that confirmed the need for, and validity of, liability 
insurance in 1845. See Fotntaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 666; and Cour Royale de Paris 1 Jul 
1845 Journal du Palais, Jurisprudence française II 1845, 793-794 (Automédon).  
88 See this para 2.3.1 below on the three reasons for the delay in the introduction in liability insurance. 
Abraham Liability Century 14. Abraham argues at 19 that ‘[t]he answers [as to why it took liability 
insurance so long to develop] lie both in economic history and in legal doctrines that prohibited 
insuring against tort liability’. 
89 Paragraphs 2.3.1.1(a)-2.3.1.1(c) below. 
90 Paragraph 2.3.1.2(a) below. 
91 Paragraph 2.3.1.2(b) below. 
92 See generally Abraham Liability Century 14-27; Scales (2008) 94 Virginia LR 1260-1262; Abraham 
(2001) 87 Virginia LR 86-87; Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 575-580; Enright & Jess Professional 
Indemnity paras 1.170-1.182; Jerry & Richmond Understanding Insurance Law para 10[b]; and Clarke 
Policies and Perceptions 252 on moral hazard and insurance.  
93 See Enright & Jess ibid para 1.182 for an explanation of what they refer to as the two elements of 
moral hazard, namely ‘that the availability of insurance will relax or dissipate the usual human and 
institutional energies which ought to be directed towards reducing the likelihood that the insured event 
will occur’; and ‘the effect that the personality of the insured has on the risk: is the insured naturally 
careful or careless, righteous or criminal?’ The last element is less often emphasised by other authors 
on this topic.  
For a discussion on the origin of the doctrine of moral hazard in insurance, see Baker (1996-
1997) 75 Texas LR 244-267. Briefly, the word hazard (danger, chance of danger) was used in fire 
insurance to refer to physical hazards long before it was paired with the adjective ‘moral’. (For further 
detail on the increase in hazard in fire insurance policies, see Insurance Society of New York Fire 
Insurance Contract 117-136.) Baker suggests that the first references to ‘moral hazard’ appear to be in 
an American fire-insurance guide that was published in 1862. From the middle of the 19th century 
insurers began to use the term ‘moral hazard’. However, the concerns encompassed within the term 
already existed at the beginning of the 19th century. Both moral and physical hazard are still terms in 
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During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, insurance was approached with 
great caution.94 Initially, there was no possibility of insuring against the consequences 
of an insured’s own fault in both first- and third-party insurance. 95  During the 
nineteenth century there was an insufficient distinction not only between the degrees 
of an insured’s fault,96 but also between the elements of fault and wrongfulness. All 
conduct with fault by the insured (whether negligent or intentional) was regarded as 
wrongful and for that reason not insurable.97 There was also no distinction between 
the reasons for excluding an insurer’s liability due to its own conduct.98 
Although insurance was a lawful transaction with social benefits, it was seen to 
create a moral hazard. At common law, insurance against the consequences of an 
insured’s conduct with fault (including negligent conduct) was regarded as contrary to 
public policy in that was seen to create an excessive moral hazard.99 There were 
public-policy concerns that insurance against the consequences of all forms of fault 
would encourage wrongful behaviour by the insured and negate the impact of the 
imposition of liability in tort.100  
To counteract the possibility of moral hazard in first- and third-party insurance, 
from early on insurance did not (and generally still does not) cover an insured against 
the consequences of its intentional and wrongful conduct.101 This reduces the risk of 
moral hazard to some extent.  
                                                                                                                                            
use and factors considered by insurers. See para 1.4 above for a discussion on the economics of liability 
insurance and moral hazard from a current perspective. 
94 See Abraham Liability Century 20 who points out that insurance seemed like gambling which was 
frowned upon.  
95 Roman-Dutch, French and English law, eg, excluded insurance cover for all forms of fault on the 
part of the insured in the 18th century. See Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 403-409. 
96  Namely, between intent and negligence. In time, the distinction between intentional and non-
intentional conduct by the insured was established and insurance became possible against the latter but 
(generally) not against the former.  
97 See Welford Accident Insurance 433-436 on the public-policy objections that existed under early 
English law to contracts of indemnity against the consequences of negligent, intentional or wrongful 
acts by the insured. Eventually non-intentional conduct by the insured became insurable as a rule, but 
not (generally) if the conduct is wrongful. 
98 The lines were initially blurred between principles that have since been clarified, namely, that there 
is an implied term in insurance contracts against insurance of the intentional conduct of the insured, 
and it is against public policy to insure the consequences of an insured’s wrongful conduct.  
99 Abraham Liability Century at 14 and 17; and Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 86. 
100 Abraham contends that liability in tort still has a deterrence function today. See Abraham (2001) 87 
Virginia LR 86. However, Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 279 para 14.4 argues ‘that deterrence 
and punishment should have no place in the civil law’. Clarke Policies and Perceptions 257-258 is also 
not convinced that the exclusion of liability cover for unlawful intentional conduct deters criminals. 
101  This was not because insurance contracts expressly so provided, but because they were so 
interpreted. See Abraham Liability Century 16. See also Welford Accident Insurance 433-436 on the 
public-policy objections that existed under early English law to contracts of indemnity against the 
consequences of negligent, intentional or wrongful acts by the insured.  
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Throughout the nineteenth century courts grappled with whether insurance 
against the consequences of an insured’s own negligence was valid: first in the realm 
of first-party insurance;102 then in relation to mechanisms that resembled liability 
insurance (eg, the exclusion or limitation-of-liability clauses 103  or ‘benefit-of-
insurance’ clauses);104 and lastly in connection with liability insurance itself.105 The 
possibility of insurance against the consequences of one’s own conduct in liability 
insurance was initially regarded as wrongful – irrespective of the degree of fault. 
Abraham argues convincingly that it is particularly difficult to combat moral 
hazard in liability insurance.106 As an insured may in principle incur unlimited legal 
liability towards third parties, an insurer cannot minimise moral hazard effectively 
merely by placing a limit on the amount of cover it provides.  
This section analyses how public policy gradually changed in favour of 
insurance against the consequences of an insured’s own negligence. Abraham 
observes that he could find no American cases in which the validity of liability 
insurance was directly addressed prior to its introduction late in the nineteenth 
century.107 However, he observes that ‘the idea of insuring against civil liability was 
highly suspect; [that] liability insurance was considered almost immoral’108 and was 
criticised as a ‘method of avoiding moral responsibility’.109 
 
2.3.1.1(a)  The Validity of Insurance against Loss or Damage Caused by an 
Insured’s (or its Employees’) Negligent Conduct in First-Party 
Insurance 
 Until the nineteenth century, insurance against losses caused by an insured’s 
own negligent conduct was generally considered contrary to public policy in first-
party insurance in both UK and US law.110 An insured could not validly insure against 
                                                 
102 Paragraph 2.3.1.1(a) below. 
103 Paragraph 2.3.1.1(b) below. 
104 Paragraph 2.3.1.1(c) below. 
105 Abraham Liability Century at 21; Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 576 and 578; and Scales (2008) 
94 Virginia LR at 1261. See para 2.3.3 below as to the legal recognition of liability insurance itself. 
106 Abraham Liability Century 16-17. 
107 Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 86-87 n 6. 
108 Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 575. 
109 Abraham Liability Century 15.  
110  Welford Accident Insurance 433-436; Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 407 n 140; 
Abraham ibid 21. 
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the consequences of its own or its employees’ (eg, its master and crew or mariners) 
conduct. This included, but was not limited to, negligent conduct.111 
Busk v Royal Assurance Exchange Company112 in 1818 appears to be the first 
English decision to hold a person entitled to insure against losses caused by the 
negligent conduct of its employees which resulted in damage to a ship;113 while in 
1837 in Shaw v Robberds114 the courts in England extended this to allow an insured to 
insure against losses caused by its own negligent conduct (as opposed to that of its 
employees). Like Busk, Shaw made no express mention of a shift in public policy.  
American law lagged behind its English counterpart. But from the 1830s, 
American courts too started to acknowledge that marine insurance policies could 
cover an insured for the consequences of the negligent conduct of its employees115 in 
first-party insurance; and by the beginning of the twentieth century it was clear that 
these policies also covered loss due to the insured’s own negligence.116  
 There appears not to have been a clear shift in public policy which allowed for 
cover against losses resulting from the insured or its agents’ negligence in first-party 
insurance. Instead, marine and fire insurance policies which did not expressly exclude 
such cover, were interpreted to cover what they undertook to insure – loss of ships 
and cargo, and destruction of property by fire – even if the losses were directly or 
indirectly caused by such negligence.117  
By the middle of the nineteenth century it appears that both UK and US law 
allowed insurance against the consequences of an insured’s (or at least its employees’) 
negligence in first-party insurance. This set the scene for the introduction of liability 
                                                 
111 This discussion will focus on negligent conduct as intentional conduct was – and still is – generally 
excluded from insurance cover as explained in para 2.3.1.1 above. 
112 Busk v Royal Exchange Assurance Company (1818) 2 B & Ald 73, 106 Eng Rep 296. See De Hart 
& Simey Arnould’s Marine Insurance (8 ed) 964-967 for a discussion of other English cases that 
affirm the Busk decision. 
113 Busk v Royal Exchange Assurance Company 296. 
114 Shaw v Robberds (1837) 6 Ad & E 82, 112 Eng Rep 29. This decision concerned a fire insurance 
policy. 
115 See Patapsco Insurance Company v John Coulter (1830) 28 US 222; Columbia Insurance Company 
of Alexandria v Joseph W Lawrence Who Survived Thomas Poindexter (1836) 35 US 507; and William 
Waters v The Merchants’ Louisville Insurance Company (1837) 36 US 213. 
116 McNeely (1941) 41 Columbia LR 32. She provides a neat summary of some of the first English and 
American cases that acknowledged that insurance policies may cover loss due to the negligent conduct 
by the insured and its employees. Also see Porter Laws of Insurance (2 ed) 116 for further references to 
English and American cases on the same topic. See also para 2.3.1.1(c) below. 
117 Abraham Liability Century 21-22. 
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insurance which is, after all, also insurance against the consequence of an insured’s 
negligence.118  
The recognition of insurance cover against the consequences of an insured’s 
own negligence first arose in first-party insurance. When it was realised that an 
insured could (or should) be permitted to claim against a first-party insurer for loss 
caused by its own negligent conduct, the way was paved for the recognition of 
insurance cover for an insured’s loss caused by its liability towards third parties 
resulting from its own negligent conduct – liability insurance was with us. But the 
validity of mechanisms that resembled liability insurance (eg, exclusion or limitation-
of-liability or so-called ‘benefit-of-insurance’ clauses) discussed in the following 
paragraphs, was considered before the legal recognition of liability insurance. 
 
2.3.1.1(b) The Enforceability of Exclusion/Limitation-of-Liability Clauses  
 During the nineteenth century, public policy regarding the enforceability of the 
exclusion or limitation-of-liability 119  clauses is important in the historical 
development of liability insurance. Certain authors suggest that these clauses 
resemble liability insurance120 in that they may both create moral hazard.121 Clauses to 
exclude or limit legal liability do so by shifting the burden of liability from the 
tortfeasor to the third-party victim.122 As liability insurance covers legal liability to 
third parties, it transfers the risk of such liability from the insured tortfeasor to the 
insurer. A person insured against liability therefore, like a tortfeasor, avoids or shifts 
its liability using exclusion or limitation-of-liability clauses. The reasoning was that 
once courts recognise the legitimacy of such clauses,123 they might be more inclined 
to accept the validity of liability insurance.  
                                                 
118 Ibid 22. 
119 These types of clauses are referred to as ‘liability waivers’ in America. For the purpose of this 
discussion, their meaning and effect are the same. 
120 See Abraham Liability Century at 22-24. 
121 Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 578. 
122 Exclusion of liability clauses exclude or eliminate liability in its entirety – the tortfeasor has no 
liability at all. Limitation-of-liability clauses could limit liability in different ways. For example, a 
limitation clause may limit liability for the tortfeasor in excess of a certain amount; or it may limit the 
instances where liability could be incurred, eg, by providing that there will be no liability for the 
tortfeasor except in case of fraud or a particular form of fault. And further, total limitation of liability 
again amounts to exclusion of liability. 
123 Further distinction between these types of clauses generally falls beyond this discussion that focus 
on the recognition of (both) types of clauses as a step towards the later approval of liability insurance. 
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Before expanding on this possibility, it is necessary to provide some 
background on the carriage of goods and passengers where exclusion or limitation-of-
liability clauses first featured prominently.124 For present purposes the main focus is 
on public policy and the enforceability of exclusion or limitation-of-liability clauses 
in two categories: the carriage of goods; and the carriage of passengers. 
 As to the first category, initially public carriers of goods (so-called ‘common 
carriers’)125 were, under UK law,126 strictly liable to shippers of goods for the loss of 
or damage to such goods, irrespective of whether the carrier or its employees was 
negligent in causing the loss or damage.  
On the one hand, strict liability was regarded as necessary because of the public 
nature of the carrier trade.127 Strict liability was also perceived to make common 
carriers more careful in general128 and to encourage commerce.129 Given the crucial 
role common carriers played in the transportation of goods, the public’s interest had to 
be protected against fraudulent common carriers.130 On the other hand, public policy 
regarded it as unfair to hold a common carrier strictly liable for undeclared valuables, 
and it followed that common carriers had to be protected against potential fraud by 
shippers of these undisclosed goods. 131  English judges therefore attempted to 
accommodate the conflicting interests of common carriers and the shippers of 
                                                 
124 See Baker (1996-1997) 75 Texas LR 359-360. This study only warrants a brief summary of the very 
extensive topic of exclusion or limitation-of-liability clauses. For a comprehensive survey of the topic, 
with references to English and American case law, see Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1129-
1257 and Pagan (1981-1982) 23 William & Mary LR 799-814 in regard to the carriage of goods. See 
also Kaczorowski ibid 1157-1169 for the carriage of passengers. Further, see Kostal English Railway 
Capitalism 284-285 for a concise summary of the English position in the pre-steam age. Also see 
Beven Negligence in Law 892-897 on notice of limitation of liability by common carriers.  
125 Beven ibid 845 defines common carriers as ‘persons [who] hold themselves out as exercising the 
public employment of carrying goods for people generally, and as ready to engage in the carrying of 
goods for hire, and not as a mere casual occupation’. He provides further definitions 869-870, and at 
870 provides the following examples of common carriers: ‘waggoners and teamsters; coach-masters or 
proprietors of stage coaches…; railway companies, for goods which they profess to carry or actually 
carry; carmen and porters’. 
126 Pagan (1981-1982) 23 William & Mary LR 799 explains the relationship between the carrier of 
goods and the shipper as a ‘species of bailment for hire’.  
127 Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1135. 
128 See Proprietors of Trent Navigation v Ward (1785) 3 Esp 126, 170 Eng Rep 562 at 563-564 where 
it was held that ‘[i]f this sort of negligence were to excuse the carrier, when he finds that an accident 
has happened to goods from the misconduct of a third person, he would give himself no further trouble 
about the recovery’. 
129 Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1136. 
130 Ibid 1141.  
131 Ibid 1143. See, eg, Gibbon v Paynton (1769) 4 Burr 2298, 98 Eng Rep 199 for an example of fraud 
by a shipper. See also Pagan (1981-1982) 23 William & Mary LR 814-816; and Kaczorowksi ibid 
1140-1441 for a discussion of the Gibbon case. 
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goods.132 On the basis of justice and fairness, the courts permitted common carriers to 
limit their liability for undisclosed valuable goods in excess of a certain amount133 
subject, however, to specific conditions.134 For example, the common carrier had to 
prove that it had informed the shipper of its disclaimer of liability and of the terms of 
the contract.135 However, courts soon permitted common carriers to limit the grounds 
for incurring liability in negligence by the issue of exclusion or limitation-of-liability 
clauses by public notice displayed prominently or by special acceptances inter 
partes.136 Shortly thereafter, it was held in Maving v Todd and Others137 that ‘they 
may exclude it [liability] altogether’.138  
In 1830 the English legislature enacted the Carriers’ Act.139 Certain sources 
suggest that the Act confirmed, and in some instances even increased, rather than 
restricted the common carriers’ right to exclude or limit their strict liability at 
common law. 140  By the middle of the nineteenth century common carriers were 
increasingly contracting-out of their liability for all degrees of negligence towards 
shippers and these agreements were now recognised by the principal courts in 
                                                 
132 Kaczorowski ibid 1143. 
133 It is insightful that ‘the same principles of fair dealing, public safety, and minimizing loss based on 
moral principles of honesty, fairness and justice that explain the judicial creation of common carrier 
strict liability’ led to the judicial recognition of a carrier’s right limit its liability to, see Kaczorowski 
ibid 1143. 
134 Ibid 1148. American courts also eventually recognised this right in all jurisdictions. 
135 See, eg, Clark v Gray (1802) 4 Esp 177, 170 Eng Rep 682 at 683 where it was held that ‘[c]arriers 
are subjected to losses by the general law of the realm; I therefore think, that every man must discharge 
himself by notice given by himself; and that it was incumbent on him to prove that such notice was 
given in this case. The position was the same in the USA, see Kaczorowski ibid 1148.  
136 See Nicholson & Another v Willan & Another (1804) 5 East 507, 102 Eng Rep 1165 at 1167 where 
it was held that ‘[i]n the absence therefore of any evidence to support … a supposed tortious 
conversion of the goods in question, … we cannot help giving effect to those terms in the notice’. 
137 (1815) 1 Stark 59, 171 Eng Rep 405. Also see Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1143 for a 
discussion of the Maving case.  
138 At 405. Also see Leeson v Holt & Others (1816) 1 Stark 186, 171 Eng Rep 441 at 442 where it was 
held that ‘the common law imposed upon carriers a liability of ruinous extent, and in consequence, 
qualifications and limitations of that liability have been introduced from time to time, till, as in the 
present case, they seem to have excluded all responsibility whatsoever, so that under the terms of the 
present notice if a servant of carrier’s had in the most wilful and wanton manner destroyed the furniture 
entrusted to them, the principals would not have been liable. If the parties in the present case have so 
contracted, the plaintiff must abide by the agreement.’ Also see Kaczorowski ibid 1144 for a discussion 
of this case. 
139 ‘An Act for the more effectual Protection of Mail Contractors, Stage Coach Proprietors, and other 
Common Carriers for hire, against the Loss of or injury to Parcels or Packages delivered to them for 
Conveyance or Custody, the Value and Contents of which shall not be Declared to them by the owners 
thereof’ 1830, 11 Geo 4 c 68. See Baker (1996-1997) 75 Texas LR 360 for a brief discussion of the Act. 
140 See Pagan (1981-1982) 23 William & Mary LR 822-825; and Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 
1144-1145 for a discussion of the effect of the Carriers’ Act. 
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England.141 This was largely due to the boom in the railway industry and because it 
was deemed ‘reasonable that carriers should be allowed to make agreements for … 
protecting themselves against the new risks’, even gross negligence.142 The railways, 
in particular, exploited the situation and forced shippers to agree to prejudicial 
terms.143 Public-policy concerns prompted the Legislature to enact the Railway and 
Canal Traffic Carriers’ Act, 1854.144 
Although this Act left the Carriers’ Act, 1830, and the common-law right of 
carriers to contract out of strict liability largely in place,145 it restricted exclusion or 
limitation of liability in the case of negligence146 by carriers to some extent.  
In brief as to the public policy and enforceability of exclusion or limitation-of-
liability clauses for common carriers in English law shortly before the introduction of 
liability insurance during the second half of the nineteenth century: common carriers 
could still exclude strict common-law liability and could even contract-out of liability 
for negligence, provided certain conditions were met. 
American courts147 came to rely on the same public-policy concerns as their 
English counterparts and adopted strict liability for carriers of goods at common 
law.148 They were more determined to uphold public-policy concerns and to preserve 
the common carrier’s strict liability than the English courts. For the first half of the 
                                                 
141 See, for example, Shaw v The York and North Midland Railway Company (1849) 13 QB 347, 116 
Eng Rep 1295 at 1298 where Denman L held that ‘the declaration that the defendants [common carrier] 
received the horses to be safely and securely carried by them, which would throw the risks of 
conveyance upon the defendants, is disproved by the memorandum at the foot of the ticket’. Pagan ibid 
825 n 152 comments that the distinction between gross and ordinary negligence was blurred by that 
time. 
142 Carr v Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (1852) 7 Ex 707, 155 Eng Rep 1133 at 1136. The court, eg, 
held as follows: ‘The jury have found that the defendants have been guilty of gross negligence … [T]he 
owner [of the horse] has taken upon himself all risk of conveyance …. The contract appears to me to 
amount to this. The Company [railway as common carrier] say they will not be responsible for any 
injury or damage, however caused, occurring to live stock of any description travelling upon their 
railway. … [T]here is nothing unreasonable in the arrangement. … I am of opinion that the defendants 
[the common carrier] is not liable’.  
143 See Pagan (1981-1982) 23 William & Mary LR 824-825 and Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 
1144-1145 for a discussion of the effect of the Carriers’ Act of 1830. 
144 ‘An Act for the better Regulation of the Traffic on the Railways and Canals’, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict c 
31. See Baker (1996-1997) 75 Texas LR 360 for a brief discussion of the Act. 
145 See Pagan (1981-1982) 23 William & Mary LR 826-827; and Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 
1145 for a discussion of the effect of the Railway and Canal Traffic Carriers’ Act of 1854. 
146 Also referred to as ‘disclaimers of liability in case of negligence’ or ‘negligence-disclaimers’. 
147 See generally for what follows Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1145-1157 for a detailed 
survey with ample references to American case law. 
148 Ibid 1148. See, eg, Cole v Goodwin & Story (1838) 19 Wend 251 at 281. 
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nineteenth century, several state courts still refused to recognise that common carriers 
could contract-out of strict liability, even by express agreement.149  
However, in 1848 the United States Supreme Court ruled in New Jersey Steam 
Navigation Company v The Merchants’ Bank of Boston150 that common carriers could 
limit their strict liability by express agreement.151 The court also relied on policy 
considerations to substantiate its decision, and held that it was ‘unable to perceive any 
well-founded objection to the restriction’.152 Almost all states eventually accepted this 
decision and recognised a common carrier’s right to exempt itself from strict liability. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century judges no longer considered it necessary to 
protect the public from potentially dishonest common carriers.153 Gradually American 
courts came to allow carriers to exempt themselves from liability in negligence and 
even from gross negligence.154 
Then, in 1873 in Railroad Company v Lockwood,155 the United States Supreme 
Court refused to permit common carriers to exclude all liability as it was not ‘just and 
reasonable in the eye of the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from 
responsibility for negligence of himself or his servants’.156 Again values of public 
policy underlay the decision.  
In brief as to the public policy and enforceability of liability waivers157 in the 
United States of America shortly before the introduction of liability insurance in the 
second half of the nineteenth century: in recognition of a decision of the United States 
Supreme Court,158 most states permitted a common carrier to limit its strict liability by 
express contractual agreement, but a subsequent United States Supreme Court159 ruled 
against the total exclusion of their liability for negligence.160 
                                                 
149 See Kaczorowski ibid 1149-1150 for examples of states that refused to do so. 
150 (1848) 47 US 344.  
151 At 384. See Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1151-1152 for a discussion of the case. 
152  New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v The Merchants’ Bank of Boston above at 382. 
153 Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1152-1153. 
154 Ibid 1154 for examples of the states that allowed this and the reasons therefor. 
155 (1873) 84 US 357. See Kaczorowski ibid 1156-1157; and Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 578-
579 for a discussion of the case. The decision itself provides a useful overview of both the English and 
American law pertaining to the exclusions of liability by common carriers.  
156 Railroad Company v Lockwood above at 384. 
157 Again, the American term ‘liability waivers’ may be equated with exclusion (or limitation) of 
liability clauses under English law. For the purpose of this discussion, their meaning and effect may be 
regarded as similar. 
158 New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v The Merchants’ Bank of Boston above at 382. 
159 Railroad Company v Lockwood above at 384. 
160 In this regard, one may note the distinction made between exclusion and limitation of liability. 
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As to the second category where exclusion or limitation-of-liability clauses 
featured, carriers of passengers were under English law distinguished at common law 
from the carriers of goods.161 Whereas goods were objects over which the shipper 
totally lost control, passengers could take care of themselves and even cause their own 
injuries.162 Unlike the strict liability of the carriers of goods, carriers of passengers 
were liable in damages to injured passengers only when the injury arose due to the 
fault of the carrier or its employees.163  
The 1869 decision in Readhead v Midland Railway164 removed any doubt as to 
whether a carrier of passengers could be held strictly liable towards its passengers and 
confirmed negligence as the requirement for carrier liability.165 However, between 
1850 and 1875, English courts refrained from introducing ‘liberal contractarian 
ideas’166 to the law of passenger accidents. They resisted attempts by the carriers of 
passengers – eg, railway companies – to include express exculpatory clauses, such as 
exclusion-of-liability clauses, to absolve themselves from liability in negligence to 
passengers for loss or injury in the name freedom of contract. As a result these 
passenger carriers soon abandoned the practice of attempting to exclude liability in 
negligence without its legality ever having been tested in the English High Courts. 
Public policy dictated that the protection of passengers be ranked higher than the 
passenger carriers’ rights to freedom of contract. 
As is clear from United States Supreme Court decision in Stokes v Saltonstall,167 
the position regarding the principles of liability for carriers of passengers in America 
was the same as that in English law.168 Liability waivers excluded strict liability only, 
as negligence at least was required to hold a carrier of passengers liable for loss or 
injury the passenger suffered. In Railroad Company v Lockwood169 the United States 
                                                 
161 Kostal English Railway Capitalism 285. 
162 Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1157-1158. 
163 Kostal English Railway Capitalism 285. Cf some sources suggest that carriers of passengers had a 
high duty of care towards their passengers and that the common law did not require too much fault to 
hold them liable. See Abraham Liability Century 22-24. Abraham at 23 refers to the ‘high duty of care’ 
of carriers against their ‘customers’ and describes it as ‘something approaching, though not quite as 
exacting as, strict liability’. However, Abraham’s section on liability waivers should be read with care 
as he does not seem to distinguish between carriers of goods (common carriers) and carriers of 
passengers. See also Kaczorowski ibid 1158. 
164 (1869) LR 4 QB 379. See Kostal ibid 302-303 for comments on the decision. 
165 Readhead v Midland Railway above 393. 
166 Kostal English Railway Capitalism 319. 
167 (1839) 38 US 181 at 191-192. See Kaczorowski (1990) 51 Ohio State LJ 1158 for a reference to the 
decision. 
168 See Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 578 for the position in the USA. 
169 Railroad Company v Lockwood above at 384. 
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Supreme Court refused to allow a carrier of passengers to contract-out of liability for 
negligence because it was ‘with special force’170 to that category of carriers not just 
and reasonable in the eye of the law. Special circumstances applied to that category in 
particular. 
In conclusion, until shortly before the introduction of liability insurance, there 
was still considerable apprehension as regards the use of exclusion clauses (and to 
some extent limitation-of-liability clauses) under English law, and liability waivers 
under American law, by common carriers and carriers of passengers. There were 
public-policy concerns that these mechanisms could create a moral hazard by 
common carriers as tortfeasors.171 While liability insurance was regarded as a way of 
avoiding or shifting moral responsibility, it was seen to resemble exclusion (or 
limitation) of liability clauses172 and, therefore, was viewed with similar disapproval. 
But once courts recognised the legitimacy of exclusion or limitation-of-liability 
clauses, they might have been more inclined to accept the validity of liability 
insurance.  
 
2.3.1.1(c)  The Legality of ‘Benefit-of-Insurance’ Clauses  
‘Benefit-of-insurance’ clauses are another mechanism that resembles liability 
insurance. Under a so-called ‘benefit-of-insurance’ clause the insured under first-party 
insurance 173  insures against its own loss or damage, but then provides the party 
responsible for that loss174 with the benefit of its insurance. This may be regarded as 
an alternative and reverse method of excluding or limiting the liability of the third 
party responsible for the loss suffered by the insured under first-party insurance.175 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 Abraham Liability Century at 24. 
172 And liability waivers under American law. 
173 The injured party or party that suffered loss or damage or the third-party plaintiff in the context of 
liability insurance. 
174 The tortfeasor or the insured defendant in the context of liability insurance. 
175 An exclusion (or limitation of) liability clause provides that the tortfeasor is excluded from liability 
towards the third party, or that its liability is limited. A benefit of insurance clause provides the 
tortfeasor with the benefit of the insurance of the insured third-party plaintiff’s first-party insurance 
cover: the tortfeasor is released from liability (in total or to a certain extent) as the insured has the 
benefit of its own insurance to cover its own loss. Under a benefit of insurance clause, the tortfeasor’s 
liability towards the insured third-party plaintiff is excluded or limited because the latter has first-party 
insurance cover. Some sources suggest that a benefit of insurance clause may be regarded as ‘indirect 
insurance against damage to the policyholder’s property’. See Abraham Liability Century 24-26; and 
Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 581-582. However, a benefit-of-insurance clause does not amount to 
any insurance (for or on behalf of the tortfeaser). 
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Liability insurance is a form of third-party insurance where the insured defendant (the 
party responsible for the loss to third parties) insures against its legal liability for loss, 
damage, or injury to third parties. We have already discussed the moral hazard posed 
by liability insurance.176A party responsible for the loss may also create moral hazard 
through a benefit-of-insurance clause. By giving the party responsible for the loss the 
benefit of the insured’s insurance, the former has less incentive to protect the 
insured’s property or goods than would be the case without the benefit of the 
insurance. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the validity of benefit-of-insurance 
clauses as part of the historical development of liability insurance. Once public policy 
accepted the validity of benefit-of-insurance clauses, liability insurance, too, would be 
acceptable. 
The legal recognition of benefit-of-insurance clauses is best described using the 
facts in Phoenix Insurance Company v Erie & Western Transportation Company.177 
This important case illustrates the positive attitude of the United States Supreme 
Court to the possibility of liability insurance a few months before the first liability 
insurance company was established in the US.178 
A common carrier179 contracted out of part of its liability to three shippers180 by 
way of its bills of lading. The bills of lading further provided that if carrier incurred 
any legal liability or responsibility for the loss of the goods in its custody, it would 
enjoy the ‘full benefit of any insurance’ on the goods effected by the shippers.181 The 
three shippers took out first-party insurance on the shipment of corn against loss or 
damage from the perils of the seas and some other perils. The common carrier 
stranded due to the negligence of the crew and all the grain was soaked. 182  The 
                                                 
176 Paragraph 2.3.1.1 above. 
177 (1885) 117 US 312. The judgment includes at 313-317 a ‘statement of facts’ from the court a quo 
but it lacks some details. Further, see Abraham Liability Century 24-26; and Abraham (2005) 64 
Maryland LR 581-582 for comments on the decision. 
178 For a discussion on benefit-of-insurance clauses under English law, and in particular their impact on 
an insurer’s right to subrogation, see Van Niekerk Subrogasie 147 n 50, 344-348.  
179 That was the party that became responsible for the loss. 
180 These were the insured parties under first-party insurance that suffered loss or damage to their own 
goods. 
181 The practical implication of giving the carrier the benefit of the shippers’ insurance was not clearly 
explained in the bills of lading. See Abraham Liability Century at 25 who proposes that the common 
carrier did not have to pay for the loss of goods in its custody or, if the common carrier had paid for the 
loss, it could recover it from the shippers’ insurers. 
182 Some of the grain was thrown overboard to get it off the vessel and the remainder was sold in a 
perishable condition, see Phoenix Insurance v Erie above 315. The common carrier retained the 
proceeds of that sale. There is no reference in the facts of Phoenix Insurance that either the shippers or 
the insurer claimed the proceeds from that sale of the perishables. The insurer also did not dispute that 
fact that there was a total loss. 
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shippers’ first-party insurer claimed to be subrogated to all the shippers’ rights to sue 
the common carrier for its negligent loss of the goods. The insurer appears to have 
contended, inter alia, that providing the carrier with the benefit of the shippers’ 
insurance was against public policy and invalid in that it amounted to the common 
carrier insuring against liability for the consequences of its own (or its employees’) 
negligent conduct.183 The common carrier’s defence was that the bills of lading gave 
it the benefit of the shippers’ insurance and therefore the insurer did not have a right 
of subrogation.184 
The next part of the Phoenix Insurance judgment is particularly relevant to the 
present discussion as it illustrates the court’s approach to different types of insurance 
against the consequences of an insured’s (or its employees’) negligent conduct. The 
court reaffirmed the validity of first-party insurance against loss caused by the 
negligence of a common carrier’s employees. 185  It then held that anyone who is 
responsible for the safety of goods has a sufficient insurable interest in the goods. It 
cited the example of a contract of reinsurance in terms of which a reinsured aims to 
indemnify itself against its own responsibility, and pointed out that such contracts 
were valid.186 The court further held that a common carrier could insure goods in its 
custody to protect itself against its strict liability or liability in negligence towards 
third parties. 187  It concluded that no rule of law or public policy is violated by 
permitting a common carrier to secure insurance against loss arising from the usual 
                                                 
183 See Phoenix Insurance above 318-319 for the arguments by the insurer’s counsel which were again 
very briefly stated but were supplemented by extensive case law. It is important to note that if the 
carrier was not legally entitled to enjoy the benefit of the shippers’ insurance, that clause in the bills of 
lading would have been invalid, the insured shippers would have been able to sue the common carrier, 
and that the insurer would have been able to bring a subrogated recovery action against the common 
carrier. This appears to correspond to what the court eventually decided in Phoenix Insurance 325-326. 
184 A reason for the common carrier’s defence was that the bills of lading gave the carrier the benefit of 
the shippers’ insurance and that the insured shippers, therefore, did not have claims against the carrier 
(at least not up to the insured amount) and therefore the insurer equally did not have any claim against 
the carrier; an insurer can only enforce the rights that the insured have against third parties and no 
more. This is also the aspect which the court reiterated in its judgement. See Phoenix Insurance 321-
322. Further detail on subrogation falls beyond the scope of this discussion.  
185 Ibid 323. The court referred to William Waters v The Merchants’ Louisville Insurance Company 
(1837) 36 US 213 as authority. 
186 Ibid. The court cited Sun Mutual Insurance Company v Ocean Insurance Company (1882) 102 US 
485 as authority for the validity of contracts of reinsurance. It also noted that reinsurance was 
statutorily prohibited in England for a time, but that it was valid at common law and had always been 
valid in the USA. 
187 Phoenix Insurance above 323-324. The court cited, eg, Home Insurance Company v Baltimore 
Warehouse Co (1876) 93 US 527 as authority. 
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perils, even though that loss may have arisen from the negligence of its own 
employees.188  
Then, in a memorable phrase that indicates the court’s approval of such 
insurance, the judge held that, ‘[b]y obtaining insurance, he [the common carrier] 
does not diminish his own responsibility to the owners of the goods, but rather 
increases his means of meeting that responsibility’. 189  This statement has been 
referred to as the ‘Phoenix doctrine’190 and was subsequently applied in judgments 
dealing specifically with liability insurance.191 Sources suggest that insurance against 
the consequences of an insured or its employee’s negligence was from that point on 
regarded as a form of responsible behaviour, despite its potential for moral hazard, 
because the insurance could assist in compensating the prejudiced party.192 
The court concluded that counsel for the insurer had failed to provide it with 
any precedent where a ship owner (who obtained insurance on its ship and the goods 
it carried) could, in case of loss of the ship and the goods through the negligence of 
the master and crew, recover only for the loss of the ship and not for the goods.193 The 
court reasoned that if a ship owner could recover for the loss of the ship under such 
circumstances but not for goods it carried, 194  there had to be some trace of this 
distinction in the literature.195 As authority that no such distinction existed, the court 
referred to Walker v Maitland,196  one of the earliest English cases to affirm the 
validity of insurance against loss occasioned by the negligence of the insured’s 
employees.197  
                                                 
188 Phoenix Insurance above 323-324. 
189 Ibid para 324.  
190 Abraham Liability Century 24-25. 
191 See, eg, Boston & AR Co v Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co (1896) 34 A 778 at 786-787 and Trenton 
Passenger RR v Guarantors’ Liability Indemnity Co (1897) 37 A 609 at 611. See the discussion of 
these decisions in paras 2.3.3.1(b) and 2.3.3.2(b) below. 
192 Abraham Liability Century 24-26; and Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 581-582. 
193 Phoenix Insurance above 324. 
194 The insured goods that the court referred to here by implication belong to someone other than the 
ship owner, eg, to the shipper. Similarly, the insured goods in Phoenix Insurance belonged to the 
shippers, but the common carrier had the benefit of their insurance (although it did not amount to 
insurance on the goods).  
195 Phoenix Insurance above 324. As authority that no such distinction existed, the court referred to 
Walker v Maitland, one of the earliest English cases to affirm the validity of insurance against loss 
occasioned by the negligence of the insured’s employees. 
196 (1821) 5 B & Ald 171, 106 Eng Rep 1155. See Phoenix Insurance above 324-325 for the court’s 
extensive reference to the facts and decision in Walker v Maitland above. 
197 What the court in Phoenix Insurance wanted to illustrate by its extensive reference to Walker v 
Maitland, was that the Walker case did not exclude insurance cover for the sugar (goods that were 
carried by the ship but that belonged to the colony and not the ship owner) from the insurance cover, 
although the loss of the sugar was caused by the negligence of the ship owner’s employees. 
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The court in Phoenix Insurance then found that because a carrier could lawfully 
obtain insurance against the loss of carried goods resulting from the usual perils – 
even if the loss resulted from the negligence of the carrier’s employees – a carrier 
may likewise contract with the owner of the goods to provide that it will enjoy the 
benefit of insurance voluntarily effected by the owner.198 The court held that such an 
agreement did not prevent the owner from recovering the full value of the goods,199 
but it did bar the owner itself or its insurer (who could only sue in the insured’s right) 
from instituting any action contrary to the agreement between the carrier and the 
owner of the goods.200 
The insurance contracts against the consequences of loss due negligent conduct 
– eg, in the Walker decision – to which the court referred in Phoenix Insurance with 
approval to justify the validity of benefit-of-insurance clauses, actually concerned the 
insurance of goods rather than liability insurance in the sense of insurance against 
legal liability to third parties for loss, damage, or injury. Even giving the common 
carrier the benefit of a shipper’s insurance (as in Phoenix Insurance), did not amount 
to insurance, or liability insurance.201 The judiciary had yet to affirm the validity of 
liability insurance. However, the court’s approval of benefit-of-insurance clauses 
indicates that courts in the US were ready to enforce liability insurance which was due 
to be introduced within months of the Phoenix Insurance judgment.  
In conclusion, 202  it appears that public policy did not merely shift from 
condemning insurance against the consequences of an insured’s negligence as a moral 
hazard, to accepting it as a form of responsible behaviour. The change in public policy 
came about gradually with the expansion of civil liability and the changes in society 
which created a rising demand for liability insurance and which, in turn, put pressure 
on public policy to change.203  
                                                 
198 Phoenix Insurance above 325. 
199 Ibid. If the owner was, eg, under-insured, it could claim the difference between the insured amount 
and the full value of the goods from the carrier.  
200 Ibid. As explained earlier, the owners of the goods did not have a right to sue the carrier (at least not 
to the full extent of the insured sum) and therefore the insurer’s rights under subrogation were likewise 
limited. 
201 As explained in the introduction of para 2.3.1.1(c) above. 
202 For a discussion of the reasons for the delay in the introduction of liability insurance see paras 
2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 above. 
203 Abraham Liability Century 14. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 666 describes the same 
change in public policy towards liability insurance under Belgian law. He summarises it as follows: 
‘De filosofie van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht heeft inderdaad sinds her begin van de XIXe eeuw een 
evolutie doorgemaakt. De voornaamste bekommernis bestaat er niet langer in de aansprakelijken te 
straffen maar wel de slachtoffers te vergoeden’. This confirms that the development of liability 
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Abrahams summarises how public policy developed in favour of liability 
insurance: ‘Previously criticised on the ground that it was a method of avoiding moral 
responsibility, liability insurance was now recognised as socially desirable because it 
helped to assure that accident victims would be compensated for their injuries’.204 
Even though a third party did not have a direct claim against the liability insurer, 
liability insurance assisted the tortfeasor to satisfy claims against it. Whereas public 
policy used to be hostile to insuring against the consequences of an insured’s own 
negligence, public policy turned in favour of liability insurance that could assist to 
compensate the third party, even indirectly. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Rising Demand for Liability Insurance 
As mentioned previously,205 liability insurance took far longer than other forms 
of insurance to develop, because, amongst other reasons, the scope of civil liability 
was limited and society was not organised to create a demand for liability 
insurance.206 
The following paragraphs examine the expansion of civil liability and the 
changes in society which created a rising demand for liability insurance before it was 
introduced and legally recognised. They aim to explain how the scope of civil liability 
expanded and industrialisation changed society and created a demand for liability 
insurance. 
 
2.3.1.2(a)  The Expansion of Civil Liability  
Civil liability existed long before liability insurance was introduced in the UK 
or the US in the latter part of the nineteenth century.207 For example, in England, 
‘trespass’208 – the nearest medieval equivalent209 to today’s tort – already existed by 
                                                                                                                                            
insurance in Belgium was also delayed pending a change in public policy: liability insurance was first 
regarded as an excessive moral hazard for insurers, but in time was valued as responsible behaviour by 
an (insured) tortfeasor. See also Simoens (1980-1981) 44 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1962. 
204 Abrahams Liability Century 15.  
205 See para 2.3.1 above on the three reasons for the delay in the introduction in liability insurance. 
206 These are the second and third reasons for the delay in the introduction of liability insurance. See 
paras 2.3.1.2(a) and 2.3.1.2(b) below. These reasons are linked and discussed under one main heading 
in para 2.3.1.2. 
207 Abraham Liability Century 14; and Scales (2008) 94 Virginia LR 1260. See also Baker English 
Legal History 400-421 for further detail on the history of actions on negligence in England. 
208 See Baker ibid 60-61 where he explains trespass and trespass on the case as types of original writ in 
England. Also see the explanatory diagram in this regard at 70. 
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the fifteenth century. Until the middle of the nineteenth century there was no general-
purpose action based on negligence in English common law. 210  In Mitchell v 
Allestry,211 the court finally held that one was ‘answerable for all mischief proceeding 
from his neglect or actions, unless they were of unavoidable necessity’. 212  This 
judgment marked the start of the development of an independent action for damages 
caused by negligent conduct.213 By the middle of the nineteenth century almost all 
accident litigation was based on this broad action.214 
Until the late nineteenth century liability insurance was in any event largely 
superfluous as the scope of tortious liability was, in general, limited.215 Few instances 
of liability were recognised, relatively few claims were made, and there were stringent 
requirements for incurring liability. According to Abraham, ‘[a] variety of doctrines 
based on proximate cause, the absence of duty, the status of the parties and the 
plaintiff’s own conduct placed obstacles in the path of anyone seeking to recover 
damages in tort’.216  
The first factor Abraham identifies and which limited the scope of tortious 
liability, is the doctrine of proximate cause.217 The decision by the New York Court of 
Appeals in 1866, Ryan v New York Central Railroad, 218  illustrates some of the 
problems surrounding causation which limited the scope of tortious liability.219 Due to 
careless management, sparks from a passing locomotive set fire to the railroad’s own 
woodshed. The fire from the woodshed spread to Ryan’s house and completely 
destroyed it, yet the court denied the action for damages against the railroad. The 
railroad’s negligent conduct was not found to be the proximate cause of Ryan’s loss 
and it was therefore not liable.  
                                                                                                                                            
209 Baker ibid 400.  
210 Abraham Liability Century 20. 
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The court suggested that protection against loss and damages lay in first-party 
insurance, not in litigation or in the as yet unknown liability insurance.220 Ryan was 
decided more than twenty years before Phoenix Insurance,221 and it is clear from 
Ryan that public policy in the US at the time of the decision had not yet turned in 
favour of liability insurance.222 The court held:  
To hold that the owner must not only meet his own loss by fire, but that he must 
guarantee the security of his neighbors on both sides … would be to create a 
liability which would be the destruction of all civilized society. … [and it] would be 
to award a punishment quite beyond the offense committed (my emphasis).223  
As evidenced by the decision in Phoenix some twenty years later, after Ryan 
public policy tipped gradually in favour of insurance that resembled liability 
insurance.224  
The next factors which, according to Abraham, limited the scope of liability in 
tort, are the absence of duty and the status of the parties. These limiting factors may 
be illustrated with reference to an employer’s vicarious liability to fellow employees 
for the negligent acts of its employees. An employer was responsible for the negligent 
acts of its employees within the scope of their employment on the basis of the maxim 
respondeat superior.225 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the scope of 
the employer’s vicarious liability for the negligent actions of its employees was not 
yet settled226 – in fact, before the industrial era, the question was seldom adjudicated.  
From the 1840s, injured passengers and employees increasingly began to 
institute actions for damages against railway companies based on the negligence of 
their employees.227 During the period 1840 to 1875, and mainly in the context of 
railway accidents, English judges when called upon to interpret the vicarious liability 
of railway companies as employers distinguished between third-party ‘strangers’ to 
the workplace (which included passengers), and employees as personal injury 
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litigants.228 In cases involving the former category, judges continued to apply the 
broad vicarious liability of the pre-industrial era by enforcing the maxim respondeat 
superior.229 As explained earlier,230 common law carriers had a stringent duty of care 
towards passengers (and common carriers were strictly liable to owners of goods). 
However, when injured railway workers claimed that their employers were 
vicariously liable for their injuries caused by a fellow employee, the maxim 
respondeat superior was not applied. Injured employees were subjected to a very 
narrow theory of the employer’s vicarious liability.231 
This doctrine of common employment (or ‘fellow-servant rule’) entailed that an 
employee who had been injured by a fellow employee in the course of employment, 
could not bring an action against its employer, save if its employer was statutorily 
liable or had been personally negligent.232 This was first affirmed in the English case 
of Priestley v Fowler.233  
The next principle noted by the court in the Priestley case, was that of implied 
consent (volenti non fit injuria)234 – the employee willingly accepted risks incidental 
to its employment (such as being injured by fellow employees) in terms of its contract 
of service.235  
The English High Courts adopted the most expansive interpretation of the 
doctrine of common employment as a defence in the common-law world between 
1850 and 1860.236  The status of a party as an employee, and the absence of an 
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employer’s duty (due to the doctrine of common employment and the maxim volenti 
non fit injuria), limited the employer’s liability in tort towards its employees. The 
doctrine of common employment, the maxim volenti non fit injuria, and the doctrine 
of contributory negligence were all defences 237  to an employer’s common-law 
liability for injuries sustained by its employees in the scope of their employment, and 
were referred to as the ‘unholy trinity’.238 
The final factor which, according to Abraham, limited the scope of liability in 
tort, was the conduct of the plaintiff – so-called ‘contributory negligence’. 239  A 
negligent defendant could escape liability if the injured party’s negligence contributed 
to the accident.240 Carriers could even raise the defence of contributory negligence 
against injured railway passengers.241 
There was remarkably little accident litigation by modern standards until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. One of the reasons was that serious accidents were 
often fatal, and until 1846 death debarred an action for damages by the dependants of 
the deceased242 as ‘the right of action died with the injured person’.243 In 1846 the UK 
legislature enacted the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (‘Lord Campbell’s Act of 1846’).244 
The Act gave certain of the deceased’s relatives245 a right of action against a negligent 
defendant.246 It directed juries in fatal accident cases to award ‘such Damages as they 
may think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death’.247 This allowed 
judges a wider discretion in interpreting the phrase to juries.248 The Fatal Accidents 
Act, 1846, extended the scope of civil liability in tort and aided in securing 
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compensation for fatal accidents. 249  However, relatives of deceased employees 
generally had no action under the Act due to the doctrine of common employment.250 
Labourers campaigned for radical legislative reform of accident compensation 
law.251 In 1880 the English legislature passed the Employers’ Liability Act, 1880.252 
This Act removed some of the harsh restrictions on employers’ liability under the 
common law,253 expanded the scope of employers’ liability in tort, and triggered the 
introduction of liability insurance which had until then been negligible.254 Although 
that Act greatly increased an employer’s liability towards its employees, a large 
number of accidents did not fall within its provisions.255 The common-law defences, 
such as volenti non fit injuria and contributory negligence, remained available to the 
employer.  
The legislature sought to remedy the position, and in 1897 enacted the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1897.256 The Act extended the rights of workmen 
against their employees under the common law or the Employers’ Liability Act, 
1880.257 The Workman’s Compensation Act, 1897, provided that an employer had to 
compensate its employees for accidental personal injuries arising from and in the 
course of their employment, 258  irrespective of the cause of the accident or the 
negligence of the employer. 259  Employers could no longer raise the defence of 
contributory negligence to escape liability, unless the injury could be attributed to the 
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workman’s ‘serious and wilful misconduct’.260 Similarly, the principle of volenti non 
fit injuria was diluted by the Act in that injured employees were no longer expected to 
accept their fate. 261  The Employers’ Liability Act, 1880, and the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, 1897, assisted in the recovery of compensation for accidents.262 
When the 1880 Employers’ Liability Act extended an employer’s liability for 
accidents to its employees, most employers desperately needed insurance cover 
against those risks. Employers’ liability insurance263 was introduced shortly after the 
commencement of the Act.264 
 Civil liability has thus expanded considerably, for example, because of a 
change in the factors limiting its scope. The expansion of civil liability created a 
demand for liability insurance in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Colinvaux 
notes the significance of the development of liability insurance ‘as a response to the 
expanding risk of third party claims covered by the courts and statute’.265 
 
2.3.1.2(b)  Changes in Society: Industrialisation  
Apart from the expansion of civil liability, industrialisation contributed in 
creating a rising demand for liability insurance. 
In the farming communities that existed before the industrialisation of the 
nineteenth century, there were very few viable liability claims against third parties 
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and therefore no significant demand for liability insurance, 266  as the majority of 
personal injuries occurred on family farms.267 Potential defendants were either likely 
to be a family member who the victim had no interest in suing, or workmen (eg, 
drivers) who were not worth suing as they were unlikely to be able to pay the 
claim.268 By the end of the eighteenth century, a high proportion of collision cases 
involved ship owners as ships were valuable and their owners were perceived to be 
rich and worth suing.269 However, the recovery of damages in those cases was no 
simple matter and courts battled with the same issues that confronted them in the next 
century’s flood of railway cases.270 Until the first half of nineteenth century, typical 
tortious claims for accidental injury or damage were those of a rural society and, for 
example, involved farm or residential fires and horses and the carriages they pulled.271 
 Industrialisation led to urbanisation and population growth which, together with 
machine-based manufacturing and mechanised transportation, provided greater 
opportunity for accidents.272 Lloyds’s statistical committee, for example, found that 
the number of collisions at sea suddenly increased from the 1820s after the 
installation of steam engines and the replacement of sail power with steam from the 
1850s.273 Accidental deaths and injuries in railroad disasters increased274 alarmingly 
after the derailing of the first railway passenger train in England in 1829.275 From the 
1840s injured passengers and employees began instituting actions for damages against 
railway companies.276 Victims of accidents were no longer willing to accept their 
injuries or damage caused by others as fate or bad luck, and began increasingly to 
seek redress against the individuals and corporations responsible for the accidents.277  
The establishment of vicarious liability made it possible, for example, to sue the 
railway company rather than the negligent employee who had caused the accident.278 
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Railway companies were seen to have deep pockets and were worth suing. 279 
However, injured passengers generally won their cases, while injured employees 
generally lost theirs.280 Although railway employees were killed and injured more 
frequently than railway passengers, they rarely sued their employers after the 1850s 
due to their limited chances of success. On the other hand, railway passengers or their 
surviving relatives, increasingly sued railway companies and this led to a ‘swell of 
personal injury litigation’.281  
The passenger litigation and huge awards in damages were very costly for the 
railway companies 282  and the demand for liability insurance escalated. From the 
1860s railway companies litigated only those cases where the plaintiffs sought 
excessive damages or instituted fraudulent claims; other claims they tended to settle at 
the lowest possible amounts.283  
Industrialisation changed society’s perception of and reliance on litigation and 
in so doing created a demand for liability insurance. Colinvaux aptly points out that 
‘the history of risk, injury and liability is paralleled by the history of the growth of 
insurance’ – and the same holds true for liability insurance.284 
 
2.3.2 Mutual Marine Liability Insurance: Possible Precursor of Liability 
Insurance 
Having considered the delay in the introduction of liability insurance,285 we now 
turn to examine mutual marine liability insurance as the possible precursor of liability 
insurance.  
Mutual hull clubs and Protection & Indemnity (P&I) clubs are both forms of 
mutual286 marine insurance. They were created, at least in English law, to provide 
cover against risks that ordinary marine insurers and Lloyds were either not prepared 
to cover or to cover at reasonable cost.287 These risks included, but were not limited 
to, liability risks not covered by the traditional marine insurance contract.  
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Some marine insurance contracts added a ‘running-down clause’ for collision 
liability which provided cover to the ship owner for legal liability towards third 
parties for damage to another ship or its cargo resulting from a collision with, and 
caused by, the insured vessel. 288 
In the English case of Delanoy v Robson289  the court found, obiter, on the 
validity of insurance against damage that a ship owner may be liable to pay for 
running down another ship, that ‘[i]t would be an illegal insurance to insure against 
what might be the consequences of the wrongful acts of the insured’.290 However, the 
court created an exception where the insured also commonly functioned as an insurer 
and was therefore ‘as much interested to extend the principle of loss as to restrain 
it’.291 This collision liability was offered from as early as 1814, although its legality 
was still in dispute at that time.292  
In De Vaux v Salvador,293 for example, it was decided that collision liabilities 
did not always constitute ‘perils of the seas’ covered under the regular marine 
insurance contract. Marine insurers were only prepared to cover three quarters of 
collision liability and the balance had to be insured by P&I clubs. In addition to 
collision liability, ship- owner liability was later extended to include additional 
liability to third parties.294 Early in the nineteenth century at least twenty mutual clubs 
operated and covered additional risks, including ship-owner liability. 
Cases involving running-down clauses were rarely adjudicated by the courts 
before 1862.295 The English Parliament addressed insurance by ship owners against 
liability to third parties in the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862.296 This 
Act was repealed and re-enacted as the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894.297 Welford 
suggests that insurance by ship owners against liability that fell outside the parameters 
of the 1894 Act was invalid.298 
                                                 
288 So-called ‘running-down’ clause or ‘collision liability’. 
289 (1814) 5 Taunt 605, 128 Eng Rep 827.  
290 Delanoy v Robson above 827. 
291 Ibid.  
292 Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 407 n 140, 409 n 147.  
293 (1836) 4 A & E 420 
294 For example, liability imposed on ship owners for the dependants of a deceased person; liability for 
damage caused to harbours, docks, and piers; and liability for the full value of lost cargo. See Merkin, 
Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 1.006. 
295 Welford Accident Insurance 433. 
296 ‘An Act to amend “The Merchant Shipping Act, 1854”, “The Merchant Shipping Act Amendment 
Act, 1855,” and “The Customs Consolidation Act, 1853,”’ 1862, 25 & 26 Vict c 63. 
297 ‘An Act to consolidate Enactments relating to Merchant Shipping’ 1894, 57 & 58 Vict c 60. 
298 Welford Accident Insurance 433. 
55 
 
Certain authorities argue that running-down clauses in marine insurance policies 
were the first form of (public) liability insurance.299 For example, insurance by a ship 
owner against liability to third parties arising from collisions at sea was regarded as 
the first form of liability insurance, and motor accident insurance (as a form of public 
liability insurance) developed from it – at least insofar as it relates to insurance 
against liability arising from collisions on land.300  
Colinvaux concludes that the earliest forms of liability cover indeed appear to 
have originated in the marine insurance market.301 At the very least, mutual marine 
liability insurance was the precursor of liability insurance. However, mutual marine 
liability insurance itself may even have been the first form of liability insurance, 
although it was not offered independently but as additional cover to other or first-
party insurance. As discussed earlier, 302  even modern liability insurance may be 
offered on its own or may be combined under different sections in a comprehensive 
policy.  
 
2.3.3 The Legal Recognition of Liability Insurance 
The last part of this overview of the development of liability insurance 
addresses the pioneering insurance companies in liability insurance and focuses on 
how courts and legislation validated employers’ liability insurance 303  and public 
liability insurance.304 This thesis deals with liability insurance in general rather than 
any specific form of liability cover. It is therefore unnecessary to explore the history 
of all forms of liability insurance, but rather concentrates on the legal recognition of 
liability insurance as a concept and illustrates the mainstream development of liability 
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insurance by way of examples. This section also outlines the development of the 
liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured, and explores the origin of the liability 
insurer’s defence and the settlement of third-party claims. 305 
Although it is widely accepted that liability insurance first emerged in the form 
of employers’ liability insurance in the UK after the adoption of the Employers’ 
Liability Act, 1880,306 some accident insurance companies offered liability insurance 
earlier on a selective basis.307 Liability insurance was seen as a new field of accident 
insurance308  and accident liability insurance was offered from the mid-nineteenth 
century. 309  However, liability insurance developed randomly and remained 
unimportant until the enactment of the Employer’s Liability Act, 1880. 310  The 
introduction of motor vehicles in the UK in 1894 was followed by comprehensive 
insurance cover for first- and third-party claims.311 
  
2.3.3.1 Employers’ Liability Insurance 
2.3.3.1(a) The Pioneering Insurance Companies 
England’s Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation Limited was the pioneer 
in the field of liability insurance.312 It was formed in 1880 to provide indemnity to 
employers.313 The company’s prospectus stated that its primary objective of was ‘to 
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enable employers to protect themselves against the liability imposed upon them by the 
Employers’ Liability Act, 1880’.314 Among the objects listed in its memorandum was,  
to grant insurances to protect principals and employers, and otherwise to indemnify 
them from liability by any reason of injury, damage, or loss occurring to or caused 
by agents, servants, and workmen or other employees in their employ or acting on 
their behalf.315  
And also,  
to grant … insurances to protect principals and employers and otherwise indemnify 
them from injury, damage, or loss by reason of fraud or other misconduct of persons in their 
employ or acting on their behalf.316 
 Other accident insurance companies, such as the Railway Assurance Company, 
entered the market for employers’ liability insurance shortly afterwards.317 When the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1897, introduced the principle of automatic 
compensation for all accidents to workmen in hazardous occupations, and the 
Workmen’s Compensation Acts of 1900 and 1906, extended the principle to all 
workers generally, almost every employer was at risk and in need of liability 
insurance.318 In 1923 Welford aptly contended that employers’ liability ‘has been 
greatly extended by modern legislation, and insurance against it has become in 
practice a necessity’.319  
 
2.3.3.1(b)  The Validity of Employers’ Liability Insurance 
As early as 1887, the Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation Limited 
appeared as defendant before the courts.320 It does not appear that the validity of 
employers’ liability insurance was questioned, only the insurers’ liability in certain 
instances. Employers’ liability insurance was recognised in, amongst others, the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1906. 321  It was accepted that that statutory 
                                                 
314 Clayton British Insurance 128-129. 
315 Raynes History of British Insurance 292. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Cockerell & Green British Insurance Business 53 and Raynes ibid 292. 
318 Cockerell & Green ibid. 
319 Welford Accident Insurance 551. 
320 See, in general, the English treatises by Porter Laws of Insurance (2 ed) 188, 461; and Porter Laws 
of Insurance (3 ed) 47, 285, 476; and the American treatises by Beach Law of Insurance 66, 188-189; 
Woodruff Cases on the Law of Insurance 15-16; Vance Law of Insurance 584. 
321 Welford Accident Insurance 432. See ss 5 and 8(7) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906. 
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recognition made it unnecessary further to challenge the legality of employers’ 
liability insurance.322 
By 1920, the advantages of employers’ liability insurance for both employers 
and employees were clear. Jenks summarises these benefits as follows:  
[T]he adoption of the system of insurance against liability has practically deprived 
the measures [the Employers’ Liability Act of 1880 and the Workmen’s 
Compensation Acts of 1900 and 1906] of all terrors for ordinarily prudent 
employers; while the same system has guaranteed compensation to thousands of 
deserving workmen who would otherwise have been dependant on charity.323 
   
2.3.3.2  Public Liability Insurance324 
2.3.3.2(a)  The Pioneering Insurance Companies 
Insurance of an insured’s liability to the public at large (as opposed to a closed 
category of third parties) developed more slowly than employers’ liability 
insurance.325 The Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation Limited’s objectives 
were wide enough to include public liability insurance for employers.326 In 1880 the 
company started indemnifying employers in the UK against liability to persons other 
than their employees, so also covering the so-called ‘outside risk’.327 This cover was 
regarded as complimentary and additional to employers’ liability insurance and was 
                                                 
322 Ibid. Ten years after liability insurance was first introduced in Boston in the USA, the Court of 
Maryland rejected an attack on its validity in Boston & AR v Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co (1896) A 
778, 786-787. It cited Phoenix Insurance above as authority for its decision that insurance against 
losses that resulted from an insured’s own negligence was valid. See Abraham Liability Century 29-30; 
Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 582 and Vance Law of Insurance 605 for a discussion of the Boston 
decision. The following year the Supreme Court of New Jersey confirmed the validity of liability 
insurance on similar grounds and with reference to the same authority. See Trenton Passenger RR Co v 
Guarantors’ Liability Indemnity Co (1897) 37 A 609, 611. Also see Abraham Liability Century 29-30 
and Abraham (2005) 64 Maryland LR 582 for a discussion of this decision. 
323 Jenks History of English Law 339. 
324 Again, this included public liability insurance generally and driving-accident insurance: Welford 
Accident Insurance 428. 
325 Cockerell & Green British Insurance Business 53. 
326 Raynes History of British Insurance 292. 
327 Cockerell & Green British Insurance Business 53. Before the dawn of 20th century liability insurers 
in the USA also started to provide cover to employers for their liability to the public. See Abraham 
Liability Century 32-33 on the insurance companies that started to write public liability policies in the 
beginning of the 20th century. Also see and Abraham (2001) 87 Virginia LR 582 and Vance Law of 
Insurance 604-605, where he explains that employers’ liability insurance should rather be referred to as 
‘liability insurances’ because it did not merely cover an insured against liability towards its employees, 
but also against liability towards others such as passengers in the case of an insured common carrier. 
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initially added as an endorsement to the employers’ liability policies.328 Thereafter, 
public liability insurance grew sporadically.329 
 
2.3.3.2(b)  The Validity of Public Liability Insurance 
Public liability insurance was first defended by analogy with, for example, 
running-down clauses,330 but this proved questionable.331 As discussed earlier, 332 the 
legality of running-down clauses was initially questioned by the courts333 and was in 
any event limited in scope. Welford contends that it was, therefore, not a valid 
argument to defend the validity of public liability insurance by analogy with running-
down clauses.334  
After public-liability policies were introduced, they were by ‘common 
consent’335 regarded as valid and effective, but their legal validity still had to be tested 
in court. The legality of motor accident insurance (as seen as a form of public liability 
insurance) was first directly addressed by the English courts only in 1921 in Tinline v 
White Cross Insurance Association Limited.336  
Briefly, the insurance contract covered the insured against sums it was legally 
liable to pay to third parties as compensation for ‘accidental personal injury’.337 While 
driving his car at an excessive speed, the insured killed a pedestrian and injured 
others. He was convicted of manslaughter in a criminal case. The injured persons and 
the representative of the dead victim instituted action against the insured for damages. 
He attempted to claim from his insurance company, but the company refused his 
claim and contended that it was against public policy to indemnify him against the 
                                                 
328 Ibid. 
329 See the development of different types of public liability insurance in Enright & Jess Professional 
Indemnity para 1.184 and Cockerell & Green British Insurance Business 53. 
330 Welford Accident Insurance 432. See, eg, British Cash & Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store 
Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006. The case dealt with the validity of a contract of indemnity, but the 
court found it to be valid and referred to insurance against claims made by third parties such as 
employers’ liability insurance, running-down clauses and reinsurance in support of its argument at 
1014-1016.  
331 Welford Accident Insurance 432-433. 
332 Paragraph 2.3.2 above. 
333 Welford Accident Insurance 433 n l. 
334 Ibid 433. 
335 Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association Limited [1921] 3 KB 327 at 331. As to the legality of 
public liability insurance in the USA, see Trenton Passenger RR Co v Guarantors’ Liability Indemnity 
Co (1897) 37 A 609 at 611. Abraham Liability Century 30 notes that the doctrine of validating liability 
insurance (as in the Trenton case) was accepted almost without objection from the 1880s onwards. 
336 See Welford Accident Insurance 431-436 for his comments on the decision and for a general 
discussion on public policy and the legality of liability insurance.  
337 See Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association Limited above 327-328 for the facts of the case. 
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civil consequences of his criminal act. The court held that it was against public policy 
to indemnify an insured where the liability arose from his intentional criminal act.338 
However, it found that the accident had been caused by the insured’s negligence339 
and held that the policy covered him despite his criminal act in exceeding the speed 
limit.340  
Third-party insurance against motor-vehicle accidents had become compulsory 
in the UK by 1930, but by that time many motorists had already voluntarily insured 
themselves against liability.341 
 
2.3.3.3  Early Liability Policies and Some General Principles of Liability 
Insurance 
  By 1923 some time had elapsed since the introduction of liability insurance, and 
two forms of liability insurance could be identified in English law: employers’ 
liability insurance; and public liability insurance.342 As explained earlier,343 public 
liability insurance included both public liability insurance in general, and motor 
accident insurance. 344  As far as employers’ liability insurance was concerned, an 
employer could insure against liability at common law,345 liability under the Fatal 
Accidents Act, 1846, the Employers’ Liability Act, 1880, and the Workmen’s 
                                                 
338 Ibid 330-331. 
339 Ibid 332. The court did not draw a distinction between the different grades of negligence. It found 
that the liability policy even covered the insured’s apparent gross negligence.  
340 Ibid. For an opposite view, see O’Hearn v Yorkshire Insurance Co (1921) 64 DLR 437, 439 
(OntSC) where the Ontario Supreme Court acknowledged the legality of liability insurance, but 
rejected the insured’s claim because of its (negligent) criminal conduct. See Welford Accident 
Insurance at 436 note r for a discussion of this decision. See McNeely (1941) 41 Columbia LR 26-60 
for a comprehensive overview of the role of illegality in the context of liability insurance. 
341 See again para 2.2.5.1 above on private and social liability insurance. 
342 Welford Accident Insurance 428. In 1905, Cooley distinguished between three types of liability 
insurance in the USA, namely insurance against liability for injury to employees, against liability for 
persons other than employees (eg, passengers) and against all classes of persons (eg, the general public 
or strangers): see Cooley Law of Insurance 241-242. There were at least 32 forms of liability insurance 
in the USA by 1941. See McNeely (1941) 41 Columbia LR 26. 
343 Paragraph 2.3.3 above. 
344 Welford Accident Insurance 428, and 480-510 for a comprehensive overview of public liability 
insurance by 1923 under English law. For details on liability insurance against accidents by vehicles, 
see Beach Law of Insurance 189-190 where he refers to English and American case law. Also see 
Richards Law of Insurance 678-679 on carriers’ liability policies in the USA that covered carriers 
against liability to third parties. 
345 See para 2.3.1.2(a) above. 
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Compensation Act, 1906.346 However, for an insured to by covered, each liability had 
to be specifically insured against.347 
 Employers’ liability insurance and public liability insurance could be separate 
or combined in a single policy. Liability insurance could also be coupled with 
property insurance and personal accident insurance.348 
 In general, third parties had no direct claim against liability insurers as the 
‘insurers [were] under no obligation to the persons injured by the assured’s act’.349 
Liability policies in UK as a rule contained a clause allowing the liability 
insurer to conduct the defence of the action brought against the insured and to control 
any proceedings against the insured.350 
 
2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The first part of this chapter351 dealt with the nature of liability insurance from a 
jurisdiction-neutral perspective. Constituting supra-national working definitions of 
‘insurance’ and of ‘liability insurance’ are challenging. At its core, liability insurance 
is insurance against the insured defendant’s legal liability, as opposed to any liability, 
to third parties. It may be broadly classified as indemnity insurance and as so-called 
‘third-party insurance’.  
Liability insurance has to be distinguished from other forms of contract such as 
contracts in favour of third parties, although liability insurance may in exceptional 
                                                 
346 Welford ibid 552. 
347 For a comprehensive overview of employers’ liability insurance by 1923 under English law, see 
Welford Accident Insurance 552-624 who classified liability insurance as a form of accident insurance 
rather than as a separate branch of insurance. It is clear that employers’ liability insurance was the 
dominant form of liability insurance in the USA by the beginning of the 20th century. See Beach Law of 
Insurance 188-189; Elliott Law of Insurance 451-458; Elliott Law of Insurance (rev ed) 451-458; 
Bacon Benefit Societies (2 ed) 1047-1049; Bacon Benefit Societies (3 ed) 1320-1322; Richards Law of 
Insurance  664-668; and Cooley Law of Insurance 3313-3319. Whereas Bacon discusses employers’ 
liability insurance under accident insurance in both of these treatises, Vance and Richards deal with it 
in separate chapters. Also see Cady Outlines of Insurance 353-360 for a copy of a workmen’s 
compensation and employer’s liability policy during the 1920s. 
348 Welford Accident Insurance 428. 
349 Ibid 431 and for more general principles of liability insurance by 1923 under English law 428-479. 
For some general principles of liability insurance by 1911 under American law, see Richards Law of 
Insurance 668-678. Also see Cady Outlines of Insurance 349-352 for a copy of a liability policy from 
the 1920s. 
350 See Welford Accident Insurance 477-479 for further detail as regards the conduct of the defence and 
the recovery of the costs thereof. In the USA, liability policies from early on obliged the insurer to 
defend actions against its insured and to bear the costs thereof. It also gave the insurer the right to settle 
claims. However, the insured had to give immediate notice of any potential claims and had to assist the 
insurer in its defence. See Abraham Liability Century 35-37; Abrahams (2001) 87 Virginia LR 87; 
Richards Law of Insurance 677-778; and Vance Law of Insurance 607-608. 
351 Paragraph 2.2 above. 
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cases take the form of a contract in favour of the third party. This will for example be 
the case when the liability of a third party is also insured by way of an ‘authorised-
driver clause’ in a comprehensive motor-vehicle insurance contract. Liability 
insurance can also be distinguished from other types of insurance such as first-party 
insurance and reinsurance. Some reinsurance contracts may, however, follow the 
nature of third-party indemnity or liability insurance contracts depending on the 
nature of the primary insurance.352 
This chapter also reviewed different types of liability policies. Liability 
insurance cover may be provided in a separate policy, it may be combined under 
different sections in a comprehensive policy, or it may also be provided as part of 
‘insurance against all risks’. Liability insurance may be classified as either private or 
social insurance and may either be effected on a voluntary or be mandatory as 
required by statute. Although liability insurance may be offered by non-profit 
insurers, most modern liability policies are insurance for profit.353 
The first part of this chapter on the supra-national nature of liability insurance 
provided a theoretical background for the rest of the thesis. 
 Having identified the general characteristics of liability insurance, the second 
part of the chapter 354  described the historical development of liability insurance 
spanning almost a century, from an Anglo-American perspective. Traces of liability 
insurance could already be identified even when first-party insurance against losses 
caused by an insured’s own negligence were still regarded as against public policy. As 
civil liability expanded and society changed through industrialisation, public policy 
gradually swung in favour of liability insurance. Liability insurance was eventually 
regarded not only as beneficial, but even as necessary for both the insured defendant 
and the third-party plaintiff.  
At the very least, mutual marine liability insurance was the possible precursor to 
liability insurance. It is widely accepted that liability insurance as we know it first 
emerged in the form of employers’ liability insurance in England after the passing of 
the Employers’ Liability Act of 1880. It then shortly thereafter spread to the United 
States of America and on into other jurisdictions. Insurance of an insured’s liability to 
                                                 
352 The focus of this study is on liability insurance contracts, to the exclusion of particular types. See 
para 1.9 above on the limitations and delineation of the study. 
353  This study is limited to private liability insurance contracts as opposed to social ‘insurance’ 
schemes. See para 1.9 above on the limitations and delineation of the study. 
354 Paragraph 2.3 above. 
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the public at large (as opposed to a closed category of third parties) developed slower 
than employers’ liability insurance (to provide cover for its employees). In Europe 
liability insurance also emerged in industry late in the nineteenth century. 
The eventual availability of liability insurance added to an increase in tortious 
claims which, in turn, raised the demand for liability insurance. Abrahams 
summarises the interaction between the law of tort and liability insurance as follows:  
Often the sequence has begun with tort law expanding the scope of liability or 
permitting ever-larger recoveries. Liability insurance then responds by providing 
insurance against the new liabilities and greater amounts of coverage. … In other 
settings the sequence of interaction takes place in reverse. Here liability insurance 
comes into existence first, and tort law then seeks it out by creating new forms of 
liability, at least partly in response to the availability of this insurance as a source of 
compensation.355 
 
New forms of liability insurance continue to develop in response to changes in 
the law and liability, new technology, and a growing demand from society. 
 The history, origin, and development of liability insurance play a role in, for 
example, what ‘legal liability’ means, and how the conduct of the insured (eg, as 
regards the elements of fault or wrongfulness) impacts on its liability cover.  
The development of liability insurance law in South African law should take 
account of the universal nature of liability insurance, and the purpose of providing 
liability cover. The first forms of liability insurance were aimed at indemnifying the 
liability insured against third-party claims. Initially third parties generally did not 
have a direct claim against liability insurers, but third-party rights under liability 
insurance became increasingly important over time. There has been a growing 
emphasis on the interests of third-party plaintiffs in some jurisdictions, to ensure that 
third parties obtain the benefits from the insured defendant’s liability cover.  
Liability policies in England usually contained a clause that allowed the liability 
insurer to take over the defence of the action brought against the insured and to 
control any proceedings against the insured. In the United States of America, liability 
policies from early on obliged the insurer to defend actions against its insured and to 
bear the costs thereof. Under some systems the liability insurer now has a duty to 
                                                 
355 Abraham Liability Century 4 and for further detail on the interaction between liability insurance and 
the law of tort, 171-197. The term ‘delict’ is used in the South African chapter (ch 3) and context, 





defend, and in others even a right to decide to conduct the defence, depending on 
statutory provisions.  
These issues are explored further in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.356 
The next chapter, Chapter 3, analyses the relevant legal principles pertaining to 
liability insurance contracts under South African law, an uncodified or common-law 
system. 
                                                 
356 Chapters 3, 4 and 5 below. 
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SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION1  
The nature and general principles of liability insurance from a jurisdiction-
neutral view, as well as the initial introduction and historical development from an 
Anglo-American perspective of liability insurance, were discussed in Chapter 2. 2 
Liability insurance, however, when compared to the Anglo-American countries, was 
only introduced in South Africa as late as in 1942. This was by the introduction of a 
statutory form of motor-vehicle accident compensation,3 as liability insurance could 
not be recognised within the constraints of the Roman-Dutch law which applied to 
insurance. 4  Other forms of liability insurance, such as cover for the conduct by 
directors and officers of companies, professional liability cover for medical 
practitioners and attorneys, and general liability insurance cover, developed from 
there on over time, keeping track with international developments and to serve the 
interests of society and business. This thesis focuses on the prevailing law relating to 
contracts for general liability insurance. 
 In addition to the initial examination of the sources of liability insurance law,5 
this chapter identifies and analyses some of the lacunae, unique challenges, and 
impracticalities in the South African insurance law specifically as regards liability 
insurance contract law. The focus is on the following problematic areas: 
 
                                                 
1 The following sources have been consulted and are relied on generally in this chapter. Reinecke, van 
Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.24-25.83; Jacobs (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 
202-227; and the Replacement of the Policyholder Protection Rules in terms of the Short-term 
Insurance Act 53 of 1998 (‘SIA’), promulgated as GN 1433 in GG 41329 of 15 December 2017 and in 
effect from 1 January 2018, unless provided otherwise (the ‘PPRs’). A few amendments were made to 
the PPRs. The amendments were promulgated as GN 996 in GG 41928 of 28 September 2018 and 
came into effect from 1 October 2018. Previous versions of the PPRs fall outside of the ambit of this 
study. See also Millard Modern Insurance Law 30, 42 and 45; and Kuschke Insurance Against Damage 
Caused by Pollution passim on environmental damage against pollution, as far as it concerns liability 
insurance.  
2 Chapter 2 above. 
3 Van Niekerk (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 453-463. 
4 Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 408-409. 




– essentially, issues that arise in respect of the liability insurer’s duty to 
indemnify its insured and in relation to the liability insurer’s conduct of 
the defence and settlement of third-party claims brought against the 
insured defendant; and 
– as subsidiary theme, the legal uncertainties that may precede the 
liability insurance contract (including contract negotiation), that may 
endure for the entire subsistence of the contract (including claims 
management),6 and that may continue after the expiry of the contract.  
Some of these legal challenges can be addressed by novel and creative 
applications of our national law not yet pursued and this chapter sets out to do so.7 As 
to the remainder, this chapter identifies areas in which South African law lacks 
answers and where the other jurisdictions under review in this thesis can fruitfully be 
examined to find potential solutions.8  
The choice of English and Belgian law for the legal comparative study has 
already been explained.9 It may be re-stated that the other national chapters as far as 
possible follow the same structure10  to enable optimal vertical comparison of the 
research questions identified earlier and to facilitate the application of the foreign 
comparative materials to South African law if and where relevant. The main sources 
of all insurance contract law under South African law are common law and judicial 
                                                 
6 As ‘claims management’ is a very wide concept, this study is limited to how a claim should ideally be 
managed under the provisions of the specific liability insurance contract. The insured’s duty of 
notification of third-party claims serves as an example. Notification depends on the type of liability 
insurance contract involved. See para 3.2.2.2 below.  
7 For example, as to disclosure in the PPRs. Most countries have some form of regulation on fair 
treatment of the insured or policyholder in general – some by statute, others in subordinate legislation 
or only via principles such as Treating Customers Fairly (‘TCF’). This thesis does not delve into all of 
these provisions on general fairness for purpose of the comparative study as it provides answers for 
liability insurance contract law issues only.  
8  South African law may, eg, find valuable guidance on how English courts have dealt with the 
interpretation of the term ‘legal liability’. And so far as the duration of liability cover is concerned, 
guidance may further be found in the English law on the interpretation of terminology under the 
different types of policy and their triggers. See Chapter 4 below. Belgian law again is progressive as far 
as the liability insurer’s statutory right, and duty, to defend the insured defendant against third-party 
claims, and as regards the extensive third-party rights that protect the victim against the liability insurer 
itself. See Chapter 5 below.  
9 See para 1.8.2 above on the legal comparative method in this study. 
10  There may be some change in emphasis due to the unique characteristics of the respective 
jurisdictions. Greater focus falls on the improvement and expansion of the PPRs under South Africa 
law. Under English law, the interpretation of a liability insured’s ‘legal liability’ towards the third-party 
plaintiff is more complex and expansive than under South African and Belgian law (cf paras 3.2.2.1, 
4.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.1 below). The Belgian system governing the conduct of the defence and settlement of 
third-party claims by the liability insurer is again more advanced and detailed than the equivalent 
analysis under South African and English law (cf paras 3.3, 4.3 and 5.3 below). 
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decisions, legislation such as the LIA,11 the SIA, the Insurance Act of 201712 and their 
respective regulations, and the relevant PPRs, and finally, trade usage, customary 
insurance law and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.13  
 Although liability insurance is a specialised branch of insurance, no 
specialised dedicated legislation is in force to regulate this form of insurance,14 and 
thus the law of liability insurance is found in these same sources to a greater or 
lesser degree. The sources of liability insurance (contract) law are discussed 
below.15 
 
3.1.1 Common law and Judicial Decisions  
As mentioned above, South African commercial law is based on Roman-
Dutch law,16 including insurance law as confirmed in Mutual and Federal Insurance 
Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality.17  
True to a common-law legal system, the principles of the South African law of 
insurance developed over time based on judicial precedent arising from case law.18 
The definition of an insurance contract in general, and a liability insurance contract 
specifically under common law, were discussed in the preceding chapter.19 These 
general descriptions are amplified in the statutory instruments that follow. 
 
3.1.2  Legislation and Policyholder Protection Rules 
Liability insurance contracts in South Africa are regulated, in particular, by the 
SIA, the PPRs, and the new Insurance Act of 2017.20 These are general insurance law 
statutes and legislative instruments.  
                                                 
11 Act 52 of 1998. 
12 Act 18 of 2017 (‘Insurance Act of 2017’). 
13 ‘The ‘Constitution’. 
14 Section 156 of the Insolvency Act of 1936 (‘Insolvency Act’) provides for a statutory exception 
which applies in the event of sequestration of the insured defendant under liability insurance. See para 
3.2.3.2 below. 
15 On the sources of South African insurance law generally, see Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber 
South African Insurance Law ch 2; and Schulze Insurance Premium para 8.1. 
16 Liability insurance was in general neither possible nor recognised in Roman-Dutch law. See Van 
Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 408-409 and para 2.3 above. 
17 [1985] 1 All SA 324 (A). 
18 See, eg, Lake v Reinsurance Corporation Ltd 1967 (3) SA 124 (W) 127, where the court ventured a 
definition of an insurance contract. However, it is has been criticised for being incomplete. See 
Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 5.14.  
19 See paras 2.2 and 2.2.1 above. 
20 Other insurance legislation addresses regulatory aspects in particular. See the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 (‘FAIS Act’) and the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 
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The SIA defined a ‘liability policy’21 as:  
[A] contract in terms of which a person, in return for a premium, undertakes to 
provide policy benefits if an event, contemplated in the contract as a risk relating 
to a liability, otherwise than as part of a policy relating to a risk more specifically 
contemplated in another policy relating to another definition in this section 
occurs; and includes a reinsurance policy in respect of such a policy.22 
The SIA was in force until June 2018 after which some of its provisions 
(including definitions) were revoked and replaced by the new Insurance Act of 2017. 
The Insurance Act of 2017 however, only provides for classes and sub-classes of 
insurance business, but contains no distinct definition of a liability policy. It is 
therefore submitted that the spirit of the definition of a liability policy under the SIA – 
parts of which are still in force – remains applicable in that it was not expressly 
replaced. 
The Insurance Act of 2017 distinguishes between life insurance (previously 
long-term insurance)23 and non-life insurance (previously short-term insurance), as 
well as classes and sub-classes of insurance business.24 
Liability insurance as a form of non-life insurance is included in Schedule 2 
table 2 of the Insurance Act of 2017 which provides for the following classes and sub-
classes of non-life insurance: directors and officers; employer liability; product 
                                                                                                                                            
(‘FSRA’). The Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill (‘COFI’) was published on 11 December 2018 
and invited comments by 1 April 2019. This Bill is designed as the next step in the introduction of the 
‘Twin Peaks system’ in South Africa and is set to replace the market conduct provisions of the majority 
of the financial sector laws. Under a Twin Peaks system two regulators are established. One is 
responsible for market conduct and consumer protection, while the other is charged with maintaining 
the stability of the financial system (called prudential regulation). In South Africa, the Financial Sector 
Conduct Authority (‘FSCA’) is to oversee market conduct and the Prudential Authority (‘PA’) will be 
responsible for prudential regulation. See generally, Hattingh & Millard FAIS Act Explained passim; 
Millard (2018) 21 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘FSRA’ 1-2; Millard (2018) 21 Juta’s Insurance Law 
Bulletin ‘COFI Bill’ 81-89, and Millard ‘Fair Play?’ 129-145. This study focuses on the law of liability 
insurance contracts.  Insurance regulatory and supervision regimes fall beyond this ambit, but the thesis 
makes recommendations on the regulation of selected aspects relevant to liability insurance contract 
law. See para 1.9 above. Note that the majority of sources referred in this chapter, pre-date new 
insurance legislation and the PPRs. See, eg, Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African 
Insurance Law and Jacobs (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 202-227. 
21 Section 1(1)(xix) sv ‘liability policy’. 
22 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.27. For purposes of this 
study, no distinction is made between the terms ‘insurance contract’ in the sense of the agreement 
between the parties, and ‘insurance policy’ as referring to the reduction of the agreement to tangible 
form. The terms are used interchangeably. 
23 Long-term insurance or life insurance falls beyond the scope of this study and no reference is made 
to legislation and PPRs dealing with this form of insurance. 
24  These divisions are for administrative purposes. The PPRs still refer to the term short-term 
insurance, and not to non-life insurance as under the Insurance Act of 2017. Under the statutory 
definition, a liability policy is a short-term policy providing liability cover only. See Van Niekerk 
(1999) 2 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Legislation’ 116.  
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liability; professional indemnity; public liability; aviation; engineering; marine; 
motor; rail; transport; personal; and others.25 Some of these classes are thus specific 
forms of liability insurance. 
The TCF Principles and their consumer protection measures were included in 
the PPRs and are now part of these legislative instruments.26 The PPRs were enacted 
under section 55 of the SIA, as amended by the Insurance Act of 2017, and are 
recognised as formal statutory enactments. These PPRs apply to short-term policies27 
where the policyholder is a natural person, or a juristic person whose annual asset 
value is less than the threshold value as determined by the Minister of the Department 
of Trade and Industry in terms of section 6(1) of the Consumer Protection Act, 
2008.28  
 It must be emphasised that South Africa insurance does not resort under general 
consumer protection legislation and has been exempted from the general consumer 
protection provisions in the CPA.29 At present, therefore, there is no exclusive set of 
legislative rules that applies specifically to liability insurance as a distinct class of 
insurance, save for section 156 of the Insolvency Act which provides for a statutory 
exception in the event of the sequestration of the insured defendant.30 
 
3.1.3 Trade Usage and Customary Insurance Law 
 
A trade usage may develop into a rule of law that will be enforced by courts.31 
                                                 
25 The Insurance Act of 2017 also introduces a legal framework for microinsurance. See the definition 
of ‘microinsurance business’ in s 1 of the Act, read with Schedule 2 tables 1 & 2. Microinsurance is not 
limited to only one kind of insurance product. The PPRs contain more detailed rules specifically on 
microinsurance. See rule 2A. See also para 2.2 above on the general nature of liability insurance from 
an overall jurisdiction-neutral perspective and para 2.2.5 above on the different types of liability policy 
in general. This study concerns the general aspects of the law of liability insurance to the exclusion of 
particular types. 
26 See generally Millard (2017) 20 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Infusion with Fairness’ 1-19; 
Millard (2018) 21 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Replacement of the PPRs’ 2-5; and Millard (2018) 
21 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Legislative reforms’ 35-78.  
27 Rule 2 sv ‘policy’. Some of the rules apply to a ‘claimant’ and ‘potential policyholder’. See the 
definitions under rule 2. This study does not distinguish between the terms claimant, policyholder, 
potential policyholder, or insured and refers to all of these as ‘insured’ or ‘insured defendant’. If the 
term ‘claimant’ were to be used, it could be confused with the third-party plaintiff in the context of 
liability insurance. 
28 Act 68 of 2008 (‘CPA’). See generally Jacobs, Stoop & Van Niekerk (2010) 13 PER 302-406. 
29  The FSRA provides that the CPA does not apply to any financial sector law (like insurance) 
regulated by the FSCA. See Nagel et al Commercial Law paras 152-153. Cf, Vessio ‘Twin Peaks’ 113-
127 on Twin Peaks and the impact of the CPA on financial products and services.  
30 See para 3.2.3.2 below. 
31 Nagel et al ibid para 2.06. See the distinction between trade usage and custom. On the role of custom 
in Roman-Dutch law, see Van Niekerk Insurance in the Netherlands 245-268. Both trade usage and 
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This appears to be the case with some issues relating to insurance practice that are not 
covered by legislative instruments such as the specific Acts, regulations, PPRs and 
other codes of conduct. The relevance of trade usage or implied agreement to, for 
example, the passing of risk between contracting parties has been recognised in case 
law.32 The importance of trade usage as a source of insurance law has decreased 
considerably. 
Customary insurance law is a constitutionally recognised source of law and 
applies parallel to the common law as source of law, although not always equally 
important.33 There is considerable scope for further research in this area.  
Customary law, for example, regards ‘stokvels’ as informal risk-spreading 
mechanisms. The well-known local ‘stokvel’ can be described as a form of a savings 
club, where members contribute on a regular basis and are then allowed to draw 
money from the communal pool in accordance with a pre-determined roster.34 One of 
the benefits of a stokvel is that members have access to this savings pool in case of 
adverse events. In the context of liability (insurance), it may be argued that such 
savings may be used if a third-party claims an indemnity from an ‘insured’ or 
wrongdoer based on the latter’s legal liability towards it. A stokvel is not per se 
insurance or liability insurance, but it serves the same function as insurance. It also 
provides access to savings similar to having those savings in a banking account.35  
 
3.1.4  The General Law of Contract, Insurance Law and the Law of 
Liability Insurance 
 
The liability insurance contract is first and foremost a contract. 
It follows, therefore, that liability insurance contracts as insurance contracts are 
subject to the general law of contract.36 Although they are further subject to certain 
                                                                                                                                            
custom are less important in modern insurance law due to the proliferation of legislation. But see 
Hutchison (2017) 17 SA Merc LJ 17-42.  
32 See, eg, Barloworld Capital (Pty) Ltd t/a Barloworld Equipment Finance v Napier 2005 (1) SA 57 
(W). 
33 Hutchison (2017) 17 SA Merc LJ 17-20. 
34 Ibid 23 and 26. See also Schulze Insurance Premium para 9.1 on stokvels as informal financial 
structures as part of research on the legal aspects of an insurance premium. 
35 Further detail falls beyond the scope of this thesis on general liability insurance (contract) law. 
36  See generally Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract as to the law of contract. On the validity 
requirements of contracts in general, see Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance 
Law ch 7. 
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specific legal rules applicable to general insurance37 and more specifically to liability 
insurance.38 
 
3.1.5 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The Constitution is the supreme law, with indirect horizontal application to civil 
obligations created by contract.39 It contains no provision specifically applicable to 
insurance, but its values enjoy application via other legislative instruments – eg, the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfairness Act of 200040 which gives effect 
to the right to equality as enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution. In accordance 
with the Constitution, the Equality Act prohibits unfair discrimination.41 In particular, 
the Equality Act provides a list of illustrative unfair practices in the insurance 
industry.42 Many of these practices arise during risk profiling, premium calculation, 
and to determine the extent and limits of insurance cover provided. It depends on the 
circumstances of each case whether or not these practices involve unfair 
discrimination and so contravene the Equality Act, or whether they are merely 
differentiation that is permitted. 
  
Summative critical comment  
First, the primary sources of South African liability insurance contract law raise 
concern. Despite the increasing importance of legislation, the statutory provisions are 
fragmented and so general as to be insufficiently comprehensive. This means that the 
common law and judicial decisions remain the principal sources of liability insurance 
contract law in South Africa. It is regrettable that the new Insurance Act of 2017 did 
not address some of the main concerns relating to liability insurance contract law.43 
This may be explained by the fact that insurance legislation in South African law 
                                                 
37 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid ch 5 on the essentials of an insurance contract; and para 
2.2 above. See also, eg, Lorcom Thirteen (Pty) Ltd v Zurich Insurance Company South Africa Ltd 
[2013] 4 All SA 71 (W) on insurable interest in the context of liability insurance. 
38 See in particular Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid paras 25.24-25.83; and Jacobs (2009) 21 SA 
Merc LJ 202-227 on liability insurance. This is the focus of the study and not general aspects of the law 
of contract or insurance: see again para 1.9 above. 
39  See Hutchison & Pretorius Law of Contract para 1.10 for further detail on the effect of the 
Constitution on contracts in general. 
40 Act 4 of 2000 (‘Equality Act’). 
41 Section 6. 
42 Item 5 in the Schedule of the Act refers to three practices in connection with insurance services that 
are possibly unfair and in need of attention. See Van Niekerk (2000) 3 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 
‘Promotion of Equality’ 26-37.  
43 See Chapter 3 passim. 
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generally focuses on prudential, supervision and regulatory matters, and not on 
aspects of insurance contract law which lie at the heart of this study.44 
As explained earlier,45 it is particularly important for the international reader to 
note that insurance does not fall within South African general consumer protection 
legislation. The aim of the legislator in excluding insurance from general consumer 
protection legislation was to allow the insurance industry to introduce and enforce its 
own consumer protection measures tailored specifically to insurance contracts. 46 
Consumer protection measures for the insurance industry are, in the main, introduced 
via the PPRs of 2018 which focus on the conduct of the insurer, its treatment of the 
insured, regulation of communications, and the format of policies – eg, the duty to use 
plain language,47 transparency, and disclosure.48 For liability insurance (consumer) 
contracts, the PPRs have to be applied and enforced as the primary consumer 
protection instruments. That may be challenging and onerous for insurers. This 
chapter identifies core areas that may benefit from the application of the PPRs in the 
context of liability insurance, and further recommends how the PPRs may be 
expanded and improved to give optimal effect to consumer protection and the 
introduction of fairness in that sphere.49 
From the sources surveyed, the application of the constitutional values to 
liability insurance in South Africa has not reached its full potential. Examples are 
provided throughout this chapter, for example regarding equality, and access to 
justice.50 
                                                 
44 The final COFI legislation may change this position. 
45 See para 3.1.2 above. 
46 The implementation of mandatory rules is to a large extent dependent on the self-regulation by the 
insurers. The enforcement of and sanctions fall within the powers of the FSCA, the ombuds, and the 
courts. 
47 Rule 2 of the PPRs defines ‘plain language’ as a ‘communication that is clear and easy to understand; 
avoids uncertainty and confusion; and is adequate and appropriate in the circumstances, taking into 
account the factually established or reasonably assumed level of knowledge of the person or average 
persons at whom the communication is targeted’. 
48 Note again that the PPRs are recognised as formal legislative instruments. 
49 Clause 33 in the COFI Bill on unfair contract terms may also in future further advance fairness for 
‘financial retail consumers’. The final COFI legislation is awaited to determine the extent of the 
provisions and how they will be implemented in the insurance industry. As to the concept of ‘fairness’ 
in the regulation of contracts under the CPA, see Stoop Concept ‘Fairness’ passim (but note that the 
CPA does not apply to insurance contracts). The PPRs incorporate the TCF principles. 
50 See, eg, para 3.2.3.2 below for the third-party plaintiff’s exceptional claim against the liability 
insurer under s 156 of the Insolvency Act, and para 3.3 below for the conduct of the defence and 
settlement by the liability insurer. 
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This chapter underlines voids, challenges, and impracticalities in the South 
African law of liability insurance.51 These may be addressed by novel and creative 
application of our national law not yet pursued by the legislator or courts, and by 
implementing potential solutions found in the other jurisdictions under review.  
Second, as to foreign law, comparative legal research of the English and 
Belgian laws governing liability insurance in subsequent chapters, may assist in the 
development of South African law where solutions for the challenges posed by 
liability insurance contracts are lacking. They must, however, recognise the 
differences52 between our national system and foreign legal systems.53  
Third, this chapter contains summative critical comments throughout which will 
be collated only in the summary of the final conclusions and recommendations for the 
development of the law of liability insurance in South Africa in the final chapter.54 
Conclusions and recommendations are based on the thesis that is developed during the 
course of this study. As explained earlier, the aim of this study is to promote legal 
certainty as to the selected aspects which are most challenging in liability insurance 
practice – the nature and extent of the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured, 
and the conduct of the defence and settlement by the liability insurer of third-party 
claims against the liability insured.55 
 
3.2 THE LIABILITY INSURER’S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY THE 
INSURED 
Liability insurance depends not on only one simple legal obligation between an 
insurer and an insured as in ordinary property or life insurance. There are at least two 
distinct legal obligations that underlie third party or liability insurance – the obligation 
leading to the legal liability for which insurance cover is obtained; and the insurance 
obligation providing cover for that legal liability – each governed by its own rules of 
                                                 
51 See in particular the summative critical comments in the course of this chapter, and the summary and 
concluding remarks in para 3.4 below. 
52 For example, differences in terminology or legal principles, and practicality of implementation as 
part of the general legal framework that governs the law of liability insurance contracts under South 
African law. 
53 The chapters on English and Belgian law are Chapters 4 and 5 below. See in particular paras 4.4 and 
5.5 for summaries and concluding remarks on the survey conducted on selected aspects of the law of 
liability insurance under these foreign systems. 
54 See Chapter 6 below for the summary of the final conclusions and recommendations reached. 
55 See para 1.5 above for the research statement and objective, and para 1.9 above for limitations and 
delineation of the study. 
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law. Furthermore, third-party rights under liability insurance, and even a direct right 
to claim against the liability insurer, has become increasingly important.56  
The eventual enforcement of the insurance obligation depends, first, on the 
existence of the preceding liability obligation which is dealt with in detail below.57 
Liability claims that are insurable can arise, inter alia, from delict, contract, 
unjustified enrichment, administration, and statute. Simply put, where the insured 
defendant is legally liable towards the third-party plaintiff, this liability may be the 
risk for which liability insurance cover was procured by the insured defendant. 
The nature and content of the legal obligation between the third-party plaintiff 
and the insured defendant depends on the establishment of liability in law, whether 
delictual or otherwise. The obligation between the insured and the liability insurer 
depends strictly on the agreement between the parties as shaped by other mandatory 
legal principles. 
As the insured is generally ignorant of how the law establishes civil liability, 
and also how the contractual liability insurance obligation functions, it is of the 
utmost importance that the insurer complies with its duties of disclosure in both 
respects. This means that in compliance with its transparency duties, the insurer must 
disclose all relevant information of both relationships to the insured. This includes, on 
the one hand, information as to the insured defendant’s potential liabilities towards 
third-party plaintiffs that the policy covers, and the conduct expected of the insured 
defendant as soon as potential liability and a potential insurance claim becomes 
apparent. This means that more extensive information must be provided as to what a 
‘legal liability’ that is covered may entail.58 On the other hand, the insurer must also 
provide information on the nature of the cover it provides under the policy, the 
triggers of claims,59 the exclusions,60 and all other aspects that might impact on the 
insured’s right to be indemnified by its insurer.61 
                                                 
56 See para 3.2.3.2 below on the legal relationship between the liability insurer and the third-party 
plaintiff. 
57 This aspect is therefore discussed in para 3.2.2.1 below as part of the wider analysis of the legal 
relationship between the liability insurer and the insured defendant. 
58 For a detailed discussion of ‘legal liability’ and its role in liability insurance, see para 3.2.2.1 below. 
59 For a detailed discussion see para 3.2.2.2(a) below on the insured event, and for the duration of 
liability cover, see para 3.2.2.2(b) below. 
60 See para 3.2.2.3 for further detail on exceptions to, exclusions from, and limitations on liability 
cover. 
61 See this para 3.2 here passim on the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured. See also para 3.3 
below on the conduct of the defence and settlement by the liability insurer. 
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The common-law requirement of making proper pre-contractual disclosures in 
principle requires the disclosure of material information (in general) that could affect 
the agreement between the parties.62 This makes the duty of disclosure very broad and 
leads to uncertainty on the part of the insurer, as to exactly what it must disclose, and 
uncertainty on the insured’s side as to what it is entitled to ask for. The latter does not 
have sufficient knowledge to request specific information or an explanation from the 
insurer of the more intricate facts relating to the nature of the cover provided, unless a 
more specific list of facts is available. It is one of the aims of this study to highlight 
those specified aspects which the insurer must disclose, the identification of which 
will assist both the insurer and the prospective insured.  
A brief discussion of an insurer’s statutory disclosure duties under the PPRs 
follows,63 after which the aspects that should in view of this study require mandatory 
disclosure are identified and analysed.64 
Rule 11.4 of the PPRs provides for disclosure by the insurer before the policy is 
entered into and requires that an insurer should provide the insured with prescribed 
information, including ‘the type of policy and a reasonable and appropriate general 
explanation of the relevant policy’.65 Rule 11.4.2 also requires an insurer to disclose 
‘the nature and extent of policy benefits, including, where applicable, when the 
insurance cover begins and ends and a description of the risk insured by the policy’.66 
This information only addresses broad aspects as it is intended to cover most forms of 
                                                 
62 As explained in the context of insurance law by Millard & Kuschke (2014) 17 PER 2412-2418. For 
purposes of this thesis it is important to note that the common-law duty is general and contains no 
specific aspects that qualify as ‘material’ with regard to liability insurance disclosures.  
63 Insurers operate by way of representatives or insurance intermediaries. The PPRs clearly provide that 
an insurer remains responsible to comply with the requirements set out in the rules, irrespective of 
whether it outsourced a function to another person; or relied on a representative to facilitate 
compliance. See rule 1.3 of the PPRs. This responsibility by the insurer is confirmed in rule 11.3.6 in 
the context of disclosure. Further detail on agency and insurance intermediaries falls beyond the ambit 
of this thesis. See para 1.9 above on limitations and delineation of the study. 
64 Disclosure duties are discussed as they arise in the course of this chapter as they are relevant to 
different aspects of liability insurance contracts. The rules on disclosure may be accessed in the PPRs 
and are not restated in every scenario: more important is the examples of when disclosure by the 
insurer is required, as applied to liability insurance contracts, which are highlighted in this chapter.  
The General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Service Providers and Representatives 
(‘GCC’) under the FAIS Act, BN 80 of 2003, as amended, also prescribes mandatory disclosure by 
financial services providers, like insurers, and their representatives. See in particular rules 3 and 7 of 
the GCC. The thesis does not analyse these rules of general application in further detail. However, 
specific aspects regarding liability insurance should be described as mandatory disclosures in the GCC 
rules, in the same way that the PPRs should be expanded and applied to liability insurance contracts. 
See Hattingh & Millard FAIS Act Explained 10 and 37-38 on the GCC. 
65 Rule 11.4.2(b). 
66 Rule 11.4.2(c). 
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insurance. Not all important aspects of liability insurance are specifically described 
which results in legal uncertainty, ignorance, and disputes between the parties.  
 It remains a challenge to explain liability insurance contracts and their intricacies 
to potential insureds. The average person (insured) does not easily comprehend the 
intricacies of civil liability regimes, or their effect on the insurance relationship where 
liability insurance cover comes into play. The extent of the general duty of disclosure 
for purposes of transparency is not delineated comprehensively enough in existing 
legislative instruments on specific terms that apply to exclusively liability insurance.  
It is one of the general disclosure requirements under Rule 11.3 that any 
communication by an insurer to an insured, or potential insured,67 must be ‘in plain 
language’ 68  and ‘not misleading’. 69  This duty on the insurer is in line with the 
common-law requirement that a party to a contract, or to a prospective contract, may 
not make a material misrepresentation to the other party as this will affect the 
consensus between the parties. At issue here is not the insured’s pre-contractual duty 
of disclosure of information that may likely have materially affected the assessment of 
the risk under the policy at the time of its issue, renewal, or variation.70 Yet both the 
insurer’s statutory and common-law duties lack specificity on exactly what must be 
disclosed, to the extent that in practice very little is disclosed about the underlying 
legal aspects relating to liability insurance of which insureds are generally ignorant. In 
the discussion below, any reference to disclosure is a reference to the duty to disclose 
which rests on the insurer under the PPRs, unless indicated to the contrary.71 
A further general legislative requirement is that communication should take 
place ‘by using an appropriate medium, taking into account the complexity of the 
information being provided’. 72  Rule 11.3.4 broadly prescribes that ‘information 
provided must enable [the insured] to understand the features of the policy and help 
[the insured] understand whether it meets [the insured’s] requirements’.  
To determine ‘the level of information to be disclosed, the insurer must 
consider’73 a number of factors, including the ‘factually established or reasonably 
                                                 
67 Rule 11 also applies to potential insured – see rule 11.2. 
68 Rule 11.3.1(a). 
69 Rule 11.3.1(b).  
70 See para 3.2.2.4 below for further detail on the insured’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure of 
material facts. 
71 See Chapter 3 passim. 
72 Rule 11.3.1(c). See also rules 11.3.1(d)-11.3.1(e) as to the format of the communication required, eg,  




assumed knowledge and experience of the [insured] or average targeted [insured] at 
whom the communication is targeted’;74 ‘the policy terms and conditions, including 
its main benefits, exclusions, limitations, conditions and its duration’; 75  and ‘the 
policy’s overall complexity, including whether it is entered into together with other 
goods or services’.76 Rule 11.3.5 is especially relevant as it provides that 
[a]n insurer must take particular care to provide adequate information in respect of 
more complex or bundled features which are likely to be difficult for [an insured] to 
understand, particularly regarding the costs and risks involved,77 including defining 
or explaining terms that could not reasonably be expected to be understood.78  
This requires the insurer to provide extensive explanations to the insured on 
both relationships in the liability insurance structure as discussed earlier in this 
section.  
The complex nature and structure of liability insurance has been highlighted 
and will be further developed in the course of this chapter. The liability insurer 
therefore has an onerous obligation in regard to its duty of disclosure to the liability 
insured. The PPRs apply to all forms of insurance contracts, and although they may 
appear to be detailed, there are scope for further expansion and application to 
liability insurance in particular. A (partial) solution in meeting the requirements of 
fairness set by the PPRs, would be to provide for specialised and more detailed PPRs 
applicable exclusively to liability insurance contracts, and further to provide the 
insurance consumer with detailed explanatory notes, tables, and examples in plain 
language.79 
 
                                                 
74 Rule 11.3.4(a). 
75 Rule 11.3.4(b). As to the duration of liability insurance contracts, see para 3.2.2.2 below. As to 
limitations on, exceptions to, and exclusions from liability cover, see para 3.2.2.3 below. 
76 Rule 11.3.4(c). Liability cover may be stand-alone or part of a comprehensive policy. See para 2.2.5 
above on the different types of liability insurance. 
77 See, eg, para 3.2.1.1 on the loss covered under liability insurance. 
78 For example, ‘legal liability’ to third parties (para 3.2.2.1 below); ‘occurrence-based’ or ‘claims-
made’ policies (para 3.2.2.2 below); and ‘subrogation’ in the context of liability insurance (para 3.2.4 
below). 
79 See examples of these recommendations in the critical summative comments throughout this chapter, 
in the summary and concluding remarks in para 3.4 below, and in the final conclusions and 
recommendations in Chapter 6 below. 
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3.2.1  The Legal Relationship between the Third-Party Plaintiff and the 
Insured Defendant80 
As liability insurance is classified as third-party insurance,81 the insured’s legal 
liability (both in fact and in scope) to the third party in principle determines the 
subsequent liability of the liability insurer to the insured.82  
An insured’s liability to the third-party plaintiff is in principle independent of 
any insurance; it is incurred irrespective of whether the defendant is insured or its 
liability to the third party covered. 83  Even though the defendant may not have 
insurance at all, or may not be covered under its liability insurance contract against 
the risk of loss for liability it incurred towards the third party, the defendant may still 
be liable towards the third party for the latter’s loss. For example: where the liability 
insurer is only liable to pay part of the third party’s damage and only pays that part of 
the damages claimed by the third party from the insured because of, for instance, 
under-insurance, the insured is not relieved of its liability towards the third party for 
the balance of the third-party claim. 84  Or, for example, where a defendant has 
intentionally caused loss to the third party, it may not be covered under its liability 
insurance (which as a rule covers only the consequence of innocent or negligent 
                                                 
80 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.25; Davis Gordon & 
Getz 482; and Van Niekerk (2006) 9 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Truck and General Insurance’ 
202. 
81 See para 2.2.2.2 above for further detail on liability insurance as third-party insurance. Liability 
insurance as third-party insurance is one of the general characteristics of liability insurance as viewed 
overall. The feature is the same under all of the legal systems reviewed. See also paras 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 
below. On the distinction between liability (third-party) insurance and first-party insurance, see Spar 
Group v Webber Unreported, FB, 27 Jan 2011, case no 4193/2010, as discussed by Van Niekerk (2011) 
14 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Spar Group’  84-86. See also Russell NO and Loveday NO v 
Collins Submarine Pipelines Africa (Pty) Ltd [1975] 1 All SA 344 (A); 1975 (1) SA 110 (A) on a claim 
that falls within the realm of liability insurance, as opposed to property insurance, and the meaning of 
‘damages’. 
82 See para 3.2.2.1 below for further analysis of the concept ‘legal liability’. For further detail on the 
legal relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the insured defendant in the context of the 
conduct of the defence and settlement of claims by the third-party plaintiff against the insured 
defendant, see generally para 3.3 below. Liability policies, eg, usually contain a clause prohibiting the 
insured from settling any claim by a third party, or from making any admission of liability without the 
insurer’s written consent. See para 3.3.1.2 below. There are differences in the legal obligations and 
relationships between the liability insurer, the insured defendant, and the third-party plaintiff under our 
law and the foreign systems considered. See Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
83 See generally, Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.34-25.40 
on the quantification of the insured’s loss with reference to the quantification of the liability it incurred. 
See also para 3.2.2.1 below on the scope of the insured defendant’s liability covered. 
84 See Masunga v Mutema & Another 2007 JDR 1029 (ZH) and the discussion of this case by Van 
Niekerk (2008) 11 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Masunga’ 17-19. Also see the relevance of the 




conduct), but may still be held legally liable towards the third party for the latter’s 
loss.85 
However, some commentators have recognised the potential influence of the 
existence of liability insurance cover on the imposition of civil liability on the insured 
defendant.86 A defendant may settle a claim by acknowledging liability towards the 
third party irrespective of merit, on the assumption that the loss will be covered by the 
defendant’s liability insurance policy. 87  The existence of liability cover may also 
cause a defendant to reduce the degree of care exercised and encourage negligent 
conduct based simply on the assumption that negative consequences will always be 
covered by its liability insurance.88 
 
Summative critical comment  
It has been explained earlier,89 and is highlighted during the course of this study, 
that the multiple legal relationships involved in liability insurance add to its confusing 
and complex nature and structure, both in regard to the duty to indemnify, and in 
conducting the defence and settlement by the liability insurer. That liability insurance 
is third-party insurance, is central in this regard.  
Conclusions and recommendations during the course of this chapter follow on 
how to simplify and clarify the legal obligations and relationships between the three 
main players in liability insurance – the liability insurer, the insured defendant, and 
the third-party plaintiff. 90  Proposals for reform address both liability insurance 
practice in general, and communications by the insurer to the insured. 
  
                                                 
85 See para 3.2.2.3(b)(ii) below on the conduct of the insured. 
86 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.24. See also Van Niekerk 
(2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 383. 
87 See para 3.3.1.2 below on the settlement of claims and on clauses that prohibit an insured to admit 
liability to the third party without the insurer’s prior written consent. See also para 3.3.1.1(c) below on 
conflict of interest and the conduct of the defence. 
88 See para 1.4 above on ‘moral hazard’ from an economic perspective, and para 2.3 above on ‘moral 
hazard’ and liability insurance from an historical Anglo-American perspective. 
89 See para 1.6 above on the significance of the study and the knowledge gap. 
90 This paragraph deals with the legal relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the insured 
defendant in the context of the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured. See also para 3.3.1 
below on the legal relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the insured defendant in the 
context of the liability insurer’s defence and settlement. See further paras 3.2.2 and 3.3.1 below on the 
legal relationship between the liability insured and the insured defendant; and paras 3.2.3 and 3.3.2 
below on the legal relationship between the liability insurer and the third-party plaintiff. On other legal 
relationships in the context of liability insurance, see paras 3.2.4 and 3.3.3 below.  
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3.2.2 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Insured Defendant 
 
3.2.2.1 The Scope of the Insured Defendant’s Liability Cover  
As we have seen,91 liability insurance covers only legal liability on the part of 
the insured defendant towards third parties.92 The fact that the third party suffers a 
loss or damage is not sufficient; the insured must be liable in law to the third party 
for that loss or damage. The third party must be entitled to recover compensation 
for it from the insured before the latter’s liability insurer will incur any liability in 
terms of the liability policy. 
 As liability insurance is indemnity insurance, the insured does not have a right 
to be indemnified, and the insurer is not obliged to indemnify the insured until the 
insured has suffered a ‘loss’. For purposes of liability insurance, a ‘loss’ is suffered 
when the insured becomes ‘legally liable’ towards a third party for causing the latter’s 
loss.93 This was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Truck and General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC & Another.94  
 The terms of the insurance contract primarily determine and describe what the 
loss to the insured entails, that is, its legal liability towards a third party for the latter’s 
loss, which may then trigger the liability of the insurer towards the insured under the 
liability insurance policy.95 The ‘loss’ that is covered is thus the liability incurred 
towards a third party. 
                                                 
91 See para 2.2.2.1 above on the classification of liability insurance as indemnity insurance. Liability 
insurance as indemnity insurance is one of the general characteristics of liability insurance as viewed 
from an overall perspective: the feature is the same under the South African and the foreign systems 
reviewed. See also paras 4.2.2 and 5.2.2 below. On the interpretation, and constitutionality of a clause 
that indemnifies a party against the liability it incurs similar to the effect of liability insurance, see 
Mercedez-Benz South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Municipality 2012 JDR 1770 (ECG) and the 
discussion of this case by Van Niekerk (2013) 16 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 5-9. The clause in 
question was held not to be an indemnity clause, but an exemption clause excluding the party’s 
liability. 
92 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.27, 25.29 and 25.50. The 
aim of liability insurance is to protect an insured against (legal) liability towards third-party claims. See 
Watson NO & Another v Shaw & Others 2008 (1) SA 350 (C) and the discussion of this case by Van 
Niekerk (2008) 11 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Watson’ 4-14.  
93 This is not the only requirement for a successful claim under a liability insurance contract. See para 
3.2.2.2 below on the insured event and the duration of liability. See also para 2.2.2.1 above.  
94 2007 (2) SA 26 (SCA) para 10. Also see the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2006) 9 Juta’s 
Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Truck and General Insurance’ 194-203.  
95 See paras 3.2.2.1(b)-3.2.2.1(c) below for further detail on the time when and ways in which the 
insured becomes legally liable towards third-party plaintiffs. The Truck and General Insurance v 
Verulam Fuel Distributors case is again relevant in this regard. Also see para 3.2.2.1(a) below for 




The meaning of the phrase ‘legal liability’, also referred to as ‘liability at law’ or 
‘liability to pay’, is one of the contentious issues concerning liability insurance 
internationally and in South African law and warrants detailed analysis.96 
 
3.2.2.1(a) The Extent of the Liabilities Covered 
The insured may be indemnified against amounts that it may be liable to pay to 
third parties in delict,97  for contractual performance, for a breach of contract, or 
statutorily. 98  Indemnity against certain forms of liability cover may be excluded 
expressly or implicitly in the policy itself. 
The term ‘contractual liability’ is often used in judicial decisions, insurance 
contracts, and by commentators without further explanation as to what it entails. It is a 
matter of interpretation in every instance whether a reference to contractual liability is 
to liability for damages imposed by law for breach of a contract, and if it also refers to 
liability imposed by agreement in the contract – ie, contractual liability for 
performance of a contract voluntarily assumed by the insured. 99  The duty not to 
breach a binding agreement or contract, which forms the basis for the remedy for 
breach of contract, is a contractual obligation that is legally imposed. Liability 
imposed by the contract for performance of a contract refers to liability that the 
insured defendant has incurred directly, or merely by reason of a contract voluntarily 
concluded between itself and the plaintiff, and not by breach.  
The different bases of liability may be briefly distinguished. The requirements 
for delictual liability are conduct (by commission or omission), wrongfulness, fault,100 
causation, and damages (both patrimonial and non-patrimonial), 101  whereas the 
requirements for breach of contract are that a contract must exist, performance must 
                                                 
96 See para 3.2.2.1(a) below for further detail. However, English law is far more complex but also rich 
in judicial precedent in this regard and in relation to the scope of the insured’s liability covered in 
general. See para 4.2.2.1 below. In contrast to the position under both South African and English law, 
the position under Belgian legislation is more concise and clear, in particular as regards to the time and 
the ways in which the insured defendant may become legally liable towards the third-party plaintiff. 
See para 5.2.2.1 below, with the focus on paras 5.2.2.1(b) and 5.2.2.1(c) below. 
97 The term ‘delict’ is used in the South African chapter and context, whereas the equivalent term ‘tort’ 
is used in respect of the foreign systems reviewed.  
98 Or otherwise, eg, by way of unjustified enrichment. 
99 On occasion also referred to as ‘liability by agreement’. An example is where performance to a third 
party is covered. See the public liability section in Multimark III which is a generic policy wording 
adopted widely by industry, but many variations and other wordings exist. 
100 Delictual liability without fault is also possible in some instances. See Neethling & Potgieter Law of 
Delict 379-399. 
101 Ibid 6-7 and chs 2-7 in general. See also Bradfield Christie’s Law of Contract 587-589, and chs 13-
14 in general for further detail. 
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be due, breach of contract must occur, and damages (patrimonial) must be suffered. 102 
In the instance of contractual liability for performance of a contract voluntarily 
assumed, there is a contract and performance is due for which the insurance covers 
the delivery of satisfactory contractual performance, not for the damages due to 
breach. Despite a number of distinctions, there is nevertheless a substantial overlap 
between delictual and contractual liability and there may even be instances of 
concurrent liability, provided that the requirements for each of the separate 
obligations are met.103 
Statutory liability refers to liability incurred under statute (legislation). There 
may, therefore, also be an overlap between statutory and delictual liability.104  
The meaning of the term ‘legal liability’, the different bases of liability, and the 
questions that arise due to the distinctions and overlap between theses bases, may now 
be discussed briefly. From the sources consulted, there is very little judicial authority 
and commentary on this issue in South African law.105  
The liability insured against and that is covered as a risk must be described in 
the insurance contract.106 It is a matter of interpretation in every instance to determine 
which type of ‘legal liability’ is covered. 
The relevant part of the insuring clause of the public liability section of an 
insurance contract for business risks for this part of the discussion, typically provides 
cover for ‘[d]amages which the insured shall become legally liable to pay consequent 
                                                 
102 See Russell NO and Loveday NO v Collins Submarine Pipelines Africa (Ptd) Ltd above on a claim 
that falls within the realm of liability insurance, as opposed to property insurance, and the meaning of 
damages. 
103 Concurrent liability refers to the situation where delictual and contractual liability may both arise on 
the same set of facts, and where the third-party plaintiff may have a choice between these two alternate 
causes of action.  
104 See Neethling & Potgieter Law of Delict 398, 399-402. The distinction between a statutory debt and 
a liability for damages is not recognised under South African law. See para 4.2.2.1(a)(iv) below for the 
contrary position under English law. 
105 However, English law is far more complex but rich in judicial precedent in this regard and in 
relation to the scope of the insured’s liability covered in general. See para 4.2.2.1 below. As to the 
extent of ‘legal liability’ of an insured defendant that is covered as regards third-party plaintiffs under 
English law, see in particular para 4.2.2.1(a)(i) below on whether ‘legal liability’ covers liability in tort 
to the exclusion of contractual liability; para 4.2.2.1(a)(ii) below on ‘legal liability’ for contractual 
liability; para 4.2.2.1(a)(iii) below on ‘legal liability’, liability voluntarily assumed, and settlements; 
and para 4.2.2.1(a)(iv) below on ‘legal liability’ under statute. 
In contrast to the position under English law, the position under Belgian legislation is prescribed 
more concisely and clearly, in particular as regards to the time and the ways in which the insured 
defendant may become legally liable to the third-party plaintiff. See para 5.2.2.1 below, and in 
particular, paras 5.2.2.1(b) and 5.2.2.1(c). There does not appear to be the same number of judicial 
decisions, legal doctrine, or legal uncertainty under Belgian law as to the scope of the insured’s liability 
covered as in South African or English law. 
106 Liberty Group Limited v Jordaan [2016] JOL 35513 (FB). See also Hirsch Appliance Specialists v 
Shield Security Natal (Pty) Ltd [1992] 1 All SA 84 (D) on the insurability of vicarious losses.  
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upon accidental death of or bodily injury to or illness of any person, or accidental loss 
of or physical damage to tangible property which occurred in the course of or in 
connection with the business’.107 
It is submitted that phrase ‘legal liability’ in the insuring clause in the example 
above is wide enough to include delictual liability, contractual liability108 (at least in 
the sense of liability imposed by law for damages for breach of contract),109 and 
statutory liability,110 except if expressly excluded.111  
As a rule, liability insurance contracts expressly exclude contractual liability 
for performance of a contract voluntarily assumed by providing, for example, that 
‘the insurer will not indemnify the insured for liability accepted by agreement which 
would not have attached in the absence of the agreement’. The reason for the 
exclusion of this type of contractual liability is that proper performance under the 
contract is seen to be in the hands of the insured, and there may be an absence of 
fortuity to hold to the contrary (eg, if an insured intentionally renders performance of 
                                                 
107 For example, see the public liability section in the pro forma Multimark III policy used in industry. 
Many different policy wordings exist. 
108 In the instance of contractual liability for performance of a contract voluntarily assumed, the remedy 
claimed is delivery of satisfactory contractual performance, not damages due to breach. The insuring 
clause in this example refers to ‘damages’. However, it is conceivable that contractual liability for 
performance of a contract voluntarily assumed may be covered under a different type of insuring 
clause, or by way of an extension clause. 
109 See David Trust & Others v Aegis Insurance Co Ltd & Another 2000 (3) SA 289 (SCA) on the 
scope of cover under a professional indemnity insurance contract. Liability insurance cover was 
provided against claims made on the insured for breach of contract that amounted to breach of duty in 
the practice of its profession by the insured. The nature of the insured’s contractual relationship with 
the third party, and whether the services that the insured rendered were in the conduct of its profession 
as accountants was the issue. See also the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2000) 3 Juta’s Insurance 
Law Bulletin ‘David Trust’ 57-63. See also the David Trust case on the discussion of claims-made 
policies in para 3.2.2.2(b)(ii) below. 
110 Verulam Fuel Distributors CC v Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd 2005 (1) SA 70 (W). As to 
the scope of liability cope of cover, a liability insurer indemnified an insured in respect of liability to 
the third-party plaintiff. The insurance contract provided cover against ‘all sums including the 
claimant’s costs and expenses which the insured ... shall become legally liable to pay in respect of ... 
damage to property other than property belonging to the insured’. Upon interpretation of the insurance 
contract, the court held that there was as no restriction as to the type of cost, expense, or liability 
covered, and that the insurer’s liability could not be restricted to instances where the insured’s liability 
was based on negligence or where the third-party plaintiff had sought to hold it liable: see para 13. The 
contract did not exclude the instance where the insured’s liability arose from statute without any claim 
from the third-party plaintiff. See also the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2004) 7 Juta’s Insurance 
Law Bulletin ‘Verulam’ at 197-204.  
111  See also Verulam Fuel Distributors v Truck and General Insurance above paras 9-10 for an 
interpretation of ‘liability at law’ with reference to leading English cases; and the case discussion by 
Van Niekerk ibid. The decision by the court a quo was confirmed by the SCA in Truck and General 
Insurance v Verulam Fuel Distributors above. See para 3.2.2.1 above. Legal liability due to other 
forms of liability, such as undue enrichment may even be covered, unless expressly excluded. See also 
Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.25. 
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the contract impossible).112 Liability insurance is not primarily intended to indemnify 
an insured against contractual liability for performance assumed by the latter. Cover 
for contractual liability under a general liability policy is, thus, the exception rather 
than the rule.  
Further, liability insurance does not cover liability accepted voluntarily or ex 
gratia the insured – eg, payments made on the basis of a moral obligation or to 
preserve the insured’s reputation or maintain a good business relationship with a third 
party.113  
 
Summative critical comment114 
As to the extent of the insured defendant’s legal liabilities towards a third-party 
plaintiff covered under a liability insurance contract, there is far less judicial authority 
on the issue than in English law.115 South African law may find guidance in how 
English courts have dealt with the interpretation of the term ‘legal liability’ to inform 
and develop our national liability insurance law. That was also the approach taken by 
the court a quo in Verulam Fuel Distributors v Truck and General Insurance 
above.116 The position in English law on this point is discussed in the chapter that 
follows. 
As a general rule one may accept the following: where the insurance contract 
contains no limitation as to the type of liability for which the insurer will be liable to 
the insured, the insured will be indemnified against amounts that the insured may 
delictually, contractually (for breach of contract in particular), statutorily, or 
otherwise (eg, by way of unjustified enrichment) be liable to pay to third parties. 
Contractual liability for performance of a contract voluntarily assumed is generally 
expressly excluded from liability cover. However, it depends on the interpretation of 
the insurance contract in every instance how wide the liability under the cover 
provided is. This depends on agreement between the insured and the insurer, and the 
                                                 
112 See para 3.2.2.3(b)(ii) below on the conduct of the insured for further detail on limitations on, 
exclusions to and exceptions from liability cover. 
113 See again the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2004) 7 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Verulam’ 
202-204 for more comments and examples as regards liability incurred extra-legally or voluntarily. 
114 Regarding para 3.2.2.1(a). 
115 See para 4.2.2.1(a) below on English law, including paras 4.2.2.1(a)(i)-4.2.2.1(a)(iv) below. 
116  The decision was confirmed by the SCA in Truck and General Insurance v Verulam Fuel 
Distributors above. See para 3.2.2.1 above. 
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type of product procured. In each event a risk assessment will also impact on the 
liability the insurer is willing and able to assume. 
As explained earlier,117 rule 11.3 of the PPRs provides for general disclosure 
requirements by the insurer and rule 11.4.2 regulates disclosure by an insurer before 
the policy is entered into. Rule 11.4.2(b) requires that the insurer must provide the 
insured with prescribed information, including ‘the type of policy and a reasonable 
and appropriate general explanation of the relevant policy’. Rule 11.4.2(c), provides 
that the insurer must disclose to the insured ‘the nature and extent of policy benefits, 
including, where applicable, when the insurance cover begins and ends, and a 
description of the risk insured by the policy’. 
To clarify the extent of the insured defendant’s legal liabilities towards the 
third-party plaintiff covered under the liability insurance contract, it is recommended 
that the insurance contract should provide, in clear terms, what type of legal liability 
is covered, and what excluded. Public liability policies,118 for example, provide cover 
for ‘damages that the insured will become legally liable to pay consequent to 
accidental death, bodily injury or illness to the third party, or accidental loss of or 
physical damage to tangible property which occurred in the course of or in connection 
with the business’.119 It is recommended that the insuring clause should rather specify 
the legal liability covered clearly on the inception of the policy – eg, that the policy 
covers legal liability incurred towards third parties against the consequences of the 
insured’s delict, breach of contract, and statutory liability. This should also be 
disclosed to the insured as required under the PPRs. 
Under rule 11.3.4 of the PPRs the policy’s provisions, including its ‘main 
benefits, exclusions, limitations, conditions and its duration,’ as well as the ‘policy’s 
overall complexity,’ determine the level of information that the insurer must disclose 
to the insured. The complex nature and structure of liability insurance, that places an 
onerous duty of disclosure on the liability insurer, has already been highlighted. 
‘Legal liability’ is one of the complicated features of liability insurance. 
                                                 
117 See para 3.2 above. 
118 See again, as an example, the public policy section in the pro forma Multimark III policy used in 
industry. But many variations exist. 
119 Liability assumed under agreement that would not have attached in the absence of the agreement is 
then specifically excepted from the risk under specific exceptions, but cover may be extended to some 
instances of liability assumed by agreement that does not fall within the exceptions by way of specific 
extension. This is complex and potentially confusing for an insured. 
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Rule 11.4.2(g) also requires disclosure by the insurer of ‘concise details of any 
significant exclusions or limitations120 as contemplated in rule 10.15’.121 Rule 11.5 
deals with disclosure by the insurer after the inception of the policy.122  The rule 
provides that the insurer should disclose to the insured at the ‘earliest reasonable 
opportunity’ after the inception of the policy, but within 31 days, written information 
in a format that is clearly distinguishable from the policy. This should include 
comprehensive details of all exclusions and limitations, including prominent 
disclosure of any significant exclusions or limitations as contemplated in rule 10.15. 
Contractual liability for performance of a contract voluntarily assumed, which is 
generally expressly excluded from liability cover, should be disclosed to the liability 
insured as required by the PPRs.123  
 
3.2.2.1(b)  The Time at Which the Insured Defendant Becomes ‘Legally Liable’ 
to Third-Party Plaintiffs124  
As mentioned there are at least three main possibilities as to exactly when an 
insured may become ‘legally liable’ towards a third party: 
– when the insured has actually compensated the third party;125 
– when the third party has acquired a prima facie cause of action against 
the insured;126  
– when the insured’s liability against the third party has actually been 
established by a court judgment, an arbitral award, or by agreement.127 
Each of these three possibilities in time is discussed in greater detail below. It 
remains a possibility that the insurer and insured could by agreement determine even 
more onerous requirements, such as meeting additional requirements, as set by the 
insurer. 
                                                 
120 Rule 11.1 on the definitions for rule 11 on disclosure defines ‘significant exclusion or limitation’ as 
‘an exclusion or limitation in a policy that may affect the decision of the average targeted policyholder 
[insured] to enter into the policy and includes … any limit on the amount or amounts of cover; any 
limit on the period for which the benefits will be paid…’. The definition uses the word ‘includes’ and 
the instances mentioned are examples, rather than a closed category. 
121 Rule 10.15 prescribes rules on prominence of certain communications to the insured. 
122 See rule 11.5.1. See also rule 11.4. 
123 The same applies to any exceptions to, exclusions from and limitations on liability cover. See para 
3.2.2.3 below.  
124 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.50-25.56. 
125 See para 3.2.2.1(b)(i) below. 
126 See para 3.2.2.1(b)(ii) below. 




3.2.2.1(b)(i)  Actual Payment 
The first option as to when an insured becomes legally liable towards a third-
party plaintiff embodies the narrowest view, in that the insured actually has to 
compensate the third party to trigger its liability cover.128 
If the liability insurer has, for example, inserted a so-called ‘pay-to-be-paid 
clause’ in its insurance contract, the insured is not entitled to be paid by the liability 
insurer until the insured has first actually paid the compensation due to the third-party 
plaintiff.129 
 
3.2.2.1(b)(ii)  Potential Liability 
The second option is the widest approach. An insured must provide prima facie 
proof of liability towards the third-party plaintiff, and need not actually have finally 
established liability in law or have discharged its liability before being able to claim 
from its liability insurer. In Truck and General Insurance v Verulam Fuel 
Distributors,130 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the cause of action can exist 
even though liability has not yet formally been established or proved. 
This appears to be the most common position under our law, unless the 
insurance policy specifically provides otherwise. 131  Consequently, legal liability 
arises when the third party has a prima facie cause of action against the insured – ie, 
when all the events have occurred which render the insured liable towards the 
third party, even though the amount of its liability has not yet been quantified or 
paid.  
This option favours the insured. An insured may, for example, be in a 
position much earlier to compel the insurer to decide as regards and consent to a 
                                                 
128 This is generally regarded as the original common-law rule under English law. See para 4.2.2.1(b)(i) 
below. But the position under English law has since changed. See para 4.2.2.1(b)(iii) below. 
129 See, eg, Botha v Iveco South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 JDR 0863 (SCA), where the indemnity clause 
required actual payment of the third party by the person to be indemnified, before any payment could 
be ‘recovered’ from the indemnifier. Also see the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2012) 15 Juta’s 
Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Botha’ 106-108.  
130 Above; paras 16-18 of the judgment. See again the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2006) 9 Juta’s 
Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Truck and General Insurance’ 194-203. See also paras 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.1 above 
for the further relevance of the decision on ‘legal liability’ and its scope covered under liability 
insurance. 
131 Van Niekerk ibid 200-202.  
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defence against or settlement with the third party.132 Further, an insuredʼs potential 
liability may trigger insurance cover and the insured may claim payment from the 
insurer without first having to pay the third-party claimant itself or to take any 
formal steps towards (formally) establishing liability. It has been emphasised by 
commentators that the aim of liability insurance is to ‘protect the insured from being 
required to make a payment to a third party or having to borrow money to be able to 
do so, and not merely to indemnify [the insured] after [it] had already done so’.133 
 
3.2.2.1(b)(iii)  Established Liability 
The third option adopts the golden mean between the former two views.134 The 
insurer becomes liable to the insured only when the latter’ liability to the third-party 
plaintiff has been established either by a court, by arbitral award, or by agreement 
between the insured and the third party. The liability insurance contract may require 
that liability be established in this way135 
 
Summative critical comment 
It may be accepted that the default position in South African law is indeed that 
potential liability suffices. Legal liability therefore arises when the third party has a 
prima facie cause of action against the insured – ie, when all the events have 
occurred which render the insured liable towards the third party, even though the 
amount of its liability has not yet been quantified or paid. As explained, this 
position favours the insured which offers a benefit some other jurisdictions do not.136 
Further, an insured’s potential liability may trigger insurance cover, and the insured 
may claim payment from the insurer without itself first having to pay the third-
party claimant or itself taking any formal steps to (formally) establish liability.  
                                                 
132 See also para 3.3.1 below for further detail on the defence and settlement by the liability insurer. 
133 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law in para 25.51. This is therefore 
regarded as a specific form of indemnity insurance. 
134 This position applies in English law unless the insurance policy specifically provides to the contrary. 
See para 4.2.2.1(b)(iii) below. This position also applies in Belgian law. See para 5.2.2.1(b) below. 
135 For example, Burley Appliances Ltd v Grobbelaar NO & Others [2003] 3 All SA 505 (C). 
136 For example, an insured may much earlier be in a position to compel the insurer to decide as 
regards and consent to defence against, or settlement with, the third party. See para 3.3.1 below on the 
defence and settlement by the liability insurer. 
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However, as seen above, this position may be amended by the terms of the 
insurance contract which might, for example, stipulate ‘pay-to-be-paid’ or require 
established liability.  
 
3.2.2.1(c)  The Ways in Which the Insured Defendant Becomes ‘Legally Liable’ 
to Third-Party Plaintiffs 
 The liability policy may determine what ‘legally liable’ means for purposes of 
the scope of risk in the policy. The ways in which the insured defendant may establish 
legal liability to third parties depend on the time at which (ie, how) such a stipulated 
‘legal liability’ is established in accordance with its description in the liability policy.  
If an insurance contract requires actual payment of the amount to the third-party 
plaintiff for purposes of the moment of the existence of ‘legal liability’, that will be 
required as a way of establishing an insurance claim covering such a legal liability.  
Where the insurance contract merely requires ‘potential liability’, legal liability 
arises when the third party has a prima facie cause of action against the insured – ie, 
when all the events have occurred which render the insured liable to the third 
party.  
If the insurance contract requires ‘established legal liability’, the insurer 
becomes liable to the insured only when the latters’ liability to the third-party plaintiff 
has been established by way of either by a court, by arbitral award, 137  or by 
agreement.138 
 
Summative critical comment 
As explained earlier,139 the general position under South African law is that 
potential liability suffices, but it may be difficult for an insured to establish the exact 
time or the way in which legal liability arises. It is not always clear to the insured 
when the third party has a prima facie cause of action against it – ie, when all the 
events have occurred which render the insured liable to the third party. As 
explained earlier,140 the PPRs require disclosure by the insurer to the insured. It is 
                                                 
137 See National Ports Authority, a Division of Transnet (Soc) Ltd v The Owners & Underwriters of the 
MV “Smart” 2017 JDR 1240 (KDZ) on arbitration and settlement. 
138 English law again has a rich supply of judicial decisions on how an insured becomes legally liable 
towards the third-party plaintiff by way of a court judgment, arbitral award, or agreement between the 
parties. See paras 4.2.2.1(c)(i)-4.2.2.1(c)(iii) below. 
139 See paras 3.2.2.1(b)(ii) and 3.2.2.1(c) above. 
140 See para 3.2.2.1(a) above. 
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recommended that the insurer disclose and explain to the insured, when exactly a 
prima facie cause of action will exist by way of a number examples to guide the 
insured as to when and how its legal liability is established for purposes of the scope 
of the risk in the policy.  
If the insurance contract requires actual payment or established liability for the 
insured defendant to become legally liable to the third-party plaintiff, it may prejudice 
the insured as explained above.141 However, these ways mark a more definitive time 
when and way in which, the insured defendant may become legally liability to the 
third-party plaintiff and may provide greater legal certainty for the insured in the long 
run. From the literature consulted, there is insufficient judicial precedent on 
established legal liability by way of court judgment, arbitral award, or agreement 
between the parties142 under South African law, and it may be necessary to look to the 
English law to develop our law where insurance contracts provide for such a position. 
 
3.2.2.1(d)  Prescription of Claims in Liability Insurance  
The third-party plaintiff’s claim against the insured defendant generally 
prescribes within three years after the debt becomes due under the Prescription Act of 
1969,143 unless stipulated otherwise in the Act (ie, shorter or longer limitation periods 
for statutory liability).144 The liability insured’s claim against its liability insurer also 
prescribes, as a rule, three years after the debt becomes due,145 unless reduced by 
agreement146 or if the claim has been extinguished or becomes unenforceable by a 
time-limitation provision.147 
                                                 
141 See para 3.2.2.1(b) above. 
142 This is understandable as it does not appear to be the general position under South African law. See 
paras 3.2.2.1(b)(ii) and 3.2.2.1(c) above.  
143 Prescription Act 68 of 1969, see s 12(1) on extinctive prescription. However, note ss 12(2) and 
12(3) on the interruption of prescription periods.  
144 Ibid s 11. 
145 Act 68 of 1969 s 12(1). Again, note ss 12(2) and 12(3) on the interruption of prescription periods.  
146 Under Belgian law, contractual clauses which shorten or extend the prescription periods, or provide 
for a different completion period, are void. See para 5.2.2.1(d) below.  
147 A defence based on time-limitation provisions must be distinguished from prescription. See Pereira 
v Marine and Trade Insurance Co Ltd 1975 (4) SA 745 (A) as to contractual time limits. See also 
Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 17.34. A ‘time-bar’ clause or 
‘time-limitation’ provision is an auxiliary contractual provision which limits the insured’s time within 
which to institute action against the insurer; it does not deny the insured the right to institute legal 
action. See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); and the discussion by Van Niekerk (2007) 10 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Barkhuizen’ 199-216.  
The Napier decision led to the introduction of new rules governing decisions relating to claims 
and time-limitation provisions in a previous set of PPRs. The position under rule 17.6 of the current 
PPRs is relevant. It is very detailed, but for present purposes the following should be emphasised: any 
time-limitation provision should not include the 90-day period within which the insured may make 
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 Summative critical comment 
A debt is due, for purposes of the commencement of the prescription period, 
once the third party’s prima facie cause of action against the insured has arisen.148 It is 
submitted that the test used to determine when and how an insured’s indemnification 
falls due, can be used to determine when the third party’s legal liability against the 
insured,149 and so also the insured’s claim against the insurer, have prescribed. It 
follows that where the third party’s claim against the insured has prescribed, the 
insured’s claim against the insurer for actual loss fails due to the extinction of legal 
liability.  
Difficult questions as regards legal liability and prescription may be raised in 
the context of liability insurance, and it is to be expected that more litigation will 
follow in this regard.150 This is particularly so because the prescription of the liability 
insured’s claim against its insurer is linked to the cause of action of the third party 
against the liability insured. Further, the liability insured cannot institute its claim 
against the insurer before the event which brings the case within the scope of the 
                                                                                                                                            
representations to the insurer after receipt of notice that the insurer repudiates or disputes the claim (or 
amount thereof), and any time-limitation provision should provide for a minimum period of 6 months 
after the expiry of the 90-day period (rule 17.6.8, read with 17.6.3(b)). An insured may request 
condonation from the court for non-compliance with a time-limitation provision ‘if good cause exists 
for the failure to institute legal proceedings and that the clause is unfair’ to the insured (rule 17.6.9). 
For purposes of prescription, the debt will only be due after expiry of the 90-day period after the date 
of receipt of the insurer’s notice of repudiation (rule 17.6.10). It has been argued that these rules are 
perhaps the best example of fairness in insurance. See Millard (2017) 20 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 
‘Infusion with Fairness’ 11-12. To ensure transparency in the claims process, the insurer should also 
disclose time limits for submitting claims to the insured See rule 17.8.3(c). 
148 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law in paras 25.54-25.55; and the case 
discussion by Van Niekerk (2006) 9 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Truck and General Insurance’ 
200-201. It is also the position under Belgian law that the insured’s claim against its insurer begins to 
run from the date that gives rise to the claim, but their insurance legislation contains detailed provisions 
as to prescription. See para 5.2.2.1(d) below. Cf, Shraga v Chalk 1994 (3) SA 145 (N) and Cape Town 
Municipality & Another v Allianz Insurance Co 1990 (1) SA 311 (C). These decisions, held that an 
insured’s indemnification falls due, and that prescription of the insured’s claim against its insurer 
starts running, only after the insured has actually paid the third party’s claim, or at least after the 
amount of the insured’s liability has been judicially or consensually determined. This is the position 
under English law: see para 4.2.2.1(d) below and judicial authority. See also the case discussion by 
Van Niekerk (1998) 1 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 40. See also Burley Appliances v Grobbelaar 
above as referred to in para 3.2.2.1(b)(ii) above. 
149 But the position may be different for prescription of the third-party plaintiff’s claim against the 
liability insurer in the context of s 156 of the Insolvency Act. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber 
ibid 25.56 and para 3.2.3.2 below.  
150 See paras 4.2.2.1(d) and 5.2.2.1(d) below on English and Belgian law, and for further detail on the 
intricacies of prescription in the context of liability insurance. See also paras 4.2.2.2(b)(iv) and 
5.2.2.2(b)(iv) below on prescription as applied to the different types of insurance contract under 
English and Belgian law respectively. 
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contract and triggers liability cover, has taken place.151 The materialisation of the risk 
in liability insurance may be a gradual process spanning a considerable period and it 
may be difficult to determine when the insured’s cause of action has arisen and so the 
actual commencement date of prescription.  
Detailed provisions under Belgian law152 provide legal certainty for the most 
part, and prescription in the context of liability insurance in South Africa should 
ideally be detailed in legislation, or in the PPRs, to provide for the start of a 
prescription period, and minimum periods, regulated in the same way as time-
limitation provisions.153 As to disclosure by the insurer, it is recommended that the 
application of prescription and time-bar clauses are again instances that have to be 
disclosed expressly and in simple terms to an insured under the PPRs. This is seldom 
the case, which leaves the insured oblivious to the dangers prescription holds for a 
successful insurance claim. 
 
3.2.2.2  The Insured Event and the Duration of Liability Cover154 
The above enquiry concerned whether legal liability was covered under the 
scope of risk under the policy. The insured may recover from its liability insurer only 
the loss which has been caused by an event covered by the insurance contract. The 
insured’s legal liability towards the third-party plaintiff is the insured’s loss155  in 
terms of the liability policy and should be distinguished from the ‘insured event’ or 
trigger of insurance cover that brings the matter within the scope of a particular 
duration or period of cover designated in the liability insurance contract. 156  This 
relates to whether an insurance claim can be brought under a particular policy, and 
still does not guarantee a ‘successful claim’.157 This can be extremely confusing for 
the average insured to grasp.  
                                                 
151 For example, the ‘loss’ under an occurrence-based policy and the ‘claim’ by the third party under a 
claims-made policy. See para 3.2.2.2 below. 
152 See para 5.2.2.1(d) below. 
153 Note again the distinction between prescription and time-bars; both apply to all types of insurance 
contract, but their application is particularly complex due to the nature of liability insurance. 
154 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law in para 25.46-25.48; and Van 
Niekerk (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 382-393.  
155 As discussed in para 3.2.2.1 above.  
156 There may be different ways to categorise and scrutinise this distinction, but the core focus of this 
analysis is to distinguish the exposition of ‘legal liability’ from the ‘trigger’ that brings the matter 
within the temporal scope of a particular policy. See also para 2.2.2.1 above.  
157 The success of a claim also depends on many other circumstances – eg, timely notice, disclosure by 
the insured. See para 3.2.2.4 below. 
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The ‘insured event’ may be the incidence of the loss itself, that is, the insured’s 
legal liability towards the third party, or it may be an earlier occurrence that merely 
led to the insured’s legal liability, such as an act of negligence on the insured’s part,158 
or another occurrence which marks a significant stage in the process leading to the 
insured’s legal liability. For example, the occurrence of the third party’s loss may be 
the ‘insured event’ (ie, the position in so-called ‘occurrence-based’ insurance), or the 
event may be a claim by a third party against the insured (ie, in cases of ‘claims-
made’ insurance). This distinction is of great importance both nationally and 
internationally as it affects the insurer’s duties and the insured’s rights to claim.  
One should even distinguish further between the duration of the liability 
insurance contract as provided for by the period of insurance, and the duration of 
liability cover.159 The period of insurance in a liability policy may, for instance, be 
one year. In South African law, most liability policies have a currency of one year but 
are renewable. However, it depends on the type of insurance cover whether 
occurrences that take place or claims that are made, before, during, or after the 
duration of the contract are covered. These are all possibilities in liability insurance 
practice. Liability insurance policies grant cover for a limited time. As far as the 
duration of the liability cover is concerned, there are two broad types in South Africa 
– ‘occurrence-based’ and ‘claims-made’160 liability policies. Some ‘hybrid’ liability 
policies that are variations of ‘occurrence-based’ and ‘claims-made’ liability policies 
are also available in the market.161  
A short practical example illustrates the difference between legal liability, the 
insured event, the duration of liability cover, and the different types of liability cover. 
Assume that an insured committed a delict against the third-party plaintiff (eg, 
                                                 
158 In so-called ‘act-committed’ insurance, which is more prevalent in continental legal systems, the 
insured’s breach of contract or delict brings the case within the scope of the policy. See paras 
5.2.2.2(a)(i) and 5.2.2.2(b)(i) below in the comparative chapter on Belgian law.  
159 Again, the latter is at issue here (in para 3.2.2.2). 
160 Or a variation, ‘claims-made and notified’: see para 3.2.2.2(b)(ii) below. It is interesting to note that 
claims-made policies are illegal in France. See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4B and 
17.4D on claims-made cover. 
161 There is scant judicial authority in South African law on this aspect, as opposed to English law. See 
para 4.2.2.2 below. This section relies on some of the principles of English law that could be applied 
mutatis mutandis in our law. Occurrence-based and claims-made policies are the main types of liability 
insurance contracts in both South African and English law. It remains a question of interpretation of the 
terms of the insurance contract in every instance. The position is described in detail in Belgian 
insurance legislation, but is very complex – see para 5.2.2.2 below. Loss-occurrence policies and 
hybrid claims-made policies are permitted under Belgian law, but care should be taken that 
terminology as to the duration of liability cover under Belgian law, is not merely equated to similar 
terms under Anglo-American systems.  
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conduct that may have caused a progressive disease like asbestosis) between 2010 and 
2017 by exposing the third party long-term to asbestos. Assume further that the third 
party’s disease only manifested in 2018, that the insured was legally liable to the third 
party, and that the latter claimed damages from the insured in 2019. The insured had 
successive liability insurance policies in place between 2010 and 2019. A period of 
insurance of one year was agreed on in each of the insured’s liability policies. The 
question here is which liability policy will be triggered? For an occurrence-based 
policy to be triggered, the period of insurance must be 2018 when the third party’s 
loss occurred. However, for a claims-made policy to be triggered, the period of 
insurance must be 2019, when the third-party claim was instituted against the insured.  
The distinctions between ‘occurrence-based’162  and ‘claims-made’163  liability 
policies, as far as the event and duration of the liability cover are concerned, will now 
be discussed in detail. Although not so prevalent, ‘hybrid’ policies may exist and 
develop under South African law164 mainly because prescribed forms of minimum 
liability cover and their trigger events are not formalised in our legislation.165 
3.2.2.2(a)  The Insured Event  
3.2.2.2(a)(i)  Occurrence-based Policies  
An occurrence-based liability policy, for example, would provide as follows: 
Defined events 
Damages which the insured shall become legally liable to pay consequent upon 
accidental death of or bodily injury to or illness of any person (hereinafter termed 
injury), or accidental loss of or physical damage to tangible property (hereinafter 
termed damage) occurring within the territorial limits during the period of 
insurance.166  
 
An occurrence-based policy contains an undertaking by the liability insurer to 
indemnify the insured for loss arising from an insured event, occurrence, 
circumstance, or accident and must occur within the period of insurance of a 
particular insurance policy. The insured event in the case of occurrence-based policies 
                                                 
162 For further detail see paras 3.2.2.2(a)(i) and 3.2.2.2(b)(i) below on ‘occurrence-based’ policies. 
163 For further detail see paras 3.2.2.2(a)(ii) and 3.2.2.2(b)(ii) below on ‘claims-made’ policies. 
164 For further detail see para 3.2.2.2(b)(iii) below on ‘hybrid’ policies.  
165 For further detail see the Belgian law for an example of a legal system with prescribed forms of 
liability cover in para 5.2.2.2 below, and the summative table in para 5.2.2.2(b)(iv) which also explains 
what parts are mandatorily prescribed and which not. 
166 Emphasis added. 
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is the time of the third party’s loss: the time of its death, or when it suffers the 
illness, injury, loss, or damage. Under this type of liability insurance, it is irrelevant 
when the act causing the occurrence (eg, the insured’s delict or breach of contract) 
took place or became known, when the third party actually claimed against the 
insured, or when the insured became liable towards the third party.167  
 
3.2.2.2(a)(ii)  Claims-made Policies  
A claims-made liability, for example, would provide as follows: 
Defined events 
Damages which the insured shall become legally liable to pay consequent upon 
accidental death of or bodily injury to or illness of any person (hereinafter termed 
injury), or accidental loss of or physical damage to tangible property (hereinafter 
termed damage) which occurred within the territorial limits and on or after the 
retroactive date shown in the schedule, and which results in a claim or claims 
first being made against the insured in writing during the period of insurance.168 
 
In claims-made policies, the liability insurer undertakes to indemnify the 
insured defendant for a claim that is first made by the third party against the insured 
within the period of insurance under that particular insurance policy.169  
As regards the use of the word ‘claim’, one must distinguish carefully between 
the claim by the third party against the insured, and the insured’s claim under its 
insurance policy. Whereas the third party may claim damages from the insured and may 
be referred to as the claimant in its action against the insured, the insured may claim 
from the liability insurer in respect of its legal liability towards a third party. Again, the 
meaning and nature of the word ‘claim’, referring here to the third party’s claim against 
the insured,170 is subject to an interpretation of the insurance contract and may be 
affected by the context. Although the inquiry starts with the insuring clause in the 
policy, there may be a separate definition in the contract. A ‘claim’ will bear its usual 
                                                 
167 See, in particular, Van Niekerk (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 391-392. See also para 3.2.2.2(b)(i) below for 
further detail on ‘occurrence-based’ policies, in particular the different possibilities on whether a third-
party loss occurred during the period of insurance. 
168 Emphasis added. 
169 The insurance policy may, eg, contain a time limit for making a claim by the insured against the 
insurer. 
170 In Caltrade CC v Santam Ltd [1997] JOL 365 (C) is was held that the phrase ‘any event which may 
result in a claim under this Policy’, as applied to liability insurance in respect of claims by third 
persons, refers to a claim, duly quantified and substantiated, made by the third person against the 
insured. The case concerned a claims-made policy. 
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meaning, but it may, for example, be defined expressly to include a simple letter of 
demand or a more formal issue of summons.  
Claims-made liability policies provide cover against third-party liability if the 
insured’s conduct (such as delict or breach of contract) which causes the third 
party’s loss or damage is discovered, and a third-party claim is made against the 
insured during the period of insurance.171 It is not relevant when that injurious 
conduct took place or the loss manifested.172 The event in the case of claims-made 
policies refers to the time when the claim is made against the insured by the third 
party.173  
  
3.2.2.2(b)  The Duration of Liability Cover  
3.2.2.2(b)(i)  Occurrence-based Policies  
Occurrence-based policies do not provide retrospective cover, but they do 
provide potentially unlimited prospective cover which is limited in practice only by 
statutory or contractual prescription periods.174 
Occurrence-based policies are the preferred type of insurance cover from an 
insured’s point of view. Under these policies, the liability insurer bears the risk of 
uncertain future claims. The biggest disadvantage for liability insurers contracting on 
an occurrence-basis is that they are exposed to the aforementioned ‘long-tail’ liability 
in that claims may be made by third parties against insured and hence by the insured 
against the insurers, long after the occurrence of the insured’s conduct that caused the 
death, injury, loss, or damage.175  
The differences between occurrence-based and claims-made policies are 
particularly relevant in the case of professional liability, or progressive diseases where 
a significant period may elapse between the insured’s conduct (ie, the professional’s 
                                                 
171 On potential claims, see paras 3.2.2.2(b)(ii)-3.2.2.2(b)(iii) below. 
172 The example of the claims-made policy above includes a ‘retroactive date’ to limit retrospective 
cover. Even though the third-party claim against the insured must be made within the period of the 
policy to bring the case within the scope of the policy, the event, circumstance, or occurrence from 
which the claim arises must then further also occur after the retroactive date. 
173 See, in particular, Van Niekerk (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 391-392. See also para 3.2.2.2(b)(ii) below 
for further detail on ‘claims-made’ policies, in particular the different possibilities as to whether a 
claim has been made against the insured during the period of insurance. 
174 See para 3.2.2.1(d) above. Also note the effect of ‘time-bar’ clauses or ‘time-limitation’ provisions. 
175 See, in particular, Van Niekerk ibid. 
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act of negligence or breach of contract, or the disease-causing conduct) and the loss or 
damage to the third party and the latter’s claim against the insured.176 
Investigations and predictions by the insurer of ‘long-tail’ claims under 
occurrence-based policies are difficult to manage. Furthermore, inflation and interest 
have the potential to increase the size of such claims against liability insurers, and 
they are further, for unacceptably long periods, unable to close their books per 
underwriting year of account.  
Although public liability policies specifically, may be written on a claims-made 
basis, they are commonly occurrence-based policies. However, the disadvantages of 
occurrence-based liability policies for liability insurers have encouraged the 
development and increased use of claims-made policies in the market. Professional 
liability insurers are, for example, disinclined to offer occurrence-based policies and 
prefer to write claims-made policies. 
The time of the occurrence determines whether it falls within the period of 
cover. If the event took place at a specific time, such as loss caused by an identifiable 
accident, it is generally easy to determine which policy applies. In long-tail insurance, 
however, the question arises as to whether a particular insurer (if there is a single 
policy), or which insurer (in the case of consecutive policies), bears the loss when the 
occurrence involves damage, disease, or injury that may have been latent for a long 
period, such as pollution, asbestosis or cancer.177 There are four possible times of 
occurrence that may qualify as the ‘insured event’ in determining whether or which 
policy, applies: (1) exposure, namely, when the third party is exposed to the activity 
or circumstance that gives rise to the action against the insured; (2) loss in fact (so-
called ‘injury in fact’), although it may also refer to the position when the third-party 
injury or damage actually occurs; (3) manifestation, namely, loss does not occur until 
it becomes manifest (or known); and (4) liability on any insurer whose policy was in 
force at the time of initial exposure, or at the time of manifestation. It is submitted that 
it appears to be widely accepted in industry that the time of occurrence under South 
African law is the time of the manifestation of damage, unless the insurance contract 
provides to the contrary.178 
                                                 
176 Ibid. 
177 See para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) on the English law for further detail and judicial authority. 




When the occurrence concerns conduct, the time of the occurrence is again a 
matter of interpretation of the policy ‘accident’, ‘event’, ‘loss’, ‘occurrence’, and 
circumstance’179 
Occurrence-based liability policies often require the insured to give the insurer 
notice of any occurrence or third-party loss as soon as the insured becomes aware of 
it. The insured cannot postpone notification to the insurer until a third-party claim has 
been made.180 
 
3.2.2.2(b)(ii)  Claims-Made Policies  
Professional indemnity policies and directors’ and officers’ policies are usually 
written on a claims-made basis. Claims-made liability policies provide potentially 
unlimited retrospective cover, 181  but no prospective cover beyond the period of 
insurance. There may have been conduct by the insured within the duration of the 
policy that gives rise to claims many years later, and thus an insured will need to 
maintain a claims-made policy or successive claims-made policies for a lengthy 
period – eg, in the case of professional liability insurance, even after the cessation of 
the insured’s relevant professional activities.182  
                                                 
179 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.37. See, eg, St Paul 
Insurance Co SA Ltd v Eagle Ink System (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 2010 (3) SA 647 (SCA) on the scope of 
cover under a product liability policy that contained an exclusion of the insurer’s liability for a third-
party claim against the insured ‘arising out of ... liability directly or indirectly caused by seepage 
pollution or contamination’. See also the discussion of this case by Van Niekerk (2009) 12 Juta’s 
Insurance Law Bulletin 150-153. See further English judicial decisions in para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) below. 
English courts have also construed the meanings of aggregation clauses (or so-called ‘aggregations’) 
such as ‘loss/and or occurrence arising out of one event’, ‘claims resulting from a single event’, ‘losses 
arising out of’ and ‘occurrence or occurrences of a series consequent on or attributable to one original 
source’. 
180 The duty of notification here is not dependent on a third-party claim arising from the occurrence 
being made against the insured. See Thompson v Federated Timbers & Another [2010] JOL 26571 
(KZD); Thompson v Federated Timbers & Another (Zurich) Insurance Co (SA) Ltd (as third party) 
[2011] JOL 26625 (KZD). Also see the discussion by Van Niekerk (2011) 14 Juta’s Insurance Law 
Bulletin ‘Thompson’ 7-17.  
181 The example of the claims-made policy in para 3.2.2.2(a)(ii) above includes a ‘retroactive date’ to 
limit retrospective cover. Even though the third-party claim against the insured must be made within 
the period of the policy to bring the case within the scope of the policy, the event, circumstance, or 
occurrence from which the claim arises must then further also occur after the retroactive date. See para 
3.2.2.2(b)(iii) below for further detail on hybrid policies. See also para 3.2.2.1(d) above on prescription 
and time-limitation provisions. 
182 See, in particular, Van Niekerk (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 391-392. See also David Trust v Aegis 
Insurance Co Ltd & Another above on the scope of cover under a professional indemnity insurance 
contract. Liability insurance cover was provided against claims made on the insured for breach of 
contract that amounted to breach of duty in the practice of its profession by the insured. The nature of 
the insured’s contractual relationship with the third party, and whether the services that the insured 
rendered were in the conduct of its profession as accountants, were at issue. See also the case 
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In claims-made policies, the insured itself bears much of the risk of uncertain 
future claims because it has an extensive duty to disclose potential claims before 
entering into or renewing any such liability insurance contract. Because of the 
extended retroactive liability in claims-made policies, insurers under such policies 
require meticulous disclosure by the insured of potential liability-inducing conduct in 
the past. Occurrences before the inception of the insurance contract may result in 
third-party claims being made against the insured during the currency of the policy.183 
Liability insurers contracting on a claims-made basis are able to calculate premiums 
with greater accuracy than those underwriting occurrence-based policies, given the 
more defined nature of the risk due to the disclosure by the insured. Where the insured 
has disclosed a potential claim, the liability insurer may choose to charge higher 
premiums, or refuse to grant or renew the liability insurance policy, or may exclude 
cover from the policy for the disclosed potential liability claim. 
Insurance contracts generally impose a duty on the insured to give notice to the 
insurer about an impending or actual loss to be claimed under the policy. The type of 
policy – ie, whether it is an ‘occurrence-based’ or a ‘claims-made’ liability policy – 
may influence the interpretation of clauses requiring notification, for example, as 
regards when notice should be given. A claims-made policy usually requires notice of 
any actual third-party claim made against the insured in respect of which the insurer 
may incur liability. A claims-made policy may in addition require an insured to give 
notice of any potential claim (eg, any occurrence that may possibly give rise to a 
claim) by a third party against the insured. 184   
                                                                                                                                            
discussion by Van Niekerk (2000) 3 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘David Trust’ 57-63 and para 
3.2.2.1(a) above.  
183 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.33. 
184 Van Immerzeel & Another v Santam Ltd 2006 (3) SA 349 (SCA). This decision dealt with the scope 
of cover under a professional liability insurance policy for a ‘claim first made’ during the period of 
insurance, irrespective of when liability arose. There were two successive overlapping claims-made 
policies. Both required notification of actual and potential claims. The insured notified the insurers of a 
potential claim under the 1991 policy, and of an actual claim under the 1993 policy and was 
subsequently covered. It had a choice to claim under either of the policies and could choose to claim 
under the policy with the best of cover. See the discussion of the Van Immerzeel case by Van Niekerk 
(2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 382-392. Under English law it is typical for claims-made policies, such as 
professional indemnity policies, to require three phases of notification by the insured to the insurer: (1) 
the standard notification term that requires the insured in indemnity insurance contracts to give written 
notice of any occurrence, eg, ‘of any accident, claim or proceedings’; (2) potential claims: notice of 
occurrences ‘likely to give rise to a claim’, or alternatively, that ‘may give rise to a claim’; (3) actual 
claims: any claim made by the third party against the insured itself. See para 4.2.2.2(b)(ii) below for 
further detail.  
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Notification need not be within the period of insurance. But if the policy 
requires this, it is referred to as a ‘claims-made and notified’ policy.185 
 
3.2.2.2(b)(iii)  Hybrid Policies186 
Liability insurers, naturally, attempt to limit their exposure to prospective 
liability in the case of occurrence-based policies, or to retrospective liability in the 
case of claims-made policies by adding contractual exceptions.187 Such refinements to 
both types of policy tend to result in hybrid policies that create gaps in the cover 
provided by, for example, different successive policies. 
The significant period that may elapse between the occurrence of the event and 
the third party’s claim against the insured has primarily led to the introduction of 
hybrid policies. Those insureds under claims-made policies may protect themselves 
against claims made after the period of insurance by types of insurance such as so-
called ‘prior acts coverage’ or ‘long-tail coverage’.  
Under prior-acts cover, under the new or renewed insurance policy the insurer 
charges an additional premium to cover the insured for incidents that may have 
occurred before the inception date of the new or renewed policy.  
Claims-made policies generally include an extension clause in the form of an 
extended period of discovery which provides that ‘if the notification is made within 
the duration of a policy, any claim arising out of the matters of the subject of the 
notification will be treated as a claim under the policy, even though the claim itself is 
made outside the duration of the policy’. Under such long-tail cover, the previous 
insurer covers future claims to be made for events that occurred during the currency 
of its claims-made policy at an additional premium.  
These types of cover in effect combine claims-made and occurrence-based 
cover in a single policy. The terms of a particular liability policy may therefore amend 
                                                 
185 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law in para 25.48; and Van Niekerk 
(2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 391-392. 
186 The position appears to be similar to that under English law, although not so prevalent. Cf Belgian 
law which provides for a hybrid type of claims-made policy. See paras 5.2.2.2(a)(iii) and 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) 
below. 
187 The insurance policy may, eg, provide that it does not cover any loss or any legal liability ‘arising 
from any event or occurrence, which has been notified under any insurance in force prior to the 
inception of this [the] policy’. This clause prevents overlapping insurance (and double insurance) 
where an insured may be covered under more than one liability policy. See Van Immerzeel v Santam 
above for an example of overlapping cover under claims-made policies and Van Niekerk (2006) 18 
SA Merc LJ 383-394. Alternatively, a retroactive date may be inserted in a claims-made policy to limit 
retroactive liability.  
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the broad features of occurrence-based or claims-made policies, and may even result 
in the policy no longer being classifiable as the one or the other, but rather as a hybrid 
form of liability policy.  
 
Summative critical analysis 
This is one of the most contentious and complex areas of liability insurance. 
There appear to be two main types of liability insurance contract – occurrence-based 
and claims-made policies under South African law, although hybrid forms may occur. 
As to when ‘loss’ occurs and what qualifies as the institution of a ‘claim’ under the 
different types of insurance contract is a question of interpretation. These terms may 
best be defined clearly in the insurance contract. Guidance may be found in the 
English law on the standard interpretation of these terms.188 
Several PPRs require disclosure of the duration of liability cover. 189  It is 
recommended that the insurance contract explain the insured event and specifically 
the triggers and the duration of liability insurance cover in plain language, with the 
aid of tables and examples, as per the basic framework below. The information 
disclosed must be tailor-made for the type of liability policy involved. Prescription as 
applied to the different liability policies is also very complex and should be explained 
to an ignorant insured in detail. The insured should also be informed exactly when 
notice is required to prevent it from losing the right to claim through ignorance or 
tardiness. As disclosure by the insured is particularly relevant under claims-made 
policies, when issuing the policy the insurer should inform the insured of the 
importance thereof with clear and specific reference to the effect of failure to comply 
on the insurance claims.190 
 
  
                                                 
188 See para 4.2.2.2 below on English law. 
189 See, eg, rule 11.3.5 which prescribes disclosure by the insurer of complex features that may be 
difficult for the insured to understand. See also rule 11.4.2(c) which requires disclosure of ‘when the 
insurance cover begins and ends’. 
190 Rule 11.4.2(k). The insurer should further disclose the representations that the insured made to the 
insurer which was regarded as material to its assessments of risk: rule 11.5: see Millard (2018) 21 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Legislative Reforms’ at 41-42. 
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Summative table on the event and duration of liability cover  
under South African law 
 




Third-party loss should occur 
within period of insurance. 
Define loss as the occurrence 
or manifestation of damage. 
a) No retroactive cover 












Claims-made and  
notified 
Third-party claim should be 
instituted against the insured 
within period of insurance, or 
the insured should notify the 
insurer of circumstances that 
may lead to a third-party 
claim.  
Define ‘claim’. Claims may 
include actual or potential 
claims by third parties. 
 
Third-party claim should be 
instituted against the insured 
within period of insurance and 
the insured should have 
notified the insurer thereof 
within the period of insurance. 
 
a) Retrospective cover  
b) No prospective cover 
If potential claims are covered, or 
the policy provides for a 
retroactive date, the policy may 
become a hybrid form and that 





Same as claims-made above. 
Hybrid Variations of occurrence-based 
and claims-made policies. 
It depends from case to case. 
 
Prescribed minimum liability cover, as in Belgian law, is to the advantage of the 
insured and may also resolve some of the legal uncertainties.191  
 
3.2.2.3  Exceptions to, Exclusions from, and Limitations on Liability Cover192 
Some important exceptions to, exclusions from, and limitations on liability 
cover that may be found in insurance policies are now considered. The discussion 
is not aimed at providing an exhaustive summary of all the exceptions to, 
exclusions from, and the limitations on liability cover, as freedom of contract 
enables insurers and their prospective policyholders, by agreement, to design a 
structure to meet the specific needs of the insured that are acceptable to the insurer. 
 
  
                                                 
191 It is not recommended that the types of policies under Belgian law should be implemented under 
South African law mutatis mutandis, as the ‘hybrid claims-made’ policy has been tailor-made for that 
system, and is also extremely complex and detailed. 
192 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.37-25.38. 
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3.2.2.3(a)  The Sum Insured, Aggregations, and Event Limits 
The sum insured may limit the insurer's liability against the insured. For 
example, the standard limitation clause provides as follows: 
Limits of indemnity 
1.   The amount payable by the company [the insurer] will not exceed the 
amount stated in the schedule. 
2.   The limit of indemnity will include costs and expenses 
 (a)   recoverable by any [third-party plaintiff] from the insured; 
 (b)   incurred with the written consent of the company [the insurer]... 
 
An insured’s damage relates to two aspects – its liability towards the third party 
for the latter’s damage; and liability for its own damage. The limit of indemnity in a 
liability policy may apply both in respect of the amounts that an insured is liable to 
pay to a third party (eg, damages, costs, and expenses); and in respect of the insured’s 
own costs and expenses (eg, the insured’s costs incurred with the approval of its 
insurer).  
In Coetzee v Attorneysʼ Insurance Indemnity Fund193 the policy provided that 
‘the liability of the insurer in respect of all claims and the claimant’s costs and 
expenses and approved costs shall not exceed the limit of indemnity specified in 
Schedule A’.194 The court held that the third party’s costs were part of the insured’s 
legal liability and that such costs were covered by the indemnity provided by the 
insurance policy, even though they had not yet been incurred or quantified.195 
The court in Coetzee v Attorneys’ Insurance Indemnity Fund further held that 
the insured was not the claimant, and that the words ‘the claimant’ in the clause 
from the insurance policy, in fact referred to the third party.196 The use of the words 
‘claim’ and ‘claimant’ in Coetzee v Attorneys’ Insurance Indemnity Fund exemplifies 
the possibly confusing nature of both the use of terminology in liability insurance 
and the tripartite relationship between the insurer, the insured, and the third party in 
liability insurance as discussed extensively above. Whereas the insured may claim 
from the liability insurer in respect of its legal liability towards a third party and may 
as such be seen as a claimant under the insurance policy, the third party may claim 
                                                 
193 2003 (1) SA 1 (SCA). 
194 Emphasis added. 
195 Coetzee v Attorneys’ Insurance Indemnity Fund above 5G/H-I/J. 
196 Ibid 5J. See also Van Niekerk (2002) 5 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 22. 
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damages from the insured and may again be referred to as the claimant in its action 
against the insured. 197 
On renewal of a policy, it is especially relevant for an insured to confirm the 
types of loss (termed the ‘heads of loss’) to which the limit of indemnity applies, 
because the third party and the insured's own legal costs and expenses may be a 
large components of the indemnity that an insured requires from its insurer. For 
example, in Van Immerzeel v Sanlam Ltd198 the insured was potentially covered by 
two policies. Under the first policy (‘the 1991 policy’) the limit of indemnity 
applied in respect of both the heads of loss together (ie, the amounts that the insured 
was liable to pay to the third party (eg, damages, costs and expenses; ‘the first head 
of loss’) and in respect of the insured’s own costs and expenses (eg, the insured’s 
approved costs; ‘the second head of loss’). In the second policy (‘the 1993 policy’), 
the limit of indemnity applied only to the first head of loss and the insurers 
undertook to pay an additional proportion in respect of the second head of loss.199  
Further, as regards the sum insured and the limits of indemnity in an 
insurance contract, there may be a limitation on the liability cover per ‘claim’, per 
‘occurrence’, per ‘event’, or per ‘accident’. Problems of interpretation may arise if 
the insured is required to bear an excess for every claim, or for claims arising from a 
single occurrence, or if the insurer’s maximum liability is limited per claim or for all 
claims arising from a single occurrence.200 The policy may also have a total limit: the 
maximum amount recoverable during the currency of the policy for all claims.201 
 
3.2.2.3(b)  Exclusions or Exceptions to Liability Cover for an Insured 
Defendant’s Legal Liability to Third-Party Plaintiffs  
3.2.2.3(b)(i)  Contractual Liability  
Liability policies often contain express exclusions or exceptions as to the types 
of legal liability towards third parties that are covered. A few of these are listed 
below by way of examples.  
                                                 
197 See para 3.2.2.2(a)(ii) above. 
198 Above. 
199 See the case discussion of Van Immerzeel in Van Niekerk (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 382-392; and para 
3.2.2.2(b)(ii) above on claims-made policies. See also the conduct of the insured’s defence in the 
insured’s name and the costs relating thereto in para 3.3.1.1(d) below. 
200 See para 4.2.2.3(a) below for English case law on these aggregations and event limits. 
201 See, generally, Bosch Munitech (Pty) Ltd v Govan Mbeki Municipality [2015] 4 All SA 674 (GP) as 
to the limit of liability for indemnity insurance. 
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As explained before, liability insurance policies often expressly exclude 
contractual liability assumed by the insured for performance.202  
Liability insurers also further limit their liability by circumscribing the risk, for 
instance, where the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured if it becomes liable to a 
third party as a result of the driving of a specific motor vehicle or by the driving of a 
designated motor vehicle only in the course of the insured’s business. 
 
3.2.2.3(b)(ii)  The Conduct of the Insured Defendant203  
Further, as already observed,204 an insured may not be able to recover from the 
insurer for liability incurred by the insured as a result of its intentional (including 
reckless), conduct. If an insured’s negligent conduct is also criminal, public-policy 
considerations will determine whether the insured should be prohibited from 
benefiting from its own criminal conduct, or whether the third-party plaintiff should 
indirectly obtain the benefit of the insurance.  
 
Summative critical comment 
It again remains a question of interpretation to determine what exactly has been 
excluded from or limited by the insurance contract, and therefore parties should aim 
to use clear terminology. As recommended previously, 205  contractual liability for 
performance of a contract voluntarily assumed, which is generally expressly excluded 
from general liability cover, should be expressly disclosed to the liability insured as 
required by the PPRs. The same applies to limitations on liability cover, such as those 
pertaining to the sum insured (including aggregations and event limits) and exclusions 
or limitations applicable to the conduct of the insured. Care should be taken that 
‘significant exclusions and limitations’ 206  are prominently disclosed. 207  It is 
recommended that all of the examples dealt with in this chapter qualify as significant 
                                                 
202 See para 3.2.2.1(a) above. As to tenants’ liability cover that usually includes contractual liability, 
see Atkins Are You Covered? 112. 
203 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.42 and paras 13.143-
13.144. 
204 See para 3.2.2.1(a) above. 
205 See para 3.2.2.1(a) above for summative critical comment in the context of the extent of covered 
liabilities. 
206 See the definition of ‘significant exclusion or limitation’ in rule 11.1 as noted in para 3.2.2.1(a) 
above. 




exclusions or limitations and should be disclosed explicitly in plain and simple 
language. 
 
3.2.2.4  The Insured Defendant’s Duties to the Liability Insurer 
Insurance contracts generally impose a duty on the insured to notify the 
insurer of specific facts.208 The type of policy – ie, whether it is an ‘occurrence-
based’ or a ‘claims-made’ liability policy – may influence the interpretation of 
clauses requiring notification (eg, as regards when notice should be given, as well as 
what the insurer should be notified of).209 The purpose of the notice to the insurer is 
to prepare it for the possibility of a third-party claim against the insured, and in turn 
the latter’s claim against the insurer, so that the insurer may take steps to mitigate 
the insured’s loss and to assist the insured as soon as possible.210 
It has also been explained that an insured has a pre-contractual duty of 
disclosure and why this is particularly important in the case of claims-made 
policies.211 The duty to notify during the existence of the contract is a separate duty 
which exists once the insurance contract has been concluded and remains a 
continuous contractual duty as agreed upon by the parties.  
A typical clause that requires the insured to take reasonable precautions or 
care to avoid loss may read as follows: ‘The insured shall take all reasonable steps 
and precautions to prevent accidents or losses’. This type of clause is common in 
liability insurance policies, but again is not confined to liability insurance and is 
also included in first-party policies such as those covering property losses.212 In some 
cases an all-risks policy covers property insurance as well as providing general 
                                                 
208  See Furman & Another v Batha Unreported, GSJ, 23 Sept 2010, case no 10044/2007 on the 
requirements of proper notice (and proper defence of the action) in the context of an indemnity 
contract. There may be an analogy with obligations under liability insurance. See also the case 
discussion by Van Niekerk (2011) 14 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Furman’ 31-35.  
209 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.46-25.49. See, too, the 
discussion on the duty to notify under occurrence-based, claims-made policies and hybrid policies in 
paras 3.2.2.2(b)(i)-3.2.2.2(b)(iii) above. 
210 See also para 3.3 below on the liability insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement. 
211 See again para 3.2.2.2(b)(ii) above. Section 53 of the SIA on misrepresentation and failure to 
disclose was set to be repealed by the Insurance Act of 2017, but the repeal of s 53 of the SIA appears 
to have been deferred. Section 53 of the SIA still governs misrepresentation and failure to disclose in 
short-term insurance (non-life insurance). See Donnelly (2018) 4 SALJ 593-612. On breach of the duty 
of disclosure and fraud in the context of liability insurance, see also Commercial Union Insurance Co 
of SA Ltd v Wallace No; Santam Insurance Ltd v Africa Addressing (Pty) Ltd 2004 (1) SA 326 (SCA). 




liability cover. It often happens that these two aspects are not explained separately to 
the insured who might be under misconceptions as to which losses require 
notification and which not. The use of terminology such as ‘all risks’ is often 
misleading as insured’s believe it is ipso facto comprehensively covered for all losses 
it suffers.213 
One of the primary purposes of liability insurance is to insure the insured 
against liability for its negligent conduct. Negligence is a failure to take reasonable 
care when a reasonable person would have taken reasonable steps to avert or 
minimise the loss or damage caused to another. By imposing a contractual obligation 
on the insured to take reasonable care, the insurer may attempt to exclude its liability 
against the insured for liability in negligence. If construed literally, such a clause 
may prevent an insured from successfully claiming an indemnity against liability for 
negligence.  
Our courts have adopted a common-sense interpretation of clauses requiring 
reasonable precautions. Reasonable care refers to reasonable care as seen from the 
perspective of the relationship between liability insurer and insured (and not as 
between the insured and the third party – including the latter’s point of view). Due 
regard must be had to the purpose of the insurance contract, which includes 
indemnity against the insured’s own negligence. Only gross negligence, recklessness, 
or intent on the part of the insured (as opposed to mere negligence) will as, a general 
rule, amount to breach of the clause to take reasonable precautions – eg, if the 
insured refrains from taking precautions to avoid the loss that it ought to have taken 
merely because it is covered against loss in the policy.  
A clause that compels the insured to take reasonable steps to minimise and 
prevent loss, confirms the common-law principle that the insured may not be 
covered under the insurance contract for its intentional or reckless acts that caused 
damage or loss to the third-party plaintiff. 
 
Summative critical analysis 
As to the insured’s duty of notice: Some notice clauses, or ‘claims-made-and-
notified’ policies, might in time be found to be unfair under South African law, 
                                                 
213 As explained in para 2.2.5 above, all-risks insurance is not entirely unlimited. See Reinecke, van 
Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 13.56. 
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whether under statute or common law, specifically on the basis of public policy.214 
Where an insured is truly not informed that it must take certain action within specific 
time limits, denying the insured an insurance claim might be contrary to public policy. 
Society still views insurance as an unequal relationship, where the insurer as a big 
business company is knowledgeable and manipulates the situation for profit, whereas 
the insured is less experienced an although paying premiums diligently, does not 
enjoy cover.  
As to the pre-contractual duty of disclosure by the insured: the insurer should 
inform the insured of these aspects that might influence a successful claim for 
indemnification under the insurance policy.215 
 
3.2.3 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff216 
3.2.3.1  Common Law 
As a rule, there is, on the basis of privity of contract, no contractual relationship 
between the third-party plaintiff and the insured defendantʼs liability insurer. 
Furthermore, the insurance contract between the liability insurer and the insured 
cannot be construed as a contract in favour of a third party (the third-party plaintiff in 
the liability claim). Consequently, the third party cannot claim directly from the 
liability insurer at common law. A statutory exception, however, applies in the event 
of the sequestration of the insured defendant, as discussed below. 
 
3.2.3.2  Statutory Position 
Section 156 of the Insolvency Act provides: 
Whenever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged to indemnify 
another person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect of any liability incurred 
by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on sequestration of the estate 
of the insured, be entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of the insured’s 
                                                 
214 Some authors on English law suggest that conditions that impose unreasonable time limits on the 
insured, may in future be regarded as unfair under the Consumer Rights Act of 2015 (‘Consumer 
Rights Act’). See paras 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.4 below. 
215 Rule 11.4.2(k). The insurer should further disclose the representations that the insured made to the 
insurer which were regarded as material to its assessments of risk. See rule 11.5 and Millard (2018) 21 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Legislative Reforms’ 41-42. 
216 In writing this section, the following works were consulted: Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber 
South African Insurance Law paras 25.74- 25.83; Van Niekerk (1999) 11 SA Merc LJ 59-77; Van 
Niekerk (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 453-463; and Jacobs (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 608-616. 
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liability towards the third party but no exceeding maximum amount for which the 
insurer has bound himself to indemnify the insured. 
 
Whereas at common law the third-party plaintiff cannot claim directly from 
the insured defendant’s liability insurer, section 156 creates an exception in that it 
provides the third-party plaintiff with a direct claim against the liability insurer if the 
estate of the insured defendant is sequestrated.217 Further, as a general rule the effect of 
the sequestration of an insolvent debtor’s estate (the insured in this case) is that the 
insolvent is divested of its estate which vests in the trustee, curator or liquidator of that 
estate. Again, section 156 provides an exception in that the proceeds of a liability 
insurance contract do not fall into the insured defendant’s insolvent estate. The third 
party may claim directly from the insured’s liability insurer and is not merely an 
ordinary creditor with a concurrent claim against the insured defendant’s insolvent 
estate.  
In short, section 156 applies only to liability insurance (as third-party insurance), 
not to property insurance (as first-party insurance).218 The third party’s rights against 
the insured’s liability insurer are unique and original rights statutorily conferred on the 
third party by section 156. The insured’s estate must have been sequestrated (or 
liquidated, in the case of legal persons) before section 156 can apply; mere insolvency 
of the insured is insufficient.  
Before the third party can rely successfully on section 156, it carries a heavy 
burden of proof. It must first prove the liability of the insured to itself.219 The third party 
must further prove the existence of a valid and enforceable insurance contract between 
the insured defendant and its liability insurer, and also the liability insurer’s liability 
towards the insured to indemnify it (the insured) against liability to the third-party 
plaintiff.220 This duty is a deviation from ‘legal liability’ as discussed above. In this 
                                                 
217 For an example of the complexity and likelihood of confusion under s 156, see the case discussion 
by Van Niekerk (2012) 15 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Hollard’ 62-69. 
218 See Venfin Investments (Pty) Ltd v KZN Resins (Pty) Ltd t/a KZN Resins [2011] 4 All SA 369 (SCA) 
on the scope of application of s 156; and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2011) 14 Juta’s 
Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Venfin Investments’ 156-161. See also, in particular, Van Niekerk (2010) 22 
SA Merc LJ 453-463. 
219 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law in para 25.56 where the 
authors opine that the insured’s legal liability towards a third-party may have to be established by court 
judgment or an admission of liability for purposes of s 156. This differs from the general position on 
when and how a liability insured’s becomes ‘legally liable’ towards a third party: see again paras 
3.2.2.1(b)-3.2.2.1(c) above. 
220 As regards the requirements for the third party’s claim under s 156, see Hotels Inns & Resorts SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Underwriters at Lloyds & Others 1998 (4) SA 466 (C); and the case discussion by Van 
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event the third party must prove actual liability, as it is clear from the wording of the 
Insolvency Act that mere prima facie proof is not sufficient. On the other hand, actual 
payment by the insolvent insured to the third party plaintiff is also not required.  
The third party has no greater rights against the insured’s liability insurer than the 
insured has against the insurer in terms of the insurance contract. The third party can 
recover only the amount of the insured’s liability towards it (the third party) from the 
insured’s liability insurer. 221  The third party’s claim is, therefore, limited to the 
maximum amount of the liability of the insured’ liability insurer towards the insured.222  
For the present purposes, it is important to recognise that section 156 affects the 
position of the third party, the insured’s liability insurer, and the insured’s insolvent 
estate. In particular, the position under section 156 illustrates how the relationship 
between the insured and its liability insurer affects the position of the third party. As 
already observed, the third party has no greater rights against the insured’s liability 
insurer than the insured has in terms of the insurance contract. All exclusions and 
limitations also apply to the third party’s direct claim against the insurer. 
Section 156 is already onerous, and prescription of the third party’s claim against 
the liability insurer complicates matters still further.223 The position on prescription of 
the third-party plaintiff’s claim against the liability insurer in the context of section 156 
appears to differ from prescription of the insured defendant’s claim against the liability 
                                                                                                                                            
Niekerk (1998) 1 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Hotel Inns’ 79-81. See also David Trust v Aegis 
Insurance above and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2000) 3 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 
‘David Trust’ 57-63. Further see Transnet Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Unreported, TPD, 12 
Nov 1996, case nr 13664/95; and the discussion by Van Niekerk (1998) 1 Juta’s Insurance Law 
Bulletin 40-42.  
221 On the joining of the insured defendant’s liability insurer as co-defendant on the insured being 
wound up, see African Products (Pty) Ltd v Venter NO & Others [2007] 3 All SA 605 (C) and see also 
the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2007) 10 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘African Products’ 216-
217.  
 222 As to the extent of the third party’s claim, see Coetzee v Attorneys’ Insurance Indemnity Fund 
above; and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2002) 5 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 133-140.  See 
also Le Roux v Standard General Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 2000 (4) SA 1035 (SCA) and the case 
discussion by Van Niekerk (2000) 3 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Le Roux’ 135-138.  
223 See van Van Reenen v Santam Ltd 2013 (5) SA 595 (SCA). The court confirmed that s 156 is not a 
form of statutory cession of insured’s right against insurer to a third party, but that it creates a new and 
distinct cause of action for the third party to recover what the insurer owes the insured under the 
insurance contract on sequestration of the insured. The third party’s claim arose, and the debt became 
due for purposes of s 12(1) of Prescription Act, when the insured company was would up. Then the 
third party’s cause of action against the insurer had fully accrued. See also the case discussion by Van 
Niekerk (2013) 16 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 121-127. On prescription under liability insurance in 
general, see para 3.2.2.1(d) above.  
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insurer.224 Prescription of the third-party plaintiff’s claim against the liability insurer 
will likely only start to run when the insured is actually liable towards it.225  
 
Summative critical analysis 
It is uncertain whether section 156 will withstand a constitutional challenge 
based on equality under section 9 of the Constitution, as it appears that third-party rights 
enjoy preference above the rights of other creditors under section 156. This type of 
discrimination does not appear to be regarded as unfair in current legislation.226 Lessons 
may be learnt from the expanded provisions in English law.227 
The most beneficial position for the third party is under Belgian law, where it 
has a direct right to a claim which is not limited to the insured’s insolvency or 
sequestration. 228  But, as under section 156 of our Insolvency Act, questions of 
constitutionality may arise. Taking into consideration the principle of concursus 
creditorum, such provisions deviate from the normal rules of privity of contract and 
equal claims against the insolvent estate.  
 
3.2.4 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and Other 
Parties: the Liability Insurer Exercising its Rights of Subrogation 
for a Contribution against Joint Wrongdoers of the Insured 
Defendant 
 
Subrogation229 (where the insurer has a right against its insured to enforce the 
insured’s claim against joint wrongdoers of the insured defendant) is a naturalia of 
indemnity insurance and as such applies to liability insurance. But subrogation is 
exceptional in liability insurance. 230  There are at least two instances in which 
subrogation in the sense of claim enforcement may apply in liability insurance.  
                                                 
224 See para 3.2.2.1(d) above on prescription of the insured defendant’s claim against the liability 
insurer. 
225 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.56. 
226 See item 5 in the Schedule to the Equality Act which refers to three practices in connection with 
insurance services that are possibly unfair and in need of attention. Section 156 or its consequences are 
not covered under those three practices. 
227 The English Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act of 2010 (the ‘2010 Act’). For example, the 
Act gives the third-party plaintiff detailed rights of disclosure against the insured, the insurer, and other 
parties about insurance. It also contains detailed provisions as to limitation in this context, although 
some issues have not been resolved. See Jacobs (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 608-616 and para 4.2.3.3 below. 
228 See para 5.2.3.1 below on the third-party plaintiff’s direct right against the liability insurer. 
229 On subrogation in insurance generally, see Van Niekerk (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 502-517 and Van 
Niekerk Subrogasie passim. See also para 3.3.1.1 below on the distinction between the liability 
insurer’s right to subrogation and the conduct of the defence of the third-party claim by the insurer. 
230 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.40 and 25.58. 
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In the first place, where the insured defendant has a counterclaim against the 
third-party plaintiff to which the liability insurer may be subrogated, the 
counterclaim may be brought by the liability insurer in the exercise of its right to 
subrogation because liability insurance is a form of indemnity insurance.  
Second, where there is a joint wrongdoer, other than the third-party plaintiff, 
the liability insurer, is entitled to enforce the insured defendant’s claim for a 
contribution against such wrongdoer in the exercise of its right to subrogation.231  
 
Summative critical comment 
Referring to the extent and scope of disclosure, the insured should be made 
aware of the insurer’s right to subrogation, what this entails, and ensure that it does 
not prejudice the insurer’s rights. Even if it not expressly required under the PPRs, 
this should be brought expressly and prominently to the attention of the insured. 
 
3.3 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE AND SETTLEMENT OF 
CLAIMS BY THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST THE 
INSURED DEFENDANT  
 
As liability insurers in South Africa merely have a contractual right232 (as 
opposed to a duty) to conduct the defence and settlement, the analysis of the 
defence and settlement in the study is more limited in scope than that of the 
insurer’s duty to indemnify. 
 
3.3.1  The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Insured Defendant  
  
3.3.1.1 Conduct of the Defence  
A clause such as the following invariably appears in liability policies: ‘We 
[the insurer] may take over and conduct the defence and settlement of any claim 
and have the right to use your name for this purpose’. 
                                                 
231 See ‘Walkerson v Matterson 1936 NPD 495’; and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2006) 9 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Walkerson’ 230-236 for further explanation of the instances in which 
subrogation may apply in liability insurance. See also Samancor Ltd v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co 
Ltd & Others 2005 (4) SA 40 (SCA) on co-insurers, subrogation and contribution. 
232 Which is usually part of an express term in the insurance contract. 
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An insurer’s right to defend and settle claims is sometimes incorrectly 
confused with an insurer’s right to subrogation because often in the case of 
comprehensive policies these rights are dealt with in a single clause. The right to 
conduct the defence and settlement is concerned with an insurer’s contractual right 
to take charge of the insured’s defence to a claim brought by the third-party 
plaintiff. Subrogation, on the contrary, refers to an insurer’s common-law right to 
enforce the insured’s claim against a third-party defendant.233 Both subrogation, as 
well as the defence and settlement of the claim, are conducted by the insurer but in 
the name of the insured.234  
Under South African law, the liability insurer does not include an automatic or 
implied duty to defend the insured against third-party claims. The liability insurer 
only has a duty to defend if the insurance contract specifically so provides.235 It is 
common practice, however, that the liability insurer has an express contractual right 
to defend the action and to settle the claim against its insured.236 There is no basis on 
which to compel the liability insurer to take over the insured’s defence if it elects not 
to do so. The liability insurer will generally exercise this right to defend to protect 
itself (the insurer) against the insured defendant’s claim for an indemnity where it 
appears on merit as a judgment call, to be the best decision. 
However, an insurer which exercises its right to defend the insured against 
liability claims does incur a number of additional duties against its insured during 
this process. These duties are discussed briefly. 
The duty to act in good faith during the execution of the contract is mutual, and 
the insured should act accordance with its duty cooperate with the liability insurer in 
the conduct of the defence and settlement. Furthermore, the insured should not 
prejudice the insurer’s right to recover from the third party in the name of the 
                                                 
233 An insurer’s common-law right to subrogation may be confirmed and extended in the insurance 
policy. See para 3.2.4 above on subrogation. 
234 See Cupido v Kings Lodge Hotel 1999 (4) SA 257 (E) and the discussion by Van Niekerk (1999) 2 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Cupido’ 94 for a practical example of how the liability insurer 
conducts a defence in the name of an insured. See also South African Veterinary Council & Another 
v Veterinary Defence Association 2003 (4) SA 546 (SCA) and Van Niekerk (2003) 6 Juta’s 
Insurance Law Bulletin 85-89 for a discussion of the locus standi of a defence association of which 
a veterinarian is a member and some comments on the position of the liability insurer which 
conducts the insured’s defence.  
235 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.61. This is also the 
position under English law. See para 4.3.1.1 below. In contrast, the liability insurer has a statutory duty 
and right to conduct the defence under Belgian law. See para 5.3.1.1 below. 
236 See para 3.3.1.2 below on the settlement of third-party claims. 
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insured.237 For example, an insured should not collude with the third party to protect 
the third party against the insurer’s claim brought against the third party in the 
insured’s name.  
One may ask what the benefits are for the insured if the liability insurer has a 
duty to defend, rather than a mere right to defend. One possible advantage is that the 
defence by the liability insurer may afford the insured valuable protection from 
the expense of litigation.238 Then again, an insured may choose to appoint its own 
legal representative, because this will provide the insured with the opportunity to 
influence the defence attorney and its strategies to the benefit of the insurer. 
 
3.3.1.1(a)  When the Right or Duty to Defend Arises 
The wording of any clause dealing with defence will generally indicate when a 
contractual duty to defend, as opposed to a mere right to choose to defend, will 
arise.239 In the absence of wording indicating the contrary, the right or duty will arise 
when the insured is notified of facts giving rise to a potential liability.240 However, the 
right or duty will not arise if the liability cover has not been triggered (ie, in respect of 
claims not falling within the scope of cover).241  Part of disclosure to the insured 
should detail when the insurer will have a right or duty to defend, and of the scope of 
the duty. The insurer is required to inform the insured of the nature and extent of the 
insurance benefits and its potential limitations.242 
 
3.3.1.1(b)  The Scope and Extent of the Right or Duty  
The defence must be conducted properly, 243  whether the liability insurer 
                                                 
237 See McClain v H Mohamed & Associates [2003] 3 All SA 707 (C) and the discussion by Van 
Niekerk (2004) 7 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘McClain’ 88-97.  
238 See Mondi South Africa Ltd v Martens & Another 2012 (2) SA 469 (KZP) on the insurer’s defence 
of a third-party claim against the insured and the insurer instructing attorneys to the defend action. See 
also the discussion by Van Niekerk (2012) 15 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Mondi’ 1-2.  
239 Note again that there is generally not a duty to defend on the liability insurer under South African 
law. 
240 This is at the same time as when the insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured generally arises under 
South African law. See, eg, Botha v Iveco South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 JDR 0863 (SCA), where the 
indemnity contract contained an indemnity clause and the person to be indemnified was not requested 
in time by the indemnifier to oppose the third-party claim. The full amount of the third-party claim and 
the costs incurred could be recovered from the indemnifier. Also see the discussion by Van Niekerk 
(2012) 15 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Botha’ 106-108.  
241 See para 3.2.2.2 above on the insured event and the duration of liability cover. 
242 PPRs: see rules 11.4.2(c) and 11.4.2(g). Also see paras 3.2 and 3.2.2.1(a) above.  
243 See Furman & Another v Batha above on the requirements of (proper notice and) proper defence of 
the action in the context of an indemnity contract. There may be an analogy with obligations under 
117 
 
defends the insured by choice or by duty. If the liability insurer fails to conduct a 
proper defence,244  it may be liable to the insured for damages arising from its 
omission.245 
Concessions that the insurer makes towards the third party in defending the 
third-party claim – eg, acceptance of liability – bind the insured directly.246  This 
applies even if the insurer has not been authorised by the insured to make such a 
concession or waiver.247 This aspect must also be disclosed expressly and prominently 
by the insurer to the insured. The latter must be able to understand the risks when it 
agrees to a defence clause.  
 
3.3.1.1(c)  Conflict of Interest 
A conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the insured may arise, 
for example, in the following instances.248 
– Where there is a possibility of legal liability (eg, a judgment) in 
excess of the policy limits: the insured may prefer settlement, while the 
liability insurer has nothing to lose if the matter is litigated to its 
conclusion. 
– Where it is uncertain whether there is liability cover at all: for 
example, when the liability insurer questions whether liability falls 
within the scope of the policy (potential conflict), or when the 
insurer in fact disputes that the insured's liability is covered by the 
insurance policy (actual conflict). 
– Legal expenses insurance cover 249  may also give rise to possible 
conflict of interest in the context of liability insurance: where the 
                                                                                                                                            
liability insurance. See also the discussion by Van Niekerk (2011) 14 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 
‘Furman’ 31-35.  
244 See again McClain v H Mohamed & Associates above; and the discussion by Van Niekerk (2004) 7 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘McClain’ 88-97.  
245 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.65. 
246  See Masunga v Mutema above and Van Niekerk (2008) 11 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 
‘Masunga’ 17-19: a liability insurer’s acceptance of liability towards a third party on authority of 
insured binds the latter.  
247 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.66. 
248 This section is based on the position in English law as there is limited authority in South African 
law. See para 4.3.1.1(d) below. See also para 5.3.1.1(c) below on Belgian law. 
249 This type of insurance is aimed at legal expenses that may be incurred in legal proceedings that the 
insured may become involved in as plaintiff or defendant; it is also known as legal costs insurance. 
Under South African law, it may be provided under a separate insurance contract or in combination 
with other insurance. Liability insurance to some extent already includes an element of legal expenses 
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insured’s liability insurer is also its legal protection insurer, whether in 
a comprehensive policy or under two different policies, a conflict of 
interest may arise between the insured and the insurer. On the one 
hand, the lawyer employed by the insurer or the insurer’s panel may 
attempt to protect the insurer’s interests by, for example, minimising 
its fees by suggesting a less expensive solution such as settlement, to 
retain the goodwill of the insurer. On the other hand, settlement may 
not be in the best interests of the insured and it may have a valid 
interest in maintaining costly litigation. It is undesirable that the same 
liability insurer which, for example, refuses to conduct the insured’s 
defence, must nonetheless foot the bill for the insured’s legal 
defence.250 
– Under rule 11.4.2(j) of the PPRs an insurer is required to disclose to 
the insured ‘any circumstance that could give rise to an actual or 
potential conflict of interest in dealing with the [insured]’ before the 
policy is entered into. It is submitted that the insured may insist on its 
own legal representative if a conflict of interest exists between it and 
its liability insurer. This aspect should be highlighted and explained to 
the insured before litigation commences and decisions are taken on 
which the insured was ill informed. This is another aspect for which 
the specified duties of disclosure require attention.  
Some insurance contracts may contain a so-called ‘SC’ or senior counsel clause 
to avoid a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured in the context of the 
conduct of the defence of third-party claims.251 In terms of such a clause the insurer 
undertakes to be liable and to pay claims under the policy without dispute or defence, 
unless a senior advocate advises that the claim may be successfully contested on a 
                                                                                                                                            
insurance in that liability insurance may cover the insured’s costs and the insurer may conduct the 
defence on behalf of the liability insured. See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African 
Insurance Law para 25.71, and Jacobs (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 464-475. See also Reinecke, van Niekerk 
& Nienaber ibid para 25.73 on the different types of legal expenses insurance. 
250 Such conflict of interest may be avoided by regulating the combination of liability insurance and 
legal protection insurance by a single insurer by statute. See, eg, the position under English law in para 
4.3.1.1(d)(i) below, and Belgian law para 5.3.1.1(c) below. See also Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber 
ibid paras 25.71-25.73; Jacobs ibid; and para 3.3.1.1(d) below. 
251 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber ibid para 25.66. 
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balance of probabilities. 252  Such a clause requires some clarification for the 
uninformed insured who is unfamiliar with legal practice and the remedies available 
for such a contestation. 
 
3.3.1.1(d)  Defence Costs  
Liability policies generally provide that the insurer will pay the costs of the 
legal proceedings to defend the third-party claim against the insured, or the costs of 
settling the claim.253 Insurers either actually conduct the defence, or if not, they fund 
it or indemnify the insured against those costs. However, this applies only when the 
third-party claim falls within the scope of the liability cover.254 
Defence costs should ideally be incurred only with the insurer’s prior consent 
and should at all times be reasonable. This aspect should be prominent in the 
disclosures, and the term ‘reasonable’ must be explained to the insured to allow it to 
grasp what it means in a practical sense. Apart from defence costs, other related 
expenses such as those for investigating the claim and the third-party costs awarded 
against the insured, will generally also be included. 
 Whether the defence costs will be included in the overall sum insured,255 or in 
the limited sum insured per claim or occurrence, depends on the wording of the 
policy. In the alternative, defence costs may be treated separately and may have their 
own limit in addition to the basic indemnity cover. The insurer is required to inform 
the insured of the nature and extent of the insurance benefits and its potential 
limitations. 256  This aspect, too, requires mandatory clear disclosure to prevent 
disputes in the sphere of liability insurance claims which benefit none of the parties 
involved. Prevention of potential misconceptions and errors offers a greater benefit 





                                                 
252  See the operation of the ‘QC’ clause as an alternative agreed way to establish the insured 
defendant’s legal liability towards the third-party plaintiff under English law in para 4.2.2.1(c)(iv).  
253 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 25.68-25.70; and Jacobs 
(2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 464-475. 
254 See para 3.2.2.2 above on the insured event and the duration of liability cover. 
255 See Coetzee v Attorneys’ Insurance Indemnity Fund above where the costs and expenses incurred 
by the insured were expressly included in the contractual limit of indemnity and Van Niekerk (2002) 5 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 22. See also para 3.2.2.3(a) above.  
256 PPRs: see rules 11.4.2(c) and 11.4.2(g). Also see paras 3.2 and 3.2.2.1(a) above.  
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3.3.1.1(e)  Waiver and Estoppel  
 An insurer that starts to conduct the defence on behalf of the insured in 
knowledge that there are reasons which entitle it to deny liability on the policy, may 
be estopped from subsequently denying liability to the insured.257 
Estoppel by representation258 is where one party, the liability insured in this 
instance, has a reasonable belief in a misrepresentation by another party, the liability 
insurer (eg, that it will not deny liability on the policy). If the insured relied on this 
misrepresentation to its disadvantage, it may then hold the liability insurer to the 
misrepresentation and can prevent the liability insurer from relying on the true state of 
affairs by raising the defence of estoppel.259 
But merely taking over the insured’s defence is not inevitably an undisputable 
representation by the insurer to the insured that the insurer accepts liability under the 
policy.260 To avoid uncertainty and disputes, an insurer that conducts the defence of a 
third-party claim should rather do so under an express reservation of rights. Many 
insureds are not aware of these complications. By determining by statute which 
disclosures must be made regarding the problematic aspects identified here, will 
benefit both the insurer and the insured.  
An insurer may also waive its rights, for example, to deny liability on a 
policy.261 According to one view, waiver is a contractual agreement to abandon rights. 
A different view, however, is that waiver is a one-sided juristic act – a choice not to 
deny liability on the policy.262 Again, if the insurer reserves its rights in terms of the 
                                                 
257 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 22.116, 22.117 and 25.59.  
258 This doctrine was introduced into our law from English law. See Hutchison & Pretorius Law of 
Contract in para 3.5.1  
259 See Resisto Dairy (Pty) Ltd v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (1) SA 632 (A) where the plea 
of estoppel was upheld against a liability insurer. See further Van Reenen v Santam Ltd above on 
whether a liability insurer’s engaging of attorneys to conduct defence or settlement of third-party 
claims in name of insured against the insured, and the insurer’s payment of fees and disbursements to 
such attorneys, amount to an acknowledgment of liability by the insurer to its insured. See also the case 
discussion by Van Niekerk (2013) 16 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin 121-127. On the extent of the 
burden of proof on the insured of alleged waiver by the insurer of its right to repudiate, see Regent 
Insurance Co Ltd v Maseko 2000 (3) SA 983 (W) and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2000) 3 
Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Regent’ 63-66.  
260 The absence of representation by, or on behalf of, an insurer is no basis on which an insured can rely 
on estoppel. See Everton v Compass Insurance Co Ltd [2003] JOL 11268 (T); and the case discussion 
by Van Niekerk (2007) 10 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Everton’111-113.  
261 See Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law paras 22.92-22.105 on waiver 
in insurance generally.  
262 On the test for the intention to waive tacitly, see Road Accident Fund v Mothupi 2000 (4) SA 38 




policy, it may proceed to conduct the defence and cannot be seen to waive its right to 
deny liability on the policy afterwards. Again, this possibility of a reservation of 
rights should be highlighted as a mandatory duty in communications between the 
parties to provide legal certainty as to the positions the parties find themselves in and 
to protect their interests.  
 
3.3.1.2 Settlement of Claims: No Admissions of Liability 
 
As part of a clause in the insurance contract which entitles the liability insurer to 
take over the defence of any third-party claim that may be brought against the insured, 
the insurer is generally also entitled to settle the claim on the insured’s behalf.263 As 
explained previously,264 concessions made by the insurer to the third party – eg, a 
settlement on the amount of the claim – bind the insured,265 even if the insurer has not 
been authorised to do so by the insured. 
Another important clause in liability insurance policies prohibits the insured 
from settling the claim by a third party or from making any admission of liability 
without the insurer’s prior written consent. For example, the standard clause in a 
liability policy provides: ‘No admission, statement, offer, promise, payment or 
indemnity may be made or accepted by you [the insured] without our [the insurer’s] 
written consent’.266 
This type of clause (a ‘no-admissions clause’), although not exclusive to 
liability insurance policies, is essential from a liability insurer’s perspective to 
protect its interests and to strengthen the insurer’s right to take control of the 
proceedings instituted by the third party against the insured.  
The no-admissions clause appears very wide and may even entitle insurers to 
avoid liability if the insured’s admission (such as a mere informal ‘sorry, it’s my 
mistake’) or settlement without their consent did not in fact prejudice them.267 For 
instance, the insurer could argue that it might have persuaded the third party to 
accept a lower settlement. 
                                                 
263 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.57. 
264 See para 3.3.1.1(b) above. 
265 See Masunga v Mutema above and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2008) 11 Juta’s Insurance 
Law Bulletin ‘Masunga’17-19: a liability insurer’s acceptance of liability towards a third party on 
authority of insured binds the latter.  
266 This section is based on English law as authority in South African law is limited. See para 4.3.1.2 
above. See also para 5.3.1.2 above on Belgian law. 
267 However, there is difference in opinion on this question in English law. See para 4.3.1.2 below. 
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One may ask whether the insurer is still entitled to rely on a no-admission 
clause if it elects not to conduct the insured’s defence against the third-party 
plaintiff. If the insurer further refuses to consent to a settlement between the insured 
and the third party, the matter would have to be litigated. Could the insured argue that 
by refusing to conduct its defence, the insurer has forfeited its right to rely on the 
no-admission clause which prohibits settlement without its consent? The matter 
appears not yet to have been considered by our courts.268 What is clear, however, is 
that these challenging aspects should be explained to the potential insured and that the 
insurer should be guided by a mandatory statutory list of items it must disclose for 
proper disclosure. It should be re-emphasised that the liability insurer must at all 
times exercise its rights under the policy with due regard to the interests of the 
insured.269 The insurer has no power arbitrarily to refuse consent to a settlement 
between the insured and the third party. The insurer must make a reasonable 
estimate of the potential of the success of the third partyʼs claim. If the third party has 
a very good chance of succeeding in its claim, the insurer should consent to a 
settlement within the policy limits. By contrast, if it appears unlikely that the third 
party's claim will succeed, the insurer may refuse to consent to settlement. 
It is submitted that in some cases the liability insurer may refuse to consent to a 
settlement between the insured and the third party even though it has refused to 
conduct the insured’s defence. This may arise particularly where the insurer’s right to 
conduct the insured’s defence or settlement, and the prohibition on admissions and 
settlements by the insured without the insurer's consent, are addressed in separate 
clauses of the insurance policy and the rights thus exist independently of  each 
other.  The duty of transparency by way of detailed disclosure is an important part of 
consumer protection measures for which the insurance industry must take 
responsibility as insurance is excluded from the general consumer protection 
measures under, for example, the CPA.  
 
Summative critical comments270 
Under South African law, an insurer generally has a contractual right to defend 
its insured, unless the insurance contract provides for a duty to do so. The right to 
                                                 
268 English courts have also not yet ruled on this. See para 4.3.1.2 below. 
269 Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.67. 
270 As to the entire para 3.3 above. 
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defend the insured arises, as a rule, simultaneously with an insurer’s duty to 
indemnify. Under English law, too, there is only a contractual right271 as opposed to 
Belgian law where a liability insurer has a statutory right and duty to defend its 
insured.272 
Growing consumerism and rising litigation, coupled with the right of access to 
justice, are among the reasons for advocating for an insurer’s duty to defend, as 
opposed a mere right to defend. It is submitted that what is needed is minimum cover 
to be prescribed in the PPRs.  
However, quantitative research studies are necessary to distinguish between the 
costs of underwriting an insurance contract where the insurer has a right to defend and 
where it has a duty to defend. Such studies are recommended and their outcomes 
factored in to the decision on whether the industry wishes to (or should) prescribe a 
mandatory duty to defend in the liability insurance claims process.  
Legal expenses insurance is a further option to cover defence costs, as opposed 
to the conduct of the defence by a liability insurer, but defence by a liability insurer 
that is a specialist in the field may be preferred by the insured. There are also 
advantages to having a single rather than multiple policies.  
Part of disclosure to the insured should detail when the insurer has a right or 
duty to defend and of the scope of the duty. The insurer is required to inform the 
insured of the nature and extent of the insurance benefits and its potential 
limitations.273 Concessions by the insurer to the third party in defending the third-
party claim – such as acceptance of liability – bind the insured directly and it should 
be warned of this possibility. No-admissions clauses should be disclosed prominently 
to the insured.274 
If a liability insurer conducts the insured’s defence, it should do so under 
reservation of rights to avoid uncertainty should it later opt to deny liability to the 
insured.275 This possibility should be disclosed and the process clearly understood as 
it has consequences for the rights of both insurer and insured.  
                                                 
271 There is more judicial authority in English law which may be consulted to develop our law. See para 
4.3.1.1 below.  
272  See para 5.3.1.1 below on Belgian law and the extensive protection that Belgian insurance 
legislation provides to both the liability insurer and the insured. 
273 PPRs: see rules 11.4.2(c) and 11.4.2(g). Also see paras 3.2 and 3.2.2.1(a) above.  
274 Some authors opine that clauses like no-admissions clauses which allow the insured absolute control 
over the conduct of its actions may in future be found unfair under the (English) Consumer Rights Act. 
See paras 4.1.2 and 4.3.1.2 below. 
275 See para 3.3.1.1(e) above. 
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Under the PPRs an insurer should disclose to an insured any actual or potential 
conflict of interest276 between them.277 An insured should be informed when it has a 
right to insist on its own legal representative and on how defence costs operate. 
An insurer’s right or duty to defend is not absolute, and one may here be guided 
by advances in English and Belgian law on how to deal with conflict of interest in the 
conduct of defence and settlements.278 
 To ensure transparency in the claims processes, and when an insurer makes a 
final payment, an offer, or a settlement to the insured, it should expressly disclose the 
full details and explain the reason for making payment or settlement to the insured.279 
 
 
3.3.2 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
 
As explained earlier,280 privity of contract means that there is no contractual 
relationship between the liability insurer and the third-party plaintiff. The latter may 
only claim from the insurer under the exceptional circumstances in section 156 of the 
Insolvency Act. The liability insurer may defend the matter against the third-party 
plaintiff.  
The possible multiple relationships in liability insurance and their 
interdependency in the context of liability insurance must be re-emphasised. In view 
of the many issues identified above, a direct claim by the third party against the 
insurer, that is not limited to the insured’s insolvency or sequestration, may need 
to be reconsidered at some point in the future. This is already the position under 
Belgian law as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.3 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff’s Insurers: Litigating against each other in 
the Names of their Insured 
It may happen that the insured’s liability insurer and the third party’s property 
insurer litigate against each other in the names of their respective insured – the 
property insurer by enforcing the third party’s claim in the exercise of its right of 
                                                 
276 Rule 11.4.2(j). 
277 See para 3.3.1.1(c) above. 
278 See paras 4.3.1.1(d) and 5.3.1.1(c) below. 
279 PPRs: rule 17.8.8. 
280 See para 3.2.3 above. 
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subrogation; and the liability insurer by defending the third party’s claim.281 However, 
no contract or legal relationship exists between the respective insurers as, on the 
principle of privity of contract, each acts on behalf of its own insured. This is, once 
again, an intricacy that should be disclosed and explained to the insured. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the first instance, the main sources of South African (liability) insurance law 
are common law, judicial decisions, legislation such as the SIA, the Insurance Act of 
2017, the relevant PPRs, and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
As explained, the law of liability insurance is found in these same sources to a greater 
or lesser degree. 
 Secondly, this chapter has identified and analysed some of the voids, unique 
challenges, and impracticalities in the South African insurance law, specifically as 
regards liability insurance contract law. These are: (a) in respect of the liability 
insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured and; (b) in relation to the liability insurer’s 
conduct of the defence and settlement of third-party claims brought against the 
insured defendant. Some of these are identified below. 
 Thirdly, the legal uncertainties that may precede the liability insurance contract 
(including contract negotiation), that may endure for the entire subsistence of the 
contract (including claims management), and that may continue after the expiry of the 
contract, have been explored in the chapter. 
Fourthly, it was established in this chapter that certain of these legal challenges 
can be addressed by introducing novel and creative applications of our national law 
not yet pursued by the legislator or the courts.  
In particular, the PPRs are aimed at insurance in general, yet due to the unique 
complexities and intricacies of liability insurance cover, separate rules in the existing 
PPRs applicable only to liability insurance,282 or alternatively a complete separate set 
of PPRs exclusively for liability insurance, are recommended.283 These will help in 
                                                 
281 For an example, see Momentum Group Ltd v Fire Control Systems (Cape) CC 2007 JDR 0618 (C) 
and the case discussion by Van Niekerk (2007) 10 Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin ‘Momentum’ 230-
237; Reinecke, van Niekerk & Nienaber South African Insurance Law para 25.40 and Van Niekerk 
(2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 382-393. 
282 For example, like the separate rules specifically for microinsurance products. 
283 The same applies to the GCC under the FAIS Act, in that more specific aspects regarding liability 




ensuring greater consumer protection for the insured and greater clarity for both 
insured and insurer as regards their respective rights and duties.  
The research in Chapter 3, and the summative critical comments, lay the 
foundation for the proposals for improvements to South African liability insurance 
law. These include specifically, the innovative check list developed in Chapter 6 
covering the most important disclosure duties for liability insurance contracts, their 
operation, and the eventual claims processes. 
 Fifthly, this chapter has identified areas in which liability insurance contract 
law lacks answers, and where the other jurisdictions under review in this thesis can 
provide potential solutions.  
 As to the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured, the problematic areas 
include: 
– the interpretation of the term ‘legal liability’; 
– as to the insured event and the duration of liability cover, guidance 
under the different types of policies of their triggers of cover; 
– the fairness and clarity of notice clauses; and 
– the constitutionality and ambit of the third-party plaintiff’s rights 
against the liability insurer, as well as aspects relating to the protection 
of the third-party plaintiff.  
 
As to the liability insurer’s defence and settlement of third-party claims brought 
against the insured defendant:  
– Growing consumerism and the right of access to justice are of the reasons 
advocating for a mandatory statutory duty to defend on the liability insurer, 
as opposed to a mere contractual right to choose to defend. 
– Quantitative research is recommended to establish the need for and the 
viability and cost-effectiveness of imposing a statutory duty to defend on the 
liability insurer.  
– The principles governing the settlement of third-party claims have not yet 
developed to their full potential in South African law and cognisance should 




The nature of liability insurance as third-party insurance should be kept in mind 
when our law is considered and developed. Generally, the interests of the liability-
insurance consumer (the insured or policyholder), the third-party plaintiff, and the 
insurer that offers liability cover should be balanced. 
 
It is recommended that the above-mentioned is the minimum of aspects to be 
addressed in detail in mandatory cover to be prescribed in PPRs applicable 
specifically to liability insurance. 
 
Lastly, as the subsequent chapters highlight potential solutions to the problems 
identified in this chapter, only summative critical comments have been included in 
this chapter. Proposals for improvements and the development of a clearer and more 
specific law of liability insurance contract law in South Africa will only be collated in 
the final summary of conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 6. 
This chapter has analysed the relevant principles of the law of liability insurance 
contract law only under the national law of South Africa – an uncodified or common-
law system. As part of the legal comparative review, the following chapter, Chapter 4, 
focuses on the law of liability insurance under English law – also a common-law 
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 ENGLISH LAW  
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION1  
 
English law is an uncodified system consisting of subsidiary common-law rules. 
The main sources of English insurance (contract) law2 are common law, legislation, 
equity, and trade usages. Liability insurance is a specialised branch of insurance law 
and the law of liability insurance is found in these same sources. The law of the 
European Union also has some impact on English insurance law. 
 
4.1.1 Common Law, Judicial Decisions, and Principles of Equity 
The term ‘common law’3 refers to the body of law that developed after the 
Norman Conquest, when the royal courts went on circuit and applied new rules which 
were incorporated into the local laws and customs and which gradually came to 
replace the local customary law in local courts.4 As the decisions of the royal courts 
were progressively recorded and published, it became practice to cite prior decisions 
as persuasive and binding authority in argument before courts. Like other fields of 
                                                 
1 In writing this section, the following general works on English law were consulted: Keenan Smith & 
Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 3-17; Bailey, Ching & Taylor Modern English Legal System paras 
1.002-1.007; Gubby Legal Concepts in Language 15-25 and 34-42; and Baker English Legal History 
195-215. On English insurance law, see also Clarke Insurance Contracts para 1.1; Birds Birds’ Modern 
Insurance Law 1-3 para 1.1 and 14-22 para 1.8; Merkin, Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux’s Law of 
Insurance paras 1.019-1.054 (hereafter ‘Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance’ in the chapter); Merkin, 
Summer & Hodgson Colinvaux Supplement 1-2 ad para 1.029 (hereafter ‘Colinvaux Supplement’ in 
this chapter); and Birds, Lynch & Paul MacGillivray on Insurance paras 1.001-1.012, 2.001-2.037 
(hereafter ‘MacGillivray on Insurance’ in this chapter). 
2  The study primary concerns insurance contract law, as opposed to the regulation of insurance 
business. For further detail on the regulation of the conduct of insurance business, see MacGillivray on 
Insurance chs 36-38; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance ch 14 and Colinvaux Supplement 79-86 ad ch 114; 
Clarke ibid para 1.1(a); and Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 8-19 paras 1.6-1.9, 25-39 paras 2.3-
2.7 and ch 5. The regulation of insurance business has become more important for the United Kingdom 
(‘UK’) in recent years given the need to comply with the harmonisation requirements of the European 
Union (‘EU’) single market for insurance (but the impact of Brexit is still uncertain at present). 
MacGillivray on Insurance (14 ed) Supplement, due to be published, is said to contain updates on the 
proposed impact of Brexit on the regulation of UK insurers.  
3 As opposed to ‘civil law’. 
4 It is therefore argued that ‘the identity between custom and common law is not historically true, since 
much of the common law in early times was created by the judges who justified their rulings by 
asserting they were derived from “the general custom of the Realm”’. See Keenan Smith & Keenan’s 
Text & Cases (15 ed) 7. 
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law, the English law of insurance is based on judicial precedent5 arising from case 
law.6  
True to a common-law legal tradition,7 decisions of the superior courts are a 
substantive source of law.8  
It is relevant for a discussion of the sources of insurance law, that this branch of 
the law may be divided into the broad categories of marine and non-marine insurance 
law,9  and to observe that instances of liability insurance are to be found in both 
categories.10  
Initially, the common law did not play a significant role in the resolution of 
insurance-law disputes as merchants spread the risks between themselves and a 
Chamber of Assurance outside of the regular court system resolved their disputes. The 
law merchant (mercantile law) is based on mercantile customs and initially developed 
independently of the common law. Further, the limited number of reported cases 
limited the development of insurance law in general. When Lord Mansfield was 
appointed Chief Justice in 1756, he embarked on instructing the juries of common-
law courts in full on the rules of insurance law in each case, by drawing principles 
                                                 
5 The doctrine of binding precedent (ie, stare decisis) implies that judges must follow decisions of 
higher courts in prior cases involving similar facts in the same area of law. Gubby Legal Concepts in 
Language 15-17, 23 and 38-39. 
6 As explained by Baker English Legal History 196, ‘[t]here was probably never a time when the 
common law was not in some sense “case law”, the result of solutions found in real cases’. Case law, in 
essence, refers to the judicial decisions judges make by applying legal principles from legislation and 
binding precedents. See Gubby Legal Concepts in Language 16.  
7 The basic characteristics of English law have become established in various Commonwealth countries 
and in most states of the United States of America (‘US/USA’). The term ‘common law’ bears different 
meanings. Broadly, the term ‘common-law legal system’ is used to distinguish such systems from 
‘continental or civil-law systems’. The latter systems were originally founded on Roman law and now 
primarily consist of codes established in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see, eg, Belgian law in 
para 5.1 below). In its narrower meaning, the term ‘common law’ refers to rules derived from the 
decisions of superior courts, as opposed to those derived from statute. In its narrowest sense, the term 
‘common law’ refers to a limited number of judge-made rules, to the exclusion of the principles of 
equity. (Under Belgian law the term ‘gemeen recht’ bears a distinctive meaning, and cannot be equated 
to any of the above meanings of the term ‘common law’ under English law. See the chapter on Belgian 
law in para 5.1.1 below.) 
8 And even though there is no (encompassing) code of insurance law in English law, legislation, too, is 
an increasingly important source. See para 4.1.2 below. 
9 See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 1.032 for a summary of the differences between marine and 
non-marine insurance law in English law. This distinction has from very early on been drawn in 
English law between marine and non-marine insurance. However, there are many other possible 
classifications of insurance law. See, eg, MacGillivray on Insurance para 1.040; Birds Birds’ Modern 
Insurance Law para 1.2 at 3-5; and Clarke Law of Insurance para 1.1(d) for further detail. 
10 This study primarily concerns the general principles of the law of liability insurance. See para 1.9 
above. 
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from the law merchant and more traditional common law.11 Mansfield’s judgments, 
primarily in the field of marine insurance law, subsequently formed the foundation of 
English insurance law. 
Due to the rigidity of the common law, the King’s Court of Chancery developed 
as a court of equity. It gradually established its own principles of natural justice and 
fairness. It also granted its own remedies where none existed at common law. 12 
‘Equity’ therefore developed alongside the common law.13 Today English courts may 
apply rules derived from the common law and the principles of equity.14 The current 
position may be summarised as follows: 
‘Equity never says the common law is wrong but merely provides alternative 
solutions to legal problems. … Equity is not, therefore, a complete system of the 
law. It complements the rules of the common law.’15 
 
As England was one of the leading maritime powers for many centuries, English 
commerce at sea was more important than her territorial commerce, and consequently 
her marine insurance law developed more rapidly than non-marine insurance law. The 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 16  codified the principles of marine insurance that 
originated, in the main, from judicial decisions and treatises of legal writers.17 Despite 
                                                 
11 Prior to this date, a mere 60 insurance law cases had been reported. In addition, cases were left to the 
decision of a jury of merchants without any statement of the relevant insurance legal principles from 
the Bench. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 1.032.  
12 See Gubby Legal Concepts in Language 18 and 36-37. 
13  For a discussion of the conflict which existed between the common law and equity in the 
development of English law, see Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 8, 11-12.  
14 For example, see the ‘equitable rule on ascertainment’ para 4.2.2.1(b)(iii) below to establish an 
insured’s legal liability towards the third-party plaintiff.  
15 Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 11-12. 
16 6 Edw 7 c 41, the ‘1906 Act’. Section 1 provides that, ‘[a] contract of marine insurance is a contract 
whereby the insurer undertakes to indemnify the assured … against marine losses, that is to say, the 
losses incident to marine adventure’. As to liability insurance in marine insurance, there is a ‘marine 
adventure’ where ‘[a]ny liability to a third party may be incurred by the owner of … insurable 
property, by reason of maritime perils’ (s 3(2)(c)). ‘“Maritime perils” means the perils consequent on, 
or incidental to, the navigation of the sea …’(s 3(2)). Gilman et al Arnould’s Marine Insurance and 
Average (18 ed) para 1.04 explain that the term ‘marine adventure’ governs the scope of what may be 
insured under a marine policy, while the term ‘marine perils’ determines the risks which may be 
insured against under a marine policy. For further detail on these concepts, also see Hardy Ivamy 
Chalmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906 108 ss 1-3. Section 74 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 also 
provides that ‘[w]here the assured has effected an insurance in express terms against any liability to a 
third party, the measure of indemnity, subject to any express provision in the policy, is the amount paid 
or payable by him to such third party in respect of such liability’. Examples of marine liability 
insurance include where a marine carrier insures its liability to a cargo owner should the cargo be 
damaged by the carrier’s negligence; or where a ship owner insures against liability for damage caused 
to another vessel by the negligent navigation of its insured vessel. See ibid 123 s 74. 
17 Gilman et al ibid para 1.01. Legal treatises may be considered another source of insurance law. See 
Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 16-17. English jurists have published legal treatises 
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the expanding role of legislation18 in common-law jurisdictions generally, case law 
remains extremely important in the development of the English law of insurance.  
 
4.1.2 Legislation 
There has traditionally been more extensive statutory involvement in the field of 
liability insurance than in other area of substantive insurance law.19 The Third Parties 
(Rights Against Insurers) Act, 1930, 20  for example, recognised the existence of 
liability insurance – whether mandatory or non-mandatory. It overturned the common-
law rule21 that the proceeds of a liability policy formed part of the insured’s insolvent 
estate. 22  The 1930 Act has been replaced 23  by the Third Parties (Rights Against 
Insurers) Act, 2010, which has a wider sphere of application.24  
A number of statutes also provide for compulsory insurance against liability for 
the performance of specific forms of activity.25  However, these statutes primarily 
identify the risks against which liability insurance must be taken out, and do not 
generally prescribe the principles of liability insurance or the terms upon which the 
required liability insurance is to be effected.26  
                                                                                                                                            
through the course of time which have helped shape the law. Older treatises, as well as modern works, 
are regularly referred to when new points of law are argued in the courts. 
18 Legislation (statutes or Acts) refers to written laws passed by the legislative body in England, that is, 
the Parliament. See Gubby Legal Concepts in Language 20. An English court may override national 
legislation where it is in conflict with the law of the EU. Ibid 35. As to the impact of anti-
discrimination legislation on insurance law generally, see Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 146-147 
para 7.8.5 and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 7.122-7.124. 
19 Merkin & Hjalmarsson Compendium of Insurance Law 811-812.  
20 20 & 21 Geo 5 c 25; the ‘1930 Act’. 
21 See para 4.2.3 below for further detail. 
22 It has been observed that ‘very little has been written about liability insurance, except concerning the 
1930 Act’: Birds & Hird ‘Report’ 185. This may have well changed as the statement was made in 
excess of 20 years ago. See, eg, Clarke Law of Liability Insurance which has seen two subsequent 
editions. Commentaries by Colinvaux and MacGillivray also contain detailed analysis of the latest 
developments in the law of liability insurance. 
23 The 1930 Act still applies in some instances. See para 4.2.3.2 below for further detail. 
24 Chapter 10; the ‘2010 Act’. The 2010 Act came into operation on 1 August 2016. See para 4.2.3.3 
below for further detail. 
25 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 1.037; and Merkin & Hjalmarsson Compendium of Insurance 
Law 811-2 and 850-857. For example, the Employers’ Liability (Compulsory Insurance Act) of 1969 (c 
57) which requires employers to insure against their liability for personal injury to their employees (s 
1(1)); and the Solicitors Act of 1974 (c 47) which provides for compulsory professional indemnity 
insurance for solicitors (s 37). For further detail on employers’ liability policies and professional 
indemnity policies, see MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.083-30.109 and 30.110-30.117; 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.001-21.005 and 21.116-21.131 and Colinvaux Supplement 126 
ad paras 21.122 and 21.126. 
26 The Road Traffic Act of 1988 (c 52), which provides for compulsory insurance against liability 
arising from the use or permitting the use of a motor vehicle in respect of personal injury or property 
damage, is an exception to this rule. It intervenes in the contractual arrangements between the 
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Three relatively recent statutes have reformed27 major parts of the substantive 
law of insurance contract. 28  These statutes distinguish between ‘consumer 
insurance’29 and ‘non-consumer insurance’,30 and as a result, a distinction31 between 
these categories of insurance has become very important in the English law of 
insurance. 32  Again, instances of liability insurance are to be found in both 
categories.33 A few brief notes on these Acts suffice in the context of legislation as a 
                                                                                                                                            
contracting parties (the insured as users of motor vehicle and their insurers) by depriving insurers of the 
right to plead defences that would otherwise have been available to them (s 148). Also see Merkin & 
Hjalmarsson Compendium of Insurance Law at 850 and 942-944; MacGillivray on Insurance ch 31; 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance ch 23 and Colinvaux Supplement 151-202 ad ch 23 for further detail. A 
future publication, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance (12 ed), is set to analyse major changes as to the law 
of motor-vehicle insurance. 
27 A detailed study of these statutes falls beyond the scope of this study, but the statutes will be referred 
to in passing where relevant. Sources that pre-date these Acts should be considered with caution. 
28 There is still no (encompassing) code of insurance law in English law. The English system of 
financial regulation of insurance business is based on EU requirements that have been consolidated in 
Directive 2009/138EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance (‘Solvency II’). Solvency II has 
been included in English law by the enactment of the Financial Services and Markets, Act 2000, as 
amended (the ‘2000 Act, as amended’). General liability insurance is one of the classes of ‘general 
business’ defined in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 2000 Act. Further detail is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. See para 1.9 above.  
The protection of policyholders is provided for by Part XV of the 2000 Act, as amended. 
Insurance business is regulated by the Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (‘ICOBS’) issued 
under the 2000 Act, as amended. ICOBS is amended from time to time. The rules in ICOBS impose 
statutory duties on insurers and intermediaries. ICOBS 6 contains the rules on the disclosure of product 
information by insurers to ensure that the insured has the necessary information to make an informed 
choice on the product and the cover it requires. Some commentators argue that ICOBS has impacted on 
insurance contract law to some extent. There are general disclosure requirements for all forms of 
indemnity insurance. They also apply to liability insurance contracts, but are not tailored for liability 
insurance and will not be discussed in further detail for purposes of this thesis. See Birds Birds’ 
Modern Insurance Law 15 para 1.9-1.91, chs 2 and 5. See also MacGillivray on Insurance paras 
36.010-36.012 and 38.076-38.077. 
29 A ‘consumer’ under these Acts refers to an individual contracting ‘wholly or mainly outside that 
individual’s trade, business, craft or profession’: Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 8 para 1.5 and 
126 para 7.4.  
30 Also referred to as ‘business’ or ‘commercial insurance’. 
31 For further detail on the distinction between consumer and non-consumer insurance law, see Birds 
ibid 15-16 para 1.9 and 110-111 para 6.1; MacGillivray on Insurance paras 10.001, 19.017 and 20.023 
and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 7.007 and 7.030. 
32 A ‘contract of insurance’ is not defined under these Acts. Before this, the definition of an insurance 
contract was primarily important for fiscal and regulatory purposes of insurance business under the 
English law of insurance. See MacGillivray on Insurance para 1.001. Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance 
Law 8-9 para 1.6 proposes that, for regulatory purposes, a contract of insurance ‘is any contract having 
as its principal object one party (the insurer) assuming the risk of an uncertain event, which is not 
within its control, happening at a future time, in which event the other party (the insured) has an 
interest, and under which contract the insurer is bound to pay money or provide its equivalent if the 
uncertain event occurs’. 
33 An example of a consumer liability insurance contract is where liability insurance forms part of a 
comprehensive policy, like a householder’s policy. See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 5.11. 
Directors’ and officers’ liability policies are examples of non-consumer insurance. 
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source of insurance law.34 
First, the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act, 2012,35 
reforms aspects of the English consumer insurance law relating to pre-contractual 
disclosure and misrepresentation.36 In essence, the 2012 Act abolishes a consumer’s 
duty of disclosure of a ‘material circumstance’ or a ‘material fact’.37 A consumer now 
merely has a duty to take reasonable care38 not to make a misrepresentation.39 The 
insurer’s questions to the consumer, for example, in the proposal form, determine the 
scope of the consumer’s duty to take reasonable care. The remedies for breach of the 
duty have been modified. A remedy for breach of the duty to take reasonable care is 
available only if the misrepresentation was a ‘qualifying misrepresentation’.40 
Second, the Insurance Act, 2015,41 has amended the duty of disclosure in non-
consumer contracts.42 The duty of disclosure is retained in non-consumer law. Both a 
failure to disclose and misrepresentation now resort under the ‘duty of fair 
representation of the risk’.43 Breach of this duty does not necessarily entitle the other 
contracting party to avoid the insurance contract.44 
Both the 2012 Act and the 2015 Act modify the duty to act with utmost good 
faith in both consumer and non-consumer insurance contracts. 45  For example, 
                                                 
34 During the course of Chapter 4, a few brief references will also be made to instances where these 
Acts may affect the general principles of the law of liability insurance.  
35 Chapter 6; the ‘2012 Act’ or also known as ‘CIDRA’. The 2012 Act came in force on 6 April 2013 
and only applies to contracts entered into or renewed after that date. It has been said to ‘represent the 
first real reform of insurance contract law since the principles were first developed, especially by Lord 
Mansfield in the eighteenth century’: Birds, Lynch & Milnes MacGillivray on Insurance (Centenary 
Ed) in preface at ix. See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 117-118 para 7.0 and 126-128 para 7.04; 
Clarke Law of Liability Insurance in paras 5.11 and 7.3; MacGillivray on Insurance paras 19.003-
19.006; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 7.005-7.029 for summaries and analysis of the reforms by 
the 2012 Act. 
36 Traditionally an insurer had the right to avoid the contract of insurance in its entirety if the insured 
was guilty of non-disclosure or misrepresentation.  
37 Section 2. 
38 Section 3 provides for an objective test to determine reasonable care.  
39 For example, by misstatements on a proposal form, or in answers to questions posed telephonically 
or electronically. 
40 Remedies for breach are set out in ss 4, 5, and Schedule 1 to the Act. See Birds Birds’ Modern 
Insurance Law 128 para 7.4.2. 
41 Chapter 4; the ‘2015 Act’. The 2015 Act came into force on 12 August 2016.  
42 Part 2 of the 2015 Act. See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law; 130-146 paras 7.5-7.8; Colinvaux’s 
Law of Insurance paras 7.006 and 7.029ff and Colinvaux Supplement 28-29 ad para 7.030ff; and 
MacGillivray on Insurance paras 20.001-20.007 in particular, and ch 20 generally. 
43 Section 3. 
44 Section 8 and Schedule 1 to the 2015 Act deal with remedies for the breach of this duty; see Birds 
Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 147-151 para 7.9. 
45 Ibid 117-118 para 7.0; and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 6.002-6.006. 
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avoidance of the contract as an automatic remedy for breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith has been abolished.46 
The 2015 Act also impacts on the law on warranties and conditions47 in both 
consumer and non-consumer contracts.48 Before the 2015 Act, breach of warranty by 
the insured automatically discharged the insurer from liability, unless the insurer 
waived the breach. Under the 2015 Act, breach of warranty by the insured merely 
suspends the liability of the insurer for the duration of the breach.  
Subject to requirements being met, insurers in non-consumer contracts may 
contract out49 of Parts 2 and 3 of the 2015 Act.50 The 2012 Act51 and the 2015 Act52 
prohibit the use of a so-called ‘basis-of-the-contract clause’ to convert a pre-
contractual representation into a warranty.53 
Of relevance to liability insurance in particular, is that the 2015 Act also 
amended some parts of the 2010 Act.54 
Thirdly, the Consumer Rights Act, 2015,55 is relevant in so far as it impacts on 
the substantive law of insurance.56 The Consumer Rights Act controls unfair terms 
                                                 
46 See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 117-158 para 7 for further detail on reforms to the duty of 
utmost good faith on the part of the insured, and 159-166 para 8 on reforms of the duty of utmost good 
faith on the part of the insurer. For further detail on the insured’s pre-contractual duty of utmost good 
faith under common law and the statutory reforms, see Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 6.022-6.025 
and Colinvaux Supplement 25 ad para 6.022; and as to the post-contractual duty, see Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance paras 6.032-6.040. See also MacGillivray on Insurance ch 17 generally as to the duty of 
good faith, and chs 19 and 20 as to the statutory reforms. 
47 See Birds ibid chs 6 and 9 for the distinction between the different types of contractual term and the 
effect of the reforms on them. Further detail falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Examples of 
conditions imposing rights on a liability insurer include conditions governing subrogation rights and 
control of the proceedings by or against the insured: Birds ibid 184 para 9.9. See paras 4.2.4 and 4.3 
below for further detail. 
48 Part 3 of the 2015 Act. See Birds ibid 114 para 6.4 and 117 para 9.7; MacGillivray on Insurance 
paras 10.122-10.127; Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.5; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance ch 8 
generally and Colinvaux Supplement 31-32 ad para 8.018ff. 
49 Birds ibid 151 para 7.10 and 9.7.2 at 183. Part 3 of the 2015 Act may not be contracted out of in 
consumer contracts. 
50 For example, excluded contracts may provide for automatic discharge by the insurer in case of 
breach of warranty by the insured; or for a right to avoid the contract without having to show 
inducement when the duty to fair representation has been breached. 
51 Section 6. 
52 Section 9. 
53 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 168-169 para 9.2.1 and 174-175 para 9.6; and Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance paras 6.012, 8.003, and 8.124-8.125. 
54 Part 6 of the 2015 Act. See MacGillivray on Insurance paras 20.007 and 30.024-30.038. See para 
4.2.3.3 below for further detail. 
55  Chapter 15; the ‘Consumer Rights Act’. From 1 October 2015, the Act replaced the previous 
regulations on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
56 The ambit of the Act is wider than insurance consumer contracts. 
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where the insured is a ‘consumer’ in a contract.57 The Act distinguishes between two 
categories of terms: ‘core terms’ and ‘non-core terms’. 58  All written terms in 
consumer insurance contracts should be transparent.59 Provided that ‘core terms’ are 
transparent and prominent,60 they are not assessed for unfairness.61 Non-core terms 
are assessed for fairness and are unenforceable if they are found to be unfair.62 It is at 
present uncertain which types of term in insurance contracts may be declared unfair.63 
As far as liability insurance is concerned, it is has been opined that conditions which 
enforce unreasonable time limits on the insured,64 and terms which give the insurer 
absolute control over the conduct of the insured’s actions, 65  may be found to be 
unfair.66 
 
4.1.3 Trade Usage 
Trade usage67 may as be regarded as a source of insurance law. First, trade 
usage relating to the meaning of terms, for example, plays a role in the interpretation 
                                                 
57 Part 2. See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 16 para 1.6 and 110-111 para 6.1; MacGillivray on 
Insurance paras 3.25-3.31 and 10.016-10.021; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 6.001 and 8.013 
and Colinvaux Supplement 24 ad para 6.001. (As to the implied terms applicable to insurance consumer 
contracts under the Consumer Rights Act, see Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 6.066-6.067.) 
58 ‘Core terms’ specify the subject matter of a contract; or the appropriateness of the price payable 
under the contract in comparison with the goods or services supplied under it. Examples of core terms 
may include: clauses which define the scope of the cover and the measure of indemnity, including 
exception clauses, suspensive conditions, limitations on liability, and warranties that define the risk run 
by the insurer. ‘Non-core terms’ will include the following: procedural clauses stipulating time limits 
and procedures for making claims and resolving disputes arising from the policy, clauses requiring 
notification of events during the currency of the policy, and forfeiture clauses. See, eg, the decision by 
the European Court of Justice, Van Hove v CNP Assurances SA (C 96-14) concerning unfair terms. 
59 Section 68. ‘Transparent’ means that a term must be expressed in plain and intelligible language, and 
be legible. 
60 Sections 64(3)-64(5). ‘Prominence’ means that a term is brought to a consumer’s attention in a way 
that an average consumer would be aware of it.  
61 Section 64(2).  
62 Section 62: ‘A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’: s 
62(4). See s 64(5) on the assessment of fairness. 
63 MacGillivray on Insurance para 10.021. 
64 For example, to give notice of loss or claims. See para 4.2.2.4 below. 
65 For example, clauses against admissions of liability by the insured and clauses relating to the control 
of the proceedings by the insurer. See paras 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 below. 
66 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 110-111 para 6.1. 
67 English law distinguishes between trade usage and custom. A custom is a rule which has existed 
either actually or presumptively from time immemorial and has obtained the force of law in a particular 
location. Trade usage, on the other hand, lacks three of the distinguishing characteristics of custom: 
first, it need not have existed from time immemorial; secondly, it does not necessarily have to be 
confined to a limited location; and thirdly, where a trade usage is contrary to the positive law the courts 
will not recognise or enforce it.  
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of insurance policies.68 If terms have acquired a meaning in a particular trade or 
business, it must be presumed that the contracting parties intended those words to bear 
that meaning. In the context of marine insurance, for example, the term ‘average’ has 
a technical meaning. Secondly, implied terms in marine insurance law may also be 
varied by trade usage. Section 87(1) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906, for example, 
provides that ‘[w]here any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract of 
marine insurance by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express 
agreement, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract’.69 
Although custom was applied by the judges and turned into the common law 
of England in the past, it is of little relevance as a current source of law.70 
 
4.1.4 The General Law of Contract, Insurance Law and the Law of 
Liability Insurance 
 
The liability insurance contract is a type of insurance contract which is, in turn, 
simply a specific type of contract. It follows, therefore, that liability insurance 
contracts as insurance contracts are subject to the general law of contract,71 although 
they are further subject to some special legal rules of insurance 72  and liability 
insurance.73 Some authorities, Clarke for example, are of view that the concept of ‘the 
law of insurance’ is a misnomer as there is no distinct body of law of insurance 
contracts which determines the majority of issues in insurance law. 74  Others 
acknowledge the existence of a symbiotic relationship between the law of insurance 
                                                 
68 See MacGillivray on Insurance para 11.016; and Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 28.8A. For 
further detail, see Hardy Ivamy Chalmers’ Marine Insurance Act 1906 42-143 regarding s 87; and 
Gilman et al Arnould’s Marine Insurance and Average (18 ed) paras 3.10-3.16. 
69 For further detail on how trade usage may vary implied terms of marine insurance law, see Hardy 
Ivamy ibid 142-143 ad s 87; and Gilman et al ibid paras 3.10-3.16. 
70 Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Texts and Cases (15 ed) 14-15.  
71 For instance, the general principles relating to the formation and termination of the liability insurance 
contract are similar to those applicable to other types of contract. See Clarke Policies and Perceptions 
353-354. Again see the impact of the Consumer Rights Act on insurance law and liability insurance 
contracts, as discussed in para 4.1.2 above. 
72 The duty of utmost good faith and the peculiar rules relating to conditions and warranties in the 
context of insurance contracts, eg, seem to be applicable to insurance contracts only and not other 
contracts. See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 1.3; and Clarke Policies and Perceptions 354-
355. However, account must be taken of the latest statutory reforms in this regard. See para 4.1.2 
above. The common law has denounced a superseding duty of good faith in contracts generally, but the 
Consumer Rights Act (introduced due to the impact of EU legislation on English law), supports the 
notion of wider recognition of the duty of good faith than merely in insurance contract. See 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 6.001. This matter is still under debate. 
73 Rules relating to the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer and the costs involved seem to be 
applicable to liability insurance only to the exclusion of other types of insurance. See below para 
4.3.1.1 for further detail. 
74 See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 1.3.  
 140 
contracts and the general law of contracts.75 It is argued that the former cannot exist 
without the latter, although the extent of the influence of insurance law on the general 
law of contract is questioned. However, the influence of judicial decisions on 
insurance law in the development of English contract law has been recognised. The 
symbiotic relationship, if any, between tort liability and liability insurance has further 
been widely debated.76 
 
4.1.5 The Law of the European Union 
English insurance law has further increasingly been influenced by the law of the 
EU.77 The Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law Project Group78 aims to 
harmonise substantive insurance contract law in EU Member States to some degree. 
The Project Group published the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law79 in 
2009. The PEICL was envisaged to become an optional instrument of European 
insurance contract law. Its application will depend on the agreement thereto by parties 
to the insurance contract. The PEICL will not replace the national insurance contract 
law of EU Member States,80 but will provide the parties to the insurance contract with 
the choice of an alternative consensual set of rules to govern their insurance 
contract.81  
The PEICL consists of rules that state the common understanding of the general 
provisions of insurance contract law throughout the EU.82 The rules cover all types of 
                                                 
75 For further detail, see Clarke ibid and Clarke Policies and Perceptions 354-358. 
76 Clarke Policies and Perceptions 308-316. 
77  As explained in para 4.1.1 above, the influence by the law of the EU generally concerns the 
regulation of the conduct of the business of insurance, as opposed to insurance contract law; and the 
impact of the law of the EU on English insurance law may change due to Brexit. However, EU 
regulations also impacted on English unfair terms in consumer contracts, as well as case law by the EU 
Court of Justice. See para 4.1.2 above. For the influence of EU law on regulating conflict of interest 
regarding legal expenses insurance in the context of liability insurance under English law, see para 
4.3.1.1(d)(iii) below. 
78 The ‘Project Group’.  
79 Basedow et al PEICL; the ‘PEICL’. See PEICL at xlix-lxviii; and Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance 
Law 21-22 para 1.10.2 for further detail. 
80 As such, the PEICL is not a source of English insurance law, but it may influence the terms of 
insurance contracts in England (and other EU Member States – see para 5.1.4 below on Belgian law). 
81 For the PEICL to apply to an insurance contract, the parties will either have to contract into (or out 
of) the PEICL. 
82 The PEICL includes ‘absolutely mandatory’ and ‘semi-mandatory’ rules. If the PEICL are adopted 
by the parties to an insurance contract, some rules may not be derogated from at all and are thus 
‘absolutely’ mandatory. Other PEICL rules are ‘semi-mandatory’ as the parties to the insurance 
contract that opted for the PEICL, may derogate from them provided that such derogation does not 
prejudice the policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary. 
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insurance other than reinsurance.83 An expanded and slightly updated version of the 
PEICL was published by the Project Group in 2015.84 The Project Group has also 
started drafting special rules for individual branches of insurance law, and the updated 
version includes provisions on liability insurance.85 
 Although the overall draft of the PEICL is ready for consideration by the 
political institutions of the EU with a view to eventual legislation, some 
commentators are sceptical about the prospect of legislation at the European level.86 
In this chapter, however, the focus remains on the English national insurance contract 
law. 
 
4.2 THE LIABILITY INSURER’S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY THE 
INSURED  
4.2.1 The Legal Relationship between the Third-Party Plaintiff and the 
Insured Defendant 
 
As liability insurance is third-party insurance, 87  the insured’s legal liability 
(both in fact and in extent) to the third party in principle determines the liability of the 
liability insurer to the insured.88 However, an insured’s liability to the third-party 
plaintiff is in principle independent of any insurance or liability insurer and the 
insured’s liability is incurred irrespective of whether the insured defendant is insured 
or covered.89 Even though the defendant may not be an ‘insured’ in that it that does 
not have insurance at all, or may not be covered under its liability insurance contract 
                                                 
83 The rules themselves are followed by comments that explain the reasons behind each rule, together 
with examples of how the rules should be applied. In addition to comments, notes to the rules confirm 
the status quo of insurance contract law in each EU Member State as well as the common viewpoints 
on each relevant legal point. 
84 Basedow et al PEICL (2 ed); the ‘PEICL (2 ed)’. See PEICL (2 ed) ‘Preface’ v. 
85 PEICL paras 1.1-1.10; and PEICL (2 ed) Part 4 at 51-56 and 286-311. 
86 Birds Birds’Modern Insurance Law 21-22 para 1.10.2. 
87 Ibid 3-4 para 1.2.1. A third party is someone other than the insured, eg, a claim by a subsidiary of an 
insured against the insured is a third-party claim: Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 20.014 and 
Colinvaux Supplement 116-117 ad para 21.014. Also see para 2.2.2.2 above for further detail on 
liability insurance as third-party insurance.  
88 See para 4.2.2.1 below for further analysis of the concept ‘legal liability’. For further detail on the 
legal relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the insured defendant in the context of the 
conduct of the defence and settlement of claims by the third-party plaintiff against the insured 
defendant, see generally para 4.3 below. Liability policies, eg, usually contain a clause that prohibits 
the insured from settling any claim by a third party, or from making any admission of liability, without 
the insurer’s written consent. See para 4.3.1.2 below.  
89  Cooke Law of Tort confirms (at 8) that ‘the fact that a party is insured is, strictly speaking, 
disregarded by the court when the liability and quantum of damages are assessed’. See Clarke Policies 
and Perceptions 308-316 for a critical discussion of the symbiotic relationship, if any, between tort 
liability and liability insurance. 
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against the liability it incurred towards the third party, the defendant may still be 
liable to the third party for the latter’s loss. So, for example, a defendant that has 
intentionally caused loss to the third party may not be covered under its liability 
insurance contract, but may still be held legally liable towards the third party for the 
latter’s loss.  
However, some commentators have recognised the influence that the existence 
of liability insurance may have on the imposition of civil liability on the insured 
defendant.90 
 
4.2.2 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Insured Defendant 
 
4.2.2.1 The Scope of the Insured Defendant’s Liability Cover 
 
As indicated previously,91 liability insurance covers only legal liability on the 
part of the insured defendant towards third parties. As liability insurance is indemnity 
insurance, the insured does not have a right to be indemnified, and the insurer is not 
obliged to indemnify the insured until the insured has suffered a ‘loss’.92 For purposes 
of liability insurance, a ‘loss’ is suffered when the insured becomes legally liable 
towards a third party for the latter’s loss. 93  The terms of the insurance contract 
primarily determine the loss to the insured – ie, its legal liability towards a third party 
                                                 
90 It has been opined that ‘the tort system would be unable to operate without the underpinning of 
insurance and the presence of insurance may have shaped some liability rules’. See Cooke Law of Tort 
8. Cooke then explains that, in the absence of third-party insurance, many claimants may be 
uncompensated or receive only partial compensation due to defendants’ inability to meet compensation 
awards. He further describes two possible ways in which insurance may impact tort law. First, 
Parliament will consider the impact of any legislative change of tort law on insurance. Secondly, as 
liability insurers conduct the defence on behalf of their insured, they determine which claims are settled 
or disputed and insurance therefore plays a role in the actual operation of the tort system. Ibid 7-9. It 
has been suggested that the fact that insurance may be taken out against liability for legal costs towards 
third parties, has contributed to the so-called ‘compensation culture’, which may be defined as a 
‘propensity to respond to injury by legal redress’. Ibid 16. It should also be noted that liability in tort is 
not static and the development of the law of tort may have an impact on insurance. Ibid 17. The 
challenges relating to the expansion of the law of tort in negligence, and the interplay with insurance, 
eg, are discussed ibid at 31ff.  
91 See para 2.2.2.1 above on the classification of liability insurance as indemnity insurance. 
92 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A. Clarke Law of Liability Insurance in para 8.6 
explains that ‘the amount of the loss covered and recoverable is the amount of damages that, as the 
consequence of the liability imposed in law, the insured is obligated to pay to third parties’. The 
ordinary meaning is ascribed to the word ‘damages’: ibid. However, the insured will not always receive 
a ‘perfect indemnity’: Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 1.028 and 1.029 and Colinvaux Supplement 
at 1-2 ad para 1.029. 
93 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 8.1. 
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for the latter’s loss – which may then trigger the liability of the insurer towards the 
insured under the liability insurance policy.94  
The meaning of the phrase ‘legal liability’, also referred to as ‘liability at law’ 
or ‘liability to pay’, is one of the contentious issues around liability insurance in 
English law and warrants detailed analysis.95 
 
4.2.2.1(a)  The Extent of ‘Legal Liability’96 
 
The insured may be indemnified against amounts that it may be liable to pay to 
third parties in tort, contractually for performance, for breach of contract, and/or by 
statute, although indemnity against certain forms of liability cover may be excluded 
expressly or by implication in the policy itself. 
The different bases of liability may briefly be distinguished as follows: 
– Tortious liability: Academic authorities have conceded that it is 
difficult to provide a satisfactory definition of this term. According to 
Winsfield, ‘tortious liability arises from a duty primarily fixed by law: 
this duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by 
an action for unliquidated damages’.97 Winsfield’s definition has been 
accepted in various English decisions.98 Some of the recent authorities 
on the law of tort acknowledge Winfield’s definition for its role in 
distinguishing tort from other branches of the law, such as contract,99 
                                                 
94 The insured’s legal liability towards the third-party plaintiff is the insured’s loss in terms of the 
liability policy (see this para 4.2.2.1 below) and should be distinguished from the ‘insured event’ that 
brings the matter within the scope of a particular period of cover designated in the liability insurance 
contract (see para 4.2.2.2 below). See paras 4.2.2.1(b)-4.2.2.1(c) below for further detail on the time 
when, and the ways in which, the insured becomes legally liable towards third-party plaintiffs. Also see 
para 4.2.2.1(c) below for further detail on the effect of the established legal liability of the insured 
towards the third party on the liability of the insurer towards the insured.  
95 See para 4.2.2.1(a) below for further detail. 
96 Or ‘liability at law’, ‘liability to pay’, or other similar terminology. In writing this section, the 
following general works on English insurance law were consulted: Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts 
para 17.4A1; Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 8.6, 10.3 and 10.4.4; MacGillivray on Insurance 
paras 30.001-30.007; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in paras 21.014-20.023 and Colinvaux Supplement 
117-118 ad paras 21.014 and 21.017; and Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law paras 20.0 and 20.11 at 
385-386 and 388. 
97 Smith & Keenan English Law (6 ed) at 296 and Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 
491.  
98 Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) at 491. 
99 The distinctive characteristics that are referred to in Winfield’s definition of ‘tortious liability’ may 
assist in providing clarification for statements made on tortious liability in the context of liability 
insurance in judicial decisions and commentaries. In the first instance, from the definition it is evident 
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and for its brevity, but do not accept the definition as entirely 
accurate.100 Therefore, they regard the different aims of the heads of 
liability as a more satisfactory basis on which to distinguish between 
contract and tort – ‘[t]he “core” of contract is the enforcing of 
promises, whereas tort aims principally at the prevention or 
compensation of harms’.101 These authors then again qualify this basis 
of distinction.102 Despite a number of distinctions, there is nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                            
that tortious liability arises from law, as opposed to from contract. That may explain why tortious 
liability (and seemingly not also contractual liability) is sometimes referred to as liability that arises at 
common law. See M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment Co Ltd v Iron Trades Manual Insurance Co 
Ltd [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 289 (QBD (Comm)) 292-293 discussed in further detail in para 
4.2.2.1(a)(i) below. Secondly, the fact that tortious liability creates a duty towards persons generally, 
explains why public liability or product liability policies (that usually provide cover against the public 
at large) generally seek to cover tortious liability, but not contractual liability voluntarily assumed. See, 
Tesco Stores Ltd v David Constable & Others [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 636 (CA (Civ Div)) para 14 
discussed in further detail in para 4.2.2.1(a)(i) below. Thirdly, it is also clear from the definition of 
tortious liability that damages in tort are not liquidated but rather ‘unliquidated’ damages. The plaintiff 
in tort must produce evidence of the loss it suffered and it is then left to the discretion of the court to 
determine the amount of damages payable. See Smith & Keenan English Law (6 ed) 273 and Keenan 
Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 518-524. See para 4.2.2.1(a)(i) below for further detail on 
whether ‘legal liability’ covers liability in tort to the exclusion of contractual liability. 
100 See, eg, Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz Tort paras 1.1-1.10; and Cooke Law of Tort 17-21, for a 
discussion of Winfield’s definition on ‘tortious liability’, and his proposed distinction between tortious 
and contractual liability critically. They criticise these distinctions as ‘generalisations’ and as ‘apt to 
mislead’. In the first instance, Winfield’s view that tortious duties are legally imposed (fixed by the law 
itself) and do not depend on agreement or consent of the persons subjected to them, whereas 
contractual obligations are assumed voluntarily (fixed by the parties themselves), is challenged on a 
number of grounds. For example, on the one hand, there are instances of tortious liability where prior 
consent by the defendant is required (eg, the liability of the occupier of premises to its visitor is based 
on a breach of duty of care that is owed by the occupier to persons whom it has permitted to enter its 
premises). On the other hand, in many instances the content of contracts is legally imposed and not 
voluntarily inserted by the contracting parties (eg, terms implied in contracts by the operation of law, 
eg statutory obligations for the sale or hire-purchase of goods, which cannot be excluded by the parties 
to the contract), or the duty not to break a promise (or contract), which forms the basis for the remedy 
for breach of contract. Secondly, other proposed distinctions between tort and contract (eg, that tortious 
liability is fault-based and contractual liability is strict) are qualified. For example, some authors 
challenge the distinction by contending that the word ‘fault’ has different meanings and that high 
standards are imposed for tortious liability especially in the case of compulsory liability insurance. See 
Cooke Law of Tort 19. 
101 Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz Tort para 1.6 and Cooke ibid. The common law traditionally takes 
account of the diverging interests between contract and tort when a remedy is granted. Therefore, an 
award for contractual damages is aimed at placing the claimant in the position which it would have 
occupied had the defendant’s undertaking been fulfilled; whereas an award for tort damages is 
designed to return the claimant to the position it was in before the defendant’s wrong was committed. 
See Cooke ibid 19-20; and Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Texts & Cases (15 ed) 518. Traditionally, the 
law of tort has been seen to protect victims against damage to their person or property and it was 
regarded as the role of contract to protect economic interests. See Cooke ibid 81. Tort law is said to 
provide limited protection for economic interests where the defendant has acted unlawfully and has 
caused economic loss to the claimant (so-called ‘economic torts’). This may be explained by a 
distinction between lawful and unlawful business practice. Cook ibid 6. 
102 Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz Tort paras 1.6-1.7; and Cooke ibid 19-20. The extent of liability for 
negligently caused economic loss is controversial and is seen as one of the areas where tort and 
contract overlap. See Cooke ibid 6. A distinction is drawn between consequential economic loss 
 145 
a substantial overlap between tortious and contractual liability103 and 
there may even be instances of concurrent liability.104 
– Contractual liability: The term is used often in judicial decisions and 
by commentators without further explanation of what it entails.105 It is 
a matter of interpretation in every instance whether the reference to 
contractual liability refers to liability for damages imposed by law for 
breach of a contract, or if it also applies to liability imposed by contract 
– ie, contractual liability for performance of a contract voluntarily 
assumed by the insured. The duty not to break a promise (or contract), 
which forms the basis for the remedy for breach of contract,106 is a 
contractual obligation imposed by law. 107  Liability imposed by 
contract for performance of a contract refers to liability that the insured 
defendant has incurred directly or merely by reason of a contract 
                                                                                                                                            
(economic loss which is consequential on physical damage to the person or property) and pure 
economic loss (economic loss where there are no personal injuries or loss to property – ie, damage to 
the pocket). Consequential economic loss may be recovered by the tort of negligence; but pure 
economic loss not. For further detail, see Cooke ibid 32-34 and 104. However, subsequent cases have 
held that liability should rather be established by the relationship between the claimant and the form of 
wealth in question, than by the type of economic loss (consequential economic loss as opposed to pure 
economic loss). Cooke ibid 104. For an extensive summary of the extent of liability for negligently 
caused loss, including the historical development and different tests, see Cooke ibid 81-117. Liability 
insurance cover for pure economic loss is discussed in more detail in paras 4.2.2.1(a)(i) and 
4.2.2.1(a)(ii) below. 
103 Cooke ibid 17.  
104 Concurrent (or co-extensive) liability refers to the situation where both tortious and contractual 
liability may arise from the same set of facts and where the claimant may have a choice between these 
alternative causes of action. See Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz Tort paras 1.5-1.7 and Cooke ibid 20, 34-
35. A difference in the respective applicable limitation periods is one of the technical distinctions 
between tort and contract.  
105 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 385 para 20.0  
106 The usual remedy for breach of contract is a so-called ‘right of action for damages at common law’: 
Smith & Keenan English Law (6 ed) 267. As opposed to damages in tort that are generally not 
liquidated, damages in contract may, depending on the circumstances, either be liquidated or 
unliquidated. See Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Texts & Cases (15 ed) 522. Liquidated damages are 
damages that have been agreed upon by the contracting parties in advance. Where this is the case, only 
breach of contact has to be proved; it is not necessary for the claimant to prove loss. An agreement for 
liquidated damages will not be valid if it constitutes a penalty; it should constitute a true pre-estimate of 
loss. See Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 ed) 405-406. It may be mentioned briefly that 
exemplary (or so-called ‘punitive damages’) are aimed at punishing rather than compensating the 
defendant, and may in principle be covered by liability insurance, but that many liability policies 
exclude any liability therefor. See MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.009 n 36; and Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance para 21.023. For further detail on the different types of damages, and on the other types of 
remedy for breach of contract, see 6 ed ibid 267-278 and Keenan Smith & Keenan’s Text & Cases (15 
ed) 405-413. 
107 So-called ‘contractual liability for damages imposed by law for breach of contract’. This type of 
liability is sometimes also referred to as pure contractual liability with a tortious counterpart. For 
further detail, see Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz Tort paras 1.5; and Cooke Law of Tort 17-18. 
 146 
voluntarily concluded between itself and the plaintiff.108  
– Statutory liability. This term refers to liability imposed by statute 
(legislation). Where a statute imposes a duty on a person, breach of 
such a duty may be classified as a tortious breach of a statutory duty, 
which may give rise to an action in damages by a person injured as a 
result.109 There may, therefore, be an overlap between statutory and 
tortious liability.  
 
The meaning of the term ‘legal liability’, the different bases of liability, and the 
questions that arise from the distinctions or overlap between theses bases, is now 
briefly considered with reference to judicial decisions. 
 
4.2.2.1(a)(i)   Whether ‘Legal Liability’ Covers Liability in Tort to the Exclusion of 
 Contractual Liability 110 
Although ‘legal liability’ in the insuring clause of a (public or product) liability 
policy usually refers to liability in tort, 111  the phrase is wide enough to include 
contractual liability. However, the general rules of the interpretation of contracts 
which aim at establishing the intention of the parties, should be applied to establish 
the content of the phrase ‘legal liability’ when it is inserted in a liability insurance 
policy, and the resulting scope of the liability cover in each specific case.112 
In M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment Co Ltd v Iron Trades Manual 
Insurance,113 the court interpreted ‘liable at law’ in the phrase that an insurer shall be 
liable for ‘all sums which the Insured shall become liable at law to pay as 
                                                 
108 Liability policies often exclude cover therefor MacGillivray on Insurance in para 30.006 in n 27. 
However, cover for liability imposed by contract may, albeit subject to restriction, be present in 
contractors’ liability policies or in the public liability section of a contractor’s all risk policy, eg, to 
cover contractual liability incurred by the contractor arising from its presence or activities on the 
contract site. For further detail on contractual liability for damages imposed by law for breach of 
contract, contractual liability imposed by contract for performance assumed by the insured, and related 
matters, see pars 4.2.2.1(a)(i)-4.2.2.1(a)(iii) below. 
109 Cooke Law of Tort 265-277. However, not all breaches of statutory duty will give rise to such an 
action for damages. It will depend whether the statute gives rise to the right to sue for damages, which 
will again depend on the intention of Parliament. For further detail on statutory liability, see paras 
4.2.2.1(a)(iv) below. 
110 For further detail on legal liability of the insured for contractual liability towards third party, and the 
distinction between contractual liability for damages imposed by law for breach of contract and for 
contractual liability imposed by contract for performance voluntarily assumed by the insured, see paras 
4.2.2.1(a)(ii)-4.2.2.1(a)(iii) below. 
111 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 1.1. 
112 Ibid in para 10.3. 
113 M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment 292. 
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damages’.114 In accordance with the general rules of interpretation of contracts, it held 
that in ‘its ordinary meaning [it] simply means “legal liability”’.115 It found that the 
tautologous phrase ‘liable at law’ was not limited to liability in tort but also covered 
contractual liability.116 The court specifically observed that it had not been referred to 
any English judicial decision to the contrary, and it distinguished the Canadian 
decisions to which it had been referred, on their facts.117 The parties to the liability 
insurance contract had to exclude cover for contractual liability expressly if they 
wished it to be excluded.118  
Therefore, the phrase ‘liable at law to pay as damages’ includes both liability in 
tort and contractual liability (for liability imposed by law to pay damages for breach 
of contract), 119  and in itself does not exclude contractual liability. 120  Some 
commentators121 caution that the policy in M/S Aswan – entitled ‘third-party (legal 
and contractual liability) insurance’ – should be distinguished from other liability 
policies.122 The reference to contractual liability in the title of the policy therefore 
played a role in the court’s decision and this was brought to the attention of the parties 
in support of its decision.123 It is further notable that the policy was held not to have 
been a public liability policy.124  
                                                 
114 Ibid 292-294. It had to be determined whether the liability policy covered the insured’s liability 
towards the plaintiff in damages for loss of spilt waterproofing compound. 
115 Ibid 292-293. 
116 Ibid 293. The defendants argued that the phrase ‘liable at law’ meant that the liability of the insured 
had to arise at common law, and not under contract, but the Court of Appeal disagreed at 292-293. 
According to Winfield’s definition of tortious liability, it arises from law, as opposed to from contract, 
and in consequence tortious liability (and seemingly not also contractual liability) would sometimes be 
referred to as ‘liability that arose at common law’; but then Winfield’s definition has been criticised. 
See para 4.2.2.1(a) above for further detail. 
117 M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment 293. 
118 Ibid. 
119 See para 4.2.2.1(a)(ii) below for further comments on M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment. 
120 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 385-386 para 20.00 n 3 and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance 
para 10.3. See paras 4.2.2.1(a)(ii), 4.2.2.1(a)(iii) and para 4.2.2.3(b)(i) below for further comments on 
the exclusion of contractual liability from liability cover. 
121 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts ibid para 17.4A1 n 7. 
122 M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment 293. According to Winfield’s definition, tortious liability 
arises from law, as opposed to from contract and ‘legal liability’ would, on that interpretation, refer to 
tortious liability (and seemingly not also to contractual liability).  
123 M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment 293. 
124 Ibid. Winfield’s definition of tortious liability under English law implies that the duty that gives to it 
is a duty towards persons generally. This explains why public liability or product liability policies, 
usually provide cover against the public at large, generally seek to cover tortious liability, but not 
contractual liability for liability voluntarily assumed. See para 4.2.2.1(a) above for further detail. It is 
therefore relevant that the policy in M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment was not a public liability 
policy. The inference could therefore not be drawn, as in the case of a public liability policy, that the 
policy would generally seek to cover tortious liability to the exclusion of contractual liability. Also see 
para 4.2.2.1(a)(ii) below for further comments on M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment. 
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In Tesco Stores Ltd v Constable,125 the Court of Appeal held that the phrase 
‘liable at law for damages’ in the insuring clause of a public liability policy were wide 
enough to include not only liability in tort,126 but also contractual liability (ie, for 
liability imposed by law to pay damages for breach of contract).127 However, the 
words that followed the phrase in this particular case, made it clear that the cover was 
limited to liability in tort.128 The contractual liability extension clause provided cover 
for liability assumed by the insured under contract. The liability covered under the 
extension clause was subject to the same limitation as the insuring clause: the 
contractual liability had to be ‘in respect of’ liabilities defined by the law of tort.129 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the insured’s contractual claim for pure economic loss 
under its public liability policy and reasoned as follows as to why the claim fell 
outside the scope of cover of the policy: 
[The insured’s] liability was not in respect of material damage to property, but in 
respect of its contractual obligations under the deed of covenant … . It was not 
liable to [the third party] for any inference with [its] property rights, nor was it liable 
in contract in respect of liabilities defined by the law of tort. It was only liable to 
[the third party] under the deed of covenant for obligations under the deed of 
covenant. [The third party’s] claim against [the insured] was not typical of a public 
liability policy. It was a straightforward contractual claim for economic loss. [The 
insured] had not damaged [the third party’s] property or property rights and could 
not found its liability to [the third party] on the ground that it had damaged [another 
party’s] property or property interests.130 
The Court of Appeal in Tesco Stores Ltd v Constable explained the relevance of 
the type of policy – eg, a public liability policy – in distinguishing between cover for 
tortious and the different types of contractual liability.131  It explained that public 
                                                 
125 Tesco Stores Ltd v Constable paras 9, 10, 30 and 31. It had to be determined whether the policy 
provided cover against contractual liability for pure economic loss (loss of future business) that arose 
from a deed of covenant and was independent of any tortious liability. 
126 Ibid para 15. 
127 Ibid para 18. Also see para 4.2.2.1(a)(ii) below for more comments on contractual liability in Tesco 
Stores. 
128 The Court of Appeal further held that ‘the wording could be construed to cover contractual liability 
co-extensive with liability in tort … to give effect to the intention of the parties’. See ibid para 20. As 
far as the insuring clause was concerned, it did not cover ‘“private liability” assumed under contract’ 
which would not have attached in the absence of such an agreement. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 
para 21.015. 
129 Tesco Stores paras 24, 25 and 29. The function of the particular contractual extension clause may be 
explained ‘to permit the parties to a construction contract to transfer tortious liabilities between 
themselves without impairing the assured’s public liability cover’. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 
para 21.015. 
130 Tesco Stores paras 29-30. 
131 Ibid para 14.  
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liability policies provide cover against liability to the public at large, that public 
liability arises in tort, and that it cannot arise in contract only. 132  Public liability 
policies would therefore generally cover liability in tort and/or liability in contract for 
damages for breach of contract (so-called ‘liability in contract with a tortious 
counterpart’), but they would not cover liability assumed by the contract which would 
not have attached in the absence of the contract (so-called ‘pure contractual liability’), 
unless they clearly provided therefor. 133  The Court of Appeal contrasted public 
liability with private liability which arises from contracts entered into by 
individuals.134  Private liability policies would generally cover contractual liability 
(both private liability assumed under the contract and liability for damages for breach 
of contract), but they may also extend to tortious liability (eg, to cover an insured as 
tortfeasor that is also liable towards a third party in tort).  
In Tesco Stores Ltd v Constable135 it was held that although the public liability 
policy in question did not cover liability in contract for pure economic loss,136 the 
‘[policy] wording may extend cover to third party claims in contract even for pure 
economic loss although one would expect it to say so clearly and for instance to be 
described as contract liability, financial or consequential loss cover’.137 
A public liability policy is also unlikely to cover liability for restitution, as 
restitution is primarily concerned with the reversal of an unjust gain, as opposed to 
indemnify an insured against loss.138 
The difference in English law between tortious and contractual liability has been 
summarised as follows: whereas liability in tort is ‘concerned primarily with 
                                                 
132 Ibid. 
133 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.015. 
134 Tesco Stores para 14. 
135 Ibid. 
136 The Court of Appeal referred with approval to a number of decisions that concerned public liability 
policies covering liability in respect of damage to property, where the insureds’ contractual claims 
against the insurer for economic loss by the third party consequential upon, but not directly the result of 
the physical damage to the property, were rejected. See para 23. These decisions seem to have been 
referred to, to describe the limiting effect of the words ‘in respect of’ in the insuring clause in Tesco 
Stores, rather than to distinguish between so-called consequential and pure economic loss. See para 
4.2.2.1(a) above for a distinction between these terms. See also Axa Insurance UK Plc v Thermonex 
Limited (in liquidation) [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 323 (QBD (Merc)), 2012 WL 7870263 paras 60-65 
where it was held that public liability insurance does not generally provide cover against liability for 
pure economic loss. See also Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.136 and MacGillivray on 
Insurance para 30.006. 
137 Tesco Stores para 14. Some authorities are of view that liability for consequential economic loss 
may be recovered by the tort of negligence, but pure economic loss not. See para 4.2.2.1(a) above for a 
brief discussion, and criticism, of the position. 
138 Axa Insurance v Thermonex para 66.  
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compensating physical loss’, [contractual liability] ‘compensates for loss of 
expectation or profit’.139 The difference between the aims of these types of liability 
may also be explained with reference to the public liability section of a contractor’s 
all-risks policy which covers defective workmanship that would require rectification 
if it resulted in ‘physical damage to the personal property of a third party or 
interference with a third party’s property rights, as opposed to their purely economic 
interests’.140 The policy therefore covers liability in tort and consequential economic 
loss, but not pure economic loss.141  
If there is concurrent liability in contract and in tort,142 the cover for tort liability 
will take priority and any exclusion of contractual liability will thus not affect the 
cover for liability in tort.143 
If a claim against the insured is based on negligence (in tort) which is covered 
by the policy, and also on breach of contract, which has neither expressly been 
                                                 
139 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.014 and Colinvaux Supplement 116-117 ad para 21.014. The 
reference to contractual liability may include liability damages imposed by law for breach of contract 
and for contractual liability imposed by contract for performance voluntarily assumed by the insured 
(pure contractual liability). The distinction between liability for damages in tort and for damages in 
contract for breach of contract may also be explained by the so-called ‘doctrine of consideration’. 
Cooke Law of Tort 81 summarises it as follows: ‘Where a person had entered a bargain promise and 
provided consideration, this would justify the court protecting their expectation interest in a breach of 
contract action. Damages for breach of contract are to put the claimant in the position they would have 
been in if the contract had been performed. Contrast this with the tortious objective of damages, to put 
the claimant in the position they would have been in if the tort had not been committed. This protects 
the status quo interest.’ However, see para 4.2.2.1(a) above for criticism on this type of distinction in 
the context of economic loss, which is increasingly regarded as an area where the law of tort and of 
contract overlap. 
140 James Longley & Co v Forest Giles Ltd [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 421 (CA (Civ Div)), 2001 WL 
825585 para 17. The policy here contained an express exception that it would not cover contractual 
liability assumed under an agreement, unless such liability would have attached in the absence of the 
agreement. Ibid para 12. Notwithstanding the exception, the policy contained an extension in respect of 
contractual liability for physical damage to property. Liability in respect of liquidated damages was 
expressly excluded from this extension. Ibid para 13. An action for breach of contract for liquidated 
damages, was therefore also excluded.  
141 It has already been explained that economic loss is an area where the law of tort and contract 
overlap, and that pure economic loss is not generally recoverable in tort. See para 4.2.2.1(a) above.  
142 Concurrent causes of action may be distinguished from successive causes of action. In the case of 
concurrent causes of action, two or more causes of action exist co-extensively. The concurrent causes 
may either be interdependent or independent. Successive causes of action refer to consecutive causes, 
eg, where an event occurred and ended before another competing cause commenced. Clarke Law of 
Insurance Contracts para 25.9A is of view that ‘[i]n many cases, both views of the facts are possible 
and the court has room to manoeuvre and outflank the peril or the exception, as desired’. For further 
detail on concurrent and successive causes of action, see Clarke ibid paras 25.5-25.7 and 25.9A.  
143 Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v Axa Royale Belge SA (Formally NV Royale Belge) [2002] Lloyd’s Rep IR 
589 (CA (Civ)), 2002 WL 45493 para 18 where the Court of Appeal held: ‘What are excluded are 
damages which could only be recovered in contract.’ The exclusion clause here excluded claims for 
damages which were solely recoverable in contract. The claim made against the insured could have 
been founded in tort, or alternatively in contract. The claim in tort was held not to be affected by the 
exclusion clause.  
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covered nor excluded by the policy, the claim will be covered.144 It follows that if ‘a 
claim against the insured may be classified in a number of ways, there is coverage if 
any one of those classifications is insured’.145 
As to the classification of an insured’s liability, problems may arise if the claim 
made by the third party against the insured is framed in terms that fall outside the 
scope of the policy, but the actual substance of the claim is insured. The court may 
then consider the true nature of the claim against the insured: the substance of the 
action will be determined, rather than how it has been framed.146 
 
4.2.2.1(a)(ii)   ‘Legal Liability’ for Contractual Liability  
Some commentators are of the view that a liability policy covers contractual 
liabilities if they have a tortious counterpart (for example, liability imposed by law for 
damages for breach of contract), but that a liability policy does not cover pure 
contractual liability (for liability imposed by contract for performance voluntarily 
assumed), except if expressly so provided. 147  Most liability policies exclude 
contractual claims with no tortious counterpart (that is, pure contractual liability) 
indirectly by excluding liability voluntarily incurred.148 
It is again a matter of interpretation whether the reference to, or the exclusion 
of, ‘contractual liability’ merely refers to liability for damages imposed by law for 
                                                 
144  Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A1. In Capel-Cure Myers Management Ltd v 
McCarthy [1995] LRLR 498 (QBD) the court held at 503: ‘[I]t is the position that the Courts have long 
recognised that loss may be proximately caused by more than one peril, ie a combination of causes. In 
that event the loss may be properly attributed to each such cause, and assuming that one of those causes 
falls within the terms of the indemnity provided, the assured may recover. … [T]he case before me is 
one of liability insurance, in which the single act or omission giving rise to the claim is capable of 
being characterised as a breach of more than one duty owed to [the third party] while the insuring 
clause relied on relates only to one class of liability. However, it seems to me that similar principles 
apply. … Accordingly it seems to me that, …, an action by [the third party] lies against the [insured] 
which is properly framed in a form in which it would be a necessary averment that the [insured] are by 
virtue of their status/or activities under various statutory duties … which on the facts they have 
breached, and if an action could successfully be brought against them in that form, it is irrelevant that a 
different cause of action (such as breach of contract or fiduciary duty) could also be successfully 
alleged against them on the same facts.’ For further detail on causation in liability insurance, see Clarke 
ibid paras 25.2 and 25.4(d).  
145 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.033 and Colinvaux Supplement 118-119 ad para 21.033.  
146 Ibid for English decisions on the classification of the insured’s liability.  
147 Ibid para 21.014 and Colinvaux Supplement 116-117 ad para 21.014. 
148 See, eg, Omega Proteins Ltd v Aspen Insurance UK Ltd [2010] 2 CLC 370 (QBD (Comm)) para 19 
where the liability policy excluded liability ‘under any contract or agreement unless such liability 
would have attached in the absence of such contract or agreement’. See also para 4.2.2.3(b)(i) below 
for further detail on the exclusion from cover of contractual liability in liability policies. 
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breach of contract or if it also includes liability imposed by contract in the sense of 
contractual liability for performance assumed by the insured.  
In Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co & Others v Youell & 
Others,149 the insuring clause in the policies covered ‘any sum or sums which the 
Assured shall become legally liable to pay whether contractually or otherwise 
howsoever to pay damages to third parties arising and occasioned through any of the 
Assured’s activities anywhere in the World’.150 The Court of Appeal held that the 
insured had to show only a liability in damages to the relevant third parties for its 
cancellation of the contracts between them.151 It found that the insured was indeed 
under a legal liability in damages in respect of their claims, and that the policies 
therefore covered breach of contract.152 
In Enterprise Oil Ltd v Strand Insurance Co Ltd,153 there was express cover for 
‘liability imposed … by law or assumed under contract or agreement’.154 Liability in 
tort, liability imposed by contract for breach of contract, and contractual liability for 
performance assumed by the insured were therefore included. 
The decision in M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment v Iron Trades Manual 
Insurance, again, merely referred to ‘contractual liability’ without further explanation 
as to what that included.155 The insuring clause referred to ‘liable at law to pay as 
damages’.156 The phrase suggests that the court’s references to ‘contractual liability’ 
were limited to liability for damages for breach of contract and did not include 
contractual liability for performance assumed by the insured.157 
In Tesco Stores v Constable, the Court of Appeal not only considered liability in 
tort, but also liability for damages for breach of contract and pure contractual liability 
for performance assumed by the insured. Referring to the insuring clause of the 
specific public liability policy, the Court of Appeal held: 
                                                 
149 [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 136 (CA). 
150 Ibid 139. 
151 Ibid 141. 
152 See also Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty Co v Bovis Lend Lease Ltd [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 494 
(QBD (Comm)) paras 69-70 where the court considered whether the liability policy covered breach of 
contract. For an in-depth discussion of the decision, see paras 4.2.2.1(a)(v), 4.2.2.1(c)(ii) and 
4.2.2.2(a)(ii) below. 
153 [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 500 (QBD (Comm)). 
154 Ibid 508. Also see para 4.2.2.1(a)(iii) below for further comments on this case. 
155 M/S Aswan Engineering 293. 
156 Ibid 292. 
157 See para 4.2.2.1(a)(i) for further comments on this decision on whether ‘legal liability’ covers 
liability in tort to the exclusion of contractual liability. 
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A tort gives rise to a “liability at law” for damages. Although a breach of contract 
gives rise to a liability at law for damages the critical question is what the liability 
must be for.158 
 The court subsequently concluded that the damages had to be ‘in respect of’ 
the classes of liability set out in the policy and that each of those classes of liability 
was one that arose in tort. The contractual extension clause that applied to liability 
assumed under contract was subject to the same limitation as the insuring clause – the 
liabilities had to be defined in tort. 159  The insured’s contractual claim for pure 
economic loss was accordingly not covered under the public liability policy.160 
 
4.2.2.1(a)(iii)  ‘Legal Liability’, Liability Voluntarily Assumed and Settlements  
Both public liability and product liability policies generally seek to exclude 
contractual liability voluntarily assumed because their primary objective is to 
indemnify the insured against liability in tort. 161  Most of these liability policies, 
therefore, specifically exclude liability for contractual claims without a tortious 
parallel, and they do so by excluding cover for liability voluntarily assumed by the 
insured.162 
Liability insurance generally does not cover liability assumed voluntarily or ex 
gratia by the insured, payments made by the insured on the basis of a perceived moral 
obligation, or made to preserve the insured’s reputation or good business relationship 
with a third party in cases where there is no legal liability.163 However, provided that 
the insured is in fact legally liable to the third party, amounts paid under an ex gratia 
settlement in satisfaction of (non-admitted) legal liability are covered. 164  The 
following judicial statements explain the position. 
                                                 
158 Tesco Stores para 18. 
159 Ibid paras 24, and 30-31. The contractual liability assumed had to be in respect of the physical 
impact on a third-party claimant’s person, property or property rights for the contractual extension to 
be applicable. See para 24. 
160 See para 4.2.2.1(a)(i) above for further comments on the decision regarding the relevance of the 
type of policy, such as a public liability policy, in distinguishing between cover for tortious and the 
different types of contractual liability. 
161  Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 385-386 para 20.0. See also the discussions in paras 
4.2.2.1(a)(i)-4.2.2.1(a)(ii) above. 
162 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.014 and Colinvaux Supplement 116-117 ad para 21.014. 
163 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.047 and Colinvaux Supplement 123 ad para 21.047. 
164 See the discussion on the establishment of legal liability by way of agreement in para 4.2.2.1(c)(i) 
below. 
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In Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation v Youell, the insured 
compensated third parties in full and final settlement (in respect of luxury cruises that 
had to be cancelled) and no subsequent claims were made against the insured. The 
Court of Appeal affirmed that the insured was covered under its liability insurance 
policies and held: 
[A]ll that it was necessary for [the insured] to demonstrate was a liability in 
damages to the [third parties] compensated. If such liability existed, the form and 
nature of the compromise designed to avoid and/or satisfy claims in respect of such 
liability should not be determinative of the question whether or not there was a 
claim under the policy. … [I]t seems clear that [the insured was] under a legal 
liability in damages in respect of [the third parties’] claims in this case.165 
In Enterprise Oil v Strand Insurance, the court held that ‘all sums which [the 
insured] may be obligated to pay by reason of liability assumed under contract or by 
agreement … on account of personal injury’166 referred to liability undertaken by 
contract, for example, that the insured would indemnify another for personal injuries 
to third parties. However, the insuring clause did not extend to a settlement agreement 
between the insured and a third party in respect of alleged tortious liability. The court 
defined a settlement agreement as ‘a compromise of the fact whether there was in fact 
any liability on account of personal injury’.167 It therefore held that the parties to the 
insurance contract did not intend to transform an alleged or arguable tortious liability 
(which could not be imposed by law) into an actual (legal) liability in contract by way 
of a compromise in a settlement agreement.168  
 
4.2.2.1(a)(iv) ‘Legal Liability’ under Statute 
 ‘Legal liability’ has been held to refer to and include statutory liability.169 In 
Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable (Sued on His behalf & on behalf of All 
Other Members of Syndicate 386 at Lloyd’s)170 the insuring clause provided cover for 
sums which the insured, a police authority, was ‘legally liable to pay as damages for 
                                                 
165 Peninsular above 141. 
166 Enterprise Oil above para 66. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 However, the term ‘liability at law by way of damages’ and similar wording have been held not to 
cover compensation payable under a statutory obligation which imposed liability irrespective of the 
fault of the insured. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.017 Colinvaux Supplement 117-118 ad 
para 21.017. 
170 [2009] Lloyd’s Rep IR 607 (CA (Civ)), 2009 WL 289348.  
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accidental damage to property arising out of the business’ of the insured.171  The 
insured was entitled to be indemnified by its insurer from liability to pay 
‘compensation’ under statute to the owners of property damaged in a riot.172 Although 
this type of liability will not generally give rise to a claim in damages, the Court of 
Appeal referred with approval to the meaning ascribed to the term ‘damages’ in the 
dissenting judgment of an earlier decision:173 ‘sums which fall to be paid by reason of 
some breach of duty or obligation, whether that duty or obligation is imposed by 
contract, by the general law, or legislation’.174 
However, Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable should be distinguished 
from the earlier decision in Bartoline Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc.175 In 
that decision ‘legal liability for damages in respect of ... accidental loss of or damage 
to property’ was construed to provide ‘an indemnity in respect of certain  
types of tortious liability’, 176  but not for environmental clean-up costs which the 
insured was by statute obliged to pay. The latter was regarded as a statutory debt,177 
rather than as a liability for damages. 
 
  
                                                 
171 Ibid para 1. 
172 Ibid para 26. 
173 Hall Brothers Steamship Co Ltd v Young [1939] 1 KB 748 (CA) 756-757.  
174  Bedfordshire Police Authority v Constable para 23, where the CA referred to Hall Brothers 
Steamship v Young ibid 756-757.  
175 [2007] Lloyd’s Rep IR 423 (QBD (MDR)). As explained by Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 
21.017 and Colinvaux Supplement 117-118 ad para 21.017: ‘Bartoline and the earlier cases were 
regarded by the Court of Appeal in Bedfordshire as illustrations of liability being imposed on the 
assured in the absence of any duty owed to third parties by the assured’. The liability in Bartoline 
therefore did not concern the tort of breach of statutory duty which may give rise to an action in 
damages. The elements of such a tort are: that the statutory duty in question gives rise to an action in 
damages; that the duty was owed to the claimant (third party); that the duty was breached; and that 
damage was caused by the breach of duty. See Cooke Law of Tort 265-266. The statute may impose a 
strict or a fault-based standard, it is a question of interpretation in every instance. Ibid 273. 
176 In para 110. The court observed in para 45 that the statute ‘and the law of torts seek to protect very 
different interests’ and ordered the insured to pay clean-up costs.  
177 See para 61ff for the distinction in English law between a statutory debt and a liability for damages. 
As to the statutory debt, the ‘court was satisfied that liability under [that particular statute] was not 
dependent upon proof of negligence and the cause of action was not breach of statutory duty in tort 
[that would give rise to an action for damages] but rather one imposed directly by the legislation’. See 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.017 and Colinvaux Supplement 117-118 ad para 21.017. As 
explained above in para 4.2.2.1(a), not every breach of statutory duty will classify as a breach of the 
tort of statutory duty which will give rise to an action for damages. That will depend whether the 
statute gives rise to the right to sue for damages, which will again depend on the intention of 
Parliament. 
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4.2.2.1(a)(v)  More Clauses aimed at Limiting ‘Legal Liability’ 
Insurers have developed standard wordings to provide basic cover and basic 
exclusions in their liability insurance policies.178 
The main aim of a liability policy is to provide cover for liability in tort.179 
The insured’s negligent conduct180 is generally included in the risk by way of cover 
for liability in tort. However, an insured’s intentional or reckless conduct is, as a rule, 
excluded from the risk181 in the absence of agreement to the contrary. Many liability 
policies attempt to limit the insurer’s obligation to the insured to certain types of 
liability in tort, for example, by providing cover for the insured’s liability arising from 
‘neglect, error or omission’.182  
In Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty v Bovis Lend Lease, after considering the 
relevant case law, the court held that the insuring clauses which provided cover for 
legal liability ‘as a result of any neglect, error or omission or breach of warranty of 
authority in the conduct of the insured’,183 did not require the insured to establish 
liability in negligence to trigger cover under the policies.184 A breach of warranty may 
be negligent or non-negligent on the part of the person giving the warranty, and the 
court found no reason why the cover had to be limited to negligent breach of 
warranty. It further reasoned that if the policies covered non-negligent breach of 
warranty, any errors and omissions would also not need to be negligent to trigger 
cover under the policy. However, by the very nature of insurance, deliberate breaches 
of warranty, deliberate errors, or deliberate omissions are not covered as they fall in 
the category of self-realisation of the risk, unless these risks are covered expressly by 
                                                 
178 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 385 para 20.0. 
179 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.042. See also MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.092. 
180  For further information on the exception excluding common-law negligence, eg, by way of a 
condition that the insured shall take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents and disease. See 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 19.2A, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.042, and the 
discussions in paras 4.2.2.3(b)(ii) and 4.2.2.4 below. 
181 Due to at least an implied term in insurance contracts that intentional loss is excluded from the risk, 
but often by way of a so-called ‘intentional act exclusion’. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance par 
21.016 and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 10.7. On the exclusion of fraud, see also Clarke ibid 
para 10.4.7. See also para 4.2.2.3(b) below for further detail on exclusions on liability cover for the 
conduct of the insured. 
182 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 385-386 para 20.0 n 4 observes that professional liability 
policies often provide cover against ‘negligent act, error or omission’, but that the word ‘negligent’ 
does not qualify the words ‘act’ or ‘omission’. Thus, not only negligence is covered. See also 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.016; and MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.085 for further 
detail on the coverage for ‘non-negligent acts’ in liability policies.  
183 Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty above para 13, see issue 3. 




4.2.2.1(b)  The Time at Which the Insured Defendant Becomes ‘Legally Liable’ 
to Third-Party Plaintiffs186 
There are at least three possibilities as to exactly when an insured may become 
legally liable to a third party: 
– when the insured has actually compensated the third party;187 
– when the third party has a prima facie cause of action against the 
insured;188 
– when the insured’s liability against the third party has actually been 
established by a court judgment, an arbitral award, or by agreement.189 
Each of these three possibilities in time is now discussed in greater detail. 
 
4.2.2.1(b)(i) Actual Payment 
The first option as to when an insured becomes legally liable to a third party is 
the narrowest in that the insured must actually compensate the third party to trigger its 
liability cover. This is generally regarded as the original common-law rule by 
reference to Collinge v Heywood,190 where the court held that ‘no action arose till [the 
insured] was damnified, and that he was not damnified till he had paid the bill’.191 
Some commentators192 question Collinge v Heywood as authority for the view 
that an insured’s cause of action against the insurer only arises on the insured’s actual 
                                                 
185 It is further generally against public policy for an insured to benefit from its unlawful or criminal 
conduct. See para 4.2.2.3(b)(ii) below for further detail on exclusions on liability cover for the conduct 
of the insured. 
186 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4A2 and 17.4A3; Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 
388-391 para 20.1.1; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.047-21.052 and Colinvaux Supplement 
122-123 ad paras 21.047, 21.051, 21.052; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.002-30.003. See 
also Enright & Jess Professional Indemnity paras 1.083-1.115 on professional indemnity insurance law. 
187 See para 4.2.2.1(b)(i) below for further detail on actual payment as a possible way to establish when 
an insured becomes legally liable towards a third party. 
188 See para 4.2.2.1(b)(ii) below for further detail on potential liability as a possible way to determine 
when an insured may become legally liable towards a third party. 
189 See para 4.2.2.1(b)(iii) below for further detail on established liability as a possible way to ascertain 
when an insured may become legally liable towards a third party. 
190 (1839) 9 Ad & E 633 (QBD), 112 ER 1352.  
191 Ibid 641, 1354. 
192 Enright & Jess Professional Indemnity paras 1.087-1.093. The writers agree with the decision in 
Firma C-Trade SA v Newcastle Protection & Indemnity Association; Socony Mobil Oil Inc & Others v 
West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Ltd (No2) [1991] 2 AC 1 (HL) 
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payment of the third party. However, if the liability insurer has inserted a so-called 
‘pay- to-be-paid clause’ 193  in its insurance contract, the insured is not entitled 
payment by the insurer until the insured has first actually paid compensation to the 
third party. An advantage of this option for the insured is that the limitation period 
against the insurer commences relatively late.194 A negative aspect is that the insured 
may not have sufficient funds readily available to pay the third party.195 It follows that 
the view that the insured defendant must actually compensate the third party to trigger 
its liability cover may defeat the very purpose of liability insurance, which is to 
provide the insured with the ability to claim from its liability insurer rather than first 
having to pay the third party from its own pocket. An insurer may favour this narrow 
approach because its liability under the insurance contract is triggered rather late. 
Also, the likelihood of being involved in litigation as liability insurer (eg, conducting 
the defence of the insured in the name of the insured) and of being named in litigation 
(which may create adverse publicity) becomes less likely when the third parties’ 
claims have already been paid.196 
 
4.2.2.1(b)(ii)  Potential Liability 
The second option is the widest view. An insured need not actually have 
discharged its liability before claiming from its liability insurer. Some sources suggest 
that the cause of action can exist even though liability has not yet been formally 
established or proved.197  
                                                                                                                                            
40, where the court opined that: ‘Collinge v Heywood was a procedural decision and it laid down no 
rule as to common law rights of parties under a contract of indemnity’. Enright & Jess ibid para 1.091. 
See also Total Liban SA v Vitol Energy SA [2001] QB 643 (QBD) 650 which rejected the argument in 
Collinge v Heywood that, ‘there is a general common law rule in English law that liability without 
actual payment [of that liability] does not constitute a recoverable loss’. Enright & Jess ibid para 1.090 
contend that the insured’s right to an indemnity arises on the occurrence of the insured event and the 
insured then has a cause of action for a declaration to that effect, but that it does not mature into a right 
for the insured to be paid directly by the insurer until the insured has actually paid the third party. 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.051 and Colinvaux Supplement 123 ad para 21.051, also opines 
that, ‘[t]here is no need for the assured to show that he has actually made payment to the third party’ to 
establish its legal liability towards the third party.  
193 See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 21.051; and Colinvaux Supplement 123 ad par 21.051 for further 
detail in regard to ‘pay-to-be-paid clauses’ in Protection and Indemnity (‘P&I’) Clubs and in 
reinsurance. 
194  Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A1. As to the limitation of actions in liability 
insurance, see para 4.2.2.1(d) below for further detail. 
195 Clarke ibid para 17.4A1. 
196 Ibid. 
197 See, eg, Central Electricity Board v Halifax Corporation [1963] AC 785 (HL) 801 where the court 
held that ‘a cause of action can exist although one of the facts essential to the cause of action … has not 
yet been proved when action is brought’. Enright & Jess Professional Indemnity para 1.104 appear to 
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Under this interpretation ‘legal liability’ can refer to potential legal obligations 
to a third party. Legal liability may, therefore, arise when the third party has a prima 
facie cause of action against the insured – ie, when all the events which render the 
insured liable towards the third party have occurred – even though the amount of its 
liability has not yet been quantified, paid, or formally established.  
This possibility favours the insured.198 An insured may much earlier be in a 
position to obtain the insurer’s involvement in and consent to a settlement with the 
third party. Further, not only an insured’s actual established liability, but also its 
potential liability can trigger insurance cover. The insured may claim payment199 from 
the insurer without first having to pay the third-party plaintiff out of its own pocket or 
having to take any formal steps to establish actual liability. 
 
4.2.2.1(b)(iii)  Established Liability200 
The third takes is a golden mean between the two previous views. It applies in 
English law, unless the insurance policy specifically provides to the contrary. 201 
Under equity, a loss has been suffered when the liability of the party seeking to 
enforce an indemnity has been established.202 
The existence of this equitable rule was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd:203  
 
The insured only acquires a right to sue [the insurer] for the money when his 
liability to the injured person has been established so as to give rise to a right of 
                                                                                                                                            
support the view that ‘“liability” means actually or potentially subject to an obligation’. However, 
Clarke ibid para 17.4A2 ascribes their view to the fact that Enright practices in Australia where the law 
appears to be different from England. Compare para 4.2.2.1(b)(iii) below on ‘established liabilty’ as a 
third possible way in which an insured may become legal liability towards a third party 
198 Clarke ibid para 17.4A2. 
199 And if not payment, then at least involvement. 
200 Also referred to as ‘ascertainment’ (ascertained liability). See Enright & Jess Professional Liability 
para 1.105. 
201 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4A2 and 17.4A3. 
202 Also known as the ‘equitable rule’. In Re Richardson Ex parte Governors of St Thomas’s Hospital 
[1911] 2 KB 707 (CA) 709 the Court of Appeal distinguished between the common-law rule and 
equitable rule and held: ‘Equity has always taken a wider and more liberal view of these rights of 
indemnity than the old Common Law Courts did. … The common law view was first pay and then 
come to the Court under your agreement to indemnify. In equity that view was not taken. … [I]n the 
view of the Court of Equity it was not necessary for the person entitled to the indemnity to be ruined by 
having to pay the full amount in the first instance.’ Clarke ibid para 17.4A2 refers to some of the 
critics’ ‘forceful attack on this “equitable rule” of ascertainment’. See, eg, Enright & Jess Professional 
Liability paras 1.094-1.102 for criticism in this regard. 
203 [1967] 2 QB 362 (CA).  
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indemnity. His liability to the injured person must be ascertained and determined to 
exist either by judgment of the court or by an award in arbitration or by 
agreement.204  
The insurer becomes liable to the insured only when the latter’s liability to the 
third-party plaintiff has been established either by a court, by arbitration, or by 
agreement between the insured and the third party. 
This ‘Post Office rule’, has been criticised in that the 1930 Act205 on which the 
case turned, did not require liability to be established.206  
However, the House of Lords confirmed the Post Office rule in Bradley v 
Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd, 207  by holding that the insured ‘cannot sue for an 
indemnity from the insurers unless and until the existence and amount of his liability 
to a third party has been established by action, arbitration or agreement’.208 
The disadvantage for the insured of this approach is that the insurer is not 
obliged to accept or reject the insured’s claim until its liability has been established. 
In the interim, the insured may find it difficult to make an informed decision as to 
whether or not to settle the claim. 209  Knowledge by the insured of the insurer’s 
decision to accept or reject a claim, may impact on an insured’s decision to settle the 
claim. For example, if an insured has been informed that its insurer will accept a 
claim, it may be more inclined to settle the matter, and vice versa.  
                                                 
204 Ibid 373-374. 
205 Concerning third parties’ rights against insurers. 
206 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A3. See also Enright & Jess Professional Indemnity 
paras 1.106-1.116 for further criticism.  
207 [1989] AC 957 (HL). 
208 Ibid 966. For further critical discussion of the decisions in Post Office v Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance and Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance, see Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 5.8C; and 
the Enright & Jess Professional Indemnity paras 1.109-1.115, 1.121 and 1.124-1.128. Despite 
reservations about the correctness of the Post Office rule in previous editions, MacGillivray on 
Insurance para 30.003 now regards it as authoritative as confirmed in Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance. 
The principle in Post Office and Bradley was also applied as an established legal principle in Teal 
Assurance Company Limited v W R Berkley Insurance (Europe) Limited & Another [2011] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 285, 2011 WL 197339 (QB (Comm)) para 30 and in [2012] Lloyd’s Rep 315 (CA (Civ)), 2011 
WL 5903305 para 20. The Supreme Court in Teal [2013] 2 CLC 390 SC paras 13-15 also subsequently 
confirmed the position of the courts a quo by quoting from Cox v Bankside Members Agency Ltd 
[1995] 2 Lloyd’s LR 437 (CA (Civ)) 457-458. (At issue in Cox was the position after the statutory 
assignment to a third-party claimant under the 1930 Act of the potential right to recover under the 
insurance policy claims as yet unascertained against the insolvent insured.) See also Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance para 21.052 and Colinvaux Supplement 123 ad para 21.051 on interim awards and the 
establishment of liability. 
209 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A2. English professional liability policies sometimes 
contain a so-called ‘Queen’s Counsel clause’ (‘QC clause’) that may curb this negative effect. Ibid para 
17.4.A3(d). For further details on the QC clause as an alternative, agreed method to establish liability 
between the insured and the third-party plaintiff, see para 4.2.2.1(c)(iv) below. 
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4.2.2.1(b)(iv)  Conclusion 
 
In the absence of agreement to the contrary, to trigger its liability cover English 
case law provides that the insured’s legal liability (which falls within the scope of the 
policy) to the third party must be established and quantified by agreement, court 
judgment, or arbitral award.210  
 
4.2.2.1(c)  The Ways in Which the Insured Defendant Establishes ‘Legal 
Liability’ to Third-Party Plaintiffs211 
 
The ways in which (ie, how) the insured defendant can establish legal liability 
towards third parties – agreement, judgment, or arbitral award – warrant further 
analysis. Further explanation is also required as to whether, and if so to what extent, 
established liability of the insured to the third party is automatically binding on the 
insurer for the latter’s liability towards the insured under the insurance policy to be 
established.212 
A few brief observations will also be made regarding express wording in 
liability insurance policies that may offer alternative, agreed methods 213  of 
establishing liability between the insured and third-party plaintiffs,214 and the effect 
that liability may have on the insurer’s liability to the insured under the insurance 
policy. 
 
4.2.2.1(c)(i) By Agreement 
The term ‘agreements’ generally refers to less formal events 215  occurring 
between the insured and the third party, such as a settlement, compromise, or 
                                                 
210 See Post Office as discussed in para 4.2.2.1(b)(iii) above.  
211 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A3; Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 12.5ff; Birds 
Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 388-389 para 20.1.1; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.020, 
21.047-21.053,, and 21.107-21.112 and Colinvaux Supplement 122-123 and 125 ad paras 21.047, 
21.051-21.053 and 21.107; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.006, 30.008, and 30.091. 
212 See paras 4.2.2.1(c)(i)-4.2.2.1(c)(iii) below on the ways in which liability between the insured and 
the third party may be established, and the effect of liability so established on the liability between the 
insurer and the insured. 
213 Other than liability of the insured towards the third party established by agreement, judgment or 
arbitral award. 
214 See para 4.2.2.1(c)(iv) below for further detail on alternative agreed ways to establish the liability of 
the insured towards the third-party plaintiff. 
215 It appears to include an admission of bankruptcy. In Law Society of England and Wales & Others v 
Shah & Others; In Re Aziz, Granziani and Barda Law Society of England and Wales v Earp & Another  
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mediation. Insurance policies generally provide that insurers have the right to take 
over negotiations between the insured and the third party, and also prohibit an insured 
from making admissions of liability to third parties in settlements without the 
insurer’s prior written approval.216 However, in the absence of such terms, the insured 
may enter into a settlement agreement with the third party without any prior approval 
from the insurer.  
Three different aspects that may prove relevant in this context are considered. 
First, in terms of the Post Office rule, to determine liability by way of a settlement 
agreement, the agreement must establish liability as such.217 It is not sufficient for an 
insured merely to settle to avoid liability by, for example, making payments, or to 
settle legal proceedings based on nuisance, for example, in order to continue with its 
operations.218 The settlement must take the form of a binding (not merely provisional) 
agreement between the insured and the third party, irrespective of whether or not it is 
embodied in a formal document.219 Any amount paid by the insured under the third-
party settlement must be reasonable. Second, a settlement may establish the liability 
of the insured towards the third party. However an insurer is not bound by it to 
establish the insurer’s liability towards the insured. 220  The insurer is bound by a 
settlement agreement only if it accepts the agreement, or, in case of estoppel, when 
                                                                                                                                            
[2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 442 (Ch) paras 21-22, 34, 44 and 49, the court held that the admission of a 
claim in bankruptcy was adequate to establish a claim against the insured; that the formal discharge of 
the bankrupt from the remedy of payment did not extinguish the cause of action on which the 
obligation to pay was founded; and that there remained a possibility of a claim against the insurers. For 
further detail on the operation of the 1930 and the 2010 Acts on third parties’ rights against insurers, 
see paras 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3 below. 
216 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.107, 21.108 and 21.112 and Colinvaux Supplement at 125 ad 
para 21.107.  
217 See para 4.2.2.1(a)(i) above for further detail on ‘legal liability’, liability voluntarily assumed and 
settlements. For a critical discussion of the position and relevant judicial decisions, also see Enright & 
Jess Professional Liability paras 1.116-1.120. 
218 In Corbin v Payne, The Times, 11 Oct 1990 (CA) the Court of Appeal held that ‘[t]o read a policy as 
entitling the plaintiff to purchase at the insurers’ expense the liberty to go on using a noisy and possibly 
dangerous machine which he had chosen to bring on to his land and to install near his neighbour’s 
residence was far removed from the tenor and obvious intent of the policy’.  
219 See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.107 and 21.108 and Colinvaux Supplement 125 ad para 
21.107. See also MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.006 for further detail on settlements.  
220 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.047 states that, ‘[s]ettlements raise distinct issues, in that they 
may be subject to terms under which insurers may be subject to control their making and in that a 
settlement cannot be more than prima facie evidence of liability’. See also Colinvaux Supplement 122-
123 ad para 21.047. The position differs from the establishment of liability by judgment (and arbitral 
award). See paras 4.2.2.1(c)(ii)-4.2.2.1(c)(iii) below. Also see MacGillivray on Insurance ibid; 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.047, 21.107 and 21.108 and Colinvaux Supplement 122-123 
and 125 ad paras 21.047 and 21.107 for further detail. For a critical discussion of the position and 
relevant judicial decisions, also see Enright & Jess Professional Indemnity paras 1.116-1.120. 
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the insurer is estopped from denying that it accepted the settlement agreement.221 
Third, the position regarding single settlements covering different claims and 
counterclaims is explored. These aspects are addressed in the following judicial 
statements. 
As to the first aspect, the Court of Appeal in MDIS (formerly McDonnell 
Information Systems Limited) v Swinbank London & Edinburgh Insurance Company 
Limited, Aegon Insurance Company (UK) Limited,222 agreed with the findings of the 
court a quo223 and held: 
[T]he obligation to indemnify arises only when the legal liability of the assured is 
established. Legal liability cannot arise from the making of an allegation or the 
formulation or service of a claim.224 
 
The settlement agreement should, therefore, establish the insured’s liability. It is 
not the mere fact of a compromise that is relevant, but rather whether the compromise 
was justified based on a proper analysis, and whether it has, objectively, established 
the insured’s liability towards the third party.  
In dismissing the insured’s argument that its liability could be established 
subjectively, the Court of Appeal in MDIS v Swinbank held: 
If the argument for [the insured] were correct, the practical realities of their claim 
for indemnity would be obscured. [According to this argument], [t]he liability for 
the underwriters would depend not on an objective analysis of the true cause of the 
loss for which the assured as responsible, but rather on the way in which the claim 
against them by a third party was formulated and pursued, and if improper conduct 
                                                 
221 For more detail on estoppel under English law as one of the forms of waiver, see para 4.3.1.1(e) 
below on waiver by the insurer’s conduct of the defence. Most reinsurance agreements contain so-
called ‘follow the settlements’ clauses that require reinsurers to provide indemnity to their reinsured, as 
long as the settlement was reached in a ‘bona fide and business like fashion’. For further detail, see 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 18.044-18.046. 
222 [1999] Lloyds’ Rep IR 516 (CA (Civ)), 1999 WL 982480. 
223 See MDIS v Swinbank where the (majority judgment) of the Court of Appeal quoted the court a 
quo’s findings with approval in para 24: ‘[A]s between insured and insurers, it is established liability 
which this insurance pays, and it is upon the nature and causation of any liability established that I 
consider the insured’s right to indemnification must depend. … In a case compromised short of 
judgment, it is necessary and appropriate to ascertain the real basis on which the case was 
compromised. That depends not on what the third party may have alleged, although it is an important 
consideration when seeking to understand the overall position. It involves taking an overall view of the 
nature and causation of the liability recognised by the compromise. A defendant who, confident on the 
allegations made, nonetheless settles before discovery knowing that, if he continues, documents will 
reach the other side which will enable different allegations to be made to which he will or may have no 
answer, cannot on this basis ground his claim against the insurers solely and artificially on the 
allegations which happen to be made against him. He must address the real basis of such liability as is 
established by the compromise which he makes.’ (My emphasis.) 
224 Ibid para 27.  
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within the meaning [of an exemption clause in the policy] were not alleged, the 
underwriters’ exemption from liability would have no application.225  
 
MDIS v Swinbank was applied in Enterprise Oil v Strand Insurance, where the 
court held that ‘in the absence of express wording to the contrary, an insured under a 
liability policy could only recover against his insurer if it was actually under a liability 
to a third party, upon a proper analysis of the law and the facts’.226 The court found 
that the insured had to ‘demonstrate that it was or would have been actually liable to 
[the third party] in the [foreign legal] proceedings in respect of the alleged tortious 
interference’.227 It further found that such a conclusion ‘does not prevent [the insured 
from] recovering because it had entered into the Settlement Agreement in respect of 
an actual liability’.228 Only actual (legal) liability on the part of the insured to the 
third party that may be imposed by law, as opposed to alleged or arguable liability, 
will establish an insurer’s liability towards its insured by way of agreement. However, 
the court found that the insuring clause of the liability policy did not extend to a 
settlement agreement between the insured and a third party in respect of alleged 
tortious liability; and that the insured did not ‘assume liability’ in tort in the settlement 
agreement.229  
In Astrazeneca Insurance Company Ltd v XL Insurance (Bermuda) Ltd, ACE 
Bermuda Insurance Ltd,230 the Court of Appeal231 referred with approval to previous 
authority, including MDIS v Swinbank, and held that ‘insuring clauses in liability 
insurance contracts are to be construed as providing cover against actual liability (as 
opposed to alleged liability), unless there is clear wording in the contract showing that 
this principle is intended to be excluded’.232 However, the majority of settlements do 
                                                 
225 Ibid. The Court of Appeal further explained why it rejected the insured’s argument: ‘In other words, 
the contractual entitlement of the underwriters to seek exemption from the liability would depend on 
decisions, possibly ill-formed, possibly motivated by tactical considerations, by others to which they 
were not parties, and which, as between underwriters and the assured, might very well be entirely 
fortuitous. This outcome would be contrary to the contractual intentions of the parties, who expressly 
agreed [on an exception from liability for loss caused by dishonesty].’ 
226 Ibid para 66.  
227 Ibid para 72. 
228 Ibid para 73. 
229 Ibid paras 64-66. 
230 [2013] EWCA Civ 1660. See also Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.050 for further detail. 
231 Ibid para 22.  
232 The Court of Appeal para 63 generally observed that ‘had a draftsman, cognizant of English law, 
intended the position to be as [the insured] contends it to be, it is difficult to accept that he would have 
left his intention to be discerned by the sort of analysis upon which [the insured] relies’. See, eg, Ace 
European Group & Ors v Standard Life Assurance Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1713, [2013] CLC 255 for 
an example of a liability insurance policy that amended the general principles on how an insured may 
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not contain an admission of liability and most are made with an express no-admission, 
or a denial of liability. It is difficult to envisage a settlement which in its terms did not 
admit liability that could be regarded as establishing that liability existed.  
As to the second aspect – that a settlement agreement may establish the liability 
of the insured towards the third party but that an insurer is generally not bound to it 
automatically in that it establishes the insurer’s liability towards the insured – the 
court of Appeal in MDIS v Swinbank held that ‘while, by reason of the compromise, 
[the insured] has proved a loss… [i]t is open to the underwriters to assert … [that the 
insured] would not be able to recover under the policy’.233 In MDIS v Swinbank, the 
loss was not proximately caused by the insured’s neglect, but by dishonesty that was 
expressly excluded from cover under the policy.  
MDIS v Swinbank was again applied in Enterprise Oil v Strand Insurance, 
where the court held that,  
 
if the insured negotiated a settlement which identifies certain heads of claim as 
being referable to certain causes of action that are within the perils insured under the 
insured’s liability policy, then that will be evidence that the insured has suffered a 
loss that is covered by the policy, [b]ut … that can be challenged by underwriters … 
on evidence that is extrinsic to the settlement agreement itself.234 
 
The court in Enterprise Oil v Strand Insurance confirmed that an insurer had a 
right to challenge whether the insured’s right to an indemnity under the policy has so 
been established, except if it (the insurer) was specifically involved as a party in the 
(judgment, award, or)235 settlement.236 The court further observed that an insurer may 
challenge whether the insured was in fact and in law liable to the third party, as well 
                                                                                                                                            
establish its liability towards the third party by way of clear wording in the contract. ‘Mitigation Costs’ 
were defined in this policy as ‘any payment of loss, costs or expenses reasonable and necessary 
incurred by the Assured in taking action to avoid a third-party claim or to reduce a third-party claim 
which would have been covered under this Policy’. See ibid para 2. The Court of Appeal held that the 
cash injection and other remedial payments that the insured made to third-party investors to reverse a 
shortfall in third parties’ investments, were recoverable mitigation costs, although not all of the 
investors that received payment would have had a claim against the insured. The definition ascribed to 
‘mitigation costs’ in the policy resulted in the court finding ‘that relevant “payment” does not have to 
be made to discharge a particular liability of a particular third party claimant’. Ibid para 246.  
233 Above; para 25. 
234 Ibid para 170. 
235 The case is discussed here, rather than under judgments or arbitral awards, as it dealt with legal 
liability in the context of settlements.  
236 Ibid para 167. The court’s remark as to judgments or awards is obiter as the case concerned a 
settlement agreement.  
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as the quantum of the loss, and also whether the insured’s liability to the third party is 
a loss that falls within the scope of the liability policy.237 
As to the third aspect, namely a single settlement covering different claims and 
counterclaims, the controversial decision in Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty v Bovis 
Lend Lease created some obstacles.238 In that decision the court held that to establish 
liability, the following were required: 
Firstly, there has to have occurred an eventuality which has rendered the insured 
liable to a third party. Secondly, the eventuality and the consequent liability has to 
be within the scope of cover as provided by the policy. Thirdly, it must be 
established that such liability has caused loss to the insured of an amount within the 
scope of the contractual indemnity.239 
 
The court then referred to two different facets of the establishment of liability, 
namely, that ‘the [judgment, arbitration or]240 settlement agreement … constitute[d] 
the assured’s loss on the policy caused by the assured’s liability’;241 and ‘that it is a 
source of evidence’.242 According to the court, a judgment and an arbitral award are 
conclusive evidence as to both the insured’s liability and to the quantum of its 
liability.243 However, it held that a settlement of a third-party claim only:  
[E]vidences the amount which the assured has agreed to pay to discharge the claim 
in respect of the assured’s liability but that it [is] not conclusive evidence as 
between assured and insurer as to whether there was in truth [objectively] liability 
or, if so, what the true amount of that liability was’.244  
 
An insured who relies on a settlement agreement as a way of establishing legal 
liability for purposes of liability insurance, therefore must prove by extrinsic evidence 
that it is indeed ‘under a liability insured by the policy’ and that the settlement amount 
it paid is ‘reasonable having regard to the amount of damages that it would have to 
pay if the matter had gone to trial’.245 The court therefore concluded that an overall 
                                                 
237 Ibid. However, the court did concede (again obiter) that ‘in the case of judgments and awards … the 
merits as to liability and quantum is unlikely to be upset in an action on the liability policy’. 
238 See, eg, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.111 for a critical discussion of the decision. 
239 Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty para 31. 
240 Remember, the case concerned a settlement agreement and the court’s remarks as to judgments and 
awards are therefore obiter. 
241 Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty para 39. 
242 Ibid para 43. 
243 There is authority contrary to this obiter view. See para 4.2.2.1(c)(ii)-4.2.2.1(c)(iii) below for further 
detail. 
244 Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty para 44. 
245 Ibid para 44. 
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settlement amount such as the one before it, did not establish individual liability under 
the liability insurance policies, and did not impose ‘any identifiable loss in respect of 
any identifiable eventuality’246 on the insured. It merely ‘identifie[d] the overall price 
paid by the assured as consideration for a contract which conferred on the insured 
certain benefits’.247  
The judgment in Lumbermans has been criticised on various grounds.248 To 
itemise and allocate a sum to each claim and counterclaim may hinder settlement 
negotiations, even though the overall figure might be acceptable to both parties. 
Further, in some instances, such an agreement may constitute an admission of liability 
by the insured contrary to the terms of the policy. It is also objectionable that so much 
trouble and expense should be incurred by using the court’s suggested method of 
establishing liability without even being certain that the liability insurer will cover the 
claim.  
 The Lumbermans decision was not followed in Enterprise Oil v Strand 
Insurance where the court, again obiter, held that an insured did not have to show that 
the ‘amount of its loss to be claimed under an insured peril covered by the liability 
policy has been “specifically ascertained” in the wording of judgment, award or 
settlement’.249 The court justified its decision on the basis that the policy wording did 
not require that; that an insurer has a right to challenge whether the insured is liable to 
the third party; and that the loss as ‘ascertained’ between an insured and a third party 
in a judgment, arbitral award, or settlement is irrelevant as between the insured and 
insurer.250 It further criticised the view of the court in the Lumbermans case in as 
much as it could lead to commercial inconvenience and to artificial statements in 
judgments, arbitral awards, or settlements.251 According to the court in Enterprise Oil 
v Strand Insurance, the insured could provide evidence extrinsic to the settlement 
agreement to show that it was liable for a particular amount under an overall 
settlement.252 This approach appears to be preferred from an insured’s perspective 
over that in Lumbermans, although it may still be challenging for an insured to 
                                                 
246 Ibid para 55.  
247 Ibid. 
248 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.111; MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.008; Clarke Law of 
Insurance Contracts para 17.4A3(a) and para 17.4A(3) n 1-2; and Enright & Jess Professional Liability 
paras 1.116-1.120. 
249 Enterprise Oil para 166. Note again that this case concerned a settlement agreement. 
250 Ibid paras 167-170. 
251 Ibid para 172. 
252 Ibid paras 170-171.  
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provide evidence of the relevant liability where an overall nor lump-sum settlement 
has been reached. 
 
4.2.2.1(c)(ii) By Judgment 
 
 As to the establishment of an insured’s legal liability towards a third party by 
judgment, the Court in Cheltenham & Gloucester plc v Royal & Sun Alliance 
Insurance Co plc253 held that a decree obtained by third-party plaintiff against an 
insured will establish an insurer’s liability even though there is no record explaining 
the basis of the decree.254 Although the insured’s liability towards the third party may 
have been established in this way, an insurer may still escape liability under the terms 
of the policy,255 – eg, if the insured’s liability that has been established to the third 
party falls outside the scope of cover of the insurance policy.  
A default judgment is sufficient to establish liability, although it may be 
rescinded at a later stage.256 If an insured disputes liability to the third-party claimant, 
for example by way of litigation, it follows in principle that liability has not yet been 
established. However, the Court of Appeal held in Brice & Others v JH Wackerbarth 
(Australasia) Pty Ltd, Flack, Dominium Insurance Co Ltd & Alliance Assurance Co, 
Third Parties257 that, ‘the Judge will give his decision in the main action before he 
decides in the third party proceedings. So the liability of the insured will have been 
ascertained.’ Nothing prevents the third-party proceedings (in the claim by the insured 
against its insurer) from continuing.258 The Court of Appeal further observed that the 
insured can also apply for a declaration that it will be entitled to an indemnity from 
the insurer if it (the insured) is found liable as against the third-party plaintiff.259 
However, an insurer does not have locus standi in litigation between the third-
party plaintiff and the insured to seek a declaration that its insured is not liable to the 
third party.260 
                                                 
253 2001 SLT 347 (OK), a decision on Scottish law. 
254 Ibid 350E-F. This may occur, eg, where an insured has not defended the action or has allowed the 
decree to pass. 
255 Ibid. 
256 See, eg, Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd v National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association 
Ltd [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 274 (QBD (Comm)) 277.  
257 [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 274 (CA) 275-276. 
258 Ibid 276. 
259 Ibid. 
260  Meadows Indemnity Co Ltd v The Insurance Corporation of Ireland Plc & International 
Commercial Bank Plc [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 298 (CA) 304-6 and 309. 
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The Post Office rule must therefore be applied with commercial sense and with 
a consideration of the particular circumstances of each case. Where necessary, a 
flexible view must be taken on the establishment of liability. For example, it has been 
held that the determinations of the Pensions Ombudsman are ‘findings of legal 
liability’.261  
Two specific issues require further comment. 
The first deals with whether the judgment between the third party and the 
insured may be binding on the insurers, that is, whether that judgment could 
automatically establish the liability of the insurer towards the insured under the 
policy. It has formerly been considered that judgments as to insureds’ liability 
towards third parties are automatically binding on insurers, as there is an implied 
obligation on insurers in insurance contracts to recognise these judgments. 262 
However, the current position appears to be that judgments (both of English courts 
and of foreign courts in so far as they are recognised and enforced in England) are not 
automatically binding on insurers, at least not if the insurers were not parties to those 
judgments.263 In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, an insurer will not be 
bound by a judgment between the third-party plaintiff and the insured determining 
whether or not the insured was under a liability, or what the basis of that liability 
was.264  
The second issue is whether a judgment against the insured in favour of the 
third party is to be recognised, for purposes of a claim by the insured against the 
insurer, as opposed to merely establishing the insured’s liability towards the third 
party. 265  Here a distinction is drawn between English judgments and foreign 
                                                 
261 London Borough of Redbridge v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 545 (QBD 
(Comm)) para 7. The court held further that the insured had a statutory liability to pay compensation in 
respect of maladministration. Compare the earlier case of Smit Tak Offshore Services & Others v 
Youell and General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Plc [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 154 (CA) 
159 where the court held that a letter from the Department of Ports and Customs did not establish the 
legal liability of the insured because the Department did not have the authority to order the removal of 
the wreck and that the insured was not legally liable for the costs of removing the wreck. Although the 
Department of could withdraw the insured’s license to operate in Dubai, such a loss would not have 
been covered by the policy.  
262 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.047 and Colinvaux Supplement 122-123 ad para 21.047.  
263 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.047 para 21.048; MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.005. 
The insured may have to bring proceedings against an insurer for a declaratory order, or the liability 
insurers may have to be joined in third-party proceedings of the third-party against the insured. 
264 On this aspect the position coincides with that of the establishment of liability by way of settlement 
agreements. See MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.006.  
265  A judgment of a third party against the insured, or an agreed settlement between them, may 
establish the insured’s legal liability to the insured and be indicative that the insured has suffered a loss, 
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judgments. English judgments against the insured are generally recognised as claims 
by the insured against its liability insurer. However, the position regarding foreign 
judgments is uncertain and more complex. There are two possibilities. On the one 
hand, there is judicial authority (obiter)266 to the effect that a foreign judgment will be 
automatically binding on the insurer for purposes of a claim by the insured against the 
insurer. This applies unless the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute; or 
the arbitration was brought in breach of an arbitration or a jurisdiction clause; or the 
insured did not defend the proceedings properly; or the judgment was ‘ultimately 
perverse’. On the other hand, some judicial authority (again obiter)267 supports the 
view that a foreign judgment against the insured may establish the insured’s loss, but 
it may not necessarily conclusively establish the legal liability of the insured towards 
the third party. It is argued that the test as to whether a foreign judgment constitutes a 
claim which triggers liability cover, does not depend on whether it is ‘manifestly 
perverse’, but rather on whether it was, ‘on the balance of probabilities, wrong’.268  
 
4.2.2.1(c)(iii) By Arbitral Award 
Legal liability as required by the Post Office rule may also be established by 
way of an arbitral award.269 In determining whether an arbitral award regarding the 
insured’s liability against the third party is binding on the insurer, the same 
considerations arise as in the case of judgments.270 
 
4.2.2.1(c)(iv)  Alternative Agreed Ways to Establish the Liability of the Insured to 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
 
Express wording in liability insurance policies may provide alternative, agreed 
methods271 to establish liability between the insured and the third-party plaintiff.  
English professional liability policies sometimes contain a so-called ‘QC’ clause 
which is mainly for the benefit of the insured.272 A typical QC clause reads: 
                                                                                                                                            
but it does not automatically qualify as an insured event which triggers liability cover. See paras 
4.2.2.1(c)(v) and 4.2.2.2 below. 
266 The decision concerned settlement.  
267 The decision concerned settlement in the reinsurance context. 
268 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.049. 
269  On the role of QC clauses and their (possible) function as ‘arbitration clauses’, see para 
4.2.2.1(c)(iv) below. 
270 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.048. See also the discussion in para 4.2.2.1(c)(ii) above and 
Jacobs, Masters & Stanley International Arbitration for further detail in that regard. 
271 Other than liability of the insured to the third party established by agreement, judgment, or arbitral 
award. 
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[The insurer will pay] any such claim or claims which may arise without requiring 
the assured to dispute any claim, unless a Queen’s Counsel (to be mutually agreed 
upon by the underwriters and assured) advise that the same could be successfully 
contested by the assured and the assured consents to such a claim being contested, 
but such consent not to be unreasonably withheld.273 
 
Colinvaux opines that the QC clause imposes three possible obligations on 
insurers.274 They must namely pay: 
– the costs of any claim; 
– the claim itself – unless Queen’s Counsel advises that it may probably 
be contested successfully; and 
– claims that can probably be contested successfully (on the advice of 
Queen’s Counsel), if the insured reasonably objects to contesting them. 
Some commentators are of the view that the QC clause offers cover for the 
insured under its liability policy before its liability to the third party has been 
established.275 Others submit that the QC clause restricts the circumstances in which 
insurers can deny that liability by the insured against the third party was established 
by way of the insured and the third party’s settlement.276 
 Or, one may regard the procedure under the QC clause as an alternative, agreed 
method by which liability may be established between the insured and the third party 
as required by the Post Office rule.277 The argument goes that the Queen’s Counsel 
fulfils the role of an arbitrator. In usual arbitral proceedings, an arbitrator is appointed 
by the insured and the third-party plaintiff to establish the former’s legal liability to 
the latter. Under the QC clause, a Queen’s Counsel is appointed ‘as arbitrator’ by the 
insured and the insurer in the insurance policy, to determine the insured’s legal 
liability towards the third-party plaintiff (for purposes of the insurance policy, not as 
an actual arbitrator between the insured and the third party). 
                                                                                                                                            
272 As discussed in para 4.2.2.1(b) below, the insurer is not obliged to accept or reject the insured’s 
claim until the insured’s liability towards a third-party plaintiff has been established and in the 
meantime an insured may find it difficult to make an informed decision as to whether to settle the claim 
or not. QC clauses may reduce this negative effect to some extent. 
273 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4A3(d). See also Clarke ‘Report’ 189; Clarke Law of 
Liability Insurance para 12.5.2; MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.103; and Enright & Jess 
Professional Indemnity para 1.151 for further detail on QC clauses and their different variations. 
274 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.082 and Colinvaux Supplement 124 ad para 21.082. 
275 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts 17.4A3(d). 
276 MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.103.  
277 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts 17.4A3(d). 
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It appears that although a QC clause establishes the liability of the insured 
towards the third party, it does not follow that the insured will be covered under the 
insurance policy. As to the effect of a QC clause on the insurer’s liability towards the 
insured, Colinvaux submits that: 
 
The question whether the policy corresponds to any claim which may be made 
against the insured is not usually within the terms of the [QC] clause, and it is open 
to the [insurers] to see[k] a judicial determination of coverage on assumed facts, as 
if there is coverage the QC clause can then be applied to the question of whether the 
[in]sured was or was not liable [towards the third party].278 
 
4.2.2.1(c)(v) Conclusion 
Omega Proteins v Aspen Insurance279  contains a neat summary of the principles 
relating to the establishment of liability by the insured towards the third-party plaintiff 
(and its impact on the liability of the insurer towards the insured): 
– the insured must establish that it has suffered a loss which is covered 
by one of the perils insured against; 
– the insured’s loss may be established by a judgment or award against 
the insured or by an agreement to pay; 
– the loss must fall within the scope of cover of the policy; 
– as a matter of practicality, the judgment, arbitral award, or settlement 
may settle the question as to whether the loss is covered by the policy 
as the insurers may accept it; 
– if the insurer is not a party to the judgment, arbitral award, or 
settlement and there is no agreement by the insurer to be bound, neither 
the judgment award nor the agreement is conclusive as to whether or 
not the insured’s loss is covered by the policy;  
– it is open to the insurers to contest whether the insured was in fact 
liable towards the third party; whether it was liable on the basis set out 
in the judgment; or to prove that the true basis of the insured’s liability 
fell within an exception under the policy; 
                                                 
278 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance in para 21.082 and Colinvaux Supplement 124 ad para 21.082. 
279 Omega Proteins above para 49. 
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– when an insured against whom a claim for negligence is the subject of 
a judgment against it, its insurer may seek to prove that the claim was 
for fraud; or for something not covered or excluded by the policy; and 
– likewise, an insured who is held liable for fraud (which the policy does 
not cover) may dispute the alleged fraud with its insurers, and may be 
able to establish in court that the insured’s conduct was not in fact 
fraudulent, but only negligent and that it was entitled to cover on the 
policy in issue.280 
 
4.2.2.1(d)  Limitation of Actions in Liability Insurance281 
 
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1980,282 provides that an action on a contract 
must be brought within six years from the date of accrual or vesting of the cause of 
action.283 The application of this rule to liability insurance contracts implies that the 
limitation period in a liability policy may generally commence as soon as the 
insured’s liability towards the third party has been established by way of a judgment, 
arbitral award, or binding settlement, provided that the event that brings the case 
within the scope of the policy has taken place.284 The judgment or arbitral award 
against the insured in favour of the third party, or a binding settlement between them, 
establishes that the insured’s cause of action has accrued for purposes of the limitation 
of its action on the insurance contract. The limitation period is therefore not antedated 
to the date on which the event that brings the case within the scope of the policy took 
                                                 
280  See MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.006 and 30.091 for discussions of Omega Proteins. 
Compare also London Borough of Redbridge v Municipal Mutual Insurance above para 12 where it 
was held that, ‘it is neither permissible nor possible to look beyond or outside the four corners of the 
determination itself for the basis of the liability to which the insured has become subject’. Omega 
Proteins cast doubt on the decision in London Borough of Redbridge Municipal Mutual Insurance. See 
paras 50-58 and 78-79. The approach by the court in Omega Proteins was treated as correct by the 
court in Astrazeneca Insurance Company v XL Insurance, ACE Bermuda Insurance above. See paras 
60-65 and 90-96. See also Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.033 and 21.034 and Colinvaux 
Supplement 118-119 ad para 21.033 for further detail on classifying the insured’s liability. 
281 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 9.8A and 26.5B; Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 
12.14; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 10.076-10.084 and Colinvaux Supplement 37 ad paras 
10.078, 10.080 and 10.081; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.004 and 30.077. For further detail, 
see also Enright & Jess Professional Liability paras 1.094-1.102 and McGee Limitation Periods paras 
10.039-10.041.  
282 Chapter 58; the ‘Limitation Act’. 
283 As to limitation periods where the cause of action is in tort, see Clarke ‘Report’ 194-195 for further 
detail.  
284 For further detail in this regard, see para 4.2.2.2(b)(iv) below on the limitation of actions applied to 
‘occurrence-based’ and ‘claims-made’ liability policies. 
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place, nor to the date when the third parties’ cause of action against the insured arose 
or on which the insured actually paid the third party.285 
This interpretation of the accrual rule in liability insurance may result in a 
considerable delay between the date on which the insured first notifies the insurer of 
an occurrence or the possibility of a claim against it, and the eventual date on which 
the insured’s liability against the third party is established by way of judgment, 
arbitral award,or settlement. During that period, the insurers might deny liability or 
attempt to repudiate the policy, for example, for breach by the insured of its duty of 
utmost good faith.286 Limitation problems may arise if the insured does not take action 
against the insurers at the time of repudiation of the insured’s claim and the insured’s 
liability towards the third party is established more than six years after the insurer’s 
repudiation.  
It was held in Lefevre v White287 that, although the insured acquired a cause of 
action on the date of the repudiation of its claim by the insurer, the insured acquired a 
further cause of action on the date on which its liability towards the third party was 
established. The insured did not have to institute action against the insurer within six 
years of the repudiation provided that it did not accept the repudiation. Acceptance of 
the repudiation by the insured would have brought the policy to an end and 
extinguished any possible and further causes of action against the insurer. In the 
absence of a cause of action, the limitation of action would therefore no longer be an 
issue for the insured. 
                                                 
285 See Virk v Gan Life Holdings Plc [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR 159 (CA (Civ)) 162, where the accrual of 
the cause of action in liability insurance was distinguished from that in other types of insurance 
contract such as property insurance. The Court of Appeal referred with approval to Bradley v Eagle 
Star Insurance above and held at 162 that, ‘[t]he cause of action does not accrue under a liability policy 
until the liability of the insured is established by judgment, arbitration or binding settlement’, whereas 
in other types of insurance policy … ‘the limitation period begins to run as soon as the insured event 
occurs’. For the position under other contracts of insurance, see Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 
12.14.3. 
As to possible law reform of insurance law generally, the Law Commissions of England and 
Scotland recommended in December 2011 that the limitation period should not start on the date of the 
occurrence of the insured peril but only after the insurers have had a reasonable time to investigate and 
assess the claim or, alternatively, when the claim is rejected. However, the proposal was not 
implemented. Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 10.084 explains that the 2015 Act introduced a right 
to damages for late payment which led to the addition of s 5A to the Limitation Act. Under the latter 
provision a claim by an insured for damages for late payment must be brought within one year of the 
date on which the insured’s loss is paid by the insurers. 
286 However, see the statutory reforms discussed in para 4.1.2 above. 
287 [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 569 (QBD) 576 and 578-579. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 22.017 
and Colinvaux Supplement 137-138 ad paras 22.017-22.020 for a discussion of the decision in the 
context of limitation and the 1930 Act. See also Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 5.8D-5.8E 
and para 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3 below for further detail as to limitation and prescription under the 1930 
and the 2010 Acts.  
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It is permissible for the parties to an insurance contract to vary the statutory 
limitation period and to agree to a shorter or even a longer288 period. Some liability 
policies contain ‘pay-to-be-paid clauses’,289  which provide that an insured cannot 
recover from its insurer until the insured has actually paid the third-party plaintiff. 
Commentators suggest that a ‘pay-to-be-paid clause’ would probably not influence 
the accrual of the insured’s cause of action and that it would still accrue on the date on 
which the insured’s liability towards the third party was established by judgment, 
award, or settlement.290 
Some policies contain a clause providing that ‘if insurers disclaim liability for a 
claim and if, within 12 months of such a disclaimer, legal proceedings have not been 
instituted, the claim shall be deemed abandoned and shall not thereafter be 
recoverable.’291 The insured may notify its insurer of a claim against it, but if the third 
party delays instituting proceedings against the insured, the insured may in the 
meantime neglect to institute proceedings against its insurers. Such clauses have 
therefore been regarded as ‘a trap for the unwary’ insured in liability policies.292 The 
Court of Appeal agreed with this view in William McIlroy (Swindon) Ltd, Mackays 
Stores Ltd, Cathedral Works Organisation (Chichester) Ltd, Rannoch Investments 
Limited v Quinn Insurance Ltd.293 It held that ‘it makes no sense to think that an 
insured may have become time barred in a claim under [a public liability] policy 
before, possibly years before, he has any cause of action to bring it’.294 
In view of the William McIlroy decision, where a liability policy provides for a 
time bar to run from the making of a ‘claim’ by the insured against the insurer, or the 
existence of a ‘dispute’ between the insured and the insurer, the limitation period of 
the insured’s cause of action against the insurer would probably not begin to run 
before the third party’s cause of action against the insured has been established by 
way of judgment, arbitral award, or settlement.295  
                                                 
288 For example, by the conduct of the insurer, but the usual rules for waiver and estoppel apply. See 
Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 12.14.1, 12.14.2 and 4.3.1.1(e) below for further detail. 
289 See the discussion on ‘pay-to-be-paid clauses’ para 4.2.2.1(b)(i) above as to when the insured 
becomes legally liable. 
290 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 10.081.  
291 MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.077, referring to ‘deemed abandonment of proceedings’. 
292 Ibid.  
293 [2011] EWCA Civ 825 para 46. The Court of Appeal referred to Legh-Jones, Birds & Owen 
MacGillivray on Insurance (11 ed) para 28.064 with approval. 
294 William McIlroy v Quinn Insurance para 46. 
295 See MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.077 and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 3.024 for 
further comment on the case. Again note the statutory reform as to unfair terms brought abought by the 
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4.2.2.2  The Insured Event and the Duration of Liability Cover296 
The insured may recover only that loss which has been caused by an event 
covered by the insurance contract from its liability insurer. The insured’s legal 
liability towards the third-party plaintiff is the insured’s loss297 in terms of the liability 
policy and should be distinguished from the ‘insured event’ that brings the matter 
within the scope of a particular period of cover designated in the liability insurance 
contract.298 Such an event may be the occurrence of the loss itself – ie, the insured’s 
legal liability towards the third party299 – or it may be an earlier occurrence that 
merely leads to the insured’s legal liability, such as an act of negligence on the 
insured’s part,300 or another occurrence which marks a significant stage in the process 
leading to the insured’s legal liability. For example, the occurrence of the third party’s 
loss may be the ‘insured event’ (as in so-called ‘occurrence-based’ insurance), or the 
event may be a claim by a third party against the insured (as in ‘claims-made’ 
insurance). 
One should distinguish further between the duration of the liability insurance 
contract as provided for by the period of insurance, and the duration of liability 
cover.301 The period of insurance in a liability policy may, for instance, be one year. 
In English law, most liability policies endure for one year but are renewable. 302 
However, it depends on the type of insurance cover in question whether occurrences 
that take place or claims that are made, before, during, or after the duration of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Consumer Rights Act. See MacGillivray on Insurance ibid para 30.078 and Colinvaux’s Law of 
Insurance paras 3.024-3.025ff. See also para 4.1.2 above. 
296 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4B-17.4D; Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 8.1, 
8.2, 8.4-8.8; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.006-21.011; MacGillivray on Insurance paras 
30.63-30.67; Birds & Hird ‘Report’ 179-85; Clarke ‘Report’ 187-202; and Enright & Jess Professional 
Liability paras 1.132-1.162, 7.012-7.018, 14.009-14.011 and 10.119-10.164. 
297 As discussed in para 4.2.2.1 above. 
298 The latter is at issue here (para 4.2.2.2). Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4B comments 
that ‘[t]he incidence of loss, both as to its nature and timing, should be distinguished from the event 
that brings the case within the scope of a particular period of cover: that event, the insured event, is the 
one specified in the contract’. 
299 Clarke ibid. 
300 In a so-called ‘act-committed’ insurance, which is more prevalent in continental legal systems, the 
insured’s breach of contract or tort brings the case within the scope of the policy.  
301 Again, the latter is at issue here (para 4.2.2.2). 
302 Birds & Hird ‘Report’ 180. They observe that it is possible to have a liability policy with a shorter 
or longer fixed duration, as is usually the case when the liability policy is linked to another contract, eg, 
in a construction project. 
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contract, are covered. Liability insurance policies grant cover for a limited time. As 
far as the duration of the liability cover is concerned, there are two broad types in 
England, namely ‘occurrence-based’ and ‘claims-made’ liability policies. In addition, 
some ‘hybrid’ liability policies, which are variations on ‘occurrence-based’ and 
‘claims-made’ policies, have developed.  
The distinctions between ‘occurrence-based’303  and ‘claims-made’304  liability 
policies, as far as the event and duration of the liability cover are concerned, are 
discussed in what follows. Some hybrid forms of liability policies that have developed 
are also explored.305 
 
4.2.2.2(a)  The Insured Event  
 
4.2.2.2(a)(i)  Occurrence-based Policies 
 
An occurrence-based liability policy would, for example, provide that an insurer 
will indemnify the insured ‘against all sums which the insured shall become liable at 
law to pay as damages … in respect of or in consequence of … accidental loss of or 
damage to property from whatsoever cause during the period of insurance’.306  
An occurrence-based liability policy contains an undertaking by the liability 
insurer to indemnify the insured for loss arising out of an event, occurrence, 
circumstance, or accident which occurred within the period of insurance of a 
particular insurance policy.307 In the case of occurrence-based policies the event is the 
point when the third party’s loss occurred, be it the time of a death, illness, injury, loss 
or damage.308 As to the nature of the occurrence, the damage may be damage to 
property or injury to person. The occurrence or the event that triggers liability cover 
varies from one insurance contract to the other and is, therefore, a question of 
                                                 
303 For further detail, see paras 4.2.2.2(a)(i) and 4.2.2.2(b)(i) below on ‘occurrence-based’ policies. 
304 For further detail, see paras 4.2.2.2(a)(ii) and 4.2.2.2(b)(ii) below on ‘claims-made’ policies. 
305 For further detail, see para 4.2.2.2(b)(iii) below on ‘hybrid’ policies. 
306 This is an extract, with added emphasis, from the insuring clause in the liability policy in M/S 
Aswan Engineering above 292. 
307 See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 251 para 13.6.3 and 256-260 para 13.7; Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance paras 11.161-11.180 and Colinvaux Supplement 49 ad paras 11.161, 11.162, 11.164, 
11.165, 11.167, 11.176, and 11.177; and Enright & Jess Professional Liability paras 10.125-10.10.137 
for the meaning of ‘accident’, ‘loss’ and ‘occurrence’, ‘event’ or ‘circumstance’. Also see para 
4.2.2.3(a) below for further detail on ‘event limits’ and ‘aggregations’. 
308 For further detail on how to determine the time of the third party’s loss, see para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) below. 
The third party’s loss which is at issue here, must be distinguished from the insured defendant’s loss, as 
discussed in para 4.2.2.1 above. 
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interpretation in each case. In Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance, the court 
held that ‘liability arises at the time of the accident, when negligence and damage 
coincide’.309 But that it will not necessarily always be the case.310 
Under this type of liability insurance, however, it is generally irrelevant when 
the act causing the occurrence – such as the insured’s tort or breach of contract – 
either took place or became known, when the third party actually claimed against the 
insured, or when the insured became liable to the third party.311  
 
4.2.2.2(a)(ii)  Claims-made Policies 
 
A claims-made liability policy would, for example, provide that the liability 
insurer will indemnify the insured ‘for any sum which the insured may become 
legally liable to pay arising from any claim or claims first made against the 
insured’.312  
In claims-made policies, the liability insurer undertakes to indemnify the 
insured defendant for a claim that is first made by the third party against the insured 
within the period of insurance of that particular insurance policy.313  
As regards the use of the word ‘claim’, one has to distinguish carefully 
between the claim by the third party against the insured, and the insured’s claim under 
its insurance policy. Whereas the third party may claim damages from the insured and 
may be referred to as the claimant in its action against the insured, the insured may 
claim from the liability insurer in respect of its legal liability towards a third party.314 
Again, the meaning and nature of the word ‘claim’, referring here to the third party’s 
                                                 
309 Post Office above 373. However, Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4B and 17.4C1 also 
considers ‘negligence’ as an occurrence under occurrence-based insurance. Clarke ‘Report’ 189 
observes that ‘[i]n the past, that earlier event was usually the occurrence giving rise to the insured’s 
liability, such as an act of negligence on his part’. Compare Clarke Law of Liability Insurance, a more 
recent work, para 8.1 that opines as follows: ‘The event that brings a case within the scope of a 
particular policy and period of cover is the event that is specified in the insuring clause. … [T]his may 
be the occurrence out of which that loss (liability to the other person) arose, such as negligence. 
However, liability for negligence arises not at the time of the negligence, but “at the time of the 
accident, when negligence and damage coincide”.’ 
310 See para 4.2.2.1(b)(ii) below on the different possibilities as to the time of the loss. 
311 The event that brings the case within the scope of the policy is an issue of interpretation in every 
case. See para 4.2.2.1(c)(ii) below for further detail in this regard. 
312  This is an extract, with added emphasis, from the insuring clause of the liability policy in 
Lumberman’s Mutual Casualty v Bovis Lend Lease above para 17. 
313 The insurance policy may contain a time limit on the submission of the claim by the insured against 
the insurer. 
314 For further detail, see Enright & Jess Professional Liability paras 14.004ff and 10.147-10.151; 
MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.067; and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 8.5.1 and 8.8. 
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claim against the insured, is subject to the interpretation of the insurance contract and 
may be affected by the context.315 The inquiry starts with the insuring clause in the 
policy.316 An English court is likely to define a ‘claim’ as ‘a demand for something as 
due; an assertion of a right to something’.317  
Claims-made liability policies provide cover against third-party liability if the 
insured’s conduct (such as tort or breach of contract) which causes the third party’s 
loss or damage is discovered and a third-party claim is made against the insured 
during the period of insurance. It is irrelevant when that conduct took place. The event 
in the case of claims-made policies refers to the time at which the claim is made 
against the insured by the third party.318 
 
4.2.2.2(b)  The Duration of Liability Cover 
 
4.2.2.2(b)(i)  Occurrence-based Policies  
 
Occurrence-based policies do not provide retrospective cover, but they do 
provide potentially unlimited prospective cover that is limited only by statutory or 
contractual prescription periods.  
Occurrence-based policies are the preferred type of insurance cover from an 
insured’s point of view. Under these policies, the liability insurer bears the risk of 
uncertain future claims. The biggest disadvantage for liability insurers contracting on 
an occurrence basis is that they are exposed to ‘long-tail’ liability in that claims may 
be made by third parties on the insured, and hence by the insured on the insurer, long 
after the occurrence of the insured’s conduct that caused the death, injury, loss, or 
damage, or long after the third party’s loss itself occurred.319 The differences between 
occurrence-based and claims-made policies are particularly relevant in the case of 
                                                 
315 See, eg, West Wake Price & Co v Ching [1957] 1 WLR 45 (QBD) 55, 57 where the court considered 
the policy, and especially the QC clause, and held that the term ‘claim’ refers to a claim for money 
rather than to the cause of action itself. See further Thornman & Others v New Hampshire Insurance 
Co (UK) Ltd & Home Assurance Co [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 7 (CA (Civ)) 15 where the court held that 
the ‘application of the definition may vary according to the circumstances it falls to be construed’. 
316 Clarke ibid para 8.5.1. 
317 See Thornman v New Hampshire Insurance 15 where the court accepted the meaning that the 
Oxford English Dictionary ascribed to the term ‘claim’ and also referred to the decision (that the term 
‘claim’ refers to a claim for money) in West Wake Price v Ching above with approval. See 
MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.103 for further comments on West Wake Price v Ching. 
318 See also para 4.2.2.2(b)(ii) below for further detail on ‘claims-made’ policies, in particular the 
different possibilities as to whether a claim has been made against the insured during the period of 
insurance. 
319 For more information on long-tail insurance in general, see also Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts 
para 18.1A and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 8.2, 8.4, and 12.7.1. 
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professional liability or when dealing with progressive diseases, where a significant 
period may elapse between the insured’s conduct (that is, the professional’s act of 
negligence or breach of contract, or the disease-causing conduct) and the loss or 
damage to the third party and the latter’s claim against the insured.  
Investigations by the insurer of ‘long-tail’ claims under occurrence-based 
policies are difficult. Furthermore, inflation and interest have increased the size of 
such claims against liability insurers, and they are further for unacceptably long 
periods unable to close their books per underwriting year of account.  
Although public liability policies may be written on a claims-made basis, they 
are more commonly occurrence-based policies. However, the disadvantages of 
occurrence-based liability policies for liability insurers have encouraged the 
development and use of claims-made policies. Professional liability insurers are, for 
example, disinclined to offer occurrence-based policies and prefer to write claims-
made policies.320 
The time of the occurrence determines whether it falls within the period of 
cover. If the event took place at a specific time, such as loss caused by an identifiable 
accident, it is generally not difficult to determine which policy applies. In long-tail 
insurance, however, the question arises as to whether a particular insurer (if there is 
only one policy), or which insurer (in the case of consecutive policies), bears the loss 
when the occurrence involves damage, disease, or injury that may have been latent for 
a considerable time – eg, pollution, asbestosis, or cancer.  
There are four possible times of occurrence that may qualify as the ‘insured 
event’ in determining whether or which policy applies:  
– exposure: when the third party is exposed to the activity or 
circumstance that gives rise to the action against the insured;321 
                                                 
320 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 8.4 notes that occurrence-based cover is less frequent at 
nowadays. 
321 See Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd & Another [2006] 1 
WLR 1492 (CA (Civ Div)) para 15 where the court rejected this possibility and held that, ‘[i]t cannot 
be right that, at the stage of initial exposure or initial bodily reaction to such exposure, there could be a 
liability on the part of [the insured] in respect of which they could require to be indemnified under any 
public liability insurance policy’. Cf Durham v BAI (Run-Off) Ltd (in scheme of arrangement) & Other 
Cases; Re Employers’ Liability Policy ‘Trigger’ Litigation [2008] EWHC 2962 in respect of an 
employers’ liability policy; but the decision of the court a quo was reversed in part on appeal in 
Durham v BAI [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 295 (‘Durham v BAI (CA)’). In Employers’ Liability Insurance 
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– loss in fact (so-called ‘injury in fact’): although it may refer to the 
position when the third-party injury or damage actually occurs;322  
– manifestation: loss does not occur until it becomes manifest (or 
known);323 and 
– liability: of any insurer whose policy was in force at the time of initial 
exposure, during continued exposure, or at the time of manifestation.324 
A distinction is sometimes drawn between ‘losses-occurring’ and ‘events- 
occurring’ policies.325 A losses-occurring policy provides cover in respect of liability 
for injury suffered by the third party during the currency of the policy, even though 
the insured’s liability for those injuries is not established until later. An ‘events-
occurring’ policy provides indemnity for events that occur within the currency of the 
policy, even though they do not give rise to injury until a later date, and the insured’s 
liability for those injuries is not established until an even later date. The distinction 
between these two forms of policy is particularly relevant in so-called ‘exposure’ 
cases – eg, exposure to asbestos where the third party is exposed to the harmful 
substance during the currency of the policy, but where that exposure does not result in 
physical injury to the third party until some time later. 
In Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance326 the 
insuring clause in a public liability policy327 provided for indemnity ‘in respect of all 
sums which [the insured] shall become legally liable to pay as compensation arising 
                                                                                                                                            
Trigger Litigation, BAI (Run Off) Ltd v Durham [2012] UKSC 14, the Supreme Court again reinstated 
the judgment of the court a quo. See the discussions in this para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) below. 
322 This was the earliest time that the injury could arise according to the Court of Appeal in Bolton 
Metropolitan Borough Council v Municipal Mutual Insurance above paras 18-19. See the discussion of 
Bolton in this para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) below. 
323 Bolton above para 18, where the Court of Appeal held that the injury had occurred on a later date 
than exposure ‘when a malignant tumour [was] first created [injury in fact] or when identifiable 
symptoms first occurred [manifestation of the loss]’. It was not necessary to distinguish between the 
date of injury in fact or the date manifestation of the loss in that case, as the insured had been covered 
by the same policy at both times.  
324 The so-called ‘tripple trigger’ theory or ‘multiple trigger’ theory was also rejected by the Court of 
Appeal in Bolton para 24, when it held that ‘as far as the public liability policies used in the present 
cases, I see no need for the English courts to adopt the multiple trigger theory. It has been adopted in 
the US avowedly for policy reasons in relation to the vastly greater number of asbestos-disease 
sufferers in that country. I see no reason to adopt it in this particular case where the same policy 
considerations are not present.’  
325  See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.009-21.011 and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 
30.082 and 30.110 for further detail. 
326 Bolton above. 
327 The judgment is confined to such policies, eg, Bolton paras 15 and 24. It is explained in Colinvaux’s 
Law of Insurance para 21.009 that, ‘[i]f the reasoning in Bolton is extended [to the context of 
employers’ liability insurance] the insurance [would be] seriously undermined in cases where exposure 
and the injury occur in different years’. 
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out of … accidental bodily injury or illness … to any person … which occurs during 
the currency of the policy’. The Court of Appeal found that the policy provided 
losses-occurring cover, and not events-occurring on exposure. 328  It held that 
‘actionable injury does not occur on exposure or on initial bodily changes happening 
at that time but at a much later date; whether it is when a malignant tumour is first 
created or when identifiable symptoms first occur does not matter for purposes of this 
case’.329  The court further held that the phrase ‘accidental bodily injury’ did not 
require the accident – the initial exposure – and the injury to occur within the 
currency of the policy.330 It was sufficient if the injury occurred within the currency of 
any one of the policies that may be applicable in determining the time of the 
occurrence as the time of the damage, or its manifestation.331 The Court of Appeal 
therefore preferred to determine the time of the occurrence as the time of the damage 
or of its manifestation.332 
Employers’ liability insurance policies that covered employers for ‘disease 
contracted’ and ‘injury sustained’ by their employees during the course of 
employment, were considered in Durham v BAI,333 a decision involving a group of 
test cases on the employers’ liability wording.334 The case related to mesothelioma 
compensation claims. The court a quo held that the phrases ‘injury was sustained’ and 
‘disease was contracted’ referred to when the injury or disease was caused, namely at 
the date of inhalation [exposure], and it distinguished the case from Bolton.335  
The Court of Appeal in Durham v BAI reversed the court a quo’s decision in 
part. 336  It held, in respect of the ‘disease contracted’ wording, that the insurer’s 
liability to indemnify the employers was triggered on the date of exposure – ie, on 
inhalation of the asbestos dust which caused the disease. However, where the policy 
contained the phrase ‘injury sustained’, the insurer’s liability was triggered only if the 
                                                 
328 Bolton paras 13-19, 22, 26, 44-46. 
329 Ibid para 18. 
330 Ibid para 19. 
331 Ibid. 
332 See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 7.4C2; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.009-
21.011; and MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.082 for further comment on Bolton. 
333 Durham v BAI above. 
334 The case should be read in the context of compulsory employers’ liability insurance in English law. 
For further detail see MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.110; and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 
21.009-21.011. 
335 Durham v BAI above in paras 226-227, 239, 240 and 243.  
336 Durham v BAI (CA) above. 
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policy was in force on the date of the injury – ie, when the tumour developed.337 The 
Court of Appeal in passing considered itself bound by its earlier decision in Bolton. 
Due to the significant time lapse between the exposure to asbestos during the course 
of employment, and the onset of the disease, the negligent employer may be without 
cover for liability to its former employee if it was no longer covered by liability 
insurance at the time of the injury.338 
On appeal, in Employers’ Liability Insurance Trigger Litigation, BAI v Durham, 
the Supreme Court again reinstated the judgment of the court a quo in Durham. It held 
that ‘injury sustained’ and ‘disease contracted’ both referred to exposure rather than to 
injury.339  
In the absence of any terms in the policy to the contrary, the phrase ‘injury 
sustained’ means exposure (causation) in an employers’ liability policy, and ‘injury’ 
in a public liability policy.340 
When the occurrence involves conduct, the time of the occurrence is, in English 
law, again a matter of interpretation of the policy. Numerous cases have interpreted 
terms such as ‘accident’, ‘event’, ‘loss’, ‘occurrence’, and ‘circumstance’. 341  The 
courts have also construed the meaning of aggregation clauses (or so-called 
‘aggregations’) such as ‘loss/and or occurrence arising out of one event’, ‘claims 
resulting from a single event’, ‘losses arising out of’ and ‘occurrence or occurrences 
of a series consequent on or attributable to one original source’. 
Occurrence-based liability policies also require the insured to give notice of any 
third-party loss to the insurer as soon as the insured becomes aware of it.342 
 
  
                                                 
337 Ibid paras 230-231, 233, 235, 237 and 244-245 above. 
338 MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.110 and 30.112. 
339 See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.007-21.011 and 21.123-21.124; and MacGillivray on 
Insurance para 30.110 for further comment on the case. 
340 See Equitas Insurance Limited v Municipal Mutual Insurance Limited [2019] EWCA Civ 718 (CA 
(Civ)) on employment liability insurers’ claims against their reinsurers for mesothelioma liabilities 
arising from multiple years of negligent exposure. 
341 See, Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 251 para 13.6.3 and 256-260 para 13.7; Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance paras 11.161-11.180 and Colinvaux Supplement 49-53 ad paras 11.161, 11.162, 11.164, 
11.165, 11.167, 11.176, and 11.177; and Enright & Jess Professional Liability paras 10.125-10.10.137 
for English judicial decisions on the meaning of these terms. See also Clarke Law of Insurance 
Contracts para 17.4C3; Birds ibid 401-402 para 20.3; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.040; 
MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.060-29.067; and Clarke ‘Report’ 199-200. 
342 For further detail on notice to insurers, see MacGillivray on Insurance paras 21.036-21.049 and 
30.040-30.041; and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.054.  
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4.2.2.2(b)(ii) Claims-made Policies  
Professional indemnity policies and directors’ and officers’ policies are 
generally written on a claims-made basis. Claims-made liability policies provide 
potentially unlimited retrospective cover, but no prospective cover beyond the period 
of insurance. There may have been conduct by the insured within the currency of the 
policy that gives rise to claims many years later, and thus an insured will need to 
maintain a claims-made policy, or successive claims-made policies, for a lengthy 
period – eg, in the case of professional liability insurance, even after the cessation of 
the insured’s relevant professional activities. 343 
In claims-made policies, also referred to as ‘discovery-policies’, the insured 
itself bears much of the risk of uncertain future claims as it has an extensive duty to 
disclose potential claims before entering into or renewing any such liability insurance 
contract. Because of the extended retroactive liability in claims-made policies, 
insurers require meticulous disclosure by the insured of potential liability-inducing 
conduct in the past. Liability insurers contracting on a claims-made basis are able to 
calculate premiums with greater accuracy than those underwriting occurrence-based 
policies, given the better defined nature of the risk resulting from the insured’s 
disclosures. Where the insured has disclosed a potential claim, the liability insurer 
may choose to charge higher premiums, refuse to grant or renew the liability 
insurance policy, or may exclude cover for the disclosed potential liability claim.344  
Insurance contracts generally impose a duty on the insured to give the insurer 
notice when a loss or of any event which may result in a claim by the insured under 
the policy, takes place.345 The type of policy – ie, whether it is ‘occurrence-based’ or 
‘claims-made’ – may influence the interpretation of clauses requiring notification, for 
example, when notice must be given.346 Notification under claims-made policies is 
complex.347 
                                                 
343 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 8.6.1. 
344 Enright & Jess Professional Liability para 14.047. 
345 This is a contractual duty and the extent of the duty depends on the wording of the policy. Although 
there may be some overlap, it differs from an insured’s common-law duty of pre-contractual disclosure. 
Note that the latter has now been amended by statute to a duty not to misrepresent in consumer 
insurance contracts and as a duty of fair representation of the risk in non-consumer insurance contracts. 
See para 4.1.2 on these statutory reforms. 
346 Enright & Jess Professional Liability para 14.029. See also Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 
8.5, 8.7 and 8.8. Prompt notification, eg, was discussed by the Court of Appeal in HLB Kidsons v 
Lloyd’s Underwriters [2008] EWCA Civ 1206, 2008 WL 472172 and in Maccaferri Ltd v Zurich 
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It is typical of claims-made policies, such as professional indemnity policies, to 
require three phases of notification by the insured to the insurer.  
In the first instance, claims-made policies generally contain the standard 
notification term which requires the insured to give written notice of any occurrence, 
for example, ‘of any accident, claim or proceedings’. The aim of this clause is to 
enable the insurer to investigate any accident or claim as soon as possible. 
Secondly, claims-made policies may require the insured to give notice of 
occurrences ‘likely to give rise to a claim’, or that ‘may give rise to a claim’. 
Thirdly, the insured must notify the insurer of any claim made by a third party 
against the insured itself. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
Insurance Plc [2016] EWCA Civ 1302, 2017 WL 11798 (CA (Civ)) on the interpretation of Euro 
Pools Plc (In Administration) v Royal Sun and Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2019] EWCA Civ 808, 
2019WL 02077848 regarding notification under successive claims-made policies. 
347 For further detail see Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.054-21.073 and Colinvaux Supplement 
124 ad paras 21.058 and 21.059 and discussions of various judicial decisions. See also MacGillivray on 
Insurance paras 21.036-21.049 and 30.040-30.041 and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 8.5 and 
8.7. 
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As to whether a claim by a third party against the insured arose during the 
insurance period (the time of the claim), the possibilities include:348  
– potential claims as to: 
o an occurrence of a state of affairs which may later give rise to 
third-party injury and liability by the insured towards the third 
party; 
o an occurrence of a state of affairs which may give rise to a claim 
by the third party against the insured; 
o an occurrence of a state of affairs which is likely to give rise to a 
claim by the third party against the insured; 
– assertion of claims, consisting of: 
o notification of the occurrence of a state of affairs to the insured 
that may give rise to a claim, thus, a mere allegation; 
o notification of the occurrence or a state of affairs to the insured 
which is likely to give rise to a claim;  
– institution of proceedings by the third party against the insured.349 
 
Once it has been established that a claim has been made by the third party 
against the insured within the insurance period, and the insured institutes a claim 
against its insurer, the courts proceed to determine whether relevant matters are 
covered by the claim.350 
 
4.2.2.2(b)(iii)  Hybrid Policies 
 
Liability insurers will, of course, attempt to limit their exposure to prospective 
liability in the case of occurrence-based policies, or to retrospective liability in the 
case of claims-made policies.351 Such refinements to both types of policy tend to 
                                                 
348 English courts divide the possibilities as to the time of the claim into three different groups. See, eg, 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4D2 and Enright & Jess Professional Liability paras 
14.036-14.044 in this regard. 
349 The courts treat the first three options as ‘potential claims’, the fourth and fifth as ‘assertion of 
claims’, and the last option – ‘the institution of proceedings’ – is treated separately. 
350 On the scope of the claim, see Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4D3 and the examples 
from judicial decisions given there. 
351 The insurance policy may, eg, provide that it does not cover any loss or any legal liability ‘arising 
from any event or occurrence, which has been notified under any insurance in force prior to the 
inception of this [the] policy’. Alternatively, a retroactive date may be inserted in a claims-made policy 
to limit retroactive liability. See para 4.2.2.2(b)(iv) below as to the latter. 
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result in hybrid policies that create gaps in the cover provided by, for example, 
different successive policies. 
The significant period that may elapse between the occurrence of the event and 
the third party’s claim against the insured has led to the development of hybrid 
policies. Those insured under claims-made policies may protect themselves against 
claims made after the period of insurance by using so-called ‘prior-acts cover’ or 
‘long-tail cover’.  
Under prior-acts cover, the insurer under the new or renewed insurance policy 
charges an additional premium to cover the insured for incidents that may have 
occurred before the inception date of the new or renewed policy.  
Claims-made policies generally include an extension clause in the form of an 
extended period of discovery which provides that ‘if the notification is made within 
the duration of a policy, any claim arising out of the matters of the subject of the 
notification will be treated as a claim under the policy, even though the claim itself is 
made outside the duration of the policy’. Under such long-tail cover, the previous 
insurer covers future claims to be made for events that occurred during the currency 
of its claims-made policy at an additional premium.  
These types of cover in effect combine claims-made and occurrence-based 
cover in a single policy. The terms of a specific liability policy may, therefore, amend 
the broad features of occurrence-based or claims-made policies, and may even result 
in the policy no longer qualifying as the one or the other, but rather as a hybrid form 
of liability policy.  
 
4.2.2.2 (b)(iv) Limitation of Actions Applied to Occurrence-based and Claims-made 
Policies  
It has been explained that the statutory limitation period of the insured’s claim 
may start to run on the date when the insured’s liability to the third party has been 
established by way of a judgment, arbitration award, or agreement, provided that the 
event which brings the matter within the scope of the policy has occurred.352 
The same principle applies in determining when the limitation of an insured’s 
claim against its liability insurer starts to run in both claims-made and occurrence-
                                                 
352 See para 4.2.2.1(d) above on limitation of actions in liability insurance in general. 
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based policies, but the practical consequences may vary, depending on the type of 
liability policy. This statement requires further explanation. 
Insurers have ‘long-tail liability’ under occurrence-based policies. That entails 
potentially unlimited prospective coverage subject only to statutory or contractual 
prescription periods. A significant period may elapse between the date on which the 
policy was written; the occurrence of the event – ie, the third party’s loss; and the 
latter’s claim against the insured which may subsequently lead to the formal 
determination of the insured’s legal liability by judgment, arbitral award, or 
agreement. The limitation period of the insured’s claim against its insurer may thus 
equally start running only many years after the policy was written. 
Claims-made liability policies provide potentially unlimited retrospective cover, 
but no prospective cover beyond the period of insurance. Claims-made policies, 
therefore, generally include a ‘retroactive date’ to limit retrospective cover.353 Even 
though the third-party claim against the insured must be made within the period of the 
policy to bring the case within the scope of the policy, the event, circumstance, or 
occurrence giving rise to the claim must also occur after the retroactive date. Claims-
made policies will also generally exclude or restrict cover for ‘pre-existing 
occurrences’ not disclosed by the insured.354 Less time will thus elapse between the 
date on which the policy was written and the third party’s claim against the insured 
which may subsequently lead to the formal establishment of the insured’s legal 
liability by way of judgment, arbitral award, or agreement. The delay between the 
date on which the policy was written and the date on which the limitation of the 
insured’s claim against its insurer begins to run, will be shorter in claims-made 
policies than in occurrence-based policies. However, there may still be a significant 
elapse of time. 
 
4.2.2.3  Exceptions to, Exclusions from, and Limitations on Liability Cover355 
Some of the more important exceptions to, exclusions from, and limitations on 
the liability cover that may be found in liability insurance policies will be explored 
next. However, the discussion does not intend to provide an exhaustive summary of 
all possibilities. 
                                                 
353 Enright & Jess Professional Liability in para 7.015. 
354 Ibid para 7.017.  
355 For further detail on exceptions in insurance contracts is general, see Clarke Law of Insurance 
Contracts para 19.2. 
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4.2.2.3(a)  The Sum Insured, Aggregations, and Event Limits 
 
As regards the sum insured and the limits of indemnity, the liability insurance 
policy may have a maximum limit applying to a particular period of insurance, 
regardless of the number of claims made, or there may be an event limit, that is, a 
limit that applies to each accident or each occurrence or each claim by the insured, 
with no overall maximum limit.356  
The use of aggregations (such as ‘loss/and or occurrence arising out of one 
event’, ‘loss and/or occurrence’, ‘claims resulting from a single event’, ‘losses arising 
out of’ and ‘occurrence or occurrences of a series consequent on or attributable to one 
original source’) is a way to limit the extent of the insurer’s liability.357  
 
4.2.2.3(b)  Exclusions or Exceptions to Liability Cover for an Insured 
Defendant’s Legal Liability towards Third-Party Plaintiffs 
 
4.2.2.3(b)(i)  Contractual Liability358 
In M/S Aswan Engineering Establishment v Iron Trades Manual Insurance,359 
the court held that the parties to the insurance contract had to exclude cover for 
contractual liability expressly if they wished it not to be included. 
The insurance industry has developed standard phrases to describe basic cover 
and basic exclusions. A public liability or products liability policy, for example, will 
provide cover against tortious liability, but will generally seek to exclude contractual 
liability. These policies provide an ‘indemnity against sums that the insured is legally 
liable to pay’ (which is in principle wide enough to cover contractual liability), but 
they generally then expressly exclude pure contractual liability from the indemnity by 
excluding ‘liability assumed under contract’ or providing that ‘the insurer will not 
                                                 
356 See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 251 para 13.6.3, 258-260 para 13.7, and 401-402 para 20.3 
for interesting English judicial decisions on the meaning of limits ‘per accident’, ‘per occurrence’ and 
‘per claim’ respectively. See Spire Healthcare Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2018] 
EWCA Civ 317, [2018] CLC 327 (CA (Civ)) on aggregations and the limits of cover. 
357 See para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) above on the duration of liability cover in occurrence-based policies, as well 
as the sources referred to with regard to the functions of aggregations and event limits, as well as to 
their interpretation. 
358 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4A1; MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.006-30.007 and 
paras 34.017-34.018; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.014-21.023 and Colinvaux Supplement 
116-118 ad paras 21.014, 21.017 and 21.021; Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law para 20.00 at 35; 
and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 10.3 and 10.4.4. 
359 M/S Aswan Engineering above para 293. See the discussions of the extent of ‘legal liability’ in paras 
4.2.2.1(a)(i)-4.2.2.1(a)(iii) above and the decisions discussed there on whether legal liability covers 
contractual liability, and if so, to what extent. 
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indemnify the insured for liability accepted by agreement which would not have 
attached in the absence of the agreement’. 360 
Cover for liability in contract alone is less likely in the case of public liability or 
product liability policies. The philosophy behind the exclusion of contractual liability 
is that proper performance under the contract is seen to be in the hands of the insured, 
and that there may be an absence of fortuity to provide for insurance cover. For 
example, should the insured intentionally render performance in terms of the contract 
impossible, it is self-realisation of the risk and generally uninsurable.361  In short, 
liability insurance is not (primarily) intended to indemnify an insured against 
contractual liability for performance it undertakes.  
It has been explained earlier that it is a matter of interpretation whether the 
exclusion of ‘contractual liability’ merely refers to liability imposed by contract 
(contractual liability for performance assumed by the insured) or whether it also 
includes liability for damages imposed by law for breach of contract.362 
  
                                                 
360 In Omega Proteins above paras 21-23 the court interpreted the meaning in a public liability policy 
of an exclusion clause that excluded liability arising ‘under any contract or agreement unless such 
liability would have attached in the absence of such contract or agreement’. It held that, ‘[t]he fact that 
liability arises under a contract does not, however, mean that cover is automatically excluded. The 
insurance is against “all sums which the Insured becomes legally liable to pay for damages” in 
connection with accidental loss of or damage to property. Whether or not there is cover depends on 
whether “such liability would have attached in the absence of such contract or agreement’ (para 21). 
The court (para 22) quoted Legh-Jones, Birds & Owen MacGillivray on Insurance (11 ed) para 32.017 
with approval: ‘A refinement in relation to liability of this nature is a clause which excludes any 
liability arising out of contract unless such liability would in any event have arisen in tort. The wording 
of such a clause does not always make it clear whether the test is liability in tort as if no contract 
between the assured and the claimant had existed or liability in tort assuming the existence of a 
contract. A contractor may be liable in tort as well as in contract, and the existence of a contract could 
be a factor in establishing the necessary proximity between the parties to found the tortious duty of 
care. It is submitted that the former test is correct. The purpose of the exception must surely be to 
relieve the insurer of liability which the assured has incurred directly or by reason of the conclusion of 
a contract between himself and the claimant.’ The court then summarised the way in which to interpret 
such exclusion clause such as in the present policy, as follows: ‘It invites consideration as to what 
liability would an attached in the absence of a contract; not as to what liability in tort would have arisen 
in the presence of one; nor as to whether there was liability in tort as well as in contract. The court has 
to consider what liability there would have been if there had been no contract between [the insured] and 
[the third party]’ (para 23). See the discussions on contractual liability in paras 4.2.2.1(a)(i)-
4.2.2.1(a)(iii) above. 
361 On the contrary, there will be fortuity due to an insured’s negligently or innocent non-performance 
of the contract by way of breach of contract.  




4.2.2.3(b)(ii)  The Conduct of the Insured Defendant363 
An insured may not be able to recover from the insurer when it incurs liability 
as a result of its intentional (including reckless), wrongful or criminal conduct.364 It is 
against public policy for an insured to benefit from its unlawful or criminal conduct 
under an insurance policy and cover is therefore denied. This applies equally to all 
insurance contracts.365  
However, claims may well be allowed where the loss or damage resulting from 
the insured’s unlawful or criminal conduct affects third parties.366 Then the public 
policy considerations in favour of third parties indirectly obtaining the benefit of the 
insured’s insurance cover may outweigh the considerations against the insured 
benefitting directly from its own unlawful or criminal conduct. However, there is also 
a narrower approach in terms of which compensation will only be ordered to a third-
party claimant (victim) who has an independent cause of action – eg, section 151 of 
the Road Traffic Act, 1988,367 where liability insurance is compulsory. 
Liability insurance contracts also frequently contain a so-called ‘intentional-act 
exclusion’ by providing cover, for example, for liability for death or bodily injury 
‘neither intended or [sic] expected’ by the insured.368 There are few decisions on this 
point in English law, but it is suggested that the exclusion should be ‘read as an 
amplification in negative terms of the common law definition of accident, as generally 
understood’.369 
                                                 
363 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.033, 21.042-21.045 and Colinvaux Supplement 118-119 ad para 
21.033 and 121-122 ad para 20.043; Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 235-237 para 13.2.2 and 400-
401 para 20.2.6; MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.070-30.72, and 30.92; and Clarke Law of 
Liability Insurance paras 3.3, 10.2.1, 10.4.7, and 10.7. 
364 English courts have generally confined the exclusion to the consequences of deliberate criminal 
misconduct. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.043.  
365 See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 19.2E1 for a discussion of three possible grounds for 
the exclusion of intentional and reckless acts, of which the rule of public policy seems to be the 
preferred view. However, Clarke observes that ‘to inflict loss intentionally is only unlawful in certain 
situations’ (ibid). On the courts’ approach to the rule on public policy see ibid para 19.2E2. 
366 For further detail on the exclusion (or not) of criminal acts in liability policies, see Clarke ibid paras 
19.2E3-19.2E7 and 24.B and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.043. 
367 Chapter 52.  
368 Intentional-act exclusions are also found in other types of insurance policy. For further detail on the 
‘intentional-act exclusion’ in liability policies, see Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 19.2E3-
19.2E7. See para 4.2.2.1(a)(v) above on clauses aimed at limiting ‘legal liability’. 
369 Clarke ibid para 19.2E3. There is at least an implied term in insurance contracts that intentional 
conduct is to be excluded from the risk. 
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A typical clause that places an obligation on the insured to take reasonable 
precautions, reads: ‘[t]he insured shall take all reasonable steps and precautions to 
prevent accidents or losses’. Such clauses are common in, but not confined to, liability 
insurance policies.  
One of the primary purposes of liability insurance is to insure the insured 
against liability for its own negligence. Negligence on the part of the insured is a 
failure to take reasonable care when a reasonable person would have taken steps to 
avert or minimise loss or damage. By imposing a contractual obligation on the insured 
to take reasonable care, the insurer may attempt to exclude its liability in negligence 
against the insured for the latter’s liability to the party.370 If construed literally, such a 
clause may prevent an insured from successfully claiming an indemnity against 
liability for negligence. In accordance with the general rules of interpretation of 
insurance contracts, and in particular the contra proferentem rule, an exclusion of 
negligence is construed restrictively. Some commentators contend that ‘if an 
exception to negligence is clearly worded to exclude negligence, it will not exclude 
common-law negligence unless there is still some insured loss without negligence and 
the insurance against loss without negligence is sufficient to achieve the purpose of 
the insurance contract’.371  
In Fraser v BN Furman (Productions) Ltd, Miller Smith & Partners (A Firm), 
Third Party,372 the Court of Appeal held, in the context of liability cover for injury to 
third persons, that ‘one does not construe a condition as repugnant to a commercial 
purpose of the contract’.373 It found that ‘to take precautions to prevent accidents’ 
meant that the insured (as opposed to its employees)374 had to ‘avert dangers which 
were likely to cause bodily injuries to employees’. It held that reasonable care referred 
to reasonable care as between liability insurer and insured, and not as between the 
insured and the third party. To test whether the insured had taken reasonable steps to 
prevent the accident, the insured’s actions could not be tested against those of the 
hypothetical reasonable employer as that would defeat the commercial purpose of the 
                                                 
370  For instance, if the policy provides that there will be insurance cover, save for liability from 
negligence on the part of the insured, or positively, that there will be no cover for negligence. 
371 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 19.2A1.  
372 [1967] 1 WLR 898 (CA (Civ Div)).  
373 Ibid 905D. 
374 The court applied the decision of the Court of Appeal in Woolfall & Rimmer, Limited v Moyle & 
Another [1942] 1 KB 66 (CA). 
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contract – ie, to indemnify the insured against liability for its negligence.375 The court 
held that ‘an insured’s omission or act must at least be reckless, that is to say made 
with actual recognition by the insured that a danger exists and not caring whether or 
not it is averted’.376 
English courts have therefore adopted a common sense interpretation of clauses 
that require reasonable precautions to be taken by insured. The approach in Fraser, 
which dealt with liability for injury to persons, has also been followed in England 
with regard to the insured’s liability in negligence for damage to property.377 Due 
regard must had to the purpose of the insurance contract, which includes 
indemnification against the insured’s own negligence. Only recklessness or intent on 
the part of the insured, and not mere negligence, will amount to breach of the clause 
to take reasonable precautions. Such recklessness may be present if the insured, 
merely because it is covered against loss by the policy, refrains from taking the 
precautions to avoid the loss that it ought to have taken.  
 
4.2.2.4 The Insured Defendant’s Duties towards the Liability Insurer 
Under a liability insurance policy the insured has duties towards the liability 
insurer similar to those of insured under other types of insurance contract. For 
example, the insured has an obligation to adhere strictly to the duties of utmost good 
faith 378  and disclosure. 379  As mentioned earlier, 380  insurers require meticulous 
disclosure by the insured of previous potentially liability-inducing conduct under 
claims-made policies because of the extended retroactive liability inherent in such 
policies. Such policies are even referred to as ‘disclosure policies’. The insured’s 
notification obligations under a liability insurance contract have been canvassed 
earlier.381 
The insured also has a duty to avoid or prevent loss, that is, not to cause loss 
intentionally or recklessly. The duty on the liability insured to take reasonable 
                                                 
375 Fraser v Furman para 905F-H. 
376 Ibid 906C-D. 
377 See, eg, W & J Lane v Spratt [1970] 2 QB 480 (QBD (Comm)). 
378 Note the statutory reform of this duty as discussed in para 4.1.2 above. 
379 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.031. Also note that these duties have now been reformed by 
statute to a duty not to misrepresent in consumer insurance contracts and a duty of fair representation of 
the risk in non-consumer insurance contracts. See para 4.1.2 above. 
380 See para 4.2.2.2(b)(ii) on disclosure in claims-made policies above. 
381 It has been opined that some of these terms may be regarded as unfair in view of the Consumer 
Rights Act. See para 4.1.2 above. Also see paras 4.2.2.2(b)(i) and 4.2.2.2(b)(ii) on notification in 
occurrence-based and claims-made policies.  
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precautions to prevent the loss has been discussed earlier.382 The insured further has a 
duty to mitigate loss that has already occurred. A clause compelling the insured to 
take reasonable steps to minimise and prevent loss confirms the common-law 
principle that the insured may not be covered under the insurance contract for its 
intentional or reckless act or omission that causes damage or loss to the third-party 
plaintiff. Insurance policies in general prohibit the insured from settling the claim by a 
third party or from making any admission of liability without the insurer’s written 
consent. These ‘no-admission’ clauses are of particular importance in liability 
insurance and are discussed below.383 
 
4.2.3  The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff384  
4.2.3.1  Common Law385 
Under English common law, the rule of privity of contract applies. In terms of 
that rule no one may enforce a contract to which it is not a party. Generally there is no 
contractual relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the insured defendant’s 
liability insurer. Consequently, the third party cannot claim from the liability insurer 
at common law. Although the common law was modified by the Contract (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act, 1999,386 the amendment did not make it possible for third-party 
plaintiffs to claim from the insured defendant’s liability insurer. Even when the 
insured defendant goes bankrupt, the third party is compelled to prove in the 
                                                 
382 See para 4.2.2.3(b)(ii) above on the conduct of the insured and its obligation to take reasonable 
precautions below.  
383 It has also been opined that some of these terms may be regarded as unfair in view of the Consumer 
Rights Act. See para 4.1.2 above. See also para 4.3.1.2 below, where as part of the broader discussion 
of the conduct by the insurer of the defence and the settlement of claims by third-party plaintiffs 
against the insured, the further duties of the insured towards the liability insurer are discussed.  
384 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance ch 22 deals with third-party risks under liability policies. The entire 
chapter has been replaced by Colinvaux Supplement ch 22 and the latter is referenced in para 4.2.3 
generally without mention to the former. 
385 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 5.1 and 5.1A; Colinvaux Supplement 128 ad para 22.001; 
and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 12.3 and 12.7.  
386 Chapter 31, the ‘1999 Act’. MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.039 explains that, ‘[t]his Act allows 
a third party to bring an action on a contract if the contract so confers benefits on the third party and 
does not restrict a direct action. However, this is unlikely to be a route by which a [third party] claimant 
can generally recover from liability insurers. The [third party] claimant will not normally be 
specifically identifiable as an intended beneficiary of the insurance, nor to be intended to benefit from 
the liability insurance in the manner contemplated by the Act.’ Liability insurance provides cover to an 
insured for its legal liability towards third parties and is not insurance for the benefit of third parties 
due to the absence of an intention in liability insurance to confer a benefit to a third party. The 1999 
Act may apply to the insurance for the benefit of third parties but will, therefore, not generally apply to 
third-party claimants in the context of liability insurance. 
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bankruptcy with the other creditors.387 If an insured which is indemnified under a 
contract of insurance against liability to third parties, goes bankrupt, the question 
arises whether the third party may claim from the liability insurer directly.388 This was 
not possible under common law. 
 
4.2.3.2  The Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act, 1930389  
The 1930 Act was adopted to remedy the perceived unjust position of the third-
party plaintiff on the bankruptcy of the insured in that enjoyed no preferential status 
over general creditors. The gist of the Act is that if an insured who is indemnified 
against liability to third parties under a contract of insurance becomes bankrupt (or, 
subject to exceptions, is wound up in the case of a company) or enters into a 
composition or arrangement with creditors, the insured’s rights against the insurer in 
regard to the liability it has incurred to a third party are ‘transferred and vested in the 
third party to whom the liability was incurred’.390 The provisions of the Act have 
given rise to a considerable litigation in English courts.391  
The 1930 Act has been criticised, with the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions identifying a number of problems.392 A few of these are mentioned 
briefly.393 
First, the effect of section 1(1) of the 1930 Act is that the third-party plaintiff is 
required to establish the existence and extent of the insured’s liability before it can 
institute action against the insurer. This is not only time consuming, but also involves 
                                                 
387 See, eg, Re Harrington Motor Co Ltd [1928] Ch 105 (CA). 
388 This section is based on a previously published work. See Jacobs (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 608-616. 
389 The 1930 Act, as abbreviated in para 4.1.2 above. See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 5.8; 
Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 386-396 para 20.1; and Colinvaux Supplement at 128-129 ad para 
22.002. 
390 Section 1(1) of the 1930 Act. 
391 See, eg Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 386-396 para 20.1; Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts 
para 5.8B; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.013-30.023 for detailed discussion of the1930 Act 
and some of the litigation that arose from it. Colinvaux Supplement comments on the 1930 Act as part 
of the reform by the 2010 Act: see 129-150 ad paras 22.003-22.042. Selected paras of Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance that contain detail on the 1930 Act are still referenced here in para 4.2.3.2. 
392 See The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission Third Parties – Rights Against 
Insurers (Law Com No 272) (Scot Law Com No 184) Cm 5217 on 31 July 2001, available at 
https://www.la wcom.gov.uk/project/third-parties-rights-against-insurers/ (accessed on 30 Jul 2019)). 
See also Law Commission ‘Overview of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010’, 
available at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015 
/06/Third_Parties_Rights_against_Insurers_Act_2010_Overview.pdf (accessed on 30 Jul 2019). 
393 Although the 1930 Act has been replaced, it remains applicable in some instances (and is discussed 
in the present tense). See para 4.2.3.3 below on the new 2010 Act and the instances in which the 1930 
Act still applies. 
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additional expense for the third party as it must proceed against both the insured and 
the insurer. This is unnecessary and may lead to unfair results – eg, in cases where the 
insured no longer exists.394 
Second, the 1930 Act has not kept pace with developments in company and 
insolvency law. For example, it does not expressly extend to partnerships other than 
limited partnerships, 395  or apply to voluntary arrangements 396  entered into by an 
individual insured with its creditors. It does, however, apply to voluntary 
arrangements397 entered into by insured companies with their creditors.398 
Third, the third-party plaintiff’s rights to disclosure of information regarding 
the insurance399 may be seen as inadequate.400  
Fourth, rights transferred to the third-party plaintiff are subject to any defences 
that the insurer could have raised against the insured. An insurer may therefore use 
technical defences to escape the claim by the third party – eg, that the insured failed to 
notify the insurer, even where the third party itself has complied with the notification 
obligations of the insured under the policy. 
Fifth, the 1930 Act does not apply to certain types of voluntarily incurred 
liability, such as legal expenses, and as legal-expenses insurance plays an important 
role in funding litigation, the Commissions objected to this exclusion.  
                                                 
394 See, eg, Bradley v Eagle Star Insurance above. If the insured company has been dissolved, it must 
be restored to the Register of Companies so that the third party can use it to establish liability. This 
result amounts to artificial and additional proceedings. See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 389 
para 20.1.1 on how the legislature attempted to solve the problem before the 2010 Act. 
395 Although an insolvency order against an individual partner in a general partnership may trigger the 
operation of the Act on the principle of joint and several liability, s 3A was later inserted in the 1930 
Act to extend its scope of application to limited partnerships. 
396 ‘IVAs’ 
397 ‘CVAs’. 
398 See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 22.013 on how English courts, albeit by a cumbersome and 
expensive procedure, attempted to assist a third party who was potentially unfairly prejudiced by a 
moratorium on legal proceedings brought about by an IVA. 
399 Section 2 of the 1930 Act. 
400  Until recently, the right to information only arose when the liability of the insured had been 
established. This implied that a third party had to conduct litigation against the insured (to establish the 
insured’s liability towards itself for the purposes of s 1(1)) without knowing whether there was an 
insurer against whom the third party may be able to proceed. In Re OT Computers Ltd (In 
Administration) [2004] Ch 317 (CA) 331 para 38 the Court of Appeal overruled the previous 
authorities and remedied the position: the duty to inform under s 2 of the 1930 Act now arises on 
occurrence of the insolvency events covered by s 1(1) and no longer depends on the insured’s liability 
being established. However, the actual method of obtaining information has remained unclear. The 
third party may exercise the right to information against a limited number of parties and not against 
others, such as insurance brokers who might have relevant information. Apart from requiring the 
disclosure of information that may be reasonably required by the third party for the purpose of 
enforcing its rights under the Act, it is not exactly clear which information should be provided under 
the Act. 
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Sixth, it is uncertain whether the 1930 Act applies to claims with a foreign 
element.401  
Lastly, the 1930 Act also does not provide how the Limitation Act applies to 
third-party claims.402 
As pointed out, the 1930 Act could not address the evolving needs of liability 
insurance which differ considerable from those existing in 1930. Accordingly, this 
English statute was replaced by the 2010 Act. 
 
4.2.3.3  The Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act, 2010403 
More than a decade after the Law Commissions began their reviews of the 1930 
Act, the 2010 Act was finally enacted. Although the entry into force of the 2010 Act 
was delayed on numerous occasions, it eventually came into operation on 1 August 
2016. However, it contains detailed transitional arrangements,404 and the 1930 Act 
will continue to apply in certain instances – eg, where the insured’s insolvency and its 
liability to a third party predates the commencement of the 2010 Act.405 The key 
changes included in the 2010 Act are summarised briefly.406 
First, section 1(1) of the 1930 Act was completely redrafted. Although section 
1(2) of the 2010 Act provides that ‘the rights of the relevant person under the contract 
against the insurer in respect of the liability are transferred to and vest in the person to 
whom the liability is or was incurred (“the third party”)’, section 1(3) expressly 
                                                 
401 It may also be uncertain whether a court in Great Britain has jurisdiction to hear the parties in such a 
claim. This is an increasingly serious lacuna in view of the growing number of transnational insurance 
cases. 
402 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 22.017 and 22.030. In Lefevre v White above, the third party 
obtained judgment against the insured and the insured instituted proceedings against its insurers. 
However, the insured became insolvent during the course of the proceedings, but more than six years 
after the judgment in favour of the third party. The court held that the third party had its own cause of 
action against the insurers under the 1930 Act, but that it accrued at the same time as that of the insured 
against the insurers, ie when the insured’s liability towards the third party was established by judgment. 
The third party was time-barred from instituting a fresh action. Ibid 578-579. As the 1930 Act has been 
replaced by the 2010 Act, further discussion of the position under the 1930 Act falls beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
403 The 2010 Act para 4.1.2 above. See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 386-396 para 20.1.5; 
MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.024-30.038; and Colinvaux Supplement 129-150 ad paras 22.003-
22.042 with particular focus on para 22.005 as to the general features of the 2010 Act.  
404 See Schedule 3 to the 2010 Act, for the transitional arrangements. 
405 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 12.3 n 17. 
406 See The (English) Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission Third Parties – Rights 
Against Insurers (Law Com No 272) (Scot Law Com No 184) Cm 5217 on 31 July 2001, available at 
https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/third-parties-rights-against-insurers/ (accessed on 30 Jul 2019)). 
See also (English) Law Commission ‘Overview of the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 
2010’ available at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads 
/2015/06/ Third_Parties _Rights_against_Insurers_Act_2010_Overview.pdf (accessed on 30 Jul 2019). 
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excludes the need for a third-party plaintiff to issue proceedings against both the 
insolvent insured (to establish the insured’s liability against the third party) and 
against the latter’s insurer (to establish the insurer’s liability against the insured). That 
will remain a possibility, but alternatively the third party will be able to sue the 
insurer for a declaration of the insured’s liability (or potential liability) to itself as 
third party. The 2010 Act, therefore, removes the need for the third party to apply, for 
example, to have a dissolved insured company restored to the register. Section 1(3) is 
one of the most significant sections in the Act. However, the third-party plaintiff will 
still not be able to enforce its rights against the insurer without having established the 
insured’s liability against it.407  
Second, the 2010 Act refers to a ‘relevant person’ instead of to ‘an insured’. It 
provides detailed definitions of who or what will qualify as a ‘relevant person’.408 The 
Act now also expressly covers instances in which the insured is an unincorporated 
body. The 2010 Act reflects changes in insolvency law by broadening its scope of 
application to IVAs. The 2015 Act also amended some parts of the 2010 Act, for 
example, to accommodate new insolvency procedures through which an insured may 
qualify as a ‘relevant person’. 409 
Third, the 2010 Act gives the third-party plaintiff detailed rights against the 
insured, the insurer, and other parties, to information and disclosure regarding the 
insurance.410 
Fourth, the 2010 Act still allows the insurer to raise defences such as non-
disclosure, misrepresentation, or breach of warranty by the insured; to set off the 
amount of any liability of the insured to it against the third-party plaintiff; and to 
apply any excess to the third party’s claim.411  Section 9(2) of Act provides that 
anything done by the third party that, if done by the insured, would have amounted or 
contributed to fulfilling a condition to which the transferred rights are subject, is to be 
treated as if done by the insured. This will allow the third-party plaintiff, among other 
                                                 
407 Section 1(3). 
408 Sections 4-7.  
409 Part 6 of the 2015 Act. See MacGillivray on Insurance paras 20.007 and 30.0013. See also (English) 
Law Commission ‘Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) 2010 Act: Background to the Provisions in 
the Insurance Bill’ available at https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q /uploads /2015/06/ Third_ Parties_and_Insurance_Bill_2014.pdf (accessed on 30 Jul 
2019). 
410 Section 11 and Schedule 1. However, see Colinvaux Supplement 147 in paras 22.037 for details on 
potential weaknesses of the third party’s rights to information under the 2010 Act.  
411 Sections 9-10. See Colinvaux Supplement 141-142 ad para 22.028 for detailed explanations hereof 
in the context of different types of liability policy. 
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things, to give notice and particulars of a claim to an insurer. In addition, transferred 
rights no longer require the insured to provide information (other than giving notice of 
a claim) or assistance to the insurer if the insured cannot do so, for example, if the 
insured is a body corporate which has been dissolved or an individual who has 
died.412 
Next, as to limitation under the 2010 Act, three different limitation periods are 
relevant: for a claim by the third party against the insured; for a claim by the insured 
against its insurers; and for a claim by the third party against the insurers. 413 
First, as to the third party’s claim against the insured, the imitation period under 
the Limitation Act is six years for breach of contract, and either three or six years for 
a tort. However, the 2010 Act protects the third party provided that a claim form has 
been issued against the insured within the limitation period.414 If the claim has not 
been resolved, but the limitation period expires during the course of the proceedings, 
the insurers are prevented from relying on the expiry of the limitation period when a 
third party seeks a declaration as to the insured’s liability to it (the third party) in 
declaration proceedings against the insurers. 
Second, as explained earlier,415 subject to the contract, the limitation period of 
the insured’s claim against its insurers is six years from the date on which the 
insured’s liability against the third party has been established by judgment, arbitral 
award, or binding settlement. 
Third, as to the third party’s claim against the insurers, the 2010 Act is not clear 
exactly how the Limitation Act should operate. 416  It has been submitted that it 
depends on how the third party’s right under the 2010 Act is classified. If the third 
party has an independent right against the insurer, it accrues on the date on which the 
insured becomes insolvent for purposes of the 2010 Act. If the third party’s right is 
derivative, it accrues on the date on which the insured’s liability towards it (the third 
party) has been established and quantified, but the third party cannot sue the insurer in 
its own name before insolvency. If the third party’s right is derivative, and the 
                                                 
412 Section 9(4). 
413 Colinvaux Supplement 137-138 paras 22.017-22.021. See also para 4.2.2.1(d) above on limitation of 
actions in liability insurance generally. 
414 Section 12. 
415 See also para 4.2.2.1(d) above on limitation of actions in liability insurance generally. 
416 In this sense, the position under the 1930 Act is still unchanged. 
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insured’s insolvency occurs after the expiry of the limitation period for the third 
party’s action against the insurers, there is a potential problem.417  
 
4.2.4 The Liability Insurer Exercising its Rights of Subrogation for a 
Contribution against Joint Wrongdoers of the Insured 
Defendant418 
As liability insurance is indemnity insurance, subrogation 419  applies. 420  The 
insurer must have paid to the insured all sums due under the contact of insurance to 
acquire a right of subrogation.421 Under common law, the insured must assist the 
insurer to exercise its rights in subrogation against ‘any other person responsible for 
the loss insured’.422 
Liability insurance contracts under English law are silent, in the main, on 
subrogation.423 The insured’s liability to third parties is at core of liability insurance 
and the insured event under liability insurance is unlikely to give subrogation rights to 
the insurer in general. 
Subrogation is exceptional in liability insurance,424 but the liability insurer may 
be subrogated to the insured defendant’s claim for a contribution against wrongdoers 
who acted jointly with the insured defendant. However, the rights of the insurer are no 
greater than those of the insured and may be limited by contributory negligence on the 
part of the insured. 425  Some examples of how subrogation may arise in liability 
insurance include: 
                                                 
417 For a proposed solution hereto under English Civil Procedural Rules, see Colinvaux Supplement 138 
para 22.021. Further detail falls beyond the ambit of this study. 
418 On subrogation in English law, see generally Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 31; Birds 
Birds’ Modern Insurance Law ch 17; and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.3. 
419  Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.3.1 describes subrogation under English law as 
follows: ‘When insurer A conferred a benefit (insurance money or reinstatement) on B (the insured), B 
is obliged by law to transfer to A rights, notably rights of action against any person liable to B for loss 
insured’. 
420 Subrogation preserves the principle of indemnity.  
421 Liability insurers cannot make use of their ordinary rights of subrogation to contest the insured’s 
liability as against a third party, unless they first pay the insured the full amount of its estimated loss. 
See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.074. That is one of the reasons why liability insurance 
contracts usually specifically reserve the insurer’s right to defend any proceedings that may be brought 
by the third-party plaintiff against the insured, to conduct all settlement negotiations, and to approve 
any settlement. See also para 4.3 below for further detail on the conduct of the defence and settlement 
by the insurer.  
422 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.3. 
423 Ibid para 11.4.2.3.2. 
424 Ibid para 11.4.2.3 confirms that the insured’s obligation to assist the insurer to exercise rights in 
subrogation is ‘not very important in the case of liability insurance’. 
425 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 31.4C. 
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The liability insurer may be subrogated to a counterclaim by the insured 
defendant against the third-party plaintiff, for example, where the insured also has 
rights in tort against a third party who has negligently caused damage or injury to the 
insured. Or, the liability insurer may be subrogated to the insured’s right of action 
against other, ‘fourth parties’, 426  for example, the insured defendant’s joint 
wrongdoers,427 or for a claim for an indemnity from the insured’s co-insurers. 
 
4.3 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE AND SETTLEMENT OF 
CLAIMS BY THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST THE 
INSURED DEFENDANT 
4.3.1 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Insured Defendant  
4.3.1.1  Conduct of the Defence:428 The Insurer’s Right to Defend429 
In English law, liability insurance contracts generally provide that the third-
party claim may (and will) be defended by the insured.430  However, the liability 
insurer does not have a duty to defend the insured against third-party claims unless the 
insurance contract specifically so provides.431 In Brice v Wackerbarth432 the court 
explained that ‘usually [the insurers] are entitled to wait, to watch and see’433 and then 
                                                 
426 That is, parties other than the insured or the third-party plaintiff. 
427 Joint wrongdoers may or may not be co-insured of the insured defendant. However, In England 
there has been some reluctance to allow subrogation against a co-insured in an effort to avoid circuity, 
but an exception may be made if the co-insured is guilty of fraud. In every instance, the interpretation 
of the insurance contract will be paramount. See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 31.5D and 
Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.3.3 for further detail on subrogation against a co-insured. 
Where an insured as employer has a right of action against its own employees, English courts are also 
reluctant to enforce an employer’s rights against its employees. Insurance contracts may contain a so-
called ‘waiver of subrogation’ clause. Under such a clause the insurer waives its right of subrogation to 
proceed against employees of the insured, unless the claim against the insured ‘was brought about or 
contributed to by the dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal act or omission’ of the employee. See Clarke 
Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.3.2. 
428 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E; Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law para 20.2.2 at 
396-401; and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance ch 9. For further detail, also see Colinvaux’s Law of 
Insurance paras 21.44-21.83 and Colinvaux Supplement 122-124 ad paras 21.046A, 21.047, 21.051-
21.053, 21.058, 21.069, and 21.082; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.042, 30.043 and 30.05-
30.059.  
429 This part of the comparative analysis of English law (para 4.3.1 here) is more limited in extent than 
its Belgian equivalent (para 5.3.1 below), as the Belgian system is more advanced. Under Belgian law, 
the liability insurer has a right and a duty to conduct the defence of third-party claims against the 
insured. 
430 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 9.1.1 and 9.2. 
431 Liability insurers may, therefore, in case of express policy wording to that effect, have a contractual 
duty to defend. 
432 Brice v Wackerbarth 276.  
433 Ibid 277. 
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decide on the way forward. The court further held that the insurer ‘is perfectly entitled 
not to take over the conduct of the defence of the claim but to leave the assured to 
themselves to fight the [third-party] plaintiff’s case’.434 The liability insurer, therefore, 
does not have a legal duty to conduct the defence, but it may have a contractual duty – 
although that seems unlikely.435 
It is common practice, however, for the liability insurer to have a contractual 
right to defend the action and to settle the claim against its insured, but it does not 
appear that this right exists without a contractual provision specifically providing for 
it.436  
A clause that ‘the insurer may take over and conduct the defence and settlement 
of any claim and have the right to use [the insured’s] name for this purpose’ almost 
invariably appears in English liability insurance policies.437 Such a clause does not 
give the insured a right to be defended, and neither does it place any duty on the 
insurer to defend the insured. In short, the clause does not provide a basis on which to 
compel the liability insurer to take over the insured’s defence if it chooses not to do 
so.438 However, the liability insurer will generally exercise this right to assist the 
insured in its defence against the third-party claim and to protect itself (the insurer) 
against the insured defendant’s claim for indemnity.439 
In Brice v Wackerbarth,440 the court stated that ‘[i]t is everyday practice in third 
party proceedings for the third party [in casu, the insurer] to support the defendant in 
his defence, but to protect himself against the defendant’s claim for indemnity’. The 
conduct of the defence by the insurer is done in the name of the insured. 441 
It should be noted that some English textbooks discuss an insurer’s right to 
defend the action against the insured defendant under headings such as ‘duty to 
                                                 
434 Ibid. 
435 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.074 confirms that the ‘insurer’s rights and duties in respect of 
defending the assured depend entirely upon the wording of the policy’, and then mentions the 
possibility that insurers may be under a duty to defend, or alternatively have a discretion to defend. 
436 See para 4.3.1.2 below on settlements by the insurer. See also John Wyeth & Brothers Ltd v Cigna 
Insurance Co of Europe SA-NV & ORS [2001] Lloyd’s Rep IR 420 (CA (Civ Div)), 2001 WL 239739 
paras 32ff on the possible contractual position. 
437 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.2. It is usually combined with a ‘no-admissions’ clause, as 
to which, see para 4.3.1.2 below. 
438 See para 4.3.1.1(e) on waiver below. 
439 As explained in para 4.2.4 above, liability insurers cannot make use of their ordinary rights of 
subrogation to contest the insured’s liability as against a third party, unless they first pay the insured 
the full amount of its estimated loss. They therefore reserve a contractual right to conduct the defence 
and settlement.  
440 At 276.  
441 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.074. 
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defend’442 or ‘control of proceedings – duty to defend’.443 These headings may be 
misleading as the liability insurer’s contractual right to defend the action, and the 
clause providing for it, do not as a rule impose a duty to defend on the insurer or give 
the insured a right to be defended by the liability insurer.  
However, an insurer which exercises either its contractual right to defend the 
insured, or has a contractual duty to defend the insured against liability claims, incurs 
a number of consequential duties against its insured. These duties are discussed 
briefly below.444  
 
4.3.1.1(a)  When the Right Arises445 
The triggers for indemnity cover under a liability policy 446  and for the 
contractual duty to defend the insured, if any, generally overlap in practice and 
require a notice of some kind to the insurer to activate the triggers. It is often disputed 
whether the insured has notified the insurer of the occurrence or of the third party’s 
claim against it. In the end it depends largely on the interpretation of the terms in the 
policy as to what exactly the insured had to notify the insurers of and when this had to 
happen.447  
Unless the contract provides otherwise, a contractual duty to defend is not 
limited to the amount of liability cover. Again, an insurer’s duty to indemnify is 
limited to the lesser amount of either its legal liability towards the third party, or of 
the sum insured.  
It has not been determined finally whether English law requires a real 
possibility of liability to trigger the contractual duty to defend. However, 
commentators contend that the courts will look behind the form and face of the claim 
by the third-party plaintiff against the insured and undertake a limited inquiry as to its 
substance.448 If the insurer is in breach of a duty to defend, it is liable for any loss 
suffered by the insured as a result of that breach.449 
 
                                                 
442 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E (my emphasis). 
443 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 386-397 para 20.2.2 (my emphasis). 
444 See para 4.3.1.1ff below. 
445 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E. 
446 For example, an occurrence in an occurrence-based policy or a claim in a claims-made policy. See 
the discussion in para 4.2.2.2 above; and see also Clarke ibid 17.4C-17.4D.  
447 See, eg, Kidsons v Lloyd’s Underwriters above.  
448 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E. 
449 Ibid para 17.4E6. 
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4.3.1.1(b)  The Scope and Extent of the Right450 
The defence must be conducted properly whether the liability insurer defends 
the insured by choice or by duty. If the insurer does not conduct the defence properly, 
it may be liable to the insured for breach of contract for improper settlement 
negotiations and/or defence. As it is the insurer that appoints legal representative(s) to 
conduct the defence, the insured’s ability to influence the defence counsel and its 
strategies are greatly reduced.  
One of the duties incurred by a liability insurer which conducts the insured’s 
defence is that it must ensure that its defence tactics take into account not only its own 
interests, but also those of the insured. In Groom v Crocker,451 the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that the insurers could decide what tactics to pursue provided that ‘they do 
so in what they bona fide consider to be the common interest of themselves and the 
insured’.452 The insured may insist on a solicitor of its own choice should it face 
criminal prosecution in addition to civil liability,453 or if there is a conflict of interest 
between the insured and the insurer.454 
 
4.3.1.1(c)  Defence Costs455 
As a rule, liability insurance covers the costs of the insured’s defence of the 
claim. The extent of that cover is a matter of interpretation of the contract. 456A 
common clause on defence costs in liability policies provides indemnity for ‘all costs 
and expenses of litigation recovered by any claimant from the insured’; and for ‘all 
costs and expenses of litigation incurred with the written consent of the insurer’.457 
                                                 
450 Ibid paras 17.4E1 and 17.4F and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.2.1. For further detail, see 
also Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.079-21.081 and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.042, 
30.043 and 30.050.  
451 [1939] 1 KB 194 at 203 (CA). 
452 See also the duties of the solicitor to the insured para 4.3.1.2 below. 
453 Barratt Bros (Taxis) Ltd v Davies [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (CA (Civ Div)), [1996] 1 WLR 1334, 
1340. 
454 See also para 4.3.1.1(d) below on conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer. 
455 See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 9.1.1 and 9.2.1. 
456 For examples on how English courts interpreted defence costs and surrounding issues in liability 
policies, see Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E3; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 
21.084-21.092 and Colinvaux Supplement 124 ad para 21.091; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 
30.051-30.059.  
457 Alternatively, the insurer may conduct the insured’s defence. 
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The limit on costs may be very complex or it may be layered and shared 
vertically between different insurers.458 In the absence of an express clause on costs, 
an insured’s costs reasonably incurred in defending the claim will be included in the 
indemnity, subject to the other terms in the policy and the rules governing mitigation.  
As to the costs of a third party, there is judicial authority that an insurer may be 
liable to pay the third parties’ costs in excess of the policy limit.459 A costs order may 
even be made directly against the liability insurers of an unsuccessful insured 
defendant under section 51(1) of the Senior Courts Act, 1981.460 The liability insurers 
may then be ordered to pay the third-party plaintiff’s costs, irrespective of the terms 
of the insurance contract or any limits thereunder. 461  Commentaries suggest that 
although a costs order is exceptional, judicial decisions appear to suggest that ‘it is 
easier to justify a costs order against liability insurers than in other contexts’.462 
 
4.3.1.1(d)  Conflict of Interest 463 
As we have seen, an insured may insist on its own legal representative if a 
conflict of interest exists between it and its liability insurer. A conflict of interest may 
arise, for example, where there is a possibility of a judgment in excess of the policy 
limits, or where it is uncertain whether there is liability cover at all.  
 
4.3.1.1(d)(i)  Possible Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits464 
The insured may prefer a settlement with the third party where there is a 
possibility of a judgment against it in excess of the policy limits, while the liability 
insurer has nothing to lose if the matter is litigated to its conclusion and liability is 
imposed in the excess of the policy limits. A liability insurer, therefore, has a duty to 
consider third-party settlement offers in good faith. In English law there is a perceived 
duty to settle. This duty developed due to the pressure that the rules of civil procedure 
placed on parties to settle before a matter goes to court. Cooperation between parties 
                                                 
458 See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.1.1 for examples and more detail. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Chapter 54. The Act was previously known as the ‘Supreme Courts Act’. 
461 MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.056. 
462 See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.105 and Colinvaux Supplement 125 ad para 21.105 for 
further detail. 
463 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E4 and Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 396-398 
para 20.2.2. For further detail, see Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 21.079-21.081 and Clarke Law 
of Liability Insurance para 9.2.1. 
464 Ibid. 
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is encouraged, for example, by low-cost awards against claimants, and penalties on 
parties who litigate when a compromise could have been achieved.  
Insurance policies often authorise the liability insurer to settle third-party claims 
without obtaining the insured’s permission. However, even then the insurer should 
take the interests of the insured into account when settling such claims. 465  For 
example, insurers should not unjustifiably admit liability, settle beyond the policy 
limits, or refuse a settlement offer by the third party within those limits. There is as 
yet no English authority on the position should a liability insurer refuse a settlement 
offer by the third party within the policy limits, and the third party then recovers more 
than the sum insured against the insured in subsequent litigation. The insurer may be 
liable for the entire judgment obtained against the insured and thus also for the portion 
of the amount in excess of the sum insured.466  
There is a mutual duty of utmost good faith between the insured and the 
insurer.467 For its part the insured should, for example, cooperate with the liability 
insurer in the conduct of the defence and settlement. Further, it should not prejudice 
the insurer’s rights against the third party – eg, its right to subrogation – by colluding 
with the third party.  
 
4.3.1.1(d)(ii)  Cover is Uncertain468 
It is uncertain whether a conflict arises between the insured and the insurer 
when the liability insurer questions whether liability of the insured towards the third 
party is within the scope of the policy (so that there is a potential conflict), or when 
the insurer in fact disputes that the insured’s liability is covered by the insurance 
policy (so that there is actual conflict). In English law the liability insurer’s legal 
representative must inform both the insurer and the insured as soon as evidence 
emerges that may provide the insurer with a ground for denying liability on the 
policy. This enables the insured to appoint its own legal representative to defend the 
third-party claim on its behalf should it wish to do so.  
  
                                                 
465 See also para 4.3.1.2 below on the settlement of claims. 
466 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 396-398 para 20.2.2. 
467 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E4. Note again the statutory reform of this duty as 
discussed in para 4.1.2 above. 
468 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E4 and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.2.1. 
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4.3.1.1(d)(iii)  Legal Expenses Insurance469   
Legal expense insurance may give rise to conflict of interest in the context of 
liability insurance.470 Where an insured’s liability insurer is also its legal protection 
insurer, whether in a comprehensive policy or under two different policies, a conflict 
of interests may arise between the insured and the insurer. On the one hand, the 
lawyer employed by the insurer or the lawyer on the insurer’s panel may attempt to 
protect the insurer’s interest by, for example, minimising its fees by suggesting a 
cheaper solution such as settlement to retain the goodwill of the insurer. On the other 
hand, settlement may not be in the best interest of the insured and it may have a valid 
interest in maintaining costly litigation. 
It is undesirable that the liability insurer which, for example, refuses to conduct 
the insured’s defence, must also pay for the insured’s legal defence. Further, where 
the liability insurer of an insured (the defendant, party X) is also the legal protection 
insurer of the other party (the plaintiff, party Y) to the same dispute, it may be in the 
interest of the insurer to frustrate party Y’s action against party X. 
Such conflict of interest can be avoided by regulating the combination of 
liability insurance and legal protection insurance by a single insurer, by statute.471 
The Legal Expenses Insurance Directive has been implemented in English law 
by the Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations, 1990.472 The 
Regulations came into force on 1 July 1990 and apply to ‘legal expenses insurance 
business’ as defined in the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 (Consequential 
Amendments and Repeals) Order, 2001, 473  as the ‘effecting and carrying out of 
contracts of insurance … which insure a risk arising from legal expense’.474 Legal 
expenses insurance appears to include legal expenses ancillary to other classes of 
                                                 
469 See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4E4-17.4E5 and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance 
para 9.2.2. This section is based in part on an earlier publication. See Jacobs (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 
464-475.  
470 See paras 4.3.1.1(d)(i)-4.3.1.1(d)(iii) above for further detail on such conflict of interest. 
471 The European Community (‘EC’) adopted Directive 87/344/EEC of 22 June 1987 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative proceedings relating to legal expenses insurance 
(the ‘Legal Expenses Insurance Directive’). It was replaced by the so-called ‘Solvency II’ Directive 
2009/138EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up 
and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance. (See para 4.1.2 above). The contents of these 
directives are substantially the same when it comes to legal expenses insurance.  
472 SI 1990/1159; the ‘Legal Expenses Insurance Regulations’.  
473 SI 2001/3649.  
474 Ibid s 408(1)(4). 
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insurance (eg, the conduct of a defence by a liability insurer in a liability policy and 
legal expenses cover that may be offered in liability policies), but subject to certain 
express exceptions.475  
The Legal Expenses Insurance Regulations include the following stipulations: 
– legal expenses insurance cover must be contained in a separate policy, 
or in a separate section of, for example a liability policy, relating to 
legal expenses insurance only, and in the latter case, the policy must 
specify the nature of the cover provided;476 
– a legal expenses insurer must adopt one of three internal arrangements 
to avoid conflict of interest, one of which is that the policy must afford 
the insured the right to entrust the defence of its interests to a lawyer of 
its choice from the moment it has a claim from the insurer under the 
policy;477  
– irrespective of the arrangements above, ‘[w]here … recourse is had to a 
lawyer … to defend, represent or serve the interests of the insured in 
any inquiry or proceedings, the insured shall be free to choose that 
lawyer’; and the insured shall also have a right to choose its own 
lawyer ‘whenever a conflict of interest arises’;478 and 
– the insurer must notify the insured of its right to independent legal 
advice where a conflict of interest arises or where there is a 
disagreement over the settlement of a dispute between the insurer and 
the insured.479 
 
It is important to note that regulation 6(1) gives the insured a right to 
independent legal representation where recourse is had to a lawyer under a legal 
                                                 
475 See reg 3 of the Legal Expenses Insurance Regulations. 
476 Ibid reg 4. 
477 Ibid reg 5; see in particular reg 5(4). 
478 Ibid reg 6. However, reg 7 limits the field of application of reg 6 and it will not apply, eg, where 
neither the legal expenses insurer ‘nor the assistance insurer carries on any class of liability insurance 
business’ (reg 7 (b)), or where there are arrangements for securing that parties to a dispute that are 
insured by the same legal expenses insurer obtain legal advice and representation from completely 
independent lawyers (reg 7(c)). 
479 Ibid reg 9(1)(a). 
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expenses insurance contract, and that this right is not limited to situations of conflict 
of interest.480  
4.3.1.1(e)  Waiver by the Insurer’s Conduct of the Defence481  
The broad term ‘waiver’ may be defined as  
[T]he abandonment or relinquishment of a right or a defence which may occur as 
the result either of an election by the insurer or of the creation of an estoppel 
preluding it from relying upon [its] contractual right against the [insured].482  
English law recognises two main forms of waiver: waiver by election;483 and 
waiver by promissory estoppel.484  
On the one hand, waiver by election entails a choice by the insurer to honour the 
policy rather than to deny liability.485 If the insurer is aware of facts which create a 
legal right or of its legal right to a defence, and it acts in a way which evidences its 
decision to abandon the right, the insurer will be held to have elected not to exercise 
the right.486  
On the other hand, waiver by promissory estoppel concerns an insurer’s promise 
as to its future behaviour. 487  It entails that the insurer makes an unequivocal 
representation to the insured that it does not intend to rely on a right or defence, and 
                                                 
480 Some regard the meaning of this regulation as unclear. The judgment of the EC Court of Justice in 
Eschig v UNIQA Sachversicherung AG [2010] 1 CMLR 5 ECJ 130-214 on, inter alia, the interpretation 
of arts 3(2)(c) and 4(1) of the Legal Expenses Insurance Directive and the relationship between them, is 
of specific relevance. The EC Court of Justice in Eschig v UNIQA found that art 4(1) of the Legal 
Expenses Insurance Directive must be interpreted as not permitting a legal expenses insurer to reserve 
the right to select the legal representative of all the insured where a large number of insured suffer loss 
as a result of a single event (162). It further observed that art 4(1) of the Legal Expenses Insurance 
Directive recognises the freedom of an insured to choose its own legal representation (159). The court 
also found that the right that is granted in art 4(1)(a) is not limited to situations of conflict, but is 
restricted to ‘any inquiry or proceedings’ (160). The judgment in Eschig v UNIQA was applied in 
Brown-Quinn v Equity Syndicate Management [2012] EWCA Civ 1633, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 371 on 
reg 6 of the (English) Legal Expenses Insurance Regulations regarding the insured’s choice of 
solicitors and their remuneration. See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.2.2 for further detail. 
481 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 398-399 para 20.2.3; Clarke Law of Liability Insurance paras 9.3-
9.4, Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts paras 17.4E4 and 17.4F; Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 
21.077; and MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.044-30.049.  
482 MacGillivray on Insurance ibid para 10.099 (in the context of waiver by the insurer on breach of 
warranty or other terms by the insured). The term ‘waiver’ has been criticised as ‘vague’. See ibid. 
483 Also known as ‘waiver by affirmation’. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 8.034-8.035. 
484 Also known as ‘waiver by equitable estoppel’. See MacGillivray on Insurance para 10.100. 
485 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 10.022. 
486 MacGillivray on Insurance para 10.099. 
487 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 7.238. There are also other forms of estoppel, namely ‘estoppel 
in convention’ and ‘issue estoppel’. See ibid for further detail. 
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the insured relies on the representation to its detriment.488 The insurer, as representor, 
will then be estopped from enforcing its legal right.489  
Both of these forms of waiver require an unequivocal representation on the part 
of the insurer as waiving party. There are, however, differences between the two types 
of waiver.490 Waiver by estoppel operates in equity, whereas waiver by election is not 
based on equitable principles and does not require any detrimental reliance by the 
insured. Waiver by election requires knowledge of a right that is exercisable by the 
insurer before it can make an election; whereas knowledge by the insurer is not 
required for estoppel. Once an election is made, it is irrevocable, whereas estoppel 
may in certain instances merely suspend the exercise of a right temporarily.491 In 
Kosmar Villa Hilidays plc v Trustees of Syndiacte 1243,492  the Court of Appeal 
considered the distinction between these two types of waiver.  
Generally, a liability insurer’s conduct in defending the insured defendant 
would not constitute a waiver of a right or defence on the policy. For example, if a 
liability insurer takes control of the proceedings, it is not prevented from denying 
liability to indemnify the insured, for example, if misrepresentation, breach of 
warranty, or breach of condition by the insured is discovered only at a later stage.493 
However, if the insurer knows of a right to avoid liability, or of a defence on the 
policy, and nevertheless continues the defence of the claim in judgment or in 
settlement, the insurer may be deemed to have waived its right to avoid liability or 
raise the defence.494  
The stronger the potential defence of an insurer, the stronger the implication that 
the insurer has waived the defence by defending the insured.495  Commentators496 
suggest that a distinction must to be drawn between two situations. The one is where 
an insurer continues the conduct of the proceedings where it has a right to avoid the 
policy or terminate it based on breach of warranty or breach of condition. The other is 
                                                 
488 Ibid para 10.022. MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.048 summarises the three requirements for 
estoppel as: ‘(i) a clear representation by word or conduct of a present fact; (ii) made to someone who 
is expected to act on it; (iii) and who does so, to its detriment’.  
489 MacGillivray on Insurance para 10.100. 
490 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 7.238. 
491 MacGillivray on Insurance para 10.100. 
492 [2008] Lloyd’s Rep IR 489 (CA (Civ Div)), 2008 WL 546411.  
493 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 399 para 20.2.3. Statutory reform of the duty of disclosure and 
breach of warranty and condition may impact on the insurer’s remedies. See para 4.1.2 above. 
494MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.044. 
495 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.3. 
496 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.077 and MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.044. 
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where it has the defence that there is doubt whether the claim by the third party 
against the insured is covered by the policy regardless of any breach by the insured. In 
the former instance, the insurer may be deemed to have waived its right and may, 
therefore be liable to indemnify the insured.497 In the latter instance of a coverage 
defence, the insurer is not necessarily prevented from relying on its defence.498  
If a liability insurer is uncertain whether it is liable to indemnify an insured, it is 
advised to protect itself from the argument that, by conducting the defence, it has 
waived its right or defence. The insurer may do so by continuing to defend the claim 
by the insured under an express reservation of rights.499 This it does by reserving its 
rights either informally or formally – eg, by way of non-waiver agreements500 which 
provide that the liability insurer will defend the action while reserving its right to deny 
liability to the insured under the insurance contract at a later stage. Alternatively, the 
insurer may refuse to participate in the defence or settlement process at all and direct 
the insured to act as a ‘prudent uninsured’.501 
  
                                                 
497 MacGillivray on Insurance ibid. See also, eg, Barrett Bros v Davies above 5 for an example of a 
successful plea of waiver to (promissory) estoppel to a breach of a condition precedent. 
498 In Soole v Royal Insurance Company Ltd [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 332 (QB), the court found against 
the insurers on a different ground, but it held (obiter 339-340) that the insurers were not estopped by 
their conduct of the defence from relying on a cover defence. The court reasoned as follows: ‘[T]he 
assumption of control of the proceedings is equivocal. It does not necessarily imply a representation by 
the insurers that they regard the claim … as one which must give rise to a liability to indemnify the 
insured. It indicates no more than that it appears that it may give rise to such liability. Hence the 
insurers would not be estopped from asserting that a particular claim was, in the event, never within the 
ambit of the policy. [The insurers’] conduct would not, in those circumstances, be unequivocal, 
definite, clear and cogent so as to indicate that they regarded themselves as inevitably liable under the 
policy …’ (ibid). The reasoning in Soole was approved by the Court of Appeal in Kosmar Villa 
Holidays plc v Trustees of Syndicate 1243 above, where, in para 69, it pointed out that waiver by 
estoppel rather than election applies in cases relating to cover. The court opined that this view is, 
‘consistent moreover with the analysis in [Soole], which is to the effect that the exercise by an insurer 
of a right to conduct a claim made against his insured under a liability policy is not an election, and 
certainly not an unequivocal election, to accept liability under the policy’ (ibid). It has also been argued 
that an insured cannot be said to suffer detriment by not having the opportunity to conduct its own 
defence. See Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.077. 
499 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.077, MacGillivray on Insurance para 30.049; Clarke Law of 
Insurance Contracts para 17.4F and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 12.4. 
500 See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.4. 
501 Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.077 suggests that there does not appear to be authority on the 
meaning of the term ‘prudent uninsured’ in English law and that guidance may be sought from 
Australian law. 
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4.3.1.2  Settlement of Claims: No Admissions of Liability502 
 
Liability policies generally provide that the insurer is entitled to defend and 
settle claims against the insured. The standard clause in a liability policy provides:  
No admission of liability or offer or promise of payment, whether expressed or 
implied, shall be made [by you, the insured] without the written consent of the 
insurer, which shall at its own discretion take over and conduct in the name of the 
insured the defence503 or settlement of any claim.504 
In addition to establishing a liability insurer’s contractual right to defend and 
settle, liability insurance contracts generally provide for ‘no-admissions’ by the 
insured in their standard conditions. A ‘no-admissions’ clause,505 prohibits the insured 
from settling the claim by a third party, or from making any admission of liability to 
the latter, without the insurer’s written consent.506Although not exclusive to liability 
insurance policies, from a liability insurer’s perspective a no-admissions clause is 
essential to protect its interests and to strengthen its right to take control of the 
proceedings instituted by the third party against its insured.507  
The no-admissions clause appears to be very wide and may even entitle the 
insurer to avoid liability if the insured’s admission (such as a mere informal ‘sorry, 
it’s my mistake’) or settlement without its consent, did not in fact prejudice it. For 
example, the insurer could argue that it might have persuaded the third party to accept 
a lower settlement.508 
                                                 
502 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted: 
Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 396 para 20.2.4 and 399 para 20.2.4; Clarke Law of Insurance 
Contracts paras 17.4E1 and 17.4E4; and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.2. See also 
Colinvaux Supplement 122 ad para 21.046A. See further para 4.2.2.1(c)(i) above on settlement as a 
way to establish the insured’s legal liability to the third party, and the examples of the English judicial 
decisions discussed there. 
503 See para 4.3.1.1 above on the conduct of the defence by the insurer. 
504 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 396 para 20.2.1.  
505 Or this part of the standard condition in a liability insurance contract. 
506 Another example of a no-admissions clause that was enforced in an English judicial decision, reads 
as follows: ‘[The] Insured shall not, except at his own cost, take any steps to compromise or settle any 
claim or admit liability without specific instructions in writing from the Insurer nor give any 
information or assistance to any person claiming against him, but the Insurer shall … [have] the 
absolute conduct and control of all proceedings’. See Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.2.1. 
507 As discussed in paras 4.2.2.2(b)(i), 4.2.2.2(b)(ii) and 4.2.2.4 above, liability policies also require the 
insured to notify the insurer of any occurrence and claims. An insured should also furnish the insurer 
with any relevant documentation. The liability insured should further adhere to these duties in the 
context of the defence and settlement of the third-party claim against it. 
508 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 399 para 20.2.4. The position may well have changed after the 
introduction of the Consumer Rights Act. See below in this paragraph. 
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However, the importance of the need for a definition of ‘admission’ has been 
emphasised repeatedly. Some commentators are of view that ‘an admission must 
concern “the truth of the whole or any part of another person’s case”, and generally an 
apology, an expression of regret and (probably) an admission of fault are not 
admissions of liability’.509 Whereas some sources do not doubt the validity of a no-
admissions clause,510 others contend that courts may construe a no-admission clause 
as contra proferentem.511 
In the interim, it is uncertain whether the insurer is still entitled to rely on a no-
admissions clause if it elects not to conduct the insured’s defence against the third-
party plaintiff. If the insurer further refuses to consent to a settlement between the 
insured and the third party, the matter between the insured and the third party would 
have to be litigated if the insured hopes to recover from its liability policy. The 
question is whether the insured could argue that by refusing to conduct its defence, 
the insurer forfeits its right to rely on the no-admissions clause which prohibits 
settlement without its consent. These issues have not yet been considered by the 
English courts.512 
It should again be emphasised that the liability insurer must exercise its rights 
under the policy with due regard to the interests of the insured. The insurer does not 
have arbitrary power to withhold its consent to a settlement between the insured and 
the third party.513 The insurer must make a reasonable estimate of the potential of 
success of the third party’s claim. If the third party has a very good chance of 
succeeding in its claim, the insurer should agree to a settlement within the policy 
limits.514 By contrast, if it seems unlikely that the third party’s claim will succeed, the 
insurer is justified in refusing a settlement.  
                                                 
509 Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 11.4.2.2. 
510 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 399 para 20.2.4. 
511 For example, if the admission was made in the heat of the moment concerning an accident. 
512 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 399-400 para 20.2.5. However, the author supports judicial 
decisions under Australian law. 
513 See para 4.3.1.1(d)(i) above on conflict of interest in the face of a possible judgment in excess of 
policy limits, where the liability insurer’s perceived duty to settle third-party claims against the liability 
insured has already been discussed. 
514 The question is whether a liability insurer that refuses a settlement falling within the policy limits 
between the insured and the third party, is liable to the insured for the whole amount if the third party 
recovers more than the sum insured from the insured in litigation. The matter does not yet appear to 
have been considered by the English courts. See Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 399 para 20.2.2.  
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Some authors also opine that a clause like the ‘no-admissions’ clause that gives 
the liability insurer absolute control over the conduct of the insured’s actions, may in 
future be found unfair under the Consumer Rights Act of 2015.515 
 
4.3.2  The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff516 
Apart from the possibility created by the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) 
Acts, 1930 and 2010,517 there may be two exceptional instances in which a legal 
relationship between the third party and the insured’s liability insurer may arise.  
First, some authors suggest that there is a possibility that a fiduciary relationship 
may arise between the third party and the insured’s liability insurer. However, the 
position is not clear. In practice, the liability insurer generally negotiates directly with 
the third party on behalf of the insured defendant. Liability insurers attempt to limit 
their liability as far as possible in such settlement negotiations. The insurer may, for 
instance, pressure the third party, to the latter’s detriment, to accept a settlement far 
below the amount to which it is legally entitled. It is argued that a settlement between 
the insurer as agent for the insured and the third party518 in such circumstances, may 
be voidable on the grounds of undue influence or misrepresentation, unless the insurer 
has informed the third party to seek independent legal advice or has made a realistic 
offer in respect of the third party’s loss. 519  
In Horry v Tate & Kyle Refineries Ltd,520 the court held that the relationship of 
confidence between the insurer and the third-party plaintiff imposed a duty of 
fiduciary care on the insurer. 521  The insurer breached that duty by making a 
misrepresentation which induced the third-party plaintiff to enter into a settlement and 
the insurer was not permitted to rely on the settlement.522 An inequality in bargaining 
                                                 
515 Birds ibid 396 para 20.2.1 n 57. See para 4.1.2 above and Birds ibid 110-111 para 6.1 on the 
Consumer Rights Act. 
516 In writing this section, the following general works on the English insurance law were consulted 
Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E; Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 403 para 20.4; 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance para 21.102-21.106 and Colinvaux Supplement 125 ad para 21.105; 
MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.056-30.057; and Clarke Law of Liability Insurance para 9.1.1. 
517 See the discussion of these Acts in paras 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.3.3 above. 
518 The settlement itself is between the third-party plaintiff and the insured. 
519 Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 403 para 20.4.  
520 [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 416 (QBD).  
521 Ibid 421. 
522 Ibid 422-423. 
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power existed between the insurer, acting on behalf of the insured, and the third-party 
plaintiff.523 
The possible tactics that may be used by the third party should not be 
disregarded in this instance. For example, a third party, aware that it will not recover 
damages from the insured unless the liability insurer pays the latter’s liability claim, 
may tailor its claim to fit the terms of the liability cover (eg, cover for negligence), 
and may omit any references to excluded conduct on the part of the insured (eg, 
intentional and/or criminal acts).  
Second, under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act, 1981, a third party’s costs 
may in exceptional circumstances and in the absolute discretion of the court, be 
awarded against the insurer, even if it is not a party to the proceedings.524 Although 
the insurer conducts the defence on behalf of the insured, it is conducted in the 
insured’s name. 
In TGC Chapman Ltd v Christopher,525 the Court of Appeal held that all of the 
following five conditions had to be satisfied for a costs order to be made against the 
insurer: the insurer must have decided to defend the claim; it must have funded the 
defence of the claim; it must have conducted the litigation or controlled it; it must 
have defended the claim exclusively to protect its owns interests; and the defence 
must have failed in its entirety. A sixth requirement – that the claim would not have 
been defended but for the intervention of the insurers – appears also to be required by 
English courts. The conditions for a cost order will not be satisfied lightly and such an 
order against insurers is exceptional. However, it appears that it is easier to justify a 
cost order against liability insurers than in other cases.526 
 
  
                                                 
523  This view as to the effect of the insurer’s conduct on the validity of the settlement may be 
questionable, as the settlement is between the third party and the insured (not the insurer). 
524 See para 4.3.1.1(c) above. 
525 [1998] 1 WLR 12 (CA (Civ Div)).  
526 Ibid.  
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4.3.3  The Legal Relationship between the Insured Defendant and the 
Liability Insurer’s Legal Representatives 
 
4.3.3.1 Conduct of the Defence and Settlement527 
The insurer’s solicitor owes a duty of care to the insured. In Groom v Crocker528 
the court held that the solicitor was not entitled to admit negligence on the part of the 
insured when the insured itself denied it. The court held: 
The duty of the solicitor so nominated [by the insurer] to the insured for whom he is 
to act cannot of course be the same as that which arises in the ordinary case of a 
solicitor and client, where the client is entitled to require the solicitor to act 
according to his own instructions. The whole object and usefulness of these 
provisions would be defeated if the insured were to be entitled to interfere with the 
conduct of the proceedings in that way. The insured in my opinion is not entitled to 
complain of anything done by the solicitors upon the instructions, express or 
implied, of the insurers, provided that it falls within the class of things which the 
insurers are … entitled to do under the terms of the policy. 
 
4.3.3.2  The Legal Representative of the Insured Defendant’s Duty to furnish 
the Liability Insured with Information529 
 
The solicitor appointed by the insurer must also keep the insured informed as is 
reasonably necessary.530  For example, it must inform the insured of any possible 
conflict of interest531 between the insured and the insurer.532 On request, the solicitor 
must also give the insured all the documents relating to the action in its possession, 
either during or after the action by the third-party plaintiff.533  
 
4.3.4  The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff’s Insurers: Litigating against each other in 
the Names of their Insured 
 
It may happen that the insured’s liability insurer and the third party’s property 
insurer litigate against each other in the names of their respective insured: the 
property insurer by enforcing the third party’s claim in the exercise of its right of 
                                                 
527 Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E1. 
528 At 202-203. 
529 See Clarke Law of Insurance Contracts para 17.4E2 and Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance paras 
21.074-21.075 and 21.081; MacGillivray on Insurance paras 30.042, 30.043 and 30.050; and Clarke 
Law of Liability Insurance para 9.2.  
530 Groom v Crocker above 222. 
531 Ibid 227. 
532 As to conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer, see para 4.3.1.1(d) above. 
533 Re Crocker & In Re Taxation of Costs [1936] Ch 696, 702. Cf, the decision by the Court of Appeal 
in Alistair Graham John Brown v Guardian Royal Assurance Plc [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325 (CA 
(Civ)), 1994 WL 1062352 in regard to privilege of documents.  
 217 
subrogation, 534  and the liability insurer by defending the third party’s claim. 535 
However, no contract or legal relationship exists between the respective insurers. 
 
4.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS536 
In the first instance, the sources of English insurance law are the common law, 
judicial decisions, legislation, equity, and trade usages. Liability insurance is a 
specialised branch of insurance law and the law of liability insurance is found in these 
same sources. Recent statutory reforms – eg, by way of the 2012 Act, the 2015 Act, 
and the Consumer Rights Act of 2015 – must be taken into account insofar as they 
relate to liability insurance contracts. Despite the increasing importance of legislation, 
like South African law, English law is an uncodified system that consists of subsidiary 
common-law rules. 
Secondly, as to the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured, English 
insurance law is complex but rich in precedent on the extent of an insured’s legal 
liability to the third-party and to establish legal liability. Legal liability so established, 
is the insured’s loss under the policy. The liability insurer becomes liable to the 
insured only when the latter’s liability towards the third-party plaintiff has been 
established (by way of judgment, arbitral award, or settlement). The time at which the 
liability insurer becomes liable to indemnify the insured is rather late in the judicial 
process. There are also a number of judicial decisions and legal doctrine on how the 
insured defendant’s liability towards third-party plaintiffs should be proved under 
English law. 
However, as to the duration of liability cover, the event that brings the case 
within the scope of a specific liability policy depends on the type of liability policy 
involved. In English law, professional liability policies are usually written on a 
claims-made basis, whereas public liability policies in general are written as 
occurrence-based policies. The latter type of policy is found less frequently 
                                                 
534  In contrast, see para 4.2.4 above on the liability insurer’s right to subrogation in exceptional 
circumstances. Different scenarios may arise but further detail falls beyond the scope of this study.  
535 See para 4.3.1 above on the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer. See, eg, RSA Insurance 
Plc v Assicurazione Generali SpA [2018] EWHC 1237 (QB) where it was held that insurers have two 
years (not six) to bring contribution claims against other insurers in mesothelioma cases. 
536 This para 4.4 is a concise summative conclusion of the survey conducted on selected aspects of the 
law of liability insurance under English law. English law may assist in the development of the law of 
liability insurance in South African law, but the conclusions and recommendations reached in Chapter 
6 go beyond those of para 4.4. Some parts of the law were reviewed to provide a complete overview of 
the law of liability insurance under English law, but it may not provide an appropriate solution for 
South African law in all instances. 
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nowadays. A number of English decisions have interpreted insuring aggregations and 
event limits in these policies. The duration of cover in a liability policy generally 
depends on the interpretation of the contract and on the context. Hybrid forms of 
policy have developed to address gaps in liability cover. The limitation of the action 
of an insured against its liability insurer may start to run from the date of 
establishment of the insured’s legal liability towards the third party, provided that the 
event has occurred to bring the case within the scope of the policy.  
Although an insured under a liability policy is subject to some of the same 
exclusions and limitations as an insured under other types of policy, the exclusion of 
contractual liability for performance voluntarily assumed by the insured, and for 
misconduct by the insured is particularly relevant in liability insurance. Under a 
liability policy, the insured also shares many of the usual duties of an insured towards 
an insurer. However, the insured’s notification obligations and its duty of disclosure 
have been emphasised in the case of liability policies – particularly in claims-made 
policies. Some authors suggest that conditions which impose unreasonable time limits 
on the insured may in future be regarded as unfair under the Consumer Rights Act. 
Liability insurance gives rise to a multitude of legal relationships, but a third 
party does not generally have a right to claim directly against the liability insurer 
under common law. The 1930 Act introduced a direct right to claim for the third party 
against the liability insurer in the event of the insolvency of the insured. The 
complexity and shortcomings of the 1930 Act have been widely criticised, and the Act 
has been replaced by the 2010 Act. The 2010 Act also contains detailed provisions on 
the limitation of the third-party claim against the insured, but not all the limitation 
issues that arose under the 1930 Act have been resolved – eg, the limitation period for 
the third-party plaintiff’s cause of action against the liability insured remains 
uncertain. 
Thirdly, liability policies generally provide that the liability insurer has the right 
to defend and settle claims by third parties against the insured. The insurer and its 
legal representatives, should have due regard for the insured’s interests in the exercise 
of these rights. The duty of utmost good faith is mutual and the insured should 
cooperate with the insurer in its defence and settlement of the claim. However, this 
duty has been tailored by recent statutory reform. The liability insurer’s conduct in 
defending or settling would not generally prevent it from denying liability to 
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indemnify the insured defendant, but to protect itself, it should defend under an 
express reservation of its rights.  
Liability insurance policies usually contain ‘no-admissions’ clauses. A moot 
issue that have not been addressed by English courts, is whether the insured may 
argue that by refusing to conduct its defence, the insurer has forfeited its right to rely 
on a no-admissions clause. Some authors also opine that a clause such as the no-
admissions clause which allows the liability insurer absolute control over the conduct 
of the insured’s actions, may in future be found to be unfair under the Consumer 
Rights Act. 
Liability insurance generally covers an insured’s defence costs, or alternatively, 
the insurer will conduct the defence on its behalf at its own expense. However, 
conflict of interest often arise and the Legal Expenses Insurance Directive was 
implemented in English law by the Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) 
Regulations, 1990, to address such conflict. Although the Legal Expenses Insurance 
Directive was replaced by the ‘Solvency II’ Directive, the contents of these directives 
is substantially unchanged when it comes to legal expenses insurance. 
There may be exceptional instances of a legal relationship between a liability 
insurer and the third party. A costs order for the third party’s costs against the liability 
insurer under section 51 of the Senior Courts Act, 1981 serves as an example.  
Lastly, English law enjoys strong persuasive authority in South African courts 
on matters pertaining to insurance contracts and insurance law.537 Both are common-
law legal systems. South African insurance practice largely follows the English 
insurance law practice, which is more advanced in the area of liability insurance than 
ours (eg, policy wording). Because of its more dedicated statutory law, such as the 
2010 Act, English law is more advanced than South African law in the area of liability 
insurance. The impact of the Consumer Rights Act on the law of liability insurance 
contracts may be significant. However, an uncritical adaption of English law in 
respect of South African liability insurance law may not only be incorrect, but also 
prove detrimental to the development of South African law.538 
                                                 
537 See Chapter 6 for further detail. 
538 For further detail, see Chapter 6 on the South African law of liability insurance and the conclusions 
and recommendations there. 
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This chapter has analysed the relevant principles of the law liability insurance 
under English law, an uncodified or common-law system. In the following chapter, 
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 BELGIAN LAW 
 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION1  
Belgian law is a codified or civil-law legal system.2 Legislation in the form of 
codes primarily regulates Belgian insurance law. Although the main source of Belgian 
insurance contract law is legislation, judicial decisions are another important source.3 
Liability insurance is a specialised branch of insurance law and the law of liability 
insurance is found in these same sources. The law of the European Union4 has some 
impact on Belgian insurance law. 
 
5.1.1 The General Law of Contract, Insurance Law, and the Law of 
Liability Insurance 
Liability insurance (‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’) contracts are subject to the 
general principles of the Belgian law of contract (‘verbintenissenrecht’),5 save in so 
                                                 
1 In writing this section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 340-364; 693; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht 
(2 ed) paras 74-77; 80-82; 85-133 and 665-671; Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 
para 1.1.2 at 8-9; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ para 1 at 73-74; and Jocqué (2014-
2015) 13 Rechtskundig Weekblad 483-496. Also see Bouckaert & Van Hoeke Inleiding tot het recht 
451-51; and Ballon et al Economisch Recht 21-39 as to the sources of Belgian law generally.  
2 In Belgium, there are no subsidiary ‘common-law’ rules like those in uncodified systems such as 
South African and English law. See paras 3.1 and 4.1 above on the subsidiary common law as source of 
insurance law in those legal systems.  
3  A few comments are necessary on customary law (‘gewoonterecht’); general legal principles 
(‘algemene rechtsbeginselen’); and legal doctrine (‘rechtsleer’) as sources of Belgian law in general. 
First, customary law refers to the established customs that a society considers as binding legal rules 
based on tradition. See Bouckaert & Van Hoeke Inleiding tot het recht 50 and Ballon et al Economisch 
Recht 22. Although these customs are not contained in legislation, they are regarded as having the same 
force as legislation. Belgian commercial law still relies on some customs, but today the practical 
relevance of customary law in Belgian law is limited. Customary law is not directly relevant as a 
source of the general principles of Belgian liability insurance law and a further discussion is not 
required in this thesis. Second, general legal principles, such as the principle of good faith and the non-
retrospective nature of legislation, may also be regarded as a source of Belgian law. See Bouckaert & 
Van Hoeke ibid 51 and Ballon et al Economisch Recht 22. Judicial decisions have accepted their 
existence in recent decades and have formulated and applied them to supplement legislation. Although 
the principle of good faith is, eg, indeed the basis for many substantive provisions of insurance 
contract law, general legal principles as a rule concern the contemporary legal order and are primarily 
important in the domain of administrative law. See para 5.3.1.1(e) below for the principle of good faith 
in the context of the conduct of the defence by a liability insurer. Further detail falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. Third, legal doctrine includes articles, books and commentaries by legal writers. 
Although not a binding source of law, legal doctrine may influence judicial decisions or result in 
legislation (legislative change) and it may therefore be a recognised (but indirect) source of law. 
4 The ‘EU’. 
5 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 115 explains this as follows: ‘De verzekeringsovereenkomst 
is, zoals elk contract, onderworpen aan de algemene beginselen van het verbintenissenrecht, waarop 
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far as liability insurance contract law provides for a specific principle. 6  Belgian 
private law is codified in the Belgian Civil Code. 7  The Code contains general 




It is important to provide some background to the legislative landscape10 of 
Belgian insurance contract law with emphasis on the general principles of liability 
insurance. The following discussion distinguishes between three periods and addresses 
‘landver-zekeringen’11 and ‘zeeverzekeringen’12 in each instance.13 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
voortdurend beroept word gedaan: vorming van het contract, wilsgebreken, verbintenissen van de 
partijen, sancties in geval van wanuitvoering, mechanisme van het beding ten gunste van een derde, 
overdracht der verbintenissen, enz’. 
6 Insurance law does provide original solutions that deviate from the general principles of the law of 
contract in some instances. Fontaine ibid therefore cautions as follows: ‘Nochtans dient de aandacht 
gevestigd te worden op de originele oplossingen die het verzekeringsrecht op tal van punten levert’.  
7  ‘Burgerlijk Wetboek’ (hereafter the ‘Civil Code’). The Civil Code came into effect in 1804. 
Vandeputte ‘Inleiding tot het verzekeringsrecht’ 45 explains as follows: ‘Globaal blijft nochtans het 
verzekeringscontract onderworpen aan de fundamentele beginselen van het contractenrecht van het 
Burgerlijk Wetboek’. Article 1964 of the Civil Code, eg, refers to insurance as an aleatory contract. See 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 113.  
8 The term ‘gemeen recht’ bears a distinctive meaning in Belgian law which cannot be equated to the 
term ‘common law’ in common-law legal systems. In the present context, ‘gemeen recht’ generally 
refers to the basic principles of Belgian private law that are common to (insurance) contracts and are 
contained in the Civil Code, as opposed to principles enunciated in other specific legislation. See 
Fontaine paras 174-199 and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 
47 for further detail on the ‘gemeen recht’ of Belgian contract law with particular focus on insurance 
contract law. 
9 See also para 5.1.2.4 below. Relevant terminology from Belgian law are translated and/or explained 
in the course of this chapter. As to translation in general: the term ‘overeenkomst’ means a ‘contract’; 
and the term ‘overeenkomsten’ refers to ‘contracts’. Further, the term ‘verzekeringen’ means 
‘insurance’; and the term ‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen’ refers to ‘liability insurance’.  
10 See the summative table on the legislative landscape in para 5.1.2.4 below. 
11 Generally: ‘non-marine insurance’ in layman’s terms. However, the term ‘landverzekeringen’ bears a 
distinct meaning in Belgian law and cannot be equated to the term ‘non-marine insurance’ in other 
legal systems. For legal certainty, the Dutch term is used in this chapter. See paras 5.1.2.1-5.1.2.4 
below for further detail. 
12 Generally: ‘marine insurance’ in layman’s terms. However, the term ‘zeeverzekeringen’ bears a 
distinct meaning in Belgian law and cannot be equated to the term ‘marine insurance’ in other legal 
systems. For legal certainty, the Dutch term is used is issued in this chapter. See paras 5.1.2.1-5.1.2.4 
below for further detail. 
13 Apart from the distinction between ‘landverzekeringen’ and ‘zeeverzekeringen’, some of the other 
relevant classifications of insurance in Belgian law are discussed in this chapter. See Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 71-84 and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) in paras 41-52 for further detail on the most important classifications of 
insurance (‘voornaamste indelingen van de verzekeringen’). 
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5.1.2.1 Late Nineteenth Century 
By the late nineteenth century, Belgian insurance contract law was codified14 in 
the Insurance Act of 11 June 187415  which dealt with insurance contract law in 
general, 16  including ‘landverzekeringen’ and ‘zeeverzekering’, as well as certain 
specific classes of ‘landverzekeringen’.17 The Insurance Act of 1874 was regarded as 
impressive at the time of its enactment, as it was among the first pieces of legislation 
to codify some of the general principles of insurance contract law. 18  Liability 
insurance had not yet fully evolved and the Act did not address it directly,19 save for 
the liability insurance cover of a tenant.20 
As far as ‘zeeverzekering’21  was concerned, the Act of 21 August 1879 on 
Marine and Inland Waterways,22 replaced the original text of the Commercial Code of 
1810 which had previously regulated the position. The Act of 1879 was extended23 to 
                                                 
14 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 341. 
15 ‘Wet van 11 juni 1874 betreffende de verzekeringen’, or, briefly, ‘De Verzekeringswet’, Belgian 
State Gazette (‘Belgisch Staatsblad’) of 14 Jun 1874. This Act was included in the Commercial Code 
as Titles X and XI in Book I of the Commercial Code (hereafter the ‘Insurance Act of 1874’).  
16 Insurance Act of 1874, ‘Titel X. Verzekering in het algemeen’ (hereafter ‘Title X of the Insurance 
Act of 1874’). It comprises ss 1-32.  
17 Insurance Act of 1874, ‘Titel XI. Enige [land]verzekeringen in het bijzonder’ (hereafter ‘Title XI of 
the Insurance Act of 1874’). The part on specific classes of ‘landverzekeringen’ was dealt with in arts 
33-43.  
18 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht para 87. Under Belgian law there were no codified (legislated) general 
principles of insurance contract law prior to the Insurance Act of 1874.  
19 Fontaine ibid para 665 explains this and provides that, ‘de oude wet [the Insurance Act of 1874] 
slechts vage toespelingen op de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering bevatte’ and that ‘[d]eze verzekeringen 
… nog zeer weinig ontwikkeld waren op het einde van de XIXe eeuw’. Vandeputte ‘Inleiding tot het 
verzekeringsrecht’ 134 explains further: ‘De aansprakelijkheidsverzekering is, zoals de 
zakenverzekering, een schadeverzekering. … Verschillende regelingen die gelden voor de 
zakenverzekering zijn ook toepasselijk op die aansprakelijkheidsverzekering … . De wet van 11 Juni 
1874 [The Insurance Act of 1874] handelt niet uitdrukkelijk over de verbintenis van de verzekeraar in 
de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering. Deze leemte wordt in ‘n zekere mate goedgemaakt door het feit dat 
voor de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering menigmaal in aanmerking komt wat de wet voor de 
zakenverzekering heeft bepaald.’ 
20 Title XI of the Insurance Act of 1874. The part on the liability insurance of a tenant was dealt with in 
ss 37-38. See also see, Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 341. 
21 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 74 explains that, ‘zeeverzekeringen’ pertain to ‘de dekking 
van de risico’s die eigen zijn aan zeevaart (schipbreuk, storm, stranding, aanvaring …), in de mate 
waarin deze de schepen treffen … of de goederen …of sommige ander materiële belangen; het recht 
van de zeeverzekering is niet toepasselijk op de schadegevallen die personen treffen (lichamelijke 
ongevallen, overlijden).’  
22 ‘Wet van 21 augustus van 1879 op de zee-en binnenvaart’, Belgian State Gazette of 4 Sept 1879. 
This Act was included in the Commercial Code as ‘Titel VI Zeeverzekering’ (Marine insurance) in 
Book II of the Commercial Code (hereafter the ‘Act of 1879’). Title VI comprises arts 191-250. The 
Act of 1879 still exists and is still applied. 
23 By the Act of 10 February of 1908, Belgian State Gazette of 25 Sept 1908. This Act was inserted as 
‘Titel X Binnenschepen’ (Inland waterways) in Book II of the Commercial Code. Title X comprises of 
articles 271, 276 and 277. Article 277 provides that the provisions of Title VI regarding 
‘zeeverzekering’ apply equally to the insurance of inland waterways.  
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apply to ‘binnenvaartverzekering’.24 The provisions of Title X of the Insurance Act of 
1874 addressing insurance law in general – also applied to ‘zeeverzekeringen’ and to 
insurance of transport by land, river, and inland waterway, save in so far as particular 
legislation provided otherwise.25 The Act of 1879, as amended, supplemented Title X 
of the Insurance Act of 1874 with regard to ‘zeeverzekering’ and ‘binnenvaart-
verzekering’. 
This position was maintained in Belgium for more than a century.26 By the 
middle of the twentieth century, liability insurance had become an important branch 
of insurance law.27 There were several lacunae in the Insurance Act of 1874 and its 
provisions were, in the main, not mandatory. 28  The Act did not reflect legal 
developments and offered the insured inadequate protection.29 The main objective of 
the Insurance Act of 1874 was to protect the weaker party, which at the time was 
considered to be the insurer. But insurers had excessive autonomy and started 
dictating policy terms, 30  which resulted in the use of standardised policies. 31 
Commentators called for legislative reform to protect the insureds.32 
  
                                                 
24 That may be translated as ‘inland waterways’. 
25 Section 3 of the Insurance Act of 1874. 
26 See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 346 for further detail 
on the minor changes to the Insurance Act of 1874 during this period. 
27 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 87. 
28 ‘Aanvullend recht’. Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 341 
explain the non-mandatory character of the Insurance Act of 1874 as follows: ‘De 43 artikelen van de 
wet waren hoofdzakelijk suppletief en de invulling van de contractuele bepalingen werd in zeer ruime 
mate aan de wil van de partijen overgelaten’. The same criticism was levelled against the Act of 1879. 
See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 103. 
29 Fontaine ibid paras 87 and 118.  
30 Ibid. Vandeputte ‘Inleiding tot het verzekeringsrecht’ 134 argues: ‘De polissen leggen derhalve … 
vast … de schuld die de verzekeraar moet uitvoeren wanneer het in aanmerking genomen schadegeval 
… in vervulling treedt. Ook voor het toepassingsgebied van de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering doen de 
verzekeraars een niet geringe inspanning om in de polissen, precies te omschrijven wat ze dekken. 
Zulks is niet gemakkelijk en betwistingen doen zich voor in de rechtspraak.’ 
31 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 87. Although not an actual source of law, these standard 
policies influenced some branches of insurance contract law. Fontaine para 118 suggests: ‘De ontleding 
van deze gestandaardiseerde polissen openbaarde, veel meer dan deze van de wet [the Insurance Act of 
1874], het effectief en wijd verbreid toegepaste recht’. But see Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck 
Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 346 who reason that: ‘De beperkte omvang van de wet van 
1874 [the Insurance Act of 1874] heeft zijn maatschappelijke bruikbaarheid niet verhinderd. Dit was 
ongetwijfeld te danken aan de interpretatie en de verfijningen die de rechtspraak en vooral het Hof van 
Cassatie [Belgian Supreme Court] aanbrachten’. 
32 Vandeputte ‘Inleiding tot het verzekeringsrecht’ 44 states: ‘Die toestand is onaanvaardbaar. Aan de 
praktijk van de verzekeraars en aan de rechtspraak wordt, wegens deze leemte van de wetgeving, een al 
te ruime plaats toebedeeld’.  
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5.1.2.2 Since the Introduction of the Land Insurance Contract Act of 1992 
The Land Insurance Contract Act of 25 June 1992 (‘LIC Act’),33 brought long-
awaited legislative intervention in ‘landverzekeringsovereenkomsten’. 34  It made 
fundamental changes by repealing and replacing the 1874 Act in part.35 Important for 
our purposes, is that Title X of the 1874 Act no longer applied to insurance contracts 
governed by the LIC Act,36 and Part XI (on ‘landverzekeringen’) of the Insurance Act 
of 1874 was repealed.37  
The LIC Act applied to all ‘landverzekeringsovereenkomsten’ in so far as 
specific legislation did not expressly provide otherwise. 38  It did not apply to 
reinsurance or to transport insurance of goods, save for luggage insurance and 
removal insurance.39 The LIC Act devoted an entire chapter to liability insurance 
contracts.40 The Act was commended41 for its systematic structure,42 its substantial 
content,43 its more balanced protection of the insurer and the insured, and because the 
                                                 
33 ‘Wet van 25 juni 1992 op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst’ or ‘WLVO’, Belgian State Gazette of 
20 Aug 1992 (hereafter the ‘LIC Act’), read with Royal Decree (‘Koninklijk besluit’) of 24 Dec 1992 
(hereafter ‘Royal Decree of Dec 1992’). It came into effect on 1 Jan 1993: see Royal Decree of 24 Aug 
1992 and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 101. The official version of the Insurance Act of 1992 
is available in French and Dutch, which are the official languages in Belgium. An unofficial English 
version of the initial LIC Act (of 1992) is contained in [1994] 1 Commercial Laws of Europe 55-105, 
but it does not reflect subsequent amendments to the Act. Direct quotations from Dutch legislation 
have been freely translated into English by the author to make them more accessible. 
34 Note again: this term bears a distinct meaning in Belgian law and cannot be equated to the term ‘non-
marine insurance contract law’ in other legal systems. For legal certainty, the Dutch term is used in this 
chapter. See this para 5.1.2 below for further detail. See Fontaine ibid paras 85-91 and Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 342-346 for further detail on the lengthy 
history behind the drafting of the LIC Act. 
35 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 342.  
36 Section 142 of the LIC Act and amended s 3 of Title X of the Insurance Act of 1874 accordingly. 
37 Section 147 of the LIC Act.  
38 Section 2(1) of the LIC Act, as amended, provided as follows on the scope of the Act: ‘Deze wet is 
van toepassing op alle landverzekeringen voor zover er niet wordt van afgeweken door bijzondere 
wetten’. Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 7.3 explain that ‘[e]r 
wordt aangenomen dat de wetgever met de term “landverzekering”, de zeevaart- en 
binnenvaartverzekeringen van het toepassingsgebied van de WLVO [the LIC Act] heeft willen 
uitsluiten’… as ‘[d]eze verzekeringen worden beheerst door de Verzekeringswet 11 juni 1874 [Title X 
of the Insurance Act of 1874], in de mate dat er niet van afgeweken wordt door bijzondere wetten’. 
39 Section 2(1) of the LIC Act, as amended, further provided as follows on the scope of the Act: ‘Zij is 
niet van toepassing op de herverzekering noch op de verzekeringen van goederenvervoer, met 
uitzondering van de baggage- en verhuisverzekeringen’. The term ‘removal insurance’ used in practice 
refers to the insurance of goods procured by a removal company or owner of goods for damage caused 
during, for example, the move of a household from one building to another.  
40 Chapter III, Title II. It comprised ss 77-89.  
41 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 92-100.  
42 For a useful diagram on the structure of the LIC Act, see Fontaine ibid para 173. 
43 More so, when compared to the Insurance Act of 1874. 
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majority of its provisions were mandatory.44 Insurance policies under the LIC Act had 
to comply with the statutory position, or alternatively had to contain terms more 
favourable to the party protected by its provisions.45 Although several provisions in 
the LIC Act had to be revised,46 it was regarded as exemplary legislation.47 
As regards ‘zeeverzekering’ and transport insurance, the position remained 
largely unchanged after the introduction of the LIC Act.48 Title X of the Insurance Act 
of 1874 and the Act of 1879 continued to regulate ‘zeeverzekering’ as well as 
insurance of transport by land, river, and inland waterway.  
The exact demarcation between the LIC Act and the Insurance Act of 1874 
remained uncertain.49 The LIC Act governed all liability insurance contracts falling 
within its ambit, but did not apply to ‘zeeverzekeringen’, or to insurance of transport 
by land, river, and inland waterway.50 Liability insurance relating to transport – by 
sea, inland waterway, and land – continued to be governed by Title X of the Insurance 
                                                 
44 ‘Dwingende aard’. Section 3 of the LIC Act provided that its provisions were mandatory, except 
where the option to derogate from the provisions by particular (contractual) arrangement was clear 
from a provision’s actual wording. 
45 However, it is not always easy to determine which party is protected by a specific provision. See 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 96 and 119. See paras 5.2.2.1(a), 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.3(b)(ii) 
below for further discussion of issues regarding the mandatory nature (or not) of ss 8 and 78 of the LIC 
Act respectively.  
46  See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 347-349 for a 
summary of the most important amendments. The following amended sections are relevant for 
purposes of this chapter and are discussed below: s 2(1) (on the non-applicability of the LIC Act to 
reinsurance and transport insurance of goods: para 5.1.2.3 below; s 35 (on the suspension and 
interruption of the prescription period: para 5.2.2.1(d) below); s 77 (on the scope of liability insurance: 
paras 5.2.2.1 and 5.3.1.1 below); s 78 (on the liability insurer’s obligations after the expiry of the 
contract: para 5.2.2.2 below); s 82 (on the payment by the insurer of the principal sum, interest and 
costs: paras 5.2.2.3(a) and 5.3.1.1(d) below); s 86 (on the third party plaintiff’s own/direct right against 
the insurer: para 5.2.3.1 below); and s 87 (on defences, procedural objections and forfeiture: para 
5.2.3.1 below).  
47 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 348 state it to, ‘behoorde tot de koplopers op wetgevend 
gebied’.  
48 Generally: the LIC Act only applied to non-marine insurance contracts. See s 2(1), as amended. See 
also para 5.1.2.1 above for the discussion of the legislative landscape of marine insurance and this para 
5.1.2.2 below. Again note: for legal certainty, the Dutch terms are used in this chapter. 
49 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 8 para 1.1.2.1; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) 
paras 74, 103-105; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 362; and 
Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 7.3. The Belgian Supreme 
Court (‘Hof of Cassatie’), Cass, dated 16 Sept 2011 and 1 Mar 2013, eg, decided that the insurance of 
river cruises fell within the abmit of the LIC Act. See the discussion of these decisions by Schuermans 
& Van Schoubroeck ibid para 362; and in Van Schoubroeck et al ibid para 7.3. The majority of judicial 
decisions and commentators regarded insurance of transport by air (‘luchtvaartverzekeringen’) to be 
excluded from the ambit of the LIC Act. However, the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 18 Dec 
2015, decided that the insurance of air transport indeed fell within the abmit of the LIC Act, save for 
the transport of goods. See the discussion of the decision by Van Schoubroeck et al ibid para 7.3. 
Further analysis hereof falls outside the scope of this study, which focuses on the general principles 
relating to liability insurance.  
50 Section 2(1), as amended.  
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Act of 1874 (insurance law in general), save in so far as specific legislation provided 
otherwise.51 The Insurance Act of 1897 is an example of this specific legislation.52  
 
5.1.2.3 Since the Introduction of the Insurance Act of 201453 
On 4 April 2014 Belgium adopted a new Insurance Act54 which codified some 
important aspects of Belgian insurance law.55 
As regards ‘landverzekeringsovereenkomsten’, the Insurance Act of 2014 
repealed the majority of the provisions of the LIC Act.56 The Act of 2014 re-enacted 
the vast majority of those provisions in its Part 4.57 In particular, Chapter III of Title II 
                                                 
51 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 8 para 1.1.2.1. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) 
para 74 comments that ‘in de praktijk wordt het zeeverzekeringsrecht in ruime mate mutatis mutandi 
toegepas op de land-vervoerverzekeringen’. 
52 Note that the Act of 1879 still exists and is still applied. 
53 See generally regarding liability insurance, Colle Algemene beginselen (7 ed) 193-242; and Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) 568-636. 
54 ‘Wet betreffende de verzekeringen van 4 april 2014’ (‘Wet Verzekeringen’ or ‘WVerz’), Belgian 
State Gazette of 30 Apr (hereafter the ‘Insurance Act of 2014)’. The official version of the Act is only 
available in the official languages of Belgium, namely Dutch and French. As far as could be 
established, no official or unofficial English version of the Insurance Act of 2014 exists at present.  
55 Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 Rechtskundig Weekblad 483 para 1. The Insurance Act of 2014 to some 
extent combines part of the regulation of the insurance industry (as far as it concerns the competence of 
the Financial Services and Markets Authority (‘FSMA’), insurance distribution and insurance 
intermediaries) as well as insurance contract law. Further detail on insurance regulatory and 
supervision regimes falls outside the scope of this thesis. (For additional information on the regulation 
of the insurance sector prior to the coming into force of the Insurance Act of 2014, see Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 34-59 and 111. For a useful summary of insurance regulation under the 
Insurance Act of 2014, see Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 
351-356.)   
European Community (‘EC’) Directives that deal with disclosure by insurers to their 
policyholders (or insureds) have been incorporated in Belgian law by the enactment of sections 32-37 
and 281-285 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (and some provisions that were part of the statute before 
2014, namely the LIC Act). The EC provisions are of general application to all forms of insurance. The 
provisions under Belgian law, therefore, follow suit and deal with disclosures in general: they are not 
tailored to liability insurance contracts in particular and will not be discussed in detail in this thesis. 
The majority of the provisions of the Insurance Act of 2014, including the part on liability insurance, 
are mandatory and introduce measures that aim to provide protection to the insured, the insurer and 
third parties. The part on liability insurance in the Insurance Act of 2014 is detailed and a 
comprehensive analysis of that part is sufficient for purposes of this thesis. analysis of that part is 
56 Section 347(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014. For present purposes, it may be mentioned that a few 
sections of the LIC Act, namely, s 1 (containing definitions), s 2 (on its scope of application), s 3 (on 
its mandatory character), and ss 127-128 (regarding life insurance), remain in force as sections of that 
Act. See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 358.  
57 This part is entitled ‘De landverzekeringsovereenkomst’. Part 4 generally applies to all ‘landver-
zekeringsovereenkomsten’ that are subject to Belgian law in so far as specific legislation does not 
provide to the contrary. See s 54(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014. The scope of application of Part 4 of 
the Insurance Act of 2014 is, therefore, the same as that of the former LIC Act, but the lattter Act did 
not contain the provision that ‘landverzekeringsovereenkomsten’ had to be subject to Belgian law. See 
s 2(1) of the LIC Act. As under the LIC Act, Part 4 of the Insurance Act of 2014 does not apply to 
reinsurance, or to transport insurance of goods, save for luggage insurance and removal insurance. See 
s 2(1) of the LIC Act and s 54(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 respectively. Also see Van Schoubroeck 
et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 7.1. 
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of the LIC Act dealing with liability insurance contracts was repealed and re-enacted 
virtually unchanged as Chapter 358 of Title III of Part 4 of the 2014 Insurance Act.59  
Schuermans and Van Schoubroeck explain as follows: 
Door zijn codificatie blijft het acquis van die WLVO [LIC Act] doorwerken in de 
WVerz [2014 Insurance Act].60 
As explained by the commentators above, the principles of liability insurance 
contract law established under the LIC Act therefore continue to apply under the new 
dispensation.61 Judicial decisions and legal doctrine on the LIC Act remain relevant, 
save in so far as the Insurance Act of 2014 has changed the previous position.62 This 
chapter, therefore, refers to both the previous sections of the LIC Act and the 
corresponding section in the Insurance Act of 2014.63 
The Insurance Act of 2014 entered into force on 1 November 2014.64 Part 4 of 
the Act applies to ‘landverzekeringsovereenkomsten’ entered into on or after 1 
November 2014, as well as to such agreements entered into before this date and still 
in force at that time.65 Insurers were allowed until 1 June 2015 to implement any 
                                                 
58  Chapter 3 of the Insurance Act of 2014 is entitled ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen’ and it 
comprises ss 141-153. 
59  Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 Rechtskundig Weekblad 490-491 para 28. As far as liability insurance 
contract law is concerned, s 152 of the Insurance Act 2014 on the insurer’s right of recourse against the 
policyholder has slightly amended the previous s 88 of the LIC Act. See Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheids-verzekering’ 74 para 2 n 2. For further detail, see para 5.3.1.1(d) below.  
60 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 360. 
61 This thesis contains reference to some publications that pre-date the implementation of the Insurance 
Act of 2014 (see, eg, Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’; and ‘Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed 2011). An updated third edition of Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht has since been 
published, but only limited pages were available to the author. Save for changes to section numbers in 
the Insurance Act of 2014, there is limited amendment to content in the sections relating to liability 
insurance contracts. The thesis refers to several sources published since the Insurance Act of 2014, eg, 
Van Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed); 4 Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 
Rechtskundig Weekblad 83-496 paras 1-51; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 73-109 
paras 1-47; and several other sources. The thesis has, as far as possible, been updated since the 
implementation of the Insurance Act of 2014 with reference to these publications. 
62 For an insightful analysis of the amendments to insurance contract law under the Insurance Act of 
2014, see Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 Rechtskundig Weekblad 483-496 paras 1-51. Meurs & Thiery ibid 
provide critical comment as to thorny issues as regards liability insurance and the Insurance Act of 
2014 with due reference to judicial decisions and legal doctrine. Also see Schuermans & Van 
Schoubroeck ibid passim, where the Insurance Act of 2014 has been integrated into the commentary on 
Belgian insurance law. Further see Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 
paras 7.1, 7.3, 65.1-65.2 for discussion of judicial decisions relating to liability insurance contracts. 
63 This is also in accordance to the methodology adapted by Belgian commentators. See Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck ibid xxxvii. For an accurate account, this chapter contains quotations in Dutch from 
the relevant legislative provisions concerning liability insurance. Direct quotations from Dutch 
legislation have been freely translated into English to make them more accessible.  
64 Namely, six months from 1 May 2014. See s 352 of the Insurance Act of 2014. 
65 Section 311(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014. Sections 311-319 of the Insurance Act of 2014 provide 
the transitional arrangements for the Act. Sections 311(3)-311(4) provide special transitional 
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formal amendments to their insurance contracts arising from the entery into force of 
the Act of 2014.66 
As regards ‘zeeverzekering’ and transport insurance, Title X of Insurance Act of 
1874 was repealed in its entirety67 and re-enacted as Part 5 of the Insurance Act of 
2014.68 As reflected by its title,69  Part 5 of the Act of 2014 relates to insurance 
contracts other than ‘landverzekeringsovereenkomsten’ as contemplated in Part 4 of 
that Act. Part 5 of the Act of 2014, therefore, has the same scope of application as the 
repealed Title X of the Insurance Act of 1874. 70  Part 5 also applies to ‘zeever-
zekering’, as well as to insurance of transport by land, river, and inland waterway, 
save in so far as specific legislation provides otherwise. The Act of 1879 has not been 
repealed and still governs ‘zeeverzekering’ and ‘binnenvaartverzekering’, but now in 
conjunction with Part 5 of the Insurance Act of 2014.71  
The same questions that arose regarding the demarcation between the LIC Act 
and the Insurance Act of 1874 in transport insurance, remain under the new legislative 
dispensation as the scope of application of Parts 4 and 5 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
are the same as their predecessors. Likewise, judicial decisions as to the scope of 
application of the two Acts in, for example, the domain of transport insurance still 
apply post the Insurance Act of 2014, save in as far as new decisions have changed 
the legal position. 
The Insurance Act of 2014 has been criticised for codifying insurance contract 
law without addressing all of the thorny issues that gave rise to in judicial disputes 
under the LIC Act. It has further been suggested that the re-numbering of sections will 
throw the legal profession into confusion for the next few years.72 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
arrangements as regards s 88 of the LIC Act on prescription. See para 5.2.2.1(d) below for further 
detail on prescription of claims in liability insurance. 
66 Namely, on the first day of the thirteenth month following the publication of the Insurance Act of 
2014. See s 311(6)(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014. Pending the amendment of insurance contracts and 
other insurance documentation, references in them to sections in previous legislation – eg, the LIC Act 
and the Insurance Act of 1874 – are assumed to refer to the corresponding sections in the Insurance Act 
of 2014. See s 311(6)(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014. 
67 Section 347(4) of the Insurance Act 2014. 
68 It consists of ss 225-227. 
69 ‘De verzekeringsovereenkomst, andere dan de landverzekeringsovereenkomst zoals bedoeld in deel 4’. 
70 Section 225 of the Insurance Act of 2014. 
71 Section 347 of the Insurance Act of 2014 addresses repealed legislation. See Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 
Rechtskundig Weekblad 494 para 39. 
72 Ibid 496 para 51.  
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5.1.2.4 Summary 
Summative table of the legislative landscape of insurance contract law applicable  
in Belgium with particular focus on general liability insurance contracts:  





Late 19th century Titles X and XI of the Insurance Act 
of 1874: Liability insurance was not 
addressed directly, save for the 
liability insurance cover of a tenant. 
Title X of the Insurance Act of 
1874, and the Act of 1879: 





the LIC Act 
Chapter III, Title II of the LIC Act, 
1992 (ss 77-89) concerned liability 
insurance contracts.  
Title X of the Insurance Act of 
1874 and the Act of 1879: 
Liability insurance contracts 
pertaining to most types of 




the Insurance Act 
of 2014 
Chapter 3, Title III, Part 4 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 141-153) 
governs liability insurance contracts. 
 
Part 5 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 and the Act of 1879: 
Liability insurance contracts 
pertaining to most types of trans-
port are governed by these Acts. 
 
There appears to be a difference of opinion as to whether the Insurance Act of 
2014 (or the LIC Act) defines liability insurance (contracts), or whether it merely 
describes their scope of application.73  
The following statutory definitions74 are relevant for purposes of this chapter:75  
– ‘verzekeringsovereenkomst’;76  
                                                 
73  See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 693; Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 672; and para 5.2.2.1(a) below for further detail. 
74 Part 1 of the Insurance Act of 2014 contains a number of definitions, while Part 4 sets out further 
definitions that relate to ‘landverzekeringovereenkomsten’. The relevant statutory definitions 
(previously contained in s 1 of the LIC Act), are now divided between ss 5 and 54 of the Insurance Act 
of 2014. See Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 Rechtskundig Weekblad 485-486 paras 8-11 for further comment. 
75 Given their specific meaning in Belgian law, these definitions require some explanation in the 
following footnotes. 
76 ‘Insurance contract’. Section 1A of the LIC Act defined ‘verzekeringsovereenkomst’ as follows: 
‘Een overeenkomst, waarbij een partij, de verzekeraar, zich er tegen betaling van een vaste of 
veranderlijke premie tegenover een andere partij, de verzekeringnemer, toe verbindt een in de 
overeenkomst bepaalde prestatie te leveren in het geval zich een onzekere gebeurtenis voordoet 
waarbij, naargelang van het geval, de verzekerde of de begunstigde belang heeft dat zich niet 
voordoet’. An ‘insurance contract’, therefore, refers to a contract in which the insurer, in exchange for 
the payment of a premium, undertakes towards the policyholder to provide it with benefits, as 
stipulated in the contract, on the occurrence of an uncertain event. The non-occurrence of the event 
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– ‘schadeverzekering’ and ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’,77  
– ‘verzekerde bij schadeverzekering’78 and  
– ‘benadeelde in een aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’.79 
                                                                                                                                            
must be in the interest of the insured or the beneficiary. The definition of an insurance contract has 
been included in s 5(14) of the Insurance Act of 2014. (Further detail on the definition of an insurance 
contract falls beyond the scope of this thesis.) The term ‘insurer’ (‘verzekeraar’) was not defined in the 
LIC Act but has now been defined in s 5(14) the Insurance Act of 2014. For the definition of the term 
‘insured’ (‘verzekerde’), see s 1B of the LIC Act and s 5(17) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (the latter 
Act has amended the definition slightly, but further detail is not relevant for purpose of this chapter as 
the amendment concerns personal insurance). The definition of the term ‘beneficiary’ (‘begunstigde’) 
was previously contained in s 1C of the LIC Act and has now been included in s 5(18) of the Insurance 
Act of 2014. For the definition of ‘insurance benefit’ (‘verzekeringsprestatie’), see s 1F of the LIC Act 
and s 55(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014. 
77  For ease of reference, both of these terms will be referred to as ‘indemnity insurance’ in the 
remainder of this chapter, save where the content dictates further distinction. However, some Belgian 
law distinguishes between the terms ‘schadeverzekering’ and ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’. 
Section 1G of the LIC Act defined ‘schadeverzekering’ as ‘verzekering waarbij de verzekerings-
prestatie afhankelijk is van een onzeker voorval dat schade veroorzaakt aan iemands vermogen’ and the 
same definition has been taken up in s 5(15) of the Insurance Act of 2014. The insured event in 
‘schadeverzekering’ is loss to a person’s estate or patrimony, and the term may be translated as 
‘insurance of loss or damage’. ‘Schadeverzekering’ is to be contrasted with personal insurance 
(‘persoonsverzekering’), where the insured event is loss involving a person’s life, physical integrity, or 
family life. See s 1H of the LIC Act and s 5(16) of the Insurance Act of 2014 for the definition of the 
latter term. Section 1I of the LIC Act defined the term ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’ as 
‘verzekering waarbij de verzekeraar zich ertoe verbindt de prestatie te leveren die nodig is om de 
schade die de verzekerde geleden heeft of waarvoor hij aansprakelijk is, geheel of gedeeltelijk te 
vergoeden’; and an identical definition has been included in s 55(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014. The 
essence of ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’ is that it is aimed at indemnifying no more than the 
actual loss that the insured has suffered, or for which the insured is liable. It concerns the ‘indemnity 
principle’, namely indemnification for actual loss suffered (‘indemnity insurance’). ‘Verzekering tot 
vergoeding van schade’ is contrasted to ‘verzekering tot uitkering van een vast bedrag’ (‘insurance 
providing fixed-sum payments’, ‘contingency insurance’ or ‘fixed-sum insurance’), that concerns the 
‘forfairtaire’ character of insurance, namely where the insurance benefit is not linked to the amount of 
loss or damage. See s 1J of the LIC Act and s 55(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014 for the definition of 
the latter term. All ‘schadeverzekering’ is ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’, but not the other 
way around. ‘Verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’ may include ‘schadeverzekering’ and personal 
insurance. For purpose of this chapter, the distinction between these terms is relevant in so far as there 
are different sections in the LIC Act and in the Insurance Act of 2014 which apply to them. According 
to Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 670, liability insurance qualifies as both ‘schadeverzekering’ 
and as ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’. For further detail, see Fontaine ibid paras 80, 81, 162-
164, 620-621, and 790-794. (Note that the unofficial English version of the LIA, available in [1994] 1 
Commercial Laws of Europe 55-105, incorrectly translates ‘schadeverzekering’ as ‘property insurance’ 
(‘zaakverzekering’) – a narrower term – in s 1G, instead of the wider term ‘indemnity insurance’ 
(‘schadeverzekering’). It subsequently, again incorrectly, refers in s 1G to ‘injury to a person’s 
property’, instead of to ‘patrimonial loss’. See Fontaine ibid paras 82 and 670 on the distinction 
between property insurance and indemnity insurance, and on liability insurance as a form of the latter.) 
78 Hereafter referred to as the ‘insured (defendant)’. Section 5(17)(a) of the Insurance Act of 2014 
provides that an insured in indemnity insurance (‘verzekerde bij schadeverzekering’) refers to ‘degene 
door de verzekering is gedekt tegen vermogenschade’; it denotes a person that is covered against 
patrimonial loss by insurance. This definition corresponds to that in the LIC Act s 1B(a).  
79 Although the unofficial English version of the LIC Act translates it as the ‘injured party’, it will here 
be referred to as the ‘third-party plaintiff’. In the context of liability insurance, the term refers to the 
third party for whose loss or injury the insured is responsible. Section 1D of the LIC Act defined the 
term as ‘degene aan wie schade is toegebracht waarvoor de verzekerde aansprakelijk is’ and the same 
definition has been included in s 55(1) the Insurance Act of 2014.  
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Liability insurance contracts 80  must comply with the provisions relating to 
insurance contracts (‘verzekeringsovereenkomsten’) in general, 81  the general 
provisions regarding indemnity insurance (‘schadeverzekering’), 82  the provisions 
specific to indemnity insurance (‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’ in 
particular),83 and with the provisions peculiar to liability insurance in the Insurance 
Act of 2014.84  
 
5.1.2.5 Unfair Contract Terms85 
The EC Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer 
Contracts has been incorporated into Belgian law in sections VI.82-I.87 of the Code 
of Economic Law 2010 (‘Wetboek Economisch recht 2010’). Furthermore, even 
before the enactment of the EC Directive, Belgian insurance law had rules on unfair 
contract terms for all insurance contracts, not only for insurance contracts concluded 
with consumers. The current, unamended, rules are contained in section 23 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 and provide as follows: 
De algemene, bijzondere en speciale voorwaarden, de verzekeringsovereen-
komsten in hun geheel, evenals alle clausules afzonderlijk, moeten in duidelijke en 
nauwkeurige bewoordingen worden opgesteld. Ze mogen geen enkele clausule 
bevatten die een inbreuk uitmaakt op de gelijkwaardigheid tussen de 
                                                 
80 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 670. 
81 ‘Bepalingen betreffende alle verzekeringsovereenkomsten’ in ss 58-90 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously ss 4-36 of the LIC Act). See Fontaine ibid paras 173-528 for comments on and the 
interpretation of these sections in the LIC Act. For purposes of this chapter, the most important change 
to these sections in the Insurance Act of 2014 concerns s 89(1) on the prescription period against 
minors and other persons with disabilities under Belgian law (the position was formerly governed by s 
35(1) of the LIC Act). See Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 103-104 para 40. See also 
para 5.2.2.1(d) below for further detail.  
82 ‘Schadeverzekeringen’ in ss 105-106 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 51-52 of the LIC 
Act). These sections refer to provisions relating to ‘schadeverzekeringen’, translated as ‘indemnity 
insurance’, as explained above. See Fontaine ibid paras 619-622 for comments on and the 
interpretation of these sections under the LIC Act. 
83 ‘Bepalingen eigen aan de verzekeringen tot vergoeding van schade’ in ss 91-101 of the Insurance Act 
of 2014 (previously ss 37-47 of the LIC Act). These sections refer to provisions relating to ‘de 
vergoeding tot verzekeringingen van schade’, translated as ‘indemnity insurance’, as explained above. 
See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 529-601 for comments on and the interpretation of these 
sections under the LIC Act. 
84 ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen’ in ss 141-153 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 77-89 
of the LIC Act). These sections form the focus of this chapter. See Fontaine ibid paras 672-767; and 
Van Schoubroeck ‘Aanspreeklijkheidsverzekering’ paras 1.1-1.4 at 7-29 for comments on and the 
interpretation of these sections under the LIC Act. For comments on these sections under the Insurance 
Act of 2014, see Jocqué (2014-2015) 13 Rechtskundig Weekblad 483-496 paras 1-51; Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 73-109; and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 700-751. 
85 See Van Schoubroeck ‘Onrechtmatige bedingen’ 7-8. 
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verbintenissen van de verzekeraar en die van de verzekeringnemer.86 
 
In geval van twijfel over de betekenis van een beding, prevaleert in alle gevallen 
de voor de verzekeringnemer meest gunstige interpretatie. Indien de 
verzekeringnemer en de verzekerde niet één en dezelfde persoon zijn, prevaleert 
de voor de verzekerde meest gunstige interpretatie.87 
 
In summary, insurance contracts demand clear and precise wording. No clause 
should discriminate between the status and importance of the parties. If there is 
uncertainty as to the interpretation of a clause, the interpretation that favours the 
insured prevails at all times.  
 
5.1.3 Judicial Decisions 
Despite the dominant role of codes and statutes,88 the decisions89 of the Belgian 
Supreme Court90 remain an important source of the law in that the relevant legislation 
                                                 
86 This provision does not generally apply to ‘grotere risico’s’ (large risks), but further details fall 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
87 Freely translated: ‘The general, specific, and special conditions, the insurance contracts as a whole, 
as well as all clauses individually, must be drafted accurately in clear language. They may not contain 
any clause that infringes upon the equality of the obligations of the insurer and those of the 
policyholder. In the event of uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision, the interpretation most 
beneficial to the policyholder shall prevail in all instances. Should the policyholder and the insured not 
be one and the same person, the interpretation that benefits the insured shall prevail.’ (My translation.)  
88 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 113 refers to several other legislative provisions relevant to 
insurance contract law. In para 75 he distinguishes between non-compulsory insurance (‘facultatieve’ 
or ‘niet-verplichte verzekeringen’) such as ‘familiale burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’, 
and compulsory insurance (‘verplichte verzekeringen’). An example of compulsory insurance with 
minimum conditions of insurance cover, may be found in compulsory motor-vehicle liability insurance 
(‘verplichte verzekering B.A motorrijtuigen’), as per Act of 21 November 1989 on Motor-Vehicle 
Liability Insurance, Belgian State Gazette of 8 Dec 1989; (hereafter ‘Act of 1989 on Motor-Vehicle 
Liability Insurance’) See Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 32-46 para 2.1 for an 
exposition and comments in this regard. For particular liability insurance risks, specific legislation 
prescribes minimum cover that should be provided in the insurance policy – eg, in personal liability 
insurance ‘verzekering B.A privéleven’ (a form of non-compulsory insurance), as per Royal Decree of 
12 Jan 1984, Belgian State Gazette of 31 Jan 1984 (hereafter ‘Royal Decree of Jan 1984’), on the 
minimum conditions regarding personal liability insurance (‘tot vaststelling van de 
minimumgarantievoorwaarden van de verzekeringsovereenkomsten tot dekking van de 
burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid buiten overeenkomst met betrekking tot het privéleven’). Further, 
several federal laws and community decrees or decisions (‘gemeenschaps- of gewestdecreet of besluit’) 
prescribe compulsory insurance and insurance terms, depending on the nature of the insured’s business 
or undertaking: see Van Schoubroeck ibid 9 para 1.1.2.2 and 52 para 5; Cousy & Van Schoubroeck 
Wetgeving Verzekeringen 1154-1162; and Bouckaert & Van Hoeke Inleiding tot het recht 48-49 for 
further detail. The relevance of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory liability 
insurance will be discussed further with reference to s 151 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 
87 of the LIC Act). It concerns the reliance of defences by the liability insurer against the third-party 
plaintiff that it could have raised against the insured (‘inzake de tegenstelbaarheid van 
verweermiddelen aan de benadeelde’). See Fontaine ibid para 76 and para 5.2.3.1 below for further 
detail.  
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is considered and interpreted by Belgian courts on a continuing basis. Constitutional 
law impacts on insurance law in Belgium by way of decisions by the Belgian 
Constitutional Court (‘Grondwettelijk Hof’)91 and the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens’).92  
 
5.1.4 The Law of the European Union 
Belgian insurance law is increasingly influenced by the law of the EU.93 As 
explained earlier, 94  the Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law Project 
                                                                                                                                            
89 Judicial decisions in Belgium primarily interpret legislation and clarify vague legal principles, except 
in the rare case of an interpretative law when courts may not interpret legislation: see s 84 of the 
Belgian Constitution (‘Grondwet’) Coordinated Law of 17 February 1994.  
Judicial decisions generally only bind the parties to the particular dispute in Belgium, and there 
is generally no doctrine of stare decisis (save in a few instances, eg, when the Belgian Supreme Court 
annuls the decision of a lower court, the court that has to review that case is bound by the decision of 
the Belgian Supreme Court). Due to the absence of the doctrine of stare decisis, less focus will 
therefore be on judicial decisions in this chapter than in other chapters of this thesis. However, judicial 
decisions remain an important source of law. Ballon et al Economisch Recht 22 explain the position as 
follows: ‘Rechterlijke beslissingen binden in principe slechts de partijen die bij het geschil waren 
betrokken. Niettemin is ook de rechtspraak een belangrijke bron van recht.’ Bouckaert & Van Hoeke 
Inleiding tot het recht 50 also confirm that and state as follows: ‘Herhaalde beslissingen in dezelfde 
zin, uitgesproken door diverse rechtscolleges, vormen na verloop van tijd een vaste rechtspraak, 
waarvan niet snel sal worden afgeweken door andere rechters, zelfs niet door het hof van cassatie. 
Juridisch bindend is deze vaste rechtspraak evenwel niet.’ See Fontaine ibid para 102, eg, where he 
refers to a flurry of case law concerning the third-party plaintiff’s direct claim against the liability 
insurer (ibid paras 746-758); and also a liability insurer’s right of recourse against the insured (ibid 
paras 759-766).  
90 See Ballon et al ibid 41-47 for further detail on the judicial structure in Belgium, and for a useful 
diagram see ibid 42. They explain at 45 as follows: ‘Hoewel er geen wettelijke verplichting bestaat om 
de uitspraak van het Hof van Cassatie te volgen, zal dit in de praktijk meestal het geval zijn. Indien het 
rechtscollege waarna werd verwezen de wet bijvoorbeeld opnieuw op dezelfde manier gaat 
interpreteren zal een nieuwe voorziening in cassatie kunnen worden ingesteld. Wanneer het tweede 
cassatiearrest het arrest of vonnis vernietigt om dezelfde redenen, zal de feitenrechter waarna de zaak 
dan wordt verwezen wel verplicht zijn de belissing van het Hof van Cassatie te volgen … .’ 
91 Ballon et al Economisch Recht 46. Constitutional law and the principle of non-discrimination are, eg, 
relevant in liability insurance concerning the defences by the liability insurer against the third-party 
plaintiff that it could or could not have raised against the insured in compulsory or non-compulsory 
insurance and differences thereto (‘onderscheid tussen verplichte en niet verplichte verzekeringen 
inzake de tegenstelbaarheid van verweermiddelen aan de benadeelde’). See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht 
(2 ed) paras 114 and 749. See also para 5.2.3.1 below for further detail.  
92  Ballon et al ibid 41-42. Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 103-104 para 40 (in 
particular 104 n 123) provide an example of a decision by the European Court of Human Rights that 
resulted in the amendment to the regulation of the period of prescription against minors and other 
persons with disabilities under Belgian law. See s 89(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (formerly s 35(1) 
of the LIC Act) and para 5.2.2.1(d) below for further detail.  
93 As far as insurance supervisory law is concerned, EC legislation had established a system of single 
licensing and the conflict of laws had been unified and harmonised in part through Conventions and 
Directives. See Basedow et al PEICL (2 ed) para I1 for further detail (hereafter the ‘PEICL (2 ed)’). 
The influence of the laws of the EU generally concerns the regulation of the conduct of the business of 
insurance, as opposed to insurance contract law. However, EC Directives on disclosure by the insurers 
to insured have been incorporated in Belgian law as noted above in para 5.1.2.3. These Directives also 
impacted on Belgian unfair contract terms that apply to all consumer contracts including insurance 
contracts. See para 5.1.2.5 above. For the influence of EU law regarding the regulation of a potential 
conflict of interest specifically in disputes relating to legal expenses insurance, which has, due to its 
 237 
Group,95 published the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law96 in 2009. An 
expanded and partially updated version of the PEICL was published by the Project 
Group in 2015. 97  The Project Group has also started drafting special rules for 
individual branches of law, and the updated version of the PEICL includes provisions 
on liability insurance.98  
As mentioned earlier, although the overall draft of the PEICL is ready for 
consideration by the political institutions of the EU with a view to eventual 
legislation, certain commentators are sceptical of the prospect of legislation at the 
European level.99  The focus in this chapter is, consequently, on Belgian national 
insurance contract law. 
 
5.2  THE LIABILITY INSURER’S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY THE 
INSURED 
5.2.1 The Legal Relationship between the Third-Party Plaintiff and the 
Insured Defendant 
 
From the statutory definitions set out above, 100  the following is clear. As 
liability insurance is a form of indemnity insurance, the performance of the insurance 
benefit is subject to the occurrence of an uncertain event which causes loss to the 
insured defendant’s estate.101 The insured defendant in indemnity insurance is the 
person covered by the insurance against patrimonial loss to its estate,102 whereas the 
                                                                                                                                            
challenges, been regulated in particular, see the discussion of relevant aspects in the context of liability 
insurance under Belgian law in para 5.3.1.1(c) below. Also see further, eg, paras 5.3.1.1(c) and 
5.3.1.1(d) below on the influence of EU law on legal expense insurance and motor-vehicle liability 
insurance. 
94 See para 4.1.5 above on the sources of English insurance law.  
95 The ‘Project Group’. 
96 See Basedow et al PEICL (hereafter ‘PEICL’). See PEICL xlix-lxviii for further detail. 
97 PEICL (2 ed) ‘Preface’ v. 
98 See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 30; PEICL paras 1.1-1.10; and PEICL (2 ed) Part 4 51-56 
and 286-311. Again, the PEICL will not replace the national insurance contract law of EU Member 
States, but the aim of the drafters is that it will provide parties to the insurance contract with the choice 
of an alternative consensual set of rules to govern their insurance contract. As such, the PEICL it not a 
source of Belgian law but may in future influence the terms of insurance contracts in Belgium (and 
other EU Member States – see para 4.1.5 above on English law). 
99  Birds Birds’ Modern Insurance Law 21-22 para 1.10.2 on insurance law developments on an 
European level. 
100  See the definitions of the terms ‘schadeverzekering’; ‘verzekerde bij schadeverzekering’; 
‘benadeelde’; and ‘verzekering tot vergoeding van schade’ discussed para 5.1.2.4 and accompanying 
footnotes above. 
101 Section 5(15) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 1G of the LIC Act). 
102 Section 5(17)(a) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 1B(a) of the LIC Act). 
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third-party plaintiff is the person who suffers loss for which the insured is 
responsible.103  
Liability insurance is aimed at protecting the insured’s estate against possible 
claims by third-party plaintiffs.104 It has as its purpose to indemnify, within the limits 
of the insurance contract, the insured defendant against the loss for which it is liable 
to third parties.105   
As liability insurance is third-party insurance,106 in principle the insured’s legal 
liability, in both fact and extent, to the third party determines the liability of the 
insurer to the insured. This complex tripartite relationship in liability insurance has 
been referred to as a ‘beruchte driehoeksverhouding’ or ‘notorious triangle’.107 
However, the insured’s liability to the third-party plaintiff is, in principle, 
independent of the existence of any insurance or liability insurance, and is incurred 
irrespective of whether the insured defendant is insured or covered.108 The existence 
                                                 
103 Section 55(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 1C of the LIC Act). 
104 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 9 para 1.1.1.2. 
105 Section 55(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 1I of the LIC Act). Although the third-
party plaintiff is not a party to the insurance contract between the insured defendant and the liability 
insurer, the third party may benefit indirectly from the insurance, eg, in the event that the insured 
becomes insolvent. See Van Schoubroeck ibid 9 para 1.1.1.2. The third-party plaintiff has the prospect 
of being compensated in as far as the insured would have been indemnified by its liability insurance. 
Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 73 para 1 explain as follows: ‘Voor het slachtoffer 
[the third-party plaintiff] heeft het bestaan van een aansprakelijkheidsverzekering tot gevolg dat hij een 
grotere kans heeft om effectief vergoed te worden voor de geleden schade’. See para 5.2.3.1 below for 
further detail on the third party’s direct claim against the liability insurer.  
106 See Chapter 2 above for further detail on liability insurance as third-party insurance.  
107 Cousy ‘Pikante details’ passim. Kruithof ‘De leiding van het geschil’ 5-6 para 8 provides the 
following explanation of the so-called ‘parties involved’ (‘belanghebbenden’) and the complex 
multitude of legal relationships in the context of liability insurance: ‘Het verzekerde risico bestaat uit 
de kans dat de verzekerde een schuld krijgt uit aansprakelijkheid. De waarborg houdt in dat de 
verzekeraar het vermogen van de verzekerde – diens belang – vrijwaart van dergelijke schuld. Dit 
wordt gerealiseerd enerzijds doordat de polis de verzekerde een vordering geeft tot terugbetaling van 
wat hij ingevolge de aansprakeljikheid aan de benadeelde heeft moeten betalen, en anderzijds doordat 
artikel 152 Verzekeringswet 2014 [2014 Insurance Act] (art 86 WLVO [LIC Act]) de benadeelde een 
eigen recht geeft op schadevergoeding. In het eerste geval speelt het aansprakelijkheidsgeschil zich 
formeel af tussen de benadeelde en de verzekerde; in het tweede geval situeert dit geschil zich tussen 
de benadeelde en de verzekeraar. In beide gevallen wordt de verzekeraar echter belanghebbende bij de 
uitkomst van dit geschil. Zijn belang, ie zijn vermogen, wordt geraakt door te uitkomst van het 
aansprakelijkheidsgeschil doordat hij gehouden is tot dekking indien het verzekerde risico zich 
realiseert, en dat is het geval indien de verzekerde aansprakeljik wordt bevonden.’ The thesis explains 
these parties and relationships involved, and the intricacies, in liability insurance contracts. See para 
5.2 and 5.3 passim. 
108 The distinction between an insured defendant’s limited and unlimited liability towards the third-
party plaintiff, and its effect on the cover provided in the insurance contract, are discussed below in 
para 5.2.2.1(a). For further detail on the legal relationship between the third-party plaintiff and the 
insured defendant in the context of the conduct of the defence and settlement, see generally para 5.3 
below. Liability policies usually contain a clause that prohibits the insured from settling any claim by a 
third party, or from making any admission of liability, without the insurer’s written consent. Section 
149(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 85(1) of the LIC Act) provides as follows: 
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of liability insurance is not necessary for the insured to incur liability. Even though 
the defendant may not be an ‘insured’ in that it does not have insurance at all, or may 
not be covered under its liability insurance contract against the specific liability it 
incurs to the third party, the defendant may still be liable to the third party for the 
latter’s loss. So, for example, a defendant that has intentionally caused loss to the 
third party may not be covered under its liability insurance contract,109 but may still 
be held legally liable to the third party for the latter’s loss.110  
This notwithstanding, some commentators have recognised that there is a close 
connection between the development of liability insurance111 and the law of delict.112 
Fontaine, for example, refers to the inclination by the judiciary to award larger sums 
in compensation (delictual damages) to third-party plaintiffs who have become 
insured since the rise of liability insurance. He further notes that there has been an 
increase in the different types of damages that may be claimed under the law of 
delict.113  
 
5.2.2 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Insured Defendant 
 
5.2.2.1 The Scope the Insured Defendant’s Liability Cover 
Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 77 of the LIC Act) provides as 
follows:  
                                                                                                                                            
‘Compensation, or a promise of it, to the third-party plaintiff by the insured defendant without the 
liability insurer’s consent shall not bind the latter’. See para 5.3.1.1(b) below.  
109 Section 62 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 8 of the LIC Act) provides as follows: 
‘Niettegenstaande enig andersluidend beding, kan de verzekeraar niet verplicht worden dekking te 
geven aan hem die het schadegeval opzettelijk heeft veroorzaakt’. 
110 See para 5.2.2.3 (b)(ii) below for comments on the exclusion of cover for loss caused by the 
intentional conduct of the insured. 
111 Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 73 para 1 opine that the development liability 
insurance is connected to economic and business life. They provide that ‘[d]e toegenomen complexiteit 
van het economische leven zorgt ervoor dat ook de aangeboden aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen 
specialistischer en complexer worden, zeker voor wat betreft de verzekeringen afgesloten door 
ondernemingen’. 
112 The law of delict has evolved to focus on the compensation of victims (third parties), rather than on 
the punishment of wrongdoers (insured defendants). Liability insurance has similarly developed to 
provide improved protection to third parties (such as a third party-plaintiff having a direct claim against 
the liability insurer). Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 668 explains as follows: ‘De ontwikkeling 
van de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen is door een wederzijdse wisselwerking, nauw verbonden met 
de ontwikkeling van het aansprakelilijkheidsrecht self’. See para 5.2.3.1 below for further detail. 
113 Fontaine ibid paras 666-669. 
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Dit hoofdstuk 114  is van toepassing op de verzekeringsovereenkomsten die ertoe 
strekken de verzekerde dekking te geven tegen alle vorderingen tot vergoeding 
wegens het voorvallen van de schade die in de overeenkomst is beschreven, en zijn 
vermogen binnen de grenzen van de dekking te vrijwaren tegen alle schulden uit een 
vaststaande aansprakelijkheid.115 
Liability insurance contracts aim to defend the insured (‘leiding van het 
geschil’)116 against third-party claims for compensation based on the occurrence of 
loss117 as provided for in the contract, and also indemnify the insured’s estate,118 
within the limits of cover, for a debt arising from proven liability.  
As indicated earlier,119 liability insurance is indemnity insurance. The insured 
does not have the right to be indemnified, and the insurer is not obliged to indemnify 
the insured until the insured has suffered a ‘loss’ (‘schadegeval’).120 For purposes of 
liability insurance, a ‘loss’ is suffered when the insured’s liability towards a third 
                                                 
114 This refers to the chapter on liability insurance (‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen’) that applies to 
liability insurance contract law in particular, namely Chapter 3, Title III, Part 4 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 (previously Chapter III, Title III of the LIC Act).  
115 Freely translated: ‘This chapter applies to contracts of insurance which aim to defend the insured 
against any claim for compensation based on the occurrence of loss as provided for in the contract and 
to keep its estate indemnified, within the limits of cover, for any debt arising from proven liability’. 
(My translation.) As stated in para 5.1.2.4 above, there appears to be a difference in opinion as to 
whether the Insurance Act of 2014 (or the LIC Act) defines liability insurance, or whether it merely 
decribes the scope of application of liability insurance. According to Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck 
Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 693, s 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the 
LIC Act) contains a definition of liability insurance, while Fontaine holds a contrary view. See 
Fontaine ibid para 672 where he interprets the section to refer merely to the scope of application of the 
legislative provisions on liability insurance. Some commentators are of the opinion that s 141 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act) provides a description of the scope of 
application of ss 141-152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 78-89 of the LIC Act) to liability 
insurance contracts, and that undue emphasis should not be placed on s 141 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act) as a way of determining either the scope of the undertaking to 
provide insurance, or the time when the performance by the liability insurer is due. See Van 
Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 644. They propose that a 
more neutral way of formulating the scope of application of ss 141-152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously ss 78-89 of the LIC Act) may be to provide that ‘verzekeringsovereenkomsten waarbij de 
verzekeraar zich ertoe verbindt om zich achter de verzekerde te stellen wanneer de aansprakelijkheid 
van de verzekerde zoals omschreven in de overeenkomst in het gedrang komt en het vermogen binne 
die grenzen van de dekking te vrijwaren tegen alle schulden uit een vaststaande aansprakelijkheid’. 
116 For further detail on the liability insurer’s defence, see para 5.3 below.  
117 For further detail on the meaning of the term ‘occurrence of loss’, see para 5.2.2.2 below and 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 679-699. 
118 Fontaine ibid para 673 explains that ‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen dekken het vermogen van de 
verzekerde tegen de aantastingen die het bedreigen’. The insurable interest in liability insurance, as a 
type of indemnity insurance (‘verzekeringen tot vergoeding van schade’), is a financial interest in the 
preservation of the integrity of the estate ‘in geld waardeerbaar belang … bij de gaafheid van het 
vermogen’. See s 91 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 37 of the LIC Act). The unofficial 
English version of the LIC Act in [1994] 1 Commercial Laws of Europe 55-105, incorrectly translates 
the term ‘vermogen’ as ‘property’ instead of ‘estate’. By referring to the liability insurer’s duty as 
regards the insured’s estate, s 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act) is in 
line with s 91 (previously s 37 of the LIC Act). See Fontaine ibid para 678. 
119 See Chapter 2 above on the classification of liability insurance as indemnity insurance. 
120 For further detail, see para 5.2.2.1(b) below. 
 241 
party for the latter’s loss has been established. The terms of the insurance contract 
primarily determine the loss to the insured − ie, its proven liability121 towards a third 
party for the latter’s loss − which may then trigger the liability of the insurer to the 
insured under the insurance contract. 122  Fontaine emphasises, with reference to 
liability insurance as a type of indemnity insurance, that,  
bij deze verzekeringen is de vergoede schade in dit geval deze die door de 
verzekerde wordt geleden, nl. de aantasting van zijn vermogen ingevolge de 
aansprakelijkheidsschuld die hij oploopt, zelfs indien deze schade overeenstemt met 
deze die het slachtoffer [third-party plaintiff] geleden heeft.123 
 
5.2.2.1(a)  The Extent of the Liabilities Covered 124 
 
Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 77 of the LIC Act)125 refers to the 
liability insurer’s two main duties to its liability insured:126 
– to conduct the insured’s defence against the third-party plaintiff;127 and 
– to indemnify the insured against proven liability to the third party, 
within the limits of the insurance policy.128 
As to the types of liability which may be covered under liability insurance 
(‘gedekte aansprakelijkheden’), the insured may be indemnified against amounts that 
it may be liable to pay to third-party plaintiffs in delict (‘extracontractuele 
                                                 
121 Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act) refers to ‘vaststaande 
aansprakelijkheid’. The unofficial English version ibid, translates the term ‘vaststaande 
aansprakelijkheid’ as ‘proven liability’, but it may equally be termed ‘established liability’ or ‘legal 
liability’. The term ‘proven liability’ appears to be preferred in Belgian law and will therefore be used 
in this chapter. 
122 See paras 5.2.2.1(b)-5.2.2.1(c) below for further detail on when and how the insured’s liability to 
third-party plaintiffs becomes proven. See para 5.2.2.1(c) below for further detail on the effect of the 
insured’s proven liability to the third party on the liability of the insurer to the insured. 
123 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 163 n 415. 
124 In writing this section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht paras 672-682; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) 
para 693; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 10 para 1.2.1.  
125 See para 5.2.2.1 above for further detail. 
126 The insured defendant has corresponding rights against the liability insurer to be defended against 
third-party claims and to be indemnified. Other rights of the insured against the liability insurer 
include: to choose its insurer in case of double insurance; and rights as regards its intervention in legal 
proceedings (‘tussenkomst in de rechtspleging’; see para 5.3.1 below in regard to the latter). See Van 
Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 18-19 paras 1.3.2.1-1.3.2.4 for further detail. Also see 
para 5.2.2.4 below for further detail on the insured’s duties towards the liability insurer.  
127 For further detail on the liability insurer’s duty of defence, see para 5.3 below. 
128 The emphasis here (in para 5.2.2.1(a) ff) falls on this duty as para 5.2 deals with the liability 
insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured. 
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aansprakelijk-heid’ or ‘vorderingen uit een onregmatige daad’), 129  contractually 
(‘contractuele aansprakelijkheid’),130 for breach of contract,131 or in terms of a statute 
(‘wettelijk’).132 Clearly, indemnity against certain forms of liability may be excluded 
in the insurance contract itself.133 As only private-law (civil) (‘privaat’ or ‘burger-
rechtelijk’) liabilities can be covered under a liability insurance contract, criminal, 
moral, and disciplinary liabilities are excluded.134 
 
5.2.2.1(b)  The Time When the Insured Defendant Becomes ‘Legally Liable’ to 
Third-Party Plaintiffs135 
In liability insurance the materialisation of risk (‘verwezenlijking van het 
risico’)136 may be a gradual process which unfolds over an extended period.137 The 
materialisation of the risk may have a number of legal consequences in liability 
                                                 
129 For example, liability under art 1382ff of the Civil Code or under art 544 of the Civil Code on 
nuisance by neighbours (‘burenhinder’). See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 779-782 for further detail. On liability in delict generally, see Cousy & 
Droshout ‘Fault under Belgian Law’ 27-51; Cousy & Vanderspikken ‘Causation under Belgian Law’ 
23-37; and Cousy & Vanderspikken ‘Damages under Belgian Law’ 27-51. 
130 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 674. The term is often used without an explanation as to 
what it entails. It is a matter of interpretation in every instance whether the reference to contractual 
liability refers to contractual liability for damages imposed by law for breach of the contract, and if it 
(also) pertains to liability imposed by the contract itself for performance voluntarily assumed by the 
insured. Both forms of contractual liability may in principle be covered.  
131 An example of contractual liability that may be covered under a liability insurance contract is the 
tenant’s liability to the lessor in case of fire (‘contractuele aansprakelijkheid van de huurder jegens de 
verhuurder ingeval van brand’). See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck 3 Belgische Verzekeringsrecht 
paras 755-769 for further detail.  
132 For example, product liability under the Act of 25 Feb of 1991. There may be some overlap between 
statutory liability and the other forms of liability (as the majority of instances of delictual and 
contractual liability under Belgian law are prescribed by statute).  
133 See para 5.2.2.3(b)(i) below for the exclusions to, and exceptions from, liability cover for an insured 
defendant’s legal liability towards third-party plaintiffs.  
134 The distinction between an insured defendant’s limited and unlimited liability towards the third-
party plaintiff, and its effect on the cover provided for in the insurance contract, are discussed in para 
5.2.2.3(a) below. The influence of the insured defendant’s fault on the cover in the insurance contract is 
discussed in para 5.2.2.3(b)(ii) below. 
135 In writing this section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 681, 683, 684 and 687; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 693; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 25 para 
1.3.4.2. For further detail, see Van Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch 
Handelsrecht 644-645. 
136 The term ‘schadegeval’ may generally be translated as the ‘insured event’. Fontaine ibid para 683 
explains that ‘[h]et schadegeval werd gedefinieerd als de verwezenliking van het risico’. For further 
detail on the ‘insured event’ in liability insurance, see para 5.2.2.2 below. 
137 Fontaine ibid para 168 provides as follows: ‘In sommige verzekeringstakken doet het schadegeval 
zich niet op een ogenblikkelijke wijze voor, maar verwezenlijkt zich geleidelijkt in de loop van een min 
of meer langer periode; dit kan met name het geval zijn in de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen…’.  
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insurance, 138  but is relevant here to determine when a liability insurer should 
indemnify its insured.139 
In liability insurance, the insured suffers a loss when its liability to a third party 
for the latter’s loss has been proved.140 Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 77 
of the LIC Act) provides that the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured 
defendant applies to ‘all debt arising from proven liability’ (‘alle schulden uit een 
vaststaande aansprakelijkheid’).141 The liability insurer is liable to the insured only 
once the latter’s liability to the third-party plaintiff has been established or proved.142 
In most cases, the terms of the insurance contract determine when a ‘loss’ for 
purposes of the insurer’s liability occurs.143  
  
                                                 
138 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 683 explains that ‘talrijke rechtsgevolgen vloeien voort uit 
het schadegeval’ and provides examples. However, he cautions that ‘[d]eze rechtsgevolgen zijn niet 
alle gehecht aan dezelfde fase van het proces waarin het schadegeval geleidelijk vorm krijgt’. See 
Fontaine ibid paras 683-689 for further detail. In para 684 he comments that ‘[d]e veelvoudige 
gevolgen die het verzekeringsrecht aan het begrip schadegeval hecht vergen veel meer geschak[k]eerde 
beschouwingen’. The meaning of the term ‘schadegeval’ may therefore be fluid and depends on the 
context. See, eg, Van Schoubroeck (2015) 10 Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 987 where the 
author describes the uncertainty of the meaning of the term ‘schadegeval’ and the debate in that regard 
as follows: ‘Over de juiste interpretatie en draagwijdte van het begrip “schadegeval” (veelal vertaald in 
Frans als “sinistre”) in the aansprakelijkheidsverzekering en of aan dit begrip één dan wel meerdere 
betekenissen toekomen naar gelang de concrete rechtsvraag die zich stelt, blijft in de rechtsleer 
discussie bestaan’. 
139  Fontaine ibid para 168. Van Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch 
Handelsrecht 644 opine that undue emphasis should not be placed on s 141 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act) in determining the time when the performance by the liability 
insurer is due. 
140 Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act).  
141 Where the insured pays the third-party plaintiff for debt that arose from proven liability, it can claim 
that amount (to the maximum of the insured amount) from its liability insurer. However, a liability 
insurer’s duty of indemnification of its insured will be not be due from the date of the insured’s 
negligent act (‘vanaf de dag dat de schadeverwekkende gebeurtenis zich heeft voorgedaan’) against the 
third-party plaintiff but arises only from the date on which the insured paid the third-party plaintiff. See 
the decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 29 Sept 2011, as referred to by Schuermans 
and Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 693 n 412.  
From the literature consulted there are more English judicial decisions and legal doctrine, yet 
greater legal uncertainty, on established liability as the time when the insured defendant’s legal liability 
toward a third-party plaintiff is proven, than in Belgian law. In Belgium, all debt arising from proven 
liability (‘alle schulden uit een vaststaande aansprakelijkheid’) in s 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously s 77 of the LIC Act) should be proven: see 4.2.2.1(b) above on English law. 
142 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 683. See para 5.2.2.1(c) below as to the ways in which the 
insured defendant’s liability towards third-party plaintiffs may be proved. 
143 Ibid paras 674 and 682. 
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5.2.2.1(c)  The Ways in Which the Insured Defendant’s Liability to Third-Party 
Plaintiffs may be Proven144  
 
The insured’s liability to the third party may be proved by way of agreement,145 
judgment,146 or arbitration.147  
Fontaine describes the lengthy process by which an insured’s ‘proven liability’ 
to the third-party plaintiff (in the context of delictual liability established by a court 
judgment) may arise.148 For example, in determining when delictual liability has been 
proved a number of phases may be distinguished: the insured’s delict against the third 
party, the loss suffered by the third party, the third party’s initial claim, the institution 
of legal proceedings by the third party against the insured, and the judgment in favour 
of the third party against the insured. Proven liability in Belgian law exists when all 
the elements of liability have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It may take 
several years from the third-party plaintiff’s institution of a claim or legal proceedings 
for compensation against the insured,149 before a final judgment as to the insured 
defendant’s proven liability to the third-party plaintiff is delivered and before the 
insured may claim indemnification from its liability insurer for debt arising from that 
proven liability. 
 
5.2.2.1(d)  Prescription in Liability Insurance150  
 
 Prescription in insurance law is complex. 151  In liability insurance – being 
third-party insurance – prescription is particularly complicated because prescription of 
                                                 
144 From the literature there are more English judicial decisions, legal doctrine, yet greater legal 
uncertainty on the ways in which the insured defendant’s legal liability toward a third-party plaintiff is 
proven, than in Belgian law: see para 4.2.2.1(c) above on English law. 
145 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 14 para 1.2.5.2 comments that ‘[d]eze eis kan 
zowel mondeling … als schriftelijk geformuleerd worden en minnelijk of gerechteljik worden 
behandeld’. See para 5.3 below for further detail on the conduct of the defence and settlement by the 
liability insurer. 
146 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 683 and 687. 
147  For further detail on arbitration under Belgian insurance law, see Fontaine ibid 524-528 and 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 1227-1231. 
148 Fontaine ibid para 684. 
149 Again, the third-party claim and legal proceedings will follow the insured’s delict or breach of 
contract against the third party and (at least some of) the loss suffered by the latter. 
150 In writing this section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 486-496, 759; Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 29 
paras 1.1 and 1.4.1; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 1119-
1121, 1123-1124, 1127; and Jocqué (2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen 6-9, 14-17. 
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the insured’s claim against its insurer is linked to the prescription of the third-party 
plaintiff’s claim against the insured defendant.152 
Section 88 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 34 of the LIC Act) governs 
prescription in liability insurance. The provision deals with extinctive prescription 
(‘bevrijdende verjaring’)153 and is mandatory.154 Contractual clauses which reduce or 
extend the prescription period, or which change the starting or completion date of the 
period, are void.155 
Section 88(1) of the Act of 2014 (s 34(1) of the LIC Act) provides as follows:  
De verjaringstermijn voor elke rechtsvordering, voortvloeiend uit een 
verzekeringsovereenkomst, bedraagt drie jaar. 156 …  
De termijn begint te lopen vanaf de dag van het voorval dat het vorderingsrecht doet 
ontstaan. Wanneer degene aan wie de rechtsvordering toekomt, bewijst dat hij pas 
op een later tijdstip van het voorval kennis heeft gekregen, begint de termijn te 
lopen vanaf dat tijdstip, maar hij verstrijkt in elk geval vijf jaar na de voorval, 
behoudens bedrog.157 … 
In de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering begint de termijn, wat de regresvordering van 
de verzekerde tegen de verzekeraar betreft, te lopen vanaf het instellen van de 
rechtsvordering door de benadeelde, onverschillig of het gaat om een 
                                                                                                                                            
151 See van Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 1119 for an explanation of this complexity. It 
must be noted that in some jurisdictions the term ‘limitation period’ is preferred to the term 
‘prescription’. 
152 All claims based on contractual obligations prescribe after ten years; while claims for compensation 
of loss based on delict prescribe five years from the day on which the third-party plaintiff 
(‘benadeelde’) became aware of the loss and of the identity of the liable party (the ‘liability insured’): 
art 2262bis Civil Code. For further detail, see Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 1166-1183.  
153 Jocqué (2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen 6 explains that ‘[d]e bepalingen … voorzien in 
een bevrijdende verjaring waardoor de bedoelde rechtsvorderingen door het verstrijking van de 
vasgestelde termijn teniet gaan. De verjaring … heeft de verdwijning van de eisbaarheid van deze 
schuldvorderingen tot gevolg.’ 
154 Section 56 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 3 of the LIC Act). 
155 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 29 para 1.4; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) 
paras 487 and 505; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 1121; 
and Jocqué (2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen  6-9. Fontaine ibid explains that the relatively 
short prescription period of three years is aimed at preventing the disappearance of evidence and that 
longer prescription periods would make it challenging for insurers to exercise control over the claims 
against them.  
156  Freely translated: ‘The prescription period for each legal claim ensuing from an insurance 
agreement is three years’. (My translation.) Section 88(1)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 
34(1)(i) of the LIC Act). This chapter employs Roman numbers to refer to specific parts of the 
legislative provisions that the Dutch commentators identify as ‘lid’ or ‘alinea’. To further underline 
particular detail, sentences or bullets are referred to in some instances.  
157 Freely translated: ‘The prescription period starts to run from the date of the event that gives rise to 
the claim. If a party proves that it had knowledge of the event that gave rise to the claim only at a date 
later than the date that gave rise to the claim, the prescription period shall begin to run only at such 
later date. Such a period shall expire five years from the date of event, except in the case of fraud.’ (My 
translation) Section 88(1)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 34(1)(ii) of the LIC Act). Note 
sentences one and two.  
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oorspronkelijke eis tot schadeloosstelling dan wel om een latere eis naar aanleiding 
van een verzwaring van de schade of van het ontstaan van een nieuwe schade.158  
The general principle regarding an insured’s claim against its insurer arising 
from an insurance contract (‘voor elke rechtsvordering, voortvloeiend uit een 
verzekerings-overeenkomst’)159 is that the prescription period of three years begins to 
run from the date of the event that gave rise to the claim (‘[v]anaf de dag van het 
voorval dat het vorderingsrecht doet ontstaan’).160 As the materialisation of the risk 
(‘schadegeval’) 161  in liability insurance may be a gradual process over a long 
period,162 it is particularly difficult to determine the date of the event which gave rise 
to the claim and the date of commencement of prescription. The Legislature has 
addressed this challenge in section 88(1)(iii) of the Act of 2014 (s 34(1)(iii) of the 
LIC Act) by providing a specific commencement date for the prescription of a 
liability insured’s claim against its liability insurer. The liability insured must institute 
any claim arising under a liability insurance contract against its liability insurer163 
                                                 
158 Freely translated: ‘In liability insurance, the period starts to run for the insured’s claim against the 
insurer within three years from the date on which the third party issued summons against the insured, 
irrespective of whether the original claim for indemnity is supplemented by a later claim for an 
increase in the loss suffered or the occurrence of another related loss’. (My translation.) Section 
88(1)(iii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 34(1)(iii) of the LIC Act). The focus of this 
paragraph 5.2.2.1(d) is on the prescription of the liability insured’s claim against its liability insurer.  
159 Section 88(1)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 34(1)(i) of the LIC Act). The phrase 
‘voor elke rechtsvordering, voortvloeiend uit een verzekeringsovereenkomst’ is vague. See Jocqué 
(2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen 8 for further detail. However, the insured’s claim against the 
insurer for the payment of indemnification; the insurer’s claim against the insured for, eg, payment of 
its premium; as well as the liability insurer’s claim for recourse against its insured (which prescription 
is provided for specifically in s 88(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 previously s 34(3) of the LIC Act), 
are subject to a presciption period of three years. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 488-491. 
160 Section 88(1)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 34(1)(ii) of the LIC Act). This refers to 
the time of materialisation of the risk (‘vanaf het ogenblik waarop het risico zich heeft gerealiseerd’). 
See Jocqué ibid 15; and Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 100-101 paras 37-38 for 
further detail. 
161 Prescription in liability insurance is also complicated by the different meanings that may be ascribed 
to the term ‘schadegeval’. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 689 explains in the context of 
prescription that, ‘[o]ok hier stelt men vast hoezeer elke regel met betrekking tot het schadegeval 
vasgeknoopt is aan een specifiek ogenblik van het verloop’. The other periods of prescription 
concerned in liability insurance, namely the prescription of the liability insurer’s claim of recourse 
against its insured (under s 88(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014; previously s 34(3) of the LIC Act) and 
the prescription of the direct claim of the third-party plaintiff (‘benadeelde’) against the insured’s 
liability insurer (under s 88(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014; previously s 34(2) of the LIC Act), are 
discussed below in paras 5.3.1.1(c) and 5.2.3.1. 
162 See para 5.2.2.2(b) above for further detail. 
163  Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 496 explains that ‘[h]et gaat om de bepaling van het 
vertrekpunt van de verjaring van de “regres” vordering van de verzekerde tegen de verzekeraar, dit wil 
zeggen van de vordering waarin de verzekerde zijn aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar oproept om hem 
dekking te verlenen’. 
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within three years of the issue of summons164 by the third-party plaintiff against the 
insured, 165  irrespective of whether the claim relates to the original claim for 
indemnity, a later claim as a result of an increase in the loss, or the occurrence of 
further loss.166 
The provisions governing prescription are comprehensive. 167  The detailed 
provisions of section 88(1)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 34(1)(ii) of the LIC 
Act) provide that if a party proves that it had knowledge of the event that gave rise to 
the claim only after the date which gave rise to the claim, prescription begins to run 
only at that later date. In this situation, this period will, however, lapse five years from 
the date of the event, except in the case of fraud. Although it may not often arise in 
practice, Fontaine is of view that this section may also affect the commencement date 
of the prescription period of an insured’s claim against its liability insurer where the 
insured was unaware of the third-party plaintiff’s summons.168 
Section 89 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 35 of the LIC Act) contains detailed 
provisions for the suspension and interruption of prescription periods.169 
                                                 
164 A payment demand should be distinguished from the issue of the summons. See Schuermans & Van 
Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 1127 n 21 who observe that ‘[e]en 
betalingsverzoek en een rechtsvordering zijn onderscheidende begrippen’. 
165 ‘[B]innen de drie jaar; ingaande vanaf het ogenblik dat de benadeelde voor de rechter een vordering 
tegen de verzekerde heeft ingesteld’. See Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 29 para 
1.4.1. The issue of the summons by the third-party plaintiff against the insured defendant is the event 
that gives rise to the claim of the insured against its liability insurer for purposes of s 88(1)(iii) of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 34(1)(iii) of the LIC Act). See the decision by the Belgian 
Supreme Court, Cass, dated 28 Nov of 2008, as referred to by Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid 
para 1127 n 22.  
166 Where the insured has compensated the third-party insured voluntarily (for debt arising from proven 
liability), the insured’s payment to the third-party plaintiff will be regarded as the event that gives rise 
to the claim (‘het voorval dat zijn vorderingsrecht doet ontstaan’) and the latter date will be the 
commencement date of prescription of the insured’s claim against the liability insurer. In this scenario, 
the prescription of the insured’s claim against the liability insurer does not commence on the date of the 
initial event that gives rise to the third-party plaintiff’s loss (‘het ogenblik van het initiële schadegeval’; 
the ‘schadeverwekkende gebeurtenis’). See the decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 28 
Nov of 2008, as referred to by Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 1127 n 22. 
167 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 486 describes them as ‘omstandige bepalingen’.  
168 Ibid 496 n 1252 opines that one may interpret s 88(1)(iii)of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 
34(1)(iii) of the LIC Act) on the prescription of the insured’s claim against the liability insurer in 
liability insurance, to explain the meaning of ‘the date of the event which give rise to the claim’ 
(‘voorval dat het vorderingsrecht doet ontstaan’) in s 88(1)(ii) thereof; and that the second sentence of s 
88(1)(ii) as to the extended commencement date of prescription in case of lack of knowledge also 
applies to the instances covered under s 88(1)(iii). 
169 Section 35(1) of the LIC Act provided that the prescription period ran against minors, lunatics, and 
other persons with disability, except in case of the direct claim of the third-party plaintiff against the 
liability insurer. Section 89(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 has amended the position in line with a 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights and now provides that prescription periods do not run 
against minors, lunatics, and other persons with disability until their date of majority or the suspension 
of their disability. See Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 103-109 paras 40-46 for 
further detail as regards the suspension and interruption of prescription periods. Also see Schuermans 
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5.2.2.2 The Insured Event and the Duration of Liability Cover170  
The insured may recover only that loss caused by an event covered by the 
liability insurance contract from an insurer. The insured’s proven liability towards the 
third party is the insured’s loss171 in the liability insurance contract, and should be 
distinguished from the ‘insured event’172 which brings the matter within the scope of a 
particular period of cover designated in the liability insurance contract. Such an event 
may be the incidence of the loss itself – ie, the insured’s proven liability towards the 
third party – or it may be an earlier event that merely leads to the incidence of loss, 
such as an act of negligence on the insured’s part,173 or some other occurrence which 
marks a significant stage in the process leading to the insured’s legal liability.  
Belgian law has adopted the so-called ‘Anglo-American legal terminology’ in 
an attempt to resolve legal questions in the context of the insured event and the 
duration of liability cover.174 For example, the insured’s breach of contract or delict 
may be the insured event (under ‘act-committed’ insurance); the occurrence of the 
third party’s loss may be the insured event (under ‘loss-occurrence’ insurance);175 or 
                                                                                                                                            
& Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 1134-1139; Van Schoubroeck 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ para 1.4.4 at 30-31; Jocqué (2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen 
25-33; and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 498-504.  
170 In writing this section, the following works on the Belgian insurance law were consulted: Meurs & 
Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 96-100 paras 33-35; Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 
35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1382-1389; Van Schoubroeck (2015) 10 Tijdschrift voor Belgisch 
Handelsrecht 985-988; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 694-
699; Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 13-15 para 1.2.5; and Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 680-681 and 690-702. For further detail, see Cousy ‘Over het 
“verzekerbaar risico”’ 147-165; Van Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch 
Handelsrecht 645-664; and CRIS Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering: dekking in de tijd passim.  
171 ‘Schadegeval’ para 5.2.2.1 above, is the materialisation of the risk, and it may occur gradually over 
a long period in liability insurance, and may also have a number of legal consequences. The meaning of 
the term ‘schadegeval’ may therefore change, depending on the context. 
172 ‘Schadegeval’ may generally also be translated as ‘insured event’. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht 
(2 ed) paras 168 and 683-689 for further detail. 
173 The insured event (in that instance the ‘schadeverwekkende gebeurtenis’) has been referred to as the 
‘aanknopingsfactor om te bepalen of de verzekeraar al dan niet dekking moest verlenen’ and it 
therefore determines whether an insurer has provided cover or not. See Van Schoubroeck & Meurs 
(2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1384. 
174 Also referred to as the ‘temporal scope of cover’ or ‘dekking in de tijd’. Schuermans & Van 
Schoubroek Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 694 observe that, ‘[a]ansprakelijkheden kunnen 
ontstaan vooraleer de polis werd afgesloten, maar ook nadat de verzekeringsovereenkomst reeds is 
afgelopen’. They formulate the challenge as to the duration of liability cover as whether ‘de 
verzekeringsdekking effect sorteert wanneer het tijdsverloop tussen fout en schadeverzekering zich niet 
volledig binnen de duur van de contractuele verzekeringstermijn voltrekt’. See para 5.2.2.2(b) below 
for further detail. 
175  Also known as ‘occurrence-based’ insurance. The term ‘loss-occurrence’ seems to be more 
prevalent in the majority of Belgian sources consulted and is used in the remainder of this chapter. See, 
eg, Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1385; Schuermans & Van 
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the insured event may be a claim by a third party against the insured (under ‘claims-
made’ insurance). Although the general characteristics of the different types of 
liability policy are similar in various legal systems, an insured must determine the 
exact meaning of these different policies under Belgian law and with reference to the 
liability insurance contract involved.  
Section 141 of the Insurance Contract Act of 2014 (s 77 of the LIC Act)176 
provides, as regards the scope of liability insurance contracts, that these types of 
contract aim to cover the insured against third-party claims for compensation ‘based 
on the occurrence of loss as provided for in the contract’.177 The insurance contract 
may, however, still limit cover to accidental loss only178 but the majority of policies 
                                                                                                                                            
Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 694; and Van Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) 
Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsreg 646-647. Cf Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 692 who 
refers to ‘polissen op occurrence basis’. 
176 In the past liability insurers attempted to limit liability cover to an insured’s liability towards a third 
party for an accident (‘het voorvallen van een ongeval, dit wil zeggen een “plotse en onvrijwillige” 
gebeurtenis’). See Fontaine ibid para 680. Gradually this limited cover was somewhat extended in 
practice by liability policies that covered liability for a ‘harmful event’ (‘schadeverwekkende 
gebeurtenis’) ibid. The initial version of s 77 of the LIC Act applied to insurance cover against any 
claim for compensation ‘based on a harmful event provided for in the contract’ (‘de in de 
overeenkomst beschreven schade-verwekkende gebeurtenis’) (hereafter the ‘initial version of s 77 of 
the LIC Act’) The wording of the initial version of s 77 of the LIC Act was amended to ‘the occurrence 
of loss as provided for in the contract’ (‘het voorvallen van de schade die in de overeenkomst is 
beschreven’) (hereafter ‘s 77 of the LIC Act, as amended’). See s 8 of the Act of March 1994, Belgian 
State Gazette of 4 May 1994. This was done due to possible ambiguity in the initial version of s 77 of 
the LIC Act, in conjunction with the former initial wording of s 78 of the LIC Act (hereafter referred to 
as the ‘initial version of s 78 of the LIC Act’). It was uncertain whether the initial versions of ss 77 and 
78 referred to the occurrence of loss itself (‘het voorvallen zelf van de schade’), or whether they 
referred to the act or neglect that may have resulted in the loss (‘de fout die de schade dreigt te 
veroorzaken’). See Fontaine ibid para 681 and Van Schoubroeck & Schoorens ibid 644-645. Section 
77, as amended, of the LIC Act (now s 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014) no longer contained the 
ambiguity, although other criticism remains. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 681. The 
initial version of s 78 of the LIC Act was also changed in line with the amendment of s 77 of that Act. 
See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 699; and Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 
Rechtskundig Weekblad 1384. The amended s 78 of the LIC Act (hereafter ‘s 78 of the LIC Act, as 
amended’) is now contained in s 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014. See Fontaine ibid paras 679-699 
and see paras 5.2.2.2(a) and 5.2.2.2(b) below for further detail on the application of ss 141-142 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 77-78 of the LIC Act, as amended). 
177  As discussed in para 5.2.2.1 above, some commentators are of the opinion that s 141 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act, as amended) merely provides a description of 
the scope of application of ss 141-152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 78-89 of the LIC 
Act) to liability insurance contracts and that undue emphasis should not be placed on s 141 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 77 of the LIC Act, as amended) as a way of determining the scope 
of the undertaking to provide insurance, nor of the time when the performance by the liability insurer is 
due. See Van Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 644.  
178 For example, the cover against environmental loss in public liability policies is limited to accidental 
environmental loss (‘milieuschade die in de meeste polissen BA-exploitatie beperkt is tot de 
accidentele milieuschade’). See Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 10 para 1.2.1.  
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also provide cover for gradual loss that is not caused by a sudden or accidental event 
or occurrence.179 
One should further distinguish between the duration of the liability insurance 
contract as provided for by the period of insurance, and the duration of liability cover 
in terms of that contract.180 As far as the duration of the contract is concerned, the 
period of insurance in a liability policy may, for instance, be one year, while the 
duration of liability cover may commence before the commencement of the liability 
policy and may even extend beyond the period of insurance.  
Section 85(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 30(1) of the LIC Act) provides as 
follows as to the duration and termination of insurance contracts in general: 
‘De duur van de verzekeringsovereenkomst mag niet langer zijn dan één jaar’.181 
 In Belgian law, liability policies are issued for one year, but in any event are 
renewable. 
As far as the duration or scope of the liability cover is concerned, there are three 
broad forms of liability policy in Belgium: ‘act-committed’; ‘loss-occurrence’; and 
‘claims-made’. In addition, some ‘hybrid’ liability policies – in the main, variations 
and combinations of ‘occurrence-based’ and ‘claims-made’ policies – have 
developed. It depends on the type of insurance cover whether acts or occurrences 
which take place, or whether claims that are made before, during, or after the currency 
of the contract (period of insurance) are covered. Many scenarios may arise.  
The distinctions between the different types of policy, as far as the insured 
event and the duration of cover are concerned, are discussed further below.182 Section 
                                                 
179 An example of a sudden event or occurrence is a car accident or an explosion. An example of 
gradual loss that is not sudden is long-term seepage of oil into groundwater resources. The impact of 
gradual loss on insurance cover is explained by Van Schoubroeck 10 para 1.2.1 as ‘schadegevallen of 
schadever-wekkende gebeurtenissen, waarmee worden bedoeld de niet-verwachte gebeurtenissen 
zonder de voorwaarde dat deze plots of abnomaal hoeven te zijn’.  
180 For further detail, see Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 12-13 para 1.2.4 on the 
duration of liability contracts and 13-15 para 1.2.5.1 on the duration of liability cover. Also see Van 
Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 645-664 and Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 694-699. 
181 Freely translated: ‘The duration of the liability insurance contract may not exceed one year’. (My 
translation.) See s 85(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 30(2) of the LIC Act), as discussed 
by Van Schoubroeck ibid 12-13 para 1.2.4 for exceptions to the general rule in s 85(1) of the Insurance 
Act of 2014 (previously s 30(1) of the LIC Act). 
182 For further detail and examples see paras 5.2.2.2(a)(i) and 5.2.2.2(b)(i) below on ‘act-committed’ 
policies; paras 5.2.2.2(a)(ii) and 5.2.2.2(b)(ii) below on ‘loss-occurrence’ policies; and paras 
5.2.2.2(c)(i) and 5.2.2.2(c)(ii) below on ‘claims-made’ policies and hybrid policies. 
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142 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended)183 deals with the 
liability insurer’s obligations and the termination of the contract; and is also explored 
further below.184 
 
5.2.2.2(a)  The Insured Event185  
5.2.2.2(a)(i)  Act-committed Policies 
An act-committed liability policy, like all liability policies, contains an 
undertaking by the liability insurer to indemnify the insured against loss arising from 
a ‘harmful event’ (‘schadeverwekkende gebeurtenis’). In the case of act-committed 
liability policies, however, the insured and relevant event is the occurrence of a 
harmful event, such as the insured’s delict or breach of contract, within the period of 
the particular insurance contract. Under this type of liability insurance, it is generally 
irrelevant when the loss arising from the event occurred or became known; when the 
third party actually claimed against the insured;186 or when the insured became liable 
to the third party. 
The original version of section 78 of the LIC Act of 1992 provided as 
follows:187 
De verplichting van de verzekeraar strekt zich uit tot de vorderingen die na het einde 
van de overeenkomst worden ingediend, 188  wanneer de schadeverwekkende 
gebeurtenis zich in de loop van de overeenkomst heeft voorgedaan.189 
                                                 
183 Apart from the heading ‘Verplichtingen van de verzekeraar en het einde van de overeenkomst’ 
added to s 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014, the content of the previous s 78 of the LIC Act, as 
amended, was not amended further in the 2014 Insurance Act. 
184  See the summative table on the insured event and the duration of liability cover in para 
5.2.2.2(b)(iv) below. 
185 The different types of policy should not simply be equated to those with similar names under other 
legal systems, eg, in paras 3.2.2.2(a) and 4.2.2.2(a) above and para 6.2.2.2(a) below. Although the 
broad characteristics of these policies are the same in all legal systems, the content of the policies under 
Belgian law is influenced by s 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78 of the LIC Act, as 
amended). The different types of policy are discussed in a slightly different order in this chapter than in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 6, owing to the structure of Belgian law. 
186 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 691 states that, ‘[d]e meest beperkende oplossing bestond 
erin om slechts de tenlasteneming te aanvaarden van de schadegevallen waarvan de meest 
kenmerkende fasen, het “verwekkende feit” en de “eis” van de benadeelde, zich allebei gedurende de 
dekkingsperiode hadden voorgedaan …[m]aar soms werden uitbreidingen voorzien’. For further detail, 
see the extention of liability cover after the termination of the insurance agreement in para 5.2.2.2(b)(i) 
below. 
187 See Fontaine ibid 699. 
188 This refers to the insurer’s liability to its insured after the termination of the insurance contract. See 
para 5.2.2.2(b)(i) below on the duration of liability cover for a discussion on the insurer’s liability 
towards its insured beyond the period of insurance. 
189 Emphasis added. Freely translated: ‘The obligation of the insurer extends to claims that are brought 
after the expiry of the liability insurance contract if the harmful event occurred during the currency of 
the insurance contract’. (My translation.) The phrase ‘de in de overeenkomst beschreven 
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Initially the ‘occurrence of a harmful event during the currency of an insurance 
contract’ was the trigger to bring the matter within the scope of a particular period of 
cover designated in the liability insurance contract. 190  Before 1994, the LIC Act 
therefore provided for ‘act-committed’ liability policies in Belgium.191 
 
5.2.2.2(a)(ii)  Loss-occurrence Policies 
A loss-occurrence liability policy contains an undertaking by the liability 
insurer to indemnify the insured against loss that occurs during the currency of the 
insurance contract. Under these policies, the insured and relevant event is the 
occurrence of the third party’s loss during the period of a particular insurance 
contract. Under this type of liability insurance, too, it is generally irrelevant when the 
harmful event occurred; when the third party actually claimed against the insured; or 
when the insured became liable to the third party. 
Section 78(1) of the LIC Act, as amended,192 provided as follows: 
De verzekeringswaarborg slaat op de schade voorgevallen tijdens de duur van de 
overeenkomst en strekt zich uit tot vorderingen die na het einde van deze 
overeenkomst worden ingediend.193 
This section has since been repealed and re-enacted as section 142(1) of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 without any amendment to its content. 
The general rule under Belgian law at present is that liability insurance cover 
applies to loss that has occurred to the third party during the currency of the insurance 
                                                                                                                                            
schadeverwekkende gebeurtenis’ in the initial version of s 78 of the LIC Act originated from usage in 
policies. It was linked to the phrase ‘de in de overeenkomst beschreven schadeverwekkende 
gebeurtenis’ in the initial version of s 77 of the LIC Act, as regards the scope of liability insurance 
contracts,that aimed to indemnify the insured against harmful events provided for in the contract. See 
paras 5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.1(a)(i) and 5.2.2.2 above and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 681 and 699 
for further detail. The insurer’s liability to its insured after the end of the insurance contract is 
discussed under the duration of liability cover in para 5.2.2.2(b)(i) below. 
190 See para 5.2.2.2 above for the criticism, that they were contradictory raised, against the initial 
versions of ss 77 and 78 of the LIC Act. 
191 The initial version of s 78 of the LIC Act did not allow for any policy forms other than act-
committed policies. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 696 and 697. The initial version of s 78 of 
the LIC Act was amended by s 9 of the Act of March 1994, Belgian State Gazette of 4 May 1994. See 
Fontaine ibid para 697 and para 5.2.2.2(a)(ii)ff below for further detail on the position in Belgian law 
after 1994.  
192 Also in line with s 77 of the LIC Act, as amended, s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended, no longer 
contained the contradiction for which it had previously been critised. See Fontaine ibid paras 681 and 699. 
193 Emphasis added. Freely translated: ‘The insurance cover applies to loss occurring during the term of 
the contract and extends to claims brought after the expiry of the contract’. (My translation.) The 
insurer’s liability to its insured after the end of the insurance contract is discussed under the duration of 
liability cover in para 5.2.2.2(b)(ii) below. 
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contract.194 Section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of the LIC Act, as 
amended) no longer considers the occurrence of a harmful event during the period of 
an insurance contract as the trigger for determining whether a liability insurer must 
provide insurance cover, but now prescribes the occurrence of the third-party’s loss 
within the insurance period as the trigger for insurance cover. The term ‘voorvallen 
van de schade’195 is not defined in section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78 of 
the LIC Act). 196  Most commentators on Belgian law accept the so-called 
‘manifestation-therory’ (‘manifestatietheorie’). 197  The term ‘schadevoorval’ is 
therefore considered to refer to the moment when the (third-party) loss has 
manifested198 – ie, when the third-party became aware of its loss.199 
Section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of the LIC Act, as 
amended) now provides for a loss-occurrence system which coincides with section 
141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 77 of the LIC Act, as amended). 
 
5.2.2.2(a)(iii)  Claims-made Policies and Hybrid Policies  
In ‘pure’ claims-made policies, the liability insurer undertakes to indemnify 
the insured defendant for a third-party claim (‘schadeloosstellingseis door 
benadeelde’) that has been made to either the insured defendant or the latter’s liability 
                                                 
194  Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 696; Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 698-699; and Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 97-98 
para 34. Section 142(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2) of the LIC Act, as amended) 
contains exceptions where claims-made policies are possible under certain conditions. See Schuermans 
& Van Schoubroeck ibid para 697; Fontaine ibid paras 699-700; and Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheids-verzekering’ 98-100 para 35. See para 5.2.2.2(a)(iii) below on ‘claims-made’ 
policies and ‘hybrid’ policies. 
195 Or ‘schadevoorval’ in short; ‘the occurrence of loss or damage’. 
196 Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1388; Schuermans & Van 
Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 696; and Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijk-
heidsverzekering’ 97 para 34.  
197 In keeping with American case law and legal doctrine, four possible theories or criteria to determine 
the time of (and content of the term) loss may be identified: Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck 
Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) ibid. Apart of the ‘manifestation-theory’, the ‘exposure-theory’ 
(‘blootstellingstheorie’); the ‘injury-in-fact theory’ (‘criterium van het feitelijke schade’); and the 
‘multiple or continuous trigger theory’ (‘criterium van de meervoudige schade’) exist. English law also 
recognises these theories. For further detail see para 4.2.2.2(b)(i) above. 
198 ‘[H]et zich manifesteren van de schade’. See Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 97 
para 34. Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 696 explain that, ‘er 
is pas een schadevoorval wanneer de schade zich openbaart of manifesteert. Concreet is dit het moment 
waarop de benadeelde kennis heeft of kennis krijgt van de schade.’ 
199 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 696 and Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 97-98 para 34. The manifestation theory has been accepted by judicial 
decisions, eg, Antwerpen, Court of Appeal (‘CA’) [‘Hof van Beroep’], decision of 17 Oct 2012, as 
referred to by Meurs & Thiery ibid para 34 n 102. 
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insurer within the period of insurance.200 In case of ‘pure’ claims-made policies, the 
insured and relevant event is the third party’s claim during the currency of a particular 
insurance contract. Under this type of liability insurance, it is generally irrelevant 
when the harmful event occurred; when the loss occurred or became known; or when 
the insured became liable to the third party.  After the amendment of the initial 
version of section 78 of the LIC Act in 1994,201 section 78(2)(i) provided as follows: 
Voor de takken die deel uitmaken van de algemene burgerrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid, andere dan de burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid inzake 
motorrijtuigen, die door de Koning worden bepaald, kunnen de partijen 
overeenkomen dat de verzekerings-waarborg alleen slaat op de vorderingen die 
schriftelijk worden ingesteld tegen de verzekerde of de verzekeraar tijdens de duur 
van de overeenkomst voor schade voorgevallen tijdens diezelfde duur.202 
 
Section 78(2)(i) of the LIC Act, as amended, has since been repealed and re-
enacted as section 142(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 without further changes to its 
content. 203  This section may be regarded as an exception to the loss-occurrence 
system prescribed by section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of the LIC 
Act, as amended).204 Subject to specified conditions, section 142(2) of the Insurance 
Act of 2014 (s 78(2) of the LIC Act, as amended) provides for a ‘hybrid’ type of 
claims-made policy205 against general liability in private law. When liability insurance 
contracts are enlisted in the Royal Decree of December 1992, as amended,206 parties 
                                                 
200 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 694.  
201 See para 5.2.2.2(a)(i) above for further detail. 
202 Emphasis added. Freely translated as: ‘For classes of general civil liability, other than motor-vehicle 
liability, as determined by the King, the parties may agree that the insurance cover applies only to the 
claims brought in writing against the insured or the insurer during the term of the contract for loss that 
occurred during the same period’. (My translation.) The insurer’s liability to its insured after the end of 
the insurance contract is discussed under the duration of liability cover in para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below. 
203 Section 142(2)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) of the LIC Act, as amended) 
is discussed in para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below. 
204  Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 699 discusses s 142(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously s 78(2) of the LIC Act) under ‘Uitzonderingen’; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijk-
heidsverzekering’ 98 para 35 describe it under the heading ‘Uitzonderingsregeling…’; and Van 
Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1385 refer to that position as a 
‘uitzonderingsregime’.  
205 Due to the combination of elements from claims-made policies and loss-occurrence policies (and 
even the possibility of act-committed policies). See further explanation para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii). Also see 
paras 5.2.2.2(b) and 5.2.2.2(b)(iv) for futher detail on whether the provisions of s 142 of the Insurance 
Act of 2014 (previously s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended) are mandatory, or if the parties to the 
contract may agree on variations thereof by entering into other type of hybrid policies.  
206 Section 6bis of Royal Decree of 24 Dec 1992, ‘tot uitvoering van de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de 
landverzekeringsovereenkomst’, Belgian State Gazette of 31 Dec 1992, as amended by Royal Decree 
of 29 Dec 1994, Belgian State Gazette of 27 Jan 1995 (hereafter ‘Royal Decree of Dec 1992, as 
amended’). The Legislature also determined that personal liability insurance (‘BA privéleven’) and 
personal liability insurance against fire (‘BA brand’) may not be offered under this exception. See 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 698. 
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to such liability insurance contracts, other than motor-vehicle liability insurance,207 
may agree to apply the system under section 142(2)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 
78(2)(i) of the LIC Act, as amended). However it is provided that third-party claims 
under section 142(2)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2)(i) of the LIC Act, as 
amended) should be brought in writing against the insured or the latter’s liability 
insurer during the currency of the contract for loss suffered during the same period. 
As explained above, in a pure claims-made policy the third-party claim should 
be made within the period of insurance. Under the ‘hybrid’ form of claims-made 
policies provided for under section 142(2)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2)(i) 
of the LIC Act, as amended), it is provided that the third-party claim should be made 
in writing within the period of insurance208 and, in addition, that the third-party loss 
should have occurred within the period of insurance. In the case of this ‘hybrid’ form 
of claims-made policy, the insured (and relevant) events are a written third-party 
claim and occurrence of the loss, both of which events should take place within the 
period of insurance.209 It is irrelevant when the harmful event occurred210 or when the 
insured became liable to the third party. 
 
5.2.2.2(b)  The Duration of Liability Cover211  
As explained earlier,212 the materialisation of the risk213 in liability insurance 
may start before the commencement of the insurance contract and continue beyond 
                                                 
207 ‘BA motorrijtuigen’.  
208 Save in as far as s 142(2)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) of the LIC Act, as 
amended) concerns the duration of liability cover and provides for the third-party claim to be instituted 
within an extended period of time after the expiry of the insurance contract. See para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) 
below for further detail. 
209 Under s 142(2)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(i) of the LIC Act, as amended). 
210 However, see the reference to harmful events that may give rise to the occurrence of loss within the 
period of insurance, in s 142(2)(ii) bullet 2 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) bullet 2 
of the LIC Act, as amended). See para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below for further detail. 
211 This topic is as important in Belgian law as in the other systems considered (in chapters 3 and 4) due 
to the legal challenges that it present: it therefore requires detailed analysis. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht 
(2 ed) in para 689-690 comments that ‘[d]eze vraag [dekking in de tijd] maakt het voorwerp uit van een 
afzonderlijke afdeling omwille van haar heel bijzonder belang’. See paras 3.2.2.2(b) and 4.2.2.2(b) 
above for further detail on the duration of liability cover in the other chapters on South African and 
English law. Some repetition may occur in paras 5.2.2.2(a) and 5.2.2.2(b) for purpose of clarity in this 
rather technical discussion. 
212 See para 5.2..1(b) above. 
213 Cousy ‘Over het “verzekerbaar risico”’ 158 describes it as a composite risk and defines the term 
‘composiet risico’ as ‘een risico waarvan de realisatie het plaatsgrijpen veronderstelt van verschillende, 
niet in de tijd samevallende gebeurtenissen’. He explains the process in which the ‘schadegeval’ may 
evolve in liability insurance as folows: ‘waar het schadegeval niet uit een enkele gebeurtenis, maar uit 
een opeenvolging van gebeurtenissen, uit een proces van opeenvolgende feiten (schadeverwekkende 
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the period of insurance. The gradual materialisation of the risk in liability insurance 
not only creates uncertainty in determining the precise moment of the materialisation 
of the insured event, 214  but also creates legal challenges regarding the extended 
duration of liability cover 215  beyond the period of insurance (‘uitgebreidheid 
[uitgestrektheid] van de dekking in de tijd’). 
Van Schoubroeck illustrates the uncertainty that may arise as to the duration of 
liability cover with reference to the following example. Say that there is a liability 
policy in place with insurer X when a vehicle leaves the factory after manufacture. Z 
purchases the vehicle and takes out liability cover with a different insurer, Y. Z has an 
accident and a manufacturing default with the brakes is discovered by an expert. Is X 
or Y liable?216 
The type of liability policy(ies) involved determines both which policy applies 
and the duration of liability cover. The terms ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ 217  and 
‘posterioriteitsrisico’ 218  are used for the discussion on the duration of liability 
cover.219 ‘Anterioriteitsrisico’ refers to an insured’s retrospective risk of liability for 
loss arising from events that occurred prior to the inception of the insurance 
contract.220 ‘Posterioriteitsrisico’ refers to an insured’s prospective risk if the third-
party claim is instituted against it after the period of the insurance agreement for a 
                                                                                                                                            
gebeurtenis, voorvallen van de schade, instellen van de vordering) bestaat, derwijze dat het risico erin 
bestaat dat deze verschillende niet in de samevallende feite, zich allemaal voordoen’. Ibid. 
214 See para 5.2.2.2 above. 
215 Cousy ‘Over het “verzekerbaar risico”’ 158 outlines some of the legal challenges resulting from 
composite risk specifically in the context of the loss-causing event and the duration of the policy and 
observes that the ‘composiet karakter van het risico maakt het kern uit van heel wat delicate problemen 
zoals het (juiste tijdstip van het) plaatsgrijpen van het schadegeval, … en wellicht en vooral 
uitgestrektheid van de dekking in de tijd in de aansprakelijkheidsverzekering.’ Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 689-690 also emphasises the need to extend liability cover beyond the 
period of insurance to take account of the gradual materialisation of the insured event in liability 
insurance. 
216  Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 13 para 1.2.5.1. For other (more complex) 
examples, see Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1388-1389 and Van 
Schoubroeck & Schoorens (1995) Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 650-652. 
217 Also known as ‘inlooprisico’.  
218 Also known as ‘uitlooprisico’.  
219 These terms should not simply be equated to similar terminology (or their translations) as used in 
other legal systems, eg, in paras 3.2.2.2(b) and 4.2.2.2(b) above. The Dutch terms are used here for 
legal certainty. The content of these terms under Belgian law is influenced by the different types of 
policy as provided for by s 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78 of the LIC Act, as 
amended). 
220 Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 96 para 33. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) 
para 690 explains that the term ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ refers to the case where ‘het verloop [van het 
schadegeval] reeds een aanvang heeft genomen op het ogenblik waarop het contract uitwerking krijgt, 
met name zo het “verwekkend feit” vooraf plaats gehad heeft’.  
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harmful event or loss that occurred during the currency of the insurance contract.221 
Questions arise as to whether an insured’s liability insurer, or which of its liability 
insurers in the instance of successive liability policies, should provide liability cover 
for an insured’s ‘anterioriteits’- or ‘posterioriteitsrisico’. 
The duration of liability cover222 under the different types of policy may now 
be explained on the basis of the ‘anterioriteits-’ or ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ created or 
covered by the respective policies. 
 
5.2.2.2(b)(i)  Act-committed Policies 
As discussed earlier,223 liability cover will be provided under act-committed 
policies if the harmful event (‘schadeverwekkende gebeurtenis’) occurred during the 
period of insurance. 
Act-committed liability policies do not provide retrospective cover against 
‘anterioriteitsrisico’ for harmful events (such as the insured’s delict or breach of 
contract against the third party) which occurred prior to the inception of a specific 
insurance policy (and subsequent third-party loss that arises from such anterior 
harmful events). 224  However, these policies provide prospective cover against 
‘posterioriteitsrisico’ for claims instituted by third parties against the insured (or for 
loss that manifests) after the expiry of a specific insurance contract, provided that the 
harmful event on which the claim or loss is based occurred during the currency of the 
insurance contract.  
The initial version of section 78 of the LIC Act provided as follows: 225 
De verplichting van de verzekeraar strekt zich uit tot de vorderingen die na het 
einde van de overeenkomst worden ingediend,226 wanneer de schadeverwekkende 
gebeurtenis zich in de loop van de overeenkomst heeft voorgedaan.227 
                                                 
221 Meurs & Thiery ibid. Fontaine ibid para 690 explains that the term ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ refers to 
the case where ‘de “eis” van de benadeelde wordt gesteld na het einde van de overeenkomst’.  
222 See the distinction between the duration of cover and the duration of the liability insurance contract 
para 5.2.2.2 above.  
223 See para 5.2.2.2(a)(i) above. 
224 In the context of act-committed policies, Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig 
Weekblad 1385 describe ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ to refer to ‘aansprakelijkheid voor schade die voortvloeit 
uit of veroorzaakt word door feiten die zich voordeden vóór het begin van de verzekerings-
overeenkomst’. In act-committed policies there is not retrospective cover for such 
‘anteritioriteitsrisico’s’ – the first element of risk, being the harmful event, should occur during the 
period of insurance. 
225 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 699. 
226 Emphasis added. This refers to the insurer’s liability to its insured after the end of the insurance 
contract and is the focus of this discussion. 
227 Freely translated as: ‘The obligation of the insurer extends to claims that are brought after the 
expiry of the liability insurance contract if the harmful event occurred during the currency of the 
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Under the initial version of section 78 of the LIC Act, a harmful event that 
occurred within the period of the insurance contract brought the matter within the 
scope of a particular period of cover designated in the liability insurance contract. 
Further, the insurer’s obligations extended beyond the expiry of the insurance 
contract, to the expiry of prescription periods (of claims by the third party against the 
insured on the one hand; and of claims by the insured or third party against the 
liability insurer on the other).228 Insurers were exposed to this so-called ‘long-tail 
liability’ in that claims may have been made by third parties on the insured and hence 
by the insured (or third parties directly) on the insurer, long after the expiry of the 
insurance contract and the occurrence of the harmful event.229 Legal commentators 
regarded the initial version of section 78(1) of the LIC Act as mandatory in so far as 
it related to the insurer’s obligation to prospective cover against ‘posterioriteits-
risico’.230 
The scope of the initial version of section 78 of the LIC Act was considered too 
wide due to the insurer’s potential long-tail liability. Professional liability, in 
particular, threatened to become uninsurable. As discussed earlier, 231  the initial 
version of section 78 of the LIC Act was fundamentally reviewed and replaced by a 
dual system.232  
  
                                                                                                                                            
insurance contract’. (My translation.) See para 5.2.2.2(a)(i) above as regards the insured event in act-
committed policies.  
228 For further detail on prescription, see para 5.2.2.1(d)(i) above and para 5.2.2.2(b)(iv) below. 
229 In the context of act-committed policies, Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig 
Weekblad 1384 describe ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ as follows: ‘De aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar kon 
bijgevolg gehouden zijn, binnen de regels van de verjaring, tot een zeer lange termijn van dekking voor 
eisen ingesteld na het einde van de verzekeringsovereenkomst, voor zover het schadeverwekkend feit 
zich in de duurtijd van deze overeenkomst had voorgedaan’. 
230 Van Schoubroeck & Meurs ibid 1385. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 696 explains, as 
regards the mandatory cover of ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ in act-committed policies, that ‘in zijn 
oorspronkelijke vorm sloot het artikel 78 bijgevolg elke afwijking uit’. 
231 See paras 5.2.2.2(a)(ii) and 5.2.2.2(a)(iii) above for further detail on the insured event in loss-
occurrence policies and claims-made and hybrid policies. 
232 Namely, loss-occurrence policies as a general rule, and hybrid claims-made policies as the exception 
to it, under certain conditions. See paras 5.2.2.2(b)(ii) and 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below on the duration of 
liability cover under loss-occurrence policies and hybrid claims-made policies respectively as 
prescribed by the s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended (now s 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014).  
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5.2.2.2(b)(ii)   Loss-occurrence Policies 
Liability cover will be triggered under loss-occurrence policies if the third-party 
loss occurred during the period of insurance. Loss-occurrence liability policies 
generally offer retrospective cover against ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ as far as they may 
relate to harmful events that occurred before the inception of a particular insurance 
policy.233 These policies also provide prospective cover against ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ 
for claims instituted by third parties against the insured after the expiry of a 
particular insurance contract.234 It is irrelevant whether the harmful event occurred 
before the inception insurance contract,235 or whether the claim by the third party 
against the insured was instituted after the period of the insurance contract.  
Section 78(1) of the LIC Act as amended, provided as follows:236 
De verzekeringswaarborg slaat op de schade voorgevallen tijdens de duur van de 
overeenkomst 237  en strekt zich uit tot vorderingen die na het einde van deze 
overeenkomst worden ingediend.238 
Section 78(1) of the LIC Act, as amended, has since been repealed and re-
enacted as section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 without further amendment to 
its content. Liability insurers must provide insurance cover under section 142(1) of 
the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of the LIC Act, as amended) provided that the 
third-party loss occurred (ie, manifested) 239  within the period of the insurance 
contract.  
Uncertainty existed as to whether the Legislature provided for retrospective 
cover for ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ under section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 
                                                 
233 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 694. 
234  Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 692 explains that ‘[m]et betrekking tot het 
posterioriteitsrisico, spreekt men … van polissen op occurrence basis wanneer de dekking zich 
uitstrekt tot nadien ingestelde vorderingen, voor zover [de schade] (‘the third-paraty loss’) zich heeft 
voorgedaan in de loop van de overeenkomst’.  
235 As to retrospective cover for anterioriteitscover in loss-occurrence policies, Van Schoubroeck & 
Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1387 contend that ‘[u]it de zuivere toepassing van dit 
system volgt dat de aansprakelijkheid is gedekt wanneer de schade voorvalt tijdens de duurtijd van de 
overeenkomst, met inbegrip van de schade die het gevolg is van feiten of handelingen die zich voor de 
inwerkingtreding van de overeenkomst hebben voorgedaan’. 
236 The initial version of s 78 of the LIC Act was replaced by a new version in 1994. See para 5.2.2.2 
above.  
237 See para 5.2.2.2(a)(ii) above for further detail on the insured event in loss-occurrence policies. 
238 Emphasis added. Freely translated as: ‘The insurance cover applies to loss occurring during the term 
of the contract and extends to claims brought after the expiry of the contract’. (My translation.) This 
refers to the insurer’s liability towards its insured after the termination of the insurance contract and is 
the focus of the present discussion. 
239 On the manifestion of the loss, see para 5.2.2.2(a)(ii) above. 
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78(1) of the LIC Act) if the third-party loss occurred during the period of insurance, 
but the harmful event occurred before the inception of the insurance contract.240 The 
Belgian Supreme Court has since decided that the Legislature did not intend to 
prescribe retrospective cover for ‘anteriterioriteitsrisico’ mandatorily. 241  For 
example, it is within the contractual freedom of the insured and the insurer to agree on 
whether or not liability for loss that arises due to harmful events that occurred prior to 
the inception of the insurance contract is covered under a particular insurance 
policy.242 
Section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of the LIC Act, as 
amended) provides for prospective liability cover for ‘posterioriteitsrisico’. The 
insurer’s obligations extend beyond the expiry of the insurance contract, until the end 
of prescription periods of claims by the third party against the insured on the one 
hand; and of claims by the insured or third party against the liability insurer on the 
other hand.243 Liability insurers are exposed to this so-called ‘long-tail liability’ in 
that claims may have been made by third parties against the insured, and hence by the 
insured (or by third parties directly) on the insurer, long after the expiry of the 
insurance contract and the occurrence of the third-party loss or harmful event.244  
Loss-occurrence policies are the preferred type of liability insurance cover from 
the insured’s point of view, 245  whereas claims-made policies 246  are preferred by 
insurers.247 
                                                 
240 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 699 and n 1606; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 97-98 para 34; Schuermans & Van Schouboeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 
695; and Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad at 1385.  
241 See the decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 28 Jun 2012, as discussed by Van 
Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad at 1382-1384 and at 1386-1389; 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 695; and Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 
98 para 34 n 103.  
242 Meurs & Thiery ibid. Van Schoubroeck & Meurs ibid 1388 caution that contractual limitation of 
retrospective cover for ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ may create gaps in the insurance cover. They provide that 
in successive policies, ‘door het samenspel van een contractuele inperking van het inlooprisico en de 
toepasselijke regeling van het uitlooprisico er echter dreigt een verzekerde alsnog tussen wal en schip 
te belanden’. Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 98 para 34 confirm that the insured 
may then be unable to claim cover under any of its insurance agreements. For an example see Van 
Schoubroeck & Meurs ibid. 
243 For further detail on prescription see para 5.2.2.1(d) above and para 5.2.2.2(b)(iv) below. 
244  Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1385 and Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 694. 
245 Provided that under successive loss-occurrence policies each insurer provides cover for third-party 
loss that occurred while its contract was in force, irrespective the date of the third-party claim. See 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 695 who also refers to the disadvange of loss-occurrence 
policies to the insured, namely that where a third-party institutes a claim against an insured and the 
insured claims against an insurer for loss that occurred under a very old policy, the latter policy’s limits 
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Legal doctrine holds that section 142(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of 
the LIC Act, as amended) covers prospective liability for ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ 
mandatorily. 248  Parties to an insurance contract may deviate from mandatory 
provisions only in so far as the deviation is to the advantage of the party protected by 
the legislative provision.249 The Belgian Supreme Court did not rule on which party 
was protected under the mandatory provisions of section 142 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 (s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended), but the majority of commentators consider 
the provision to be to the benefit of the insured. 250  The prospective cover for 
‘posterioriteitsrisico’ which the Legislature prescribes under section 142(1) of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(1) of the LIC Act, as amended) is therefore to be 
regarded as the minimum cover that an insured may enjoy under a loss-occurrence 
policy.251 Parties to the insurance agreement may derogate from the latter section to 
the extent that it benefits the insured or under the exception provided for in section 
142(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2) of the LIC Act).  
 
5.2.2.2(b)(iii)  Claims-made Policies and Hybrid Policies  
As explained earlier,252 in a ‘pure’ claims-made policy the third-party claim 
should be made within the period of insurance. There is, in principle, unlimited 
retrospective cover for ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ as it is irrelevant when the harmful event 
or third-party loss occurred.253  
                                                                                                                                            
of cover will apply and may, due to inflation, not be sufficient to cover a claim at the present value of 
the third-party claim.  
246 See para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below for further detail on the duration of liability cover under claims-made 
liability policies.  
247  Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2ed) para 694 explains the problems that insurers encounter with 
‘posterioriteitsrisico’ under loss-occurrence policies by referring to examples of claims for liability 
against environmental loss or damage, medical negligence, and product liability that may be instituted 
long after the occurrence of the harmful event that gave rise to the loss. It is challenging for insurers to 
provide prospective cover for ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ long after the expiry of their insurance conctracts. 
Fontaine ibid underlines the gravity of ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ by referring to reinsurers declining to 
cover risks where ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ has not been excluded.  
248 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 699; Van Schoubroeck & 
Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1386 and the decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, 
Cass, dated of 28 Jun 2012. 
249 Van Schoubroeck & Meurs ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. The following deviations from the posterioriteit (‘uitloopdekking’) for prospective cover are 
accepted as valid, as they are regarded as favouring the insured: an act-committed policy with 
prospective cover until the claims have prescribed; or prospective cover beyond 3 years. See para 
5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below for further detail. 
252 See para 5.2.2.2(a)(iii) above on the insured event in claims-made policies. 
253 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 693 refers to the insured’s extensive duty of disclosure to the 
liability insurer as one of the challenges of ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ and explains the duty as follows, ‘de 
omstandigheden me[e] te delen die hij kent en die van aard zijn om tot het verwezenlijking van het 
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These policies usually do not provide prospective cover against 
‘posterioriteitsrisico’ for claims instituted by third parties against the insured after 
the expiry of a particular insurance contract. Claims-made policies are therefore the 
preferred option from the insurer’s point of view.254  
 Section 142(2)(i) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2)(i) of the LIC Act, as 
amended) provides for ‘hybrid claims-made policies’ under certain circumstances, 
provided that the third-party claim is made in writing within the period of insurance. 
It is further required that the third-party loss occurred (manifested) within the period 
of insurance.255 There is, in principle, unlimited retrospective cover for ‘anterioriteits-
risico’ as it is irrelevant when the harmful event occurred. 
A further deviation from ‘pure’ claims-made policies, may be found in section 
142(2)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2)(ii) of the LIC Act, as amended).256 
The so-called ‘sunset clause’ prescribes limited prospective cover for ‘posterioriteits-
risico’ (‘beperkte nadekking’)257 for the ‘hybrid’ claims-made policies under section 
142(2)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2)(ii) of the LIC Act, as amended).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
risico te leiden’. He further cautions that retrospective cover against ‘anterioriteitsrisico’ is not 
permitted if the risk has materialised in full, but is possible in liability insurance due to the evolving 
nature of the occurrence of loss, eg, the harmful event has taken place but the loss (‘schadegeval’) has 
not yet maifested. 
254  Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 694 and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 694.  
255 Section 142(2)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) of the LIC Act, as amended) 
concerns the duration of liability cover and provides for the third-party claim to be instituted within an 
extended period after the termination of the insurance contract. See this para 5.2.2.2(b)(iii) below for 
further detail. 
256 Under ‘pure’ claims-made policies there is usually no prospective cover for ‘posterioriteitsrisico’. 
257  Meurs & Thiery‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 99 para 35 n 106 explain as follows: ‘De 
mogelijkheid van de toepassing van het “claims-made”-systeem werd ingelast om tegemoet te komen 
aan bezorgdheden van verzekeraars inzake langtermijnaansprakelijkheid [under, eg, loss-occurrence 
policies], maar tevens is getracht om de verzekerde (en indirect ook benadeelden) te beschermen door 
het voorzien van een beperkte posterioriteitsdekking indien aan bepaalde voorwaarden voldaan is’. The 
incorporation of the possibility of hybrid claims-made policies under certain conditions may, therefore, 
be described as a compromise solution, taking into account the interests of the liability insurer and the 
insured defendant (and to a certain extent also those of the third-party plaintiff). 
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The ‘sunset clause’ provides: 
In dat geval worden ook in aanmerking genomen, op voorwaarde dat ze schriftelijk 
worden ingesteld tegen de verzekerde of de verzekeraar binnen zesendertig 
maanden te rekenen van het einde van de overeenkomst, de vorderingen tot 
vergoeding die betrekking hebben op: 
 
o schade die zich tijdens de duur van deze overeenkomst heeft voorgedaan 
indien bij het einde van deze overeenkomst het risico niet door een 
andere verzekeraar is gedekt;258 
o daden of feiten die aanleiding kunnen geven tot schade, die tijdens de 
duur van deze overeenkomst zijn voorgevallen en aan de verzekeraar zijn 
aangeven.259 
Therefore, third-party claims brought against the insured or the insurer under 
‘hybrid’ claims-made policies, in writing, and within 36 months of the expiry of the 
insurance contract, are also covered under the ‘sunset clause’ in the following 
instances: 
– where the claims for compensation relate to third-party loss that has 
occurred during the currency of the contract, provided that on 
termination of the contract the risk is not covered by another insurer;260 
or 
– where the claims for compensation relate to acts or facts (harmful 
events) that may give rise to third-party loss, where the acts or facts 
                                                 
258 Section 142(2)(ii) bullet 1 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) bullet 1 of the LIC 
Act, as amended). Emphasis added. 
259 Section 142(2)(ii) bullet 2 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) bullet 2 of the LIC 
Act, as amended). Emphasis added. Section 142(2)(ii) may be as: ‘Third-party claims brought against 
the insured or the insurer in writing, and within 36 months after expiry of the contract, are also covered 
subject to the following conditions: where the claims for compensation relate to third-party loss that 
has occurred during the contract provided that, upon termination of the contract, the risk is not covered 
by another insurer; or where the claims for compensation relate to acts or facts that may give rise to 
third-party loss, which acts or facts occurred during the currency of the contract and were reported to 
the insurer within that period’. 
260 There was uncertainty as to the exact interpretation of this clause (ie, s 142(2)(ii) bullet 1 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 previously s 78(2)(ii) bullet 1 of the LIC Act, as amended). See Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 99-100 para 35; and Van Schoubroeck (2015) 10 Tijdschrift voor 
Belgisch Handelsrecht para 2. The decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 16 Jan 2015, 
discussed by Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 100 para 35 n 110 and Van 
Schoubroeck ‘Risico & schadegeval’ passim, interpreted this sub-section. The court held that, ‘de 
verplichte dekking gedurende de termijn van 36 maanden na het einde van de verzekerings-
overeenkomst geldt, tenzij een andere verzekeraar het schadegeval dekt’. In the case of two successive 
insurance policies that may provide cover under s 142(2)(ii) bullet 1 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously s 78(2)(ii) bullet 1 of the LIC Act, as amended), the first insurer will be relieved of liability 
only when the successive insurer in fact provides cover. Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 100 para 35 explain that, ‘[h]ieruit kan worden afgeleid dat … de eerste verzekeraar maar 
zal zijn vrijgesteld van dekking, wanneer de tweede verzekeraar effectief dekking verleent voor het 
schadegeval (d.w.z hij verleent dekking in concreto voor het risico)’ and ‘[h]et volstaat niet dat de 
tweede verzekeraar het risico in abstracto dekt’. 
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occurred during the currency of the contract and have been reported to 
the insurer within that period.261 
The Belgian Supreme Court has decided that the Legislature did not intend to 
prescribe mandatory retrospective cover for ‘anterioriteitsrisico’.262 As far as section 
142(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2) of the LIC Act, as amended) is 
concerned, parties to an insurance contract may exclude retrospective cover for 
‘anterioriteitsrisico’ by providing that the insurer will not cover claims for third-party 
loss that occurred during the period of insurance, if the harmful events that caused the 
loss occurred prior to the inception of the insurance contract.263 The prospective cover 
for ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ which the Legislature provides for under section 142(2)(ii) 
of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78(2)(ii) of the LIC Act, as amended) is mandatory. 
Parties to the insurance agreement may derogate from the latter section only in so far 
as it is to the benefit of the insured – eg, prospective cover for ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ 
beyond three years.264 
  
                                                 
261 Section 142(2)(ii) bullet 2 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 78(2)(ii) bullet 2 of the LIC 
Act, as amended). 
262 The decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 28 Jun of 2012, as discussed by Van 
Schoubroeck (2015) 10 Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht para 1. However, it is an inherent 
feature of claims-made policies (and also of hybrid forms) that the retrospective risk for 
‘anterioriteitsrisico’ is covered. 
263 Van Schoubroeck ibid para 2. This may amount to an indirect restriction on the application of the 
‘sunset clause’. 
264 Van Schoubroeck & Meurs (2012-2013) 35 Rechtskundig Weekblad 1386. Some commentators are 
of the view that the prospective cover of ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ for 36 months after the end of the 
insurance agreement under the ‘sunset clause’ may be too short due to different meanings ascribed to 
term ‘loss’ (‘schadegeval’). See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) 
para 699. 
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5.2.2.2(b)(iv)  Prescription of Claims Applied to Section 142 of the Insurance Act of    
2014265 
Summative table on the insured event and  
duration of liability cover under Belgian law266 
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Commentators are of view that the prospective cover of ‘posterioriteitsrisico’ 
under section 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended) has 
not affected (or nullified) the prescription of claims in liability insurance. Despite 
some similarities, the duration of liability cover and the prescription of claims are 
different distinct phenomena.267 
                                                 
265 Previously s 78 of the LIC Act. See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 1165 and Jocqué 
(2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen paras 75-76. 
266 Despite the profound changes to ss 77-78 of the LIC Act, as amended (now ss 141-142 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014), the sections are still subject to criticism, as explained in para 5.2.2.2 above and 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 699. 
267 Jocqué (2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen para 76 explains that, ‘de duur van de waarborg 
en de verjaring zijn twee verschillende fenomenen die beide verband houden met de tijdsdimensie van 
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While the duration of liability cover involves whether the insured event brings 
the claim, occurrence, or harmful event within the scope of a particular liability 
insurance contract,268 prescription of claims involves whether a potential claim, for 
example, by the insured or the third-party plaintiff against the liability insurer, has 
prescribed and can no longer be instituted.269 
5.2.2.3  Exceptions to, Exclusions from, and Limitations on Liability Cover  
Some of the more important exceptions to, exclusions from, and limitations on 
the liability cover in liability insurance policies are now explored. However, the 
discussion does not aim to provide an exhaustive analysis of all possibilities. 
 
5.2.2.3(a)  The Sum Insured, Aggregations, and Event Limits270 
The sum insured may generally be agreed upon between the parties to the 
liability insurance contract. However, the indemnity principle applies and the 
indemnity by the liability insurer to the insured defendant may not exceed the loss the 
latter has suffered, even where the sum insured is greater.271  
It is important to distinguish between the insured defendant’s limited and 
unlimited liability (‘onbeperkte en beperkte aansprakelijkheid’) towards the third-
party plaintiff, and the possible effect it may have on the extent of cover under the 
liability insurance contract. 
An insured defendant’s liability towards a third-party plaintiff may, in principle, 
be unlimited as may the cover under the liability policy.272 There is no capped insured 
sum in such an instance and the insurer should indemnify the insured up to the full 
amount of the third-party loss. Motor-vehicle liability insurance for bodily harm or 
                                                                                                                                            
de waarborg van de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar’. Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 1165 
opine that: ‘De duur van de verzekeringswaarborg en de verjaring van vorderingen zijn fenomenen die 
zich op eenzelfde tijdsas kunnen aftekenen en uiteraard kunnen overlappen. Het zijn echter twee 
verschillende fenomenen. De duur van de verzekeringswaarborg heeft te maken met de omvang van de 
dekking in de tijd en de verjaring heeft te maken met het instellen van vorderingen en aanspraken’. 
268  See paras 5.2.2.2 and 5.2.2.2(b)(i)-5.2.2.2(b)(iii) above. The question here is whether there is 
liability under a specific insurance policy although the insured event may fall outside the period of 
insurance.  
269  See para 5.2.2.1(d) above. The question here is whether a claim under a policy has become 
extinguished due to time lapse under statutory periods of prescription. 
270 In writing this section, the following works on the Belgian insurance law were consulted: Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 675-677; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht 
(3 ed) paras 700-710; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 11-12 para 1.2.3.  
271 Sections 91 and 105 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 37 and 51 of the LIC Act) on 
indemnity insurance. Also see Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 18 para 1.3.1. 
272 See, eg, the liability under articles 1382-1386 of the Civil Code. 
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physical injuries (‘verzekering BA motorrijtuigen voor lichamelijke letsels’) is the 
only mandatory unlimited cover under Belgian law.273  
However, the majority of liability policies limit the cover to be provided by the 
liability insurer by way of the sum insured.274 As regards the sum insured and the 
limits of indemnity, there may be an event limit, that is, a limit which applies to each 
accident, each occurrence or each claim by the insured, with no maximum. 
Alternatively, the liability policy may have a maximum limit applicable to a specific 
period of insurance, regardless of the number of claims made against the liability 
insurer. The use of aggregations – eg, sum insured per period of insurance (‘verzekerd 
bedrag per verzekeringsjaar’), or per harmful event (‘per schadeverwekkend feit’), or 
combinations of the two – is a further way of limiting the extent of the insurer’s 
liability under its liability policies.275  As discussed earlier,276  ‘schadegeval’ is the 
materialisation of the risk that may occur gradually over an extended period in 
liability insurance. However, successive identical or similar losses which arise from 
the same cause/insured event, may occur within the same period of insurance. 
Liability insurers use aggregation clauses of successive losses (clauses of serial loss or 
cumulative clauses; ‘globalisatieclausules’) in policies to treat successive losses as a 
single loss so as to limit the insurer’s liability.277  
An insured defendant’s liability to a third-party plaintiff is in some instances 
limited by statute. For example, the liability of a hotelkeeper to a guest is limited by 
statute to one hundred times the price of an overnight stay.278 Where the insured 
defendant’s liability has been limited in this way, the sum insured under the liability 
policy cannot exceed the statutory limitation279  – even if the policy provides for 
further limitation as discussed above.  
                                                 
273 Section 3(2) of Act of 1989 on Motor-Vehicle Liability Insurance; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 
ed) para 676; and Van Schoubroeck ibid 11-12 para 1.2.3. 
274 Fontaine ibid para 676. 
275 See para 5.2.2.2(b) above on the duration of liability cover in liability policies.  
276 See para 5.2.2.1 above. 
277  Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 701 explain that 
aggregation of successive losses has a contractual basis; ambiguity may be settled by judicial 
interpretation; and aggregation of successive losses and are often used in conjunction with other 
aggregations.  
278 Article 1952 of the Civil Code and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 675. 
279 This is an application of the indemnity principle. 
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Many liability policies purport to distinguish between the sum insured for 
material loss and the sum insured for death or physical injury. There are different 
insured sums for these categories.  
Two mandatory statutory rules are also important in the limitation of the sum 
insured to protect the insured’s estate against liability claims.  
First, the sum insured must be at least equivalent to the minimum amount 
prescribed for (compulsory) insurance against particular liability risks in specific 
legislation. For example, the sums insured for physical injury and material loss are 
determined for private liability insurance on a building that is insured under a fire 
insurance policy against so-called ‘simple risks’ (‘verzekering burgerrechtelijke 
aansprakelijkheid gebouw die wordt verzekerd in een brandpolis eenvoudige 
risico’s’).280  
Secondly, the sum insured as set out in the liability policy is no longer the 
absolute limit of the amount of the insurer’s liability. Section 146 of the Insurance Act 
of 2014 (s 82 of the LIC Act) deals with the payment of the principal sum, interest, 
and costs by the liability insurer:281  
De verzekeraar betaalt de hoofdsom verschuldigde schadevergoeding ten belope van 
de dekking. 
De verzekeraar betaalt, zelfs boven de dekkingsgrenzen, de interest op de in 
hoofdsom verschuldigde schadevergoeding. …282 
Voor de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen, andere dan die bedoeld in de wet van 21 
november 1989 betreffende de verplichte aansprakelijkheidsverzekering inzake 
motorrijtuigen, kan de Koning de intresten [en kosten ...] van dit artikel beperken.283 
 
                                                 
280 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakeljkheidsverzekering’ 10 para 1.2.3. 
281 In writing this section, the following general works on the Belgian insurance law were consulted: 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 723-727; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 708-710; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 11-12 
para 1.2.3 and 25 para 1.3.4.2. For further detail, see Cousy ‘De waarborg in de (professionele) 
aansprakelijk-heidsverzekering’ 64-67. 
282 See ss 146(3) and 146(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 82(3) and 82(4) of the LIC 
Act) and para 5.3.1.1(d) below as to the payment of the defence costs by the liability insurer. 
283 Freely translated: ‘The insurer shall pay the principal sum due, up to the sum insured. The insurer 
shall pay any interest due on the principal sum even where this exceeds the sum insured. … With 
regard to liability insurance other than motor-vehicle liability insurance regulated by the Act of 1989 
on Motor-Vehicle Liability Insurance, the interest [and costs] referred to in the previous two 
paragraphs can be limited by Royal Decree.’ (My translation.) Section 82(4) of the LIC Act was 
inserted in s 82 by s 10 of the Act of 16 March 1994, Belgian State Gazette of 4 May 1994, and 
provides for limitation of the payment of interest (and costs) by the liability insurer. It has since been 
repealed and re-enacted as s 146(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014. 
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Previously, the liability insurer was only liable to pay interest on the principal 
sum in so far as that amount plus interest did not exceed the limit of the cover (the 
sum insured) under the liability policy. Since the coming into force of the LIC Act, 
and now also under the 2014 Insurance Act, a liability insurer is liable to pay the 
damages due by the insured to the third-party plaintiff as follows: the principal sum 
up to the sum insured; and, in addition, interest due on the principal sum, even if this 
exceeds the sum insured in the liability policy.284 This amendment was adopted to 
protect both the insured defendant and the third-party plaintiff, as a liability dispute 
may take an inordinate time to be resolved and as the defence of the liability insured 
is generally largely in the hands of its liability insurer.  
 However, the liability insurer’s obligation to pay the interest (and costs)285 due 
on the principal amount, even in excess of the sum insured in the liability policy, is 
not unlimited:  
– The liability insurer is liable to pay the interest in the same proportion 
that it is liable to pay the principal sum due. 286 
– Further, with regard to liability insurance, other than motor-vehicle 
liability insurance regulated by the Act of 1989 on Motor-Vehicle 
Liability Insurance, the Royal Decree of Dec 1992, as amended, 
provides for the contractual limitation of the interest and costs referred 
to in section 146(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 82(4) of the LIC 
Act).287 
                                                 
284 Sections 146-148 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 82-84 of the LIC Act) deal with 
payment to the third-party plaintiff by the liability insurer, whereas s 149 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously s 85 of the LIC Act) deals with payment to the third-party plaintiff by the insured 
defendant. See paras 5.3.1.1, 5.3.1.2, and 5.3.2 below. 
285 See para 5.3.1.1(d) below on the payment of the defence costs by the liability insurer. 
286 For example, say that the insured defendant’s liability to pay the third-party plaintiff is €2 million as 
principal sum and € 800 000 towards interest, and the limit of cover under the liability policy is €1 
million, then the liabililty insurer will be liable for payment of €1 million towards the principal sum 
and €400 000 towards the interest. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 726.  
287 Section 6ter provides: ‘De in artikel 82 van de wet bedoelde intresten en kosten worden integraal 
door de verzekeraar gedragen, voor zover het geheel van de schadeloosstelling en de intresten en 
kosten per verzekeringsnemer en per schadegeval het verzekerde totaalbedrag niet overschrijdt’. Freely 
translated: ‘The interest and costs referred to in s 82 of the Act [now s 146 of the Insurance Act of 
2014] are paid by the insurer in principle, in so far as the total amout of indemnity does not exceed the 
total sum insured’. (My translation.) In principle, the liability insurer therefore pays the interest (and 
costs) if it is within the total sum insured per insured event. The Royal Decree of Dec 1992, as 
amended, further provides for the contractual limitation of payment of the interest (and costs) by the 
liability insurer if those amounts exceed the total sum insured, in accordance with the statutory 
formula. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 730; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 710; and Van Schoubroeck 12 para 1.2.3 and 25-26 para 1.3.4.2 for 
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5.2.2.3(b)  Exclusions or Exceptions to Liability Cover for an Insured 
Defendant’s Legal Liability towards Third-Party Plaintiffs  
 
5.2.2.3(b)(i)  Contractual Liability288  
As discussed earlier,289 the insured may be indemnified against amounts that it 
may be liable to pay to third parties in delict, contractually, for breach of contract, or 
statutorily, although indemnity against certain types of liability may be excluded 
expressly or by implication in the policy itself. Many liability policies cover only 
liability in delict and expressly exclude contractual liability. The parties to the 
contract may, in principle, negotiate freely whether delictual, contractual, particular 
statutory liabilities, or a combination of these, will be covered, at least while they 
have contractual freedom in the matter,290 and where it is possible to exclude liability 
contractually.291 
 
5.2.2.3(b)(ii)  The Conduct of the Insured Defendant292  
It has already been explained that only civil liabilities may be covered by a 
liability policy, and that no cover is permitted for criminal, moral, and disciplinary 
liabilities.293  
Section 62 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 8 of the LIC Act) provides as follows 
as regards ‘Fraud and fault’ (‘Bedrog en schuld’):294  
Niettegenstaande enig andersluidend beding, kan de verzekeraar niet verplicht 
worden dekking te geven aan hem die het schadegeval opzettelijk heeft veroorzaakt.  
De verzekeraar dekt de schade veroorzaakt door de schuld, zelfs de grove schuld,295 
van de verzekeringsnemer, van de verzekerde of van de begunstigde. De 
                                                                                                                                            
further detail on the limitation of payment of interest (and costs) by the liability insurer. See also 
generally Colle Algemene beginselen (7 ed) 204-211 and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) 600-611. 
288 In writing this section, the following general works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 674; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 693; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 10 para 
1.2.1. 
289 See para 5.2.2.1(a) above on the extent of covered liabilities. 
290 That is, where liability insurance is not compulsory by law. 
291 For example, delictual and contractual liability towards a passenger is compulsory under motor-
vehicle liability insurance (‘verzekering BA motorrijtuigen’).  
292 In writing this section, the following general works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 97 and 363-380; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 74-79 paras 2-9; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 10 para 1.2.1. 
293 See para 5.2.2.1(a) above on the extent of covered liabilities. 
294 For further detail on liability in delict generally, see Cousy & Droshout ‘Fault under Belgian Law’ 
27-51; Cousy & Vanderspikken ‘Causation under Belgian Law’ 23-37; and Cousy & Vanderspikken 
‘Damages under Belgian Law’ 27-51. 
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verzekeraar kan zich echter van zijn verplichtingen bevrijden voor de gevallen van 
grove schuld [zware fout] die op uitdrukkelijke en beperkende wijze in de 
overeenkomst zijn bepaald. 
De Koning kan een beperkende lijst opstellen van feiten die niet als grove schuld 
aangemerkt mogen worden.296 
The insurer is not entitled to provide cover to an insured defendant against its 
intentional causing of the loss. Neither the LIC Act, nor the Insurance Act of 2014, 
defines the meaning of a loss that has been caused ‘intentionally’. However, a court 
has ruled that under section 8 of the LIC Act (s 62 of the Insurance Act of 2014) loss 
is caused intentionally if the insured defendant has caused the loss voluntarily and 
consciously; although the insured need not have intended to cause loss of the nature 
and to the extent which occurred.297  
An agreement to cover intentional loss is void.298 This, too, has been confirmed 
by a court which held that the burden of proof rests on the insurer to establish both 
that loss was caused intentionally, and that there is a causal link between the intention 
of the insured and the loss caused.299 
                                                                                                                                            
295 Also known as ‘zware fout’ and hereafter referred to as ‘zware fout’: see this para 5.2.2.3(b)(ii) 
below for further detail. Also see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 371-380.  
296  Freely translated as: ‘Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the insurer shall not be 
required to provide a benefit to any person who intentionally caused the insured event. The insurer may 
cover loss caused by other forms of fault, including serious misconduct [‘zware fout’] by the 
policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary. However, the insurer may be exempted from its 
obligations in cases of serious misconduct [‘zware fout’] which have been expressly exempted and 
listed in detail in the liability insurance contract. The King may draw up an exhaustive list of acts 
which cannot be classified as serious misconduct [‘zware fout’]’. (My translation.) 
297 It has been decided that “‘[e]en schadegeval is opzettelijk veroorzaakt, … wanneer de verzekerde 
vrijwillig en bewust schade heeft toegebracht; … is niet vereist dat de verzekerde de bedoeling had de 
schade te veroorzaken zoals zij zich heeft voorgedaan’”. See decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, 
Cass, dated 24 Apr 2009, referred to by Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 366 and the decision by 
the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 26 Oct 2011, as referred to by Jocqué (2013) 286 Nieuw 
Juridisch Weekblad para I.A.4.5. 
298 See Fontaine ibid para 97 where he confirms, as regards s 8 of the LIC Act, that, ‘het artikel 8 alinea 
1 [s 8(i)], zijn van openbare orde, en niet louter van dwingende aard’. He further explains in para 369: 
‘De regel van artikel 8 alinea 1 [s 8(i)], is niet alleen van gebiedend recht, hij wordt ook beschouwd als 
zijnd[e] van openbare orde. Het is in deze zin dat de aanhef van de regel “niettegenstaande enig 
andersluidende beding” dient uitgelegd te worden … . Met andere woorden, de dekking van een 
opzettelijk schadegeval zou getroffen worden door de volstrekte nietigheid. Opzettelijke 
schadegevallen vallen trouwens in het algemeen onder de strafwet.’ Fontaine’s comments will also 
apply mutatis mutandi to s 62 of the Insurance Act of 2014. Also see for further detail, Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 363-370; Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 21 para 
1.3.3.2; Jocqué (2013) 280 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad 309-310; and Jocqué ibid 5-8; and Guiliams 
(2010-2011) 12 Rechtskundig Weekblad 474-485.See Weyts ‘Opzettelijkke fout’ 363-376 for an 
historical perspective. 
299 Decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 7 Jun 2001, as referred to by Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 77 para 6 n 14, where it was confirmed that article 1315(ii) of the 
Civil Code applies. The latter section provides that, “‘hij die beweert bevrijd te zijn, het bewijs [moet] 
leveren van […] het feit dat het tenietgaan van zijn verbintenis heeft teweeggebracht’”. Prior to this 
decision there was a difference in opinion as to whether loss caused intentionally by an insured was an 
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Loss caused by other forms of fault on the part of the insured defendant 
(including ‘zware fout’)300 may be covered, save in so far as ‘zware fout’301 has been 
expressly exempted, and listed exhaustively (in detail) in the liability insurance 
contract. ‘Zware fout’ is defined in neither the LIC Act nor the 2014 Insurance Act.302 
The mere fact that ‘zware fout’ on the part of the insured caused the loss, is no longer 
an automatic prohibition on liability cover.303 The insurer must, however, exempt the 
specific ‘zware fout’ expressly in the liability insurance policy, 304  and such an 
exemption is interpreted narrowly.305 The Legislature may compile a list of acts which 
cannot be classified as ‘zware fout’, and that can, therefore, not be exempted.  
                                                                                                                                            
exclusion (‘uitsluiting’) of liability or a forfeiture (‘verval’) of cover, with a different burden of proof. 
As a result of the decision, this distinction is no longer relevant in determining the burden of proof as 
regards intent. The Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 14 May 2012, as referred to by Meurs & 
Thiery ibid 78 para 7 also confirmed that loss caused intentionally by the insured qualifies as ‘een 
verval van dekking’ under s 87(2) of the LIC Act (now s 151(2) of the 2014 Insurance Act). See paras 
5.2.2.4 (on forfeiture of insurance cover) and 5.2.3.1 below (on the liability insurer’s right to the 
defences that the liability insurer may raise or not raise against the third-party plaintiff) for further 
detail. 
300 The Dutch term ‘zware fout’ is used for clarity. From the Belgian literature reviewed it is not clear 
whether the term ‘zware fout’ should be translated as recklessness, gross negligence, or should bear a 
different meaning. Dutch ‘zware fout’ involves an objective and a subjective element. Jocqué ‘De 
verzekerde en de benadeelde’ 407-408 refers to judicial decisions and legal doctrine and explains that, 
‘de grove fout [zware fout] enerzijds bestaat uit een objectief element, met name de risicoverzwaring 
buiten de normale vooruitzichten van de verzekeraar, en anderzijds uit een subjectief element, het 
bewustzijn van de verzekerde of het zich moeten bewust zijn van deze risicoverzwaring’. He proceeds 
(ibid 408) to explain the objective element as follows: ‘Het objectieve element houdt verband met het 
evenwicht tussen de prestaties van de contractpartijen, en meer bepaald met de toename van de kans 
dat het risico zich voordoet door het gedrag van de verzekerde en dit buiten de voorzieningen van de 
verzekeraar’. He then describes the subjective element as follows: ‘Het subjectieve element houdt in 
dat de verzekerde de gevolgen van zijn daad weliswaar niet heeft gewild maar dat zijn onachtzaamheid 
van die aard is dat hij wist of had moeten weten dat hierdoor een risicoverzwaring ontstond buiten de 
normale vooruitzichten van de verzekeraar’. 
301 Commentators appear to differ on whether other forms of fault on the part of the insured, eg ‘lichte 
fout’, may also be exempted by the liability insurer. Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 379. 
302 For further detail on the meaning of the term and its objective and subjective elements required 
under previous legislation, see Fredericq & Fredericq 382-383; Fredericq, Cousy & Rogge (1981) 18 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht paras 27-31 (note that these sources predate the LIC Act).  
303 Prior to the coming into force of the LIC Act, loss caused by the ‘zware fout’ of the insured was also 
excluded from insurance cover in the same way as loss caused intentionally by the insured and that 
there was no need for the loss to be expressly exempted and to be listed exhaustively. 
304  The majority of commentators appear to agree that the previous definition of ‘zware fout’ 
(consisting of of an objective and a subjective element) is no longer relevant. Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheids-verzekering’ 76 para 4 argue that ‘het volstaat dat wordt nagegaan of het feit 
waarop de verzekeraar zich beroept, overeenstemt met een geval dat is opgenomen in de 
polisvoorwaarden’. It is merely necessary to confirm whether the particular ‘zware fout’ has been 
exempted in the insurance policy expressly. 
305General exclusions such as the following are not acceptable for purposes of exempting the insurer’s 
liability for ‘zware fout’: serious breaches of safety regulations (‘ernstige inbreuken op de 
veiligheidsvoorschriften’; gross shortcomings in relation to the rules of the art or trade (‘grove 
tekortkomingen t.a.v de regels van de kunst’); taking unreasonable risks to speed up tasks or to save 
operating costs (‘het nemen van onredelijke risico’s om de werken te bespoedigen of om 
werkingskosten uit te sparen’); and neglecting the basic precautionary measures to prevent normally 
expected loss or its repetition (‘veronachtzamen van de elementaire voorzorgsmaatregelen om normaal 
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The burden of proof again rests on the insurer to prove that the ‘zware fout’ was 
exempted as alleged and that there is a causal link between the insured’s ‘zware fout’ 
and the loss caused.306 
It is said that intent and ‘zware fout’ have a personal character: an insurer’s 
liability can only be excluded as regards the person (eg, an insured, a policyholder, or 
a beneficiary) who actually caused the loss intentionally or by way of ‘zware fout’.307 
For example, where the parents of a minor are vicariously liable to third parties for 
loss that the minor caused intentionally or by ‘zware fout’, the insurer may be liable 
towards the parents for their vicarious liability, even though the insurer’s liability 
may, in principle, be excluded as regards the minor wrongdoer.  
 
5.2.2.4  The Insured Defendant’s Duties towards the Liability Insurer308  
 Under a liability insurance contract, the insured has similar duties towards the 
liability insurer as those under other types of insurance contract. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
te verwachten schade of herhaling ervan te voorkomen’). See Meurs & Thiey 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 80 para 11 n 30. To be exempted from cover, ‘zware fout’ must be 
listed expressly and exhaustively (in specific detail), eg, that ‘zware fout will be covered except in case 
of an accident that occurred while the insured was under the influence of drugs’. 
306 Decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 12 Oct 2007, as referred to by Meurs & Thiey 
ibid 78 para 6 n 17. Section 65 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 11 of the LIC Act) deals with 
forfeiture or partial forfeiture of an insured’s right to performance by the insurer due to the non-
fulfilment of a contractual obligation by the insured itself (‘geheel of gedeelteljik verval van het recht 
op verzekeringsprestasie’). The burden of proof is on the insurer to establish a causal link between the 
non-fulfilment of the contractual obligation in the forfeiture clause and the occurrence of the loss. An 
example of such a forfeiture clause in a liability insurance policy is that the insurer will not be liable in 
the event that an insured fails to comply with preventative measures expressly stipulated in the liability 
insurance policy (eg, provision of a fire extinguisher). See Meurs & Thiery ibid 81-83 paras 12-14 for 
further detail. 
307 Decisions by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 25 Mar 2003 and 4 Jun 2012, as referred to by 
Jocqué (2013) 286 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad para I.A.4.5. For further detail, see Meurs & Thiery ibid 
79-80 para 8-9; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 367 and 370; and Van Schoubroeck 
‘Aansprakelijk-heidsverzekering’ 21 para 1.3.3.2.  
308 In writing this section, the following general works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Van 
Schoubroeck ibid 15-18 para 1.3.1. For further detail, see Fontaine ibid paras 683 and 686; para 
5.2.2.1(a) above; and Van Schoubroeck ibid 18-19 para 1.3.2 for further detail on the rights of the 
insured defendant against the liability insurer, see again para 5.2.2.1(a) above; and Van Schoubroeck in 
para 1.3.2 at 18-19. The liability insurer’s rights include: the conduct of the defence (see para 5.3 
below); the right of subrogation against a responsible third party (see para 5.2.3.2 below); and the right 
of recourse against the policyholder or the insured (see para 5.3.1.1(c) below). Also see Van 
Schoubroeck ibid 26-29 para 1.3.5. 
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For example, the insured has an obligation to: 
– give notice of the insured event (‘melding [aangifte] van het 
schadegeval’);309 and 
– take all reasonable measures to prevent and mitigate the consequences 
of the loss (‘redelijke maatregelen nemen om de gevolgen van het 
schadegeval te voorkomen en te beperken’).310 
If the insured defendant fails to meet these obligations and its failure leads to 
any loss for the liability insurer, the latter has a right to claim a reduction in the 
insurance payment (performance by the insurer) equivalent to the loss suffered.311 The 
liability insurer may refuse to honour the policy if the insured acted with fraudulent 
intent in the non-fulfilment of these obligations.312 
The chapter on liability insurance in the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously the 
LIC Act) sets out a number of duties peculiar to liability insurance which the insured 
must fulfil in dealings with the liability insurer.  
The insured defendant:313 
– must submit documents to the insurer as soon as it is notified, enters an 
appearance, or submits to an investigation ordered by court 
(‘mededeling en overdracht stukken en verschijning voor de 
rechtbank’); 314 
– may not compensate, or promise to compensate, the third-party 
plaintiff without the consent of the liability insurer (‘verbod de 
benadeelde te vergoeden of vergoeding toe te zeggen’);315  but may 
                                                 
309 See s 74 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 19 of the LIC Act). The insured may, eg, have to 
give notice of the third-party claim or the third-party loss.  
310  See s 75 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 20 of the LIC Act) under the heading 
‘Verplichtingen van de verzekerde bij schadegeval’, translated as ‘Obligations at the time of the 
materialisation of the risk, or at the time of occurrence of the insured event’ (my translation). As to the 
term ‘schadegeval’, see the explanation in para 5.2.2.1(b) above. 
311 Section 65 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 11 of the LIC Act) on the full or partial 
forfeiture of the right to an insurance benefit (performance by the insurer) may also be applicable. 
312 See s 76 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 21 of the LIC Act) under the heading ‘Sancties’ 
meaning ‘Sanctions’. 
313 See para 5.3.1.1(d) below as part of the broader discussion of the conduct of the defence and 
settlement of claims by third-party plaintiffs against the insured by the insurer.  
314 See ss 145-146 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 80-81 of the LIC Act) under the 
respective headings ‘Overdracht van de stukken’ and ‘Niet-verschijning’, translated as ‘Transmission 
of documents’ and ‘Failure to enter appearance’ (my translations). 
315 See s 149(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 85(1) of the LIC Act) under the heading 
‘Schadeloosstelling door de verzekerde’ translated as ‘Compensation by the insured’ (my translation). 
The terminology ‘compensation’ (and not indemnification) by the insured defendant will be used. 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) par 716 explains that when an 
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admit the truth of a fact (even if in dispute)316 and provide immediate 
financial assistance and medical care to the third-party plaintiff 
(‘erkenning van feiten en verstrekking van eerste medische of 
geldelijke hulp’); 317 and 
– may not admit liability (‘geen erkenning van aansprakeljikheid’) to the 
third-party plaintiff without the insurer’s consent.318 
These duties are of particular importance in liability insurance and are discussed 
below.319  
 
5.2.3 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff320  
  The LIC Act, and now also the Insurance Act of 2014, have broadened the 
scope of protection for the third-party plaintiff.321 
  
                                                                                                                                            
insured defendant compensates the third-party plaintiff, the liability insurer is not necessarily liable to 
the insured defendant to reimburse the payment. The insured defendant should prove that the liability 
cover is due and that the indemnity it paid towards the third party is in accordance with the loss (that 
the insured defendant) suffered. 
316 For example, the insured driver of a vehicle may acknowledge that it crossed the traffic light after it 
had turned red. 
317 See s 149(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 85(2) of the LIC Act). 
318  Van Schoubroeck ibid 17 para 1.3.1.5. The insured driver of a vehicle may, however, not 
acknowledge that it is liable for the accident after it crossed the traffic lightonce it has turned red. There 
is a fine distinction between the admission of a fact and the admission of liability. Although both traffic 
lights cannot be red simultaneously, the hypothesis that both vehicles in principle crossed the traffic 
light after it had turned red, should be open for investigation. Van Schoubroeck explains the position as 
follows: ‘Zelfs wanneer de verzekerde de aansprakelijkheid zou erkend hebben, kan de verzekeraar dit 
niet tegen de benadeelde inroepen en op basis hiervan weigeren de benadeelde te vergoeden die tegen 
hem een rechtstreekse vordering instelde’. See para 5.2.3.1 below on the third-party plaintiff’s right 
against the liability insurer and the defences that the liability insurer may (or may not) raise against the 
third-party plaintiff. 
319 See para 5.3.1.2 below for more detail on these duties in the context of the conduct of the defence 
and settlement of the claim. 
320  In writing this section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Van 
Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 11 para 1.2.2, 20-23 para 1.3.3.3, and 29-30 para 1.4.2; 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck paras 717-728; and Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 
87-96 paras 20-32. For further detail, see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 507-514, 688-689, 
740-766; Cousy ‘Pikante details’ passim; and Jocqué ‘De verzekerde en de benadeelde’ passim. 
321  For an historical background to the third parties’ direct right against the liability insurer, see 




5.2.3.1 The Third-Party Plaintiff’s Direct Right against the Liability Insurer 
to be Indemnified for its Loss and Related Matters322  
Section 150 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 86 of the LIC Act) provides as 
follows in regard to a third-party plaintiff’s direct right (or claim) to be indemnified 
for its loss against the liability insurer (‘eigen recht van de benadeelde’ or 
‘rechtstreekse vordering van de benadeelde’):  
De verzekering geeft de benadeelde een eigen recht tegen de verzekeraar. 
De door de verzekeraar verschuldigde schadevergoeding komt toe aan de 
benadeelde, met uitsluiting van de overige schuldeisers van de verzekerde. 
Indien er meer dan één benadeelde is en het totaal bedrag van de verschuldigde 
schadeloosstellingen de verzekerde som overschrijdt, worden de rechten van de 
benadeelden tegen de verzekeraar naar evenredigdheid verminderd ten belope van 
deze som. Niettemin blijft de verzekeraar die, onbekend met het bestaan van 
vorderingen van ander benadeelden, te goeder trouw aan een benadeelde een groter 
bedrag dan het aan deze toekomende deel heeft uitgekeerd, jegens die anderen 
slechts gehouden tot het beloop van het overblijvende gedeelte van de verzekerde 
som.323 
  
Although the third-party plaintiff is not a party to the liability insurance contract 
between the insured defendant and the liability insurer, it may well have a direct right 
against the liability insurer. The third-party plaintiff has its own statutory right against 
the liability insurer,324 but that right is limited to liability insurance subject to Part 4 of 
the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously the LIC Act).325  
                                                 
322 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ para 1.3.3.3 at 20-23 summarises the third-party 
plaintiff’s rights against the liability insurer as follows: its direct right against the liability insurer to be 
indemnified for its loss; free disposal of damages paid by the liability insurer; to receive receipts of 
payment by the liability insurer; and rights and duties in regard to intervention of legal proceedings 
(see para 5.3.2 below in regard to the latter). The liability insurer’s rights and duties towards the third-
party plaintiff are discussed in conjunction with the former. Also see para 5.3.1 below. 
323 Freely translated: ‘The insurance shall confer upon the the third-party plaintiff as victim, its own 
right or claim against the insurer. The indemnity payable by the insurer shall be appropriated to the 
third party, to the exclusion of other creditors of the insured. If there is more than one third party or 
victim and the total amount of indemnification payable exceeds the sum insured, the rights of the third 
parties against the insurer shall be reduced proportionately to the extent of this sum. Nevertheless, an 
insurer who is ignorant of the existence of claims by other third-party victims and who in good faith 
pays to one of the third parties a greater amount than its due share to one of the third parties, shall 
towards the other third parties, only be liable, to the other third parties for the remaining portion of the 
sum insured.’ (My translation.)  
324 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) explains as follows in para 744: ‘De voor de benadeelde meest 
voordelige regeling bestaat inderdaad in een rechtstreekse vordering tegen de verzekeraar van de 
aansprakelijke. Het gaat dus er nu niet meer om hem een voorkeurrecht toe te kennen op die 
schadeloosstelling waarop de aansprakelijke kan aanspraak maken, maar aan het slachtoffer zelf een 
eigen recht tegen de verzekeraar toe te kennen.’  
325 See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 727-728 for further 
details and a discussion of judicial decisions on the commencement of the third-party plaintiff’s direct 
right against the liability insurer under s 86 of the LIC Act. Section 150 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
has since replaced s 86 of the LIC Act. However, s 20(9) of the Act of 16 December of 1851, 
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Any third party who has suffered loss for which the insured is (allegedly) liable, 
has its own direct right against the insured’s liability insurer, without prejudice to its 
claim against the insured defendant.326 However, the indemnity principle applies and 
the indemnity by the liability insurer to the third-party plaintiff may not exceed the 
loss the latter has suffered.327  
The third-party plaintiff’s direct right against the liability insurer protects it 
against the insured defendant’s inability to pay, but is not limited solely to the 
insolvency or sequestration of the insured.328 The indemnity payable by the liability 
insurer to the third-party plaintiff will be paid as a preferential claim to the exclusion 
of other creditors of the insured.329 
In the event that there is more than one third-party plaintiff and the total amount 
of indemnification due to them exceeds the sum insured, the rights of the third parties 
against the liability insurer are reduced proportionately to the extent of the insured 
sum. However, a liability insurer who is unaware of other third-party claims and 
which in good faith pays an amount greater than its due share of the sum insured to 
one of the third parties, is only liable to the other third parties for the remaining 
portion of the sum insured.330 
The third-party plaintiff’s direct right to claim against the (insured defendant’s) 
liability insurer is subject to two limitations.331   
  
                                                                                                                                            
‘Hypotheekwet’, Belgian State Gazette of 22 Dec of 1851, previously deleted, and then amended by s 
13 of the Act of 16 Mar of 1994, Belgian State Gazette of 4 May 1994, applies to liability insurance 
under Part 5 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ie, liability insurance that was not governed the LIC Act). It 
provides as follows: ‘Voor de verzekeringsovereenkomsten waarop de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de 
landverzekerings-overeenkomst niet van toepassing is, zijn de uit een ongeval ontstane 
schuldvorderingen ten bate van door dat ongeval benadeelde derde of diens rechthebbenden, 
bevoorrecht op de vergoeding die de verzekeraar van de burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid 
verschuldig is op grond van de verzekeringsovereenkomst. Geen betaling aan de verzekerde zal 
bevrijdend zijn, zolang de bevoorrechte schuldeisers niet schadeloos zijn gesteld.’ See Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 723 for further detail. 
326 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 20 para 1.3.3.2. 
327 Sections 91 and 105 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 37 and 51 of the LIC Act) 
concerning indemnity insurance. Also see Van Schoubroeck ibid para 1.3.3.1. 
328 Unlike in some of the other legal systems examined in this thesis. See paras 3.2.3 and 4.2.3 for the 
South African and the English legal positions. 
329  Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 20 para 1.3.3.2 explains that the third-party 
plaintiff’s direct claim is, ‘zonder omweg via het vermogen van de verzekerde waarop ook andere 
schuldeisers aanspraak kunnen maken’. The third-party plaintiff’s claim is, therefore, not subject to any 
rule of concurrence of creditors.  
330 See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 728 for further detail. 
331 Van Schoubroeck Recht voor de onderneming 20-21 para 1.3.3.2. 
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First, the third-party plaintiff must institute its direct claim against the liability 
insurer before the claim prescribes. Section 88(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 
34(2) of the LIC Act) provides a specific prescription period332 within which the 
third-party plaintiff must institute its direct claim against the liability insurer:333 
Onder voorbehoud van bijzondere wettelijke bepalingen, verjaart de vordering die 
voortvloeit uit het eigen recht dat de benadeelde tegen de verzekeraar heeft 
krachtens artikel 150 334  door verloop van vijf jaar, te rekenen vanaf het 
schadeverwekkend 335  feit of, indien er misdrijf is, vanaf de dag waarop dit is 
gepleegd. 
Indien de benadeelde evenwel bewijst dat hij pas op een later tijdstip kennis heeft 
gekregen van zijn recht tegen de verzekeraar, begint de termijn pas te lopen vanaf 
dat tijdstip, maar hij verstrijkt in elk geval na verloop van tien jaar, te rekenen vanaf 
het schadeverwekkend feit of, indien er misdrijft is, vanaf de dag waarop dit is 
gepleegd.336 
Subject to special statutory provisions, a claim arising from the right of the 
third-party plaintiff against the liability insurer under section 150 of the Insurance Act 
of 2014337 prescribes five years338 after the event giving rise to the loss339 or, where 
                                                 
332 This prescription period is independent of the prescripton period of the third-party plaintiff’s claim 
against the insured defendant itself. See Jocqué (2006) 354 Tijdschrift voor Verzekeringen 18. He 
explains the position as follows: ‘De benadeelde [third-party plaintiff] bekomt door het eigen recht een 
vordering tegen de schuldenaar (verzekeraar) [the insured defendant’s liability insurer] van zijn 
schuldenaar (aansprakelijke/verzekerde) [insured defendant] en bij gebreke aan een bijzondere 
wettelijke regeling zou hij zijn vordering tegen de onderschuldenaar [the insured defendant’s liability 
insurer] niet meer kunnen uitoefenen wanneer zijn vordering tegen de schuldenaar [the insured 
defendant] verjaard is. De verjaring van de rechtstreekse vordering van de benadeelde lastens de 
aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar [the insured defendant’s liability insurer] is aldus onderworpen aan een 
ander regime dan de vordering van de benadeelde [third-party plaintiff] ten overstaan van de 
aansprakelijke verzekerde zelf [the insured defendant]. De eigen verjaringstermijn voor de 
rechtstreekse vordering vermijdt elke betwisting omtrent de toepassing van de verjaring van artikel 
34(1) Wet Landverzekeringsovereenkomst [previously s 34(1) of the LIC Act; now s 88(1) of the 2014 
Insurance Act] op deze vordering.’ See para 5.2.2.1(d) above on prescription in liability insurance. 
333 See Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 100-103 paras 36-39. For further detail see 
Van Schoubroeck Recht voor de onderneming 29-30 para 1.4.2 and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) 
paras 507-514 and 758. 
334 Previously s 86 of the LIC Act. 
335  Section 150 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 86 of the LIC Act) still refers to 
‘schadeverwekkend feit’, despite the changes that have been made to ss 141-142 of the Insurance Act 
of 2014 (previously ss 77-78 of the LIC Act). See paras 5.2.2.1(a) and 5.2.2.2(a) above. 
336 Freely translated: ‘Subject to specific statutory provisions, a claim arising from the own or direct 
right of the third party as victim against the insurer under s 150 [of the Insurance Act of 2014], 
prescribes five years after the event that gave rise to the loss, or where there was a criminal offence, 
from the date that the criminal offence was committed. However, where the third-party as victim 
proves that it became aware of its rights against the insurer only at a later date, the prescription period 
starts to run only at such later date. But, the claim in any event prescribes ten years from the occurrence 
of the event that gave rise to the loss, or, where a criminal offence is involved, from the date on which 
the offence was committed.’ (My translation.) 
337 Previously s 86 of the LIC Act. 
338 The prescription period of five years differs from the usual presciption period of three years for 
claims arising from insurance contracts as set out in s 88(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 
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there is a criminal offence, from the date on which the offence was committed. 
However, where the third-party plaintiff proves that it became aware of its rights 
against the liability insurer only at a later date,340 the prescription period starts to run 
only at such later date.341 The claim prescribes ten years from the occurrence of the 
event that gave rise to the loss or, where a criminal offence is involved, from the date 
on which the offence was committed. 
Section 89(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 35(4) of the LIC Act), as well as a 
newly inserted section 89(5) of the Insurance Act of 2014 contain detailed provisions 
on the suspension and interruption of prescription periods of third-party plaintiffs’ 
direct claims against a liability insurer.342 
Second, the third-party plaintiff’s claim might be subject to certain of the 
defences343 available to the liability insurer against the insured defendant (‘tegenwerp-
                                                                                                                                            
34(1) of the LIC Act). For the position on the prescription period for a recourse claim by an insured 
defendant against its liability insurer, see para 5.2.2.1(d) above. 
339  The date that prescription starts to run for a third-party plaintiff’s claim against the insured’s 
liability insurer, namely from the occurrence of the event giving rise to the loss (‘vanaf het 
schadeverwekkend feit’), also differs from the date that prescription starts to run for claims by the 
insured against an insurer, which is the date of issue of summons by the third party (‘vanaf het instellen 
van de rechtsvordering door de benadeelde’). See s 88(1)(iii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 
34(1)(iii) of the LIC Act). For further detail on when prescription starts to run in a recourse claim by an 
insured defendant against its liability insurer, see para 5.2.2.1(d) above; and for the prescription of the 
claim of recourse of the liability insurer against its insured (under s 88(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014; 
previously s 34(3) of the LIC Act), see para 5.3.1.1(c) below. Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 101 para 37 explain that the date on which prescription starts to run in a claim arising out 
of the right of the third-party plaintiff against the liability insurer – from the occurrence of the event 
giving rise to the loss (‘vanaf het schadeverwekkend feit’) – does not necessarily coincide with the time 
of the occurrence of loss (‘voorvallen van de schade’) as referred to in ss 141-142 of the Insurance Act 
of 2014 (previously ss 77-78 of the LIC Act). The authors refer to judicial decisions and commentaries 
and clarify the terminology as follows: ‘Zoals … reeds werd toegelicht, wordt volgens vigerende 
rechtspraak en rechtsleer het tijdstip van “het voorvallen van schade” meestal gelijkgesteld met het 
ogenblik dat de schade zich manifesteert. Voor wat betreft de verjaringstermijn van de rechtstreekse 
vordering is het vertrekpunt wel degelijk het ogenblik van het feit of de handeling die aanleiding heeft 
gegeven tot de schade, hetgeen zich meestal zal voordoen op een moment voorafgaand aan (of in 
sommige gevallen (bijna) gelijktijdig met) het zich manifesteren van de schade.’ 
340  To meet the burden of proof in this regard, the third-party plaintiff should be aware that the 
defendant is insured and of the identity of the liability insurer. See the decision by the Belgian Supreme 
Court, Cass, dated 16 Feb 2007, as referred to by Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 102 
para 38. The majority of commentators agree that the third-party plaintiff has a duty to establish 
whether there is liability insurance and who the insurer is. The third-party may not simply sit back and 
remain passive.  
341 Section 88(2)(ii) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 34(2)(ii) of the LIC Act) contains an 
exception to the rule that prescription of the third-party plaintiff’s direct claim against the liability 
insurer starts to run from the occurrence of the event that gave rise to the loss (‘vanaf het 
schadeverwekkend feit’).  
342 See Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 104-106 paras 42-43 for further detail. 
343 The defences that the liability insurer may raise against the third-party plaintiff, are discussed here 
as part of the discussion on the third-party’s direct right against the liability insurer. However, these 
defences are also relevant in para 5.3.1.1(c) below on the conflict of interest between the insured 
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baarheid van verweermiddelen aan de benadeelde’).344 Section 151 of the Insurance 
Act of 2014 (s 87 of the LIC Act)345 contains detailed provisions in regard to these 
defences,346 excesses, nullity,347 and forfeiture. 348 
In the instances where the liability insurer may raise defences against the third-
party plaintiff, it is not liable to indemnify the third-party plaintiff and the latter must 
                                                                                                                                            
defendant and the liability insurer; and in regard to the legal relationship between the liability insurer 
and the third-party plaintiff in the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer. 
344 Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 87 para 20. Section 151 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 (previously s 87 of the LIC Act) provides as follows under the heading ‘Tegenstelbaarheid van de 
excepties, [vrijstellingen,] nietigheid en verval van recht’: 
‘§ 1. Bij de verplichte burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen kunnen de 
excepties, vrijstellingen, de nietigheid en het verval van recht voortvloeiend uit de wet of de 
overeenkomst en die hun oorzaak vinden in een feit dat zich voor of na het schadegeval heeft 
voorgedaan, aan de benadeelde niet worden tegenworpen.  
Indien de nietigverklaring, de opzegging, de beëindiging of de schorsing van de 
overeenkomst geschied is voordat het schadegeval zich heeft voorgedaan, kan zich echter 
aan de benadeelde worden tegengeworpen. 
§ 2. Voor de andere soorten burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen kan de 
verzekeraar slechts de excepties, de nietigheid en de verval van recht voortvloeiend uit de 
wet of de overeenkomst tegenwerpen aan de benadeelde persoon voor zover deze hun 
oorzaak vinden in een feit dat het schadegeval voorafgaat. 
De Koning kan het toepassingsgebied van § 1 echter uitbreiden tot de soorten van niet 
verplichte burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen die Hij bepaalt.’ 
Freely translated: ‘In mandatory civil liability insurance, defences, excesses, nullity (voidness) 
and forfeiture which derive from statute or contract and have their origin in an act committed prior to 
the loss, cannot be raised against the third party as victim. Nonetheless, the anullment (nullification), 
cancellation, or expiry of the contract before the occurrence of the insured event can be raised against 
the third party as victim. In other types of civil liability insurance, the insurer may rely, as against the 
third party as victim, only upon the defences of nullity (voidnesss) and forfeiture which derive from 
statute or contract and which have their origin in an act prior to the loss. The King may extend the 
scope of ss 1 (on compulsory civil liability insurance) to any type of non-compulsory civil liability 
insurance as prescribed by Him.’ (My translation.) 
345 For further detail, see Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 87-96 paras 20-32; Van 
Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ para 1.3.3.2 at 20-22; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) 
paras 688, 748-757; and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 
729-737.  
346 The general term ‘defences’ is used here to refer to ‘excepties’. Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck 
ibid para 729 explain that ‘[h]et begrip “exceptie” is een generieke term die elk verweermiddel omvat 
dat ertoe strekt te ontstnappen aan de uitvoering van een verbintenis wanneer deze uitvoering in rechte 
gevorderd wordt. Een exceptie kan betrekking hebben op het bestaan, de afdwingbaarheid, de 
nietigheid, het verval of de schorsing van de verbintenis.’ The general term ‘defences’ is used here to 
refer to ‘excepties’. 
347 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 729 clarify that, ‘[d]e nietigheid verwijst naar een sanctie 
op het niet-naleven door rechtssubjecten van de geldigheidsvoorwaarden bij de totstandkoming van een 
rechtshandeling. De nietigheidssanctie heeft tot gevolg dat de betrokken rechtshandeling ophoudt te 
bestaan, hetzij voor de toekomst, hetzij zowel voor het verleden als de toekomst’. 
348 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid explain that,‘[h]et verval kan worden omschreven als een 
wettelijke of conventionele sanctie voor een bepaald gedrag zonder dat dit gedrag noodzakelijk 
onverenigbaar hoeft te zijn met het vervallen subjectief recht. Artikel 11 [of the LIC Act] (tans art 65 
WVerz.)[now s 65 of the 2014 Insurance Act] laat het bedingen van een verval alleen maar toe 
wanneer dit verval de niet-nakoming van een bepaalde, in de overeenkomst opgelegde verplichting 
sanctioneert en er een oorzakelijk verband bestaat tussen de tekortkoming en het schadegeval’. See 
paras 5.2.2.3(b)(ii) and 5.2.2.4 above for further detail as regards s 65 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously s 11 of the LIC Act). 
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claim its loss from the insured defendant.349 When the liability insurer cannot raise 
defences against the third-party plaintiff, it is liable to the third-party plaintiff. 
To determine what defences the liability insurer may raise against the third-
party plaintiff, it is important to distinguish between compulsory and non-compulsory 
private- law (or civil) liability insurance (‘verplichte en niet-verplichte burger-
rechtelijke aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen’).350  
The third-party plaintiff is protected to a greater extent in the case of 
compulsory insurance351 than in the case of non-compulsory insurance, as there are 
fewer defences which the liability insurer may raise against the third-party plaintiff in 
the former instance than in the latter.  
In compulsory civil liability insurance,352 defences which derive from statute or 
contract and have their origin in an act prior to the loss cannot be raised against the 
third-party plaintiff. In instances of non-compulsory civil liability insurance353 the 
liability insurer may, as against the third-party plaintiff, rely only on defences which 
derive from statute or contract and have their origin in an act prior to the loss.354  
                                                 
349 Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 87 para 20 give the following exaplantion: ‘Kan 
de verzekeraar de betreffende verweermiddelen wel tegenwerpen aan de benadeelde, is hij tegenover 
deze benadeelde niet tot betaling gehouden en kan de benadeelde zich enkel richten tot de verzekerde’. 
350 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 729.  
351  Compulsory insurance is mandatory and non-compulsory insurance is voluntary. A list of 
compulsory insurance is published by the Financial Services and Markets Authority at 
https://www.fsma.be/nl/lijst-van-de-verplichte-verzekeringen (accessed on 30 Jul 2019). Further see 
Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijk-heidsverzekering’ 87-88 para 21 for examples of compulsory 
insurance.  
352 See Meurs & Thiery ibid 88-92 paras 22-27 for a discussion and examples of defences that the 
liability insurer may (and may not) raise against the third-party plaintiff in compulsory insurance. Also 
see Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 730-733 for further 
detail. 
353 See Meurs & Thiery ibid 92-93 paras 28-32 for a discussion and examples of defences that the 
liability insurer may raise against the third-party plaintiff in non-compulsory insurance. Also see 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 734-737 for further detail. 
354 This is the essence of the difference in the defences that may be raised in compulsory and non-
compulsory civil liability insurance. Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsvezekering’ 21 para 1.3.2.4 
summarises the distinction as follows: ‘Gaat het om een van de verplichte aansprakelijkheids-
verzekeringen … , kan de verzekeraar geen enkele exceptie … voortvloeiende uit de wet of uit 
overeenkomst aan de benadeelde tegenwerpen. Het is daarbij zonder belang of deze een oorzaak vinden 
in een feit dat zich voor of na het schadegeval heeft voorgedaan. … Voor alle niet-verplichte 
aansprakeljikheidsverzekeringen kan de verzekeraar enkel de excepties … voortvloeiende uit de wet of 
de overeenkomst tegenwerpen aan de benadelde, voor zover deze hun oorzaak vinden in een feit dat het 
schadegeval voorafgaat.’ This is confirmed by Meurs & Thiery ibid 88-89 para 22. Due to the 
procedural nature of the defences, further detail falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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If the liability insurer cannot raise a defence against the third-party plaintiff’s 
claim, it will attempt to exercise its right of recourse under section 152 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (s 88 of the LIC Act) against the insured defendant.355  
 A few matters related to the third-party plaintiff’s direct right to claim against 
the insured’s liability insurer, warrant discussion. 
 The liability insurer generally indemnifies the third-party plaintiff directly,356 
but section 149(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 85(1) the LIC Act) also provides 
for payment by the insured defendant. 357  It provides as follows in regard to 
compensation358 by the insured defendant: 
Wanneer de verzekerde de benadeelde heeft vergoed of hem een vergoeding heeft 
toegezegd, zonder de toestemming van de verzekeraar, kan zulks tegen deze laatste 
niet worden ingeroepen.359 
The third party may claim damages from the insured defendant or the liability 
insurer separately or jointly.360 Compensation, or a promise of it, to the third-party 
plaintiff by the insured defendant without the liability insurer’s consent does not bind 
the insurer. Section 85(1) of the LIC Act (s 149(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014) was 
enacted to counteract possible collusion between the third-party plaintiff and the 
insured defendant.361 
                                                 
355 Meurs & Thiery ibid 87 para 20 explain as follows: ‘De verzekeraar zal zijn verhaalsrecht tegenover 
de verzekerde willen uitoefen wanneer hij de benadeelde heeft vergoed en wanneer hij tegenover deze 
laaste niet de verweermiddellen kon doen gelden die hij wel had tegen over de verzekerde’. See paras 
5.3.1.1(c) and 5.3.2 below for further detail. 
356 Under s 86 of the Insurance Act of 1992. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 723 and para 
5.2.3.1 below. 
357 For further detail, see Fontaine ibid paras 737-739; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 716; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 16 para 
1.3.1.3. 
358 Section 149(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 85(1) the LIC Act) bears the heading: 
‘Schadeloosstelling door de verzekerde’. (Again, the terminology ‘compensation’ (and not 
indemnification) by the insured defendant will be used.)  
359 Freely translated: ‘When the insured has compensated the third party or promised to compensate the 
third party without consent of the insurer, it shall not bind the insurer’. (My translation.) 
360 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 725 explain that, ‘[i]n dit 
laatste geval zijn de verzekerde en de verzekeraar bij een vastgestelde aansprakelijkheid in solidum 
ertoe gehouden de benadeelde te vergoeden’.  
361 The insured defendant’s duty not to prejudice the liability insurer correlates with a similar duty of 
the liability insurer towards its liability insured in s 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 
79(3) of the LIC Act). It provides that interventions by the liability insurer will not imply an 
acknowledgement of debt (towards the third-party plaintiff) by the insured defendant, and will not 
prejudice the insured defendant. See para 5.3.1.1(c) below.  
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Section 147 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 83 of the LIC Act) governs the 
third-party plaintiff’s free disposal of damages (‘vrije beschikking over de schade-
vergoeding’)362 paid by the insurer by providing as follows: 
De benadeelde beschikt vrij over de door de verzekeraar verschuldigde 
schadevergoeding. Het bedrag van de schadevergoeding mag niet verschillen 
naargelang van het gebruik dat de benadeelde ervan zal maken.363 
 
The amount of damages may not vary in accordance with the use to be made of 
it by the third-party plaintiff – the third party may freely dispose of any damages paid 
by the liability insurer. 
Section 148 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 84 of the LIC Act)364 provides as 
follows regarding ‘receipts’ (‘kwitantie ter afrekening’ or ‘kwijtschrift’): 
Elke kwitantie voor een gedeeltelijke afrekening of ter finale afrekening, betekent 
voor de benadeelde niet dat hij van zijn rechten afziet.  
Een kwitantie ter finale afrekening moet de elementen van de schade vermelden 
waarop die afrekening slaat. 
 A partial or final receipt signed by the third party to acknowledge 
compensation received, does not imply that the third-party plaintiff waives its rights. 
A final receipt must state the heads of loss to which the account relates. 
 
  
                                                 
362 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 714 explain it as follows: 
‘Dit betekent dat de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar de [som van] eventuele btw als schadebestanddeel 
binnen de limieten van de verzekerde som ten laste moet nemen, ook als de schade niet wordt hersteld 
of het vernielde goed niet wordt vervangen. Hiermee is een einde gekomen aan het systeem van de 
dubbele schatting, naargelang de schade al dan niet wordt hersteld.’ Also see Van Schoubroeck 
‘Aansprakelijk-heidsverzekering’ 22 para 1.3.3.4 and Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 731-732 
for further detail.  
363 Freely translated: ‘The third party may freely dispose of any damages paid by the liability insurer. 
The amount of damages may not vary in accordance with the use to be made of it by the third-party 
plaintiff.’ (My translation.) 
364  For further detail, see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 733-736; Schuermans & Van 
Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 715; and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 23 para 1.3.3.5. 
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5.2.3.2  The Liability Insurer Subrogated to Rights and Legal Claims of the 
Insured Defendant Against Third Parties Responsible for the Loss365  
Sections 95(1)-95(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 41(1)-41(3) of the LIC 
Act)366 provide as follows in regard to the right of subrogation against a liable third 
party (‘subrogatierecht tegen de aansprakelijke derde’):367 
De verzekeraar die de schadevergoeding betaald heeft, treedt ten belope van het 
bedrag van die vergoeding in de rechten en rechtsvorderingen van de verzekerde of 
de begunstigde tegen de aansprakelijke derden.  
Indien, door toedoen van de verzekerde of de begunstigde, de indeplaatsstelling 
geen gevolg kan hebben ten voordele van de verzekeraar, kan deze van hem de 
terugbetaling vorderen van de betaalde schadevergoeding in de mate van het 
geleden nadeel. 
De indeplaatstelling mag de verzekerde of de begunstigde, die slechts gedeeltelijk 
vergoed is, niet benadelen. In dat geval kan hij zijn rechten uitoefenen voor hetgeen 
hem nog verschuldigd is, bij voorrang boven de verzekeraar.368 
Subrogation under this section is only possible against ‘third parties responsible 
for the loss’ (‘aansprakelijke derden’).369 Commentators give examples of the limited 
instances of subrogation in liability insurance.370 In the context of liability insurance, 
‘third parties responsible for the loss’, refers to where the loss is caused by joint 
wrongdoers. These joint wrongdoers are so-called ‘fourth parties’ in the context of 
liability insurance (the insured defendant and the liability insurer as the first and 
second parties, the third-party plaintiff as the third party, and the ‘third party 
                                                 
365 In writing this section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Meurs & 
Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 83-85 paras 15-16; Colle De nieuwe wet (6 ed) paras 181-186; 
and Van Schoubroeck ibid 27-28 para 1.3.5.1. 
366 This is an example of ‘persoonlijke subrogatie’, as defined in art 1249 of the Civil Code. For further 
detail, and on the distinction between ‘persoonlijke subrogatie’ and ‘zakelijke subrogatie of 
zaakvervanging’ under Belgian law, see Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht 
(3 ed) paras 1044-1059. 
367 Also known as ‘indeplaatsstelling van de verzekeraar’ or ‘verhaal van de verzekeraar tegen de 
aansprakelijke derde’. This should be distinguished from the liability insurer’s right of recourse against 
the insured defendant under s 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 88 of the LIC Act) 
discussed in para 5.3.1.1(c) below. 
368 Freely translated: ‘The insurer that has paid the damages shall be subrogated pro tanto to the rights 
and legal claims of the insured or the beneficiary against the party responsible for the loss. If 
subrogation cannot take place successfully in favour of the insurer due to the conduct of theinsured or 
the beneficiary, the insurer may claim restitution from the the insured or the beneficiary for the 
damages paid equal to the amount of the loss suffered by the insurer. Subrogation shall not prejudice an 
insured or a beneficiary who has only been partially indemnified. In that case the insured or the 
beneficiary may exercise its rights against the third party to claim what is still due to it, in preference to 
the insurer.’ (My translation.) 
369 Note the disctinction between ‘third parties responsible for the loss’ and the ‘third-party plaintiff’. 
370 Colle De nieuwe wet (6 ed) para 181; Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 27-28 para 
1.3.5.3; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 1048; Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 709-710; and Guiliams (2010-2011) 12 Rechtskundig Weekblad 474-
480. 
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responsible for the loss’ as the fourth party). However, one may assume that if the 
insured defendant has a counterclaim against the third-party plaintiff to which the 
liability insurer may be subrogated, that the counterclaim may be brought against the 
third-party plaintiff by the liability insurer in the exercise of its right to subrogation. 
The liability insurer (which has indemnified the insured by payment of the 
third-party plaintiff) may be subrogated to the rights and legal claims of the insured 
defendant against third parties co-responsible for the loss for which the insured is 
responsible – ie, joint wrongdoers. 371  The liability insurer may, for example, be 
subrogated to the insured defendant’s rights in delict against a third party who was 
negligently co-responsible for the loss for which the insured is responsible.372  
Subrogation is not possible against the insured defendant under liability 
insurance.373 Subrogatory recourse against the insured defendant would undermine the 
object of the insurance contract which is to transfer the financial risk associated with a 
third-party claim to the liability insurer on payment of a premium.374 
If subrogation cannot take place due to the conduct of the insured defendant,375 
the liability insurer may claim restitution from the latter of the indemnification paid to 
the third-party plaintiff equal to the amount of the loss suffered by the liability 
insurer.376 The subrogation rights of the liability insurer are no greater than the rights 
of the insured defendant and may be limited by any intent or contributory negligence 
on the part of the insured.377  
                                                 
371 Section 95(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 41(1) of the LIC Act) is in line of the 
indemnity principle, to avoid the third-party plaintiff being compensated twice; once by the liability 
insurer and again by the third party co-responsible for the loss. See Colle ibid para 180. Subrogation 
under this section takes place by law (‘van rechtswege’) and may not be excluded contractually. See 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid para 1045. 
372  Colle ibid para 183 explains that ‘[h]et quasi-delictuele of contractuele karakter van de 
aansprakelijkheid is daarentegen zonder belang’. 
373 In the context of liability insurance, Colle ibid explains in para 185 as follows: ‘De aansprakelijke 
persoon is daar de verzekerde [the insured defendant]. De aansprakelijke [the insured defendant] is 
geen derde zoals de wet vereist opdat de indeplaasstelling zou kunnen plaasvinden. Bovendien, indien 
het de verzekeraar toegelaten zou zijn zich tegen de verzekerde te keren, zou de 
verzekeringsovereenkomst geen voorwerp of oorzaak meer hebben. … Subrogatie betekent in de 
rechten en rechtsvorderingen treden van de oorspronklijke rechtshebbende (de subrogant). Welnu, die 
aansprakelijke verzekerde [insured defendant], wiens rechten en rechtsvorderingen de verzekeraar 
treedt, kan niet aansprakelijk zijn tegen zichzelf of een recht tegen zichzelf laten gelden’. 
374 Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 83 para 15. 
375 For example, where an insured has absolved a joint wrongdoer from liability without the insurer’s 
consent. 
376 Section 95(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 41(2) of the LIC Act). 
377 Restitution by the insurer may be in full, or only for a proportional part that is no longer recoverable 
due to the conduct of the insured. On ‘de verdeling van de schadelast bij sameloop van een opzettelijke 
en een onopzettelijke fout’, see Guiliams (2010-2011) 12 Rechtskundig Weekblad 474-485. 
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Sections 95(4) and 95(5) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 41(4) and 41(5) of the 
LIC Act) 378  prohibit subrogation by the liability insurer’s against certain of the 
insured defendant’s family members, save in case of intent (‘kwaad opzet’) on the 
part of those relatives,379  or in so far as the relatives’ liability has actually been 
covered by a different insurance contract. The same applies to a number of other close 
relations to the insured, like guests and members of its domestic staff, as set out in the 
former provisions. 
Subrogation is only possible to the extent that the liability insurer has 
indemnified the insured by the payment of the third-party plaintiff.380 An insured 
defendant who has only been partly indemnified by the liability insurer, may not be 
prejudiced by subrogation: the insured may exercise its rights against any third parties 
liable to claim what is still due to it, in preference to the insurer.  
 
  
                                                 
378 These sections provide: ‘De verzekeraar heeft geen verhaal op de bloedverwanten in de rechte 
opgaande of nederdalende lijn, de echtgenoot en de aanverwanten in de rechte lijn van de verzekerde, 
noch op bij hem inwonende personen, zijn gasten en zijn huispersoneel, behoudens kwaad opzet. In 
geval van kwaad opzet door minderjarigen kan de Koning het recht van verhaal beperken van de 
verzekeraar die de burgerrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid buiten overeenkomst met betrekking tot 
privéleven dekt. De verzekeraar kan evenwel verhaal uitoefenen op de in het vorige lid genoemde 
personen, voor zover hun aansprakelijkheid daadwerkelijk door een verzekeringsovereenkomst is 
gedekt.’ Freely translated: ‘Save in the case of intent [‘kwaad opzet’] the insurer shall have no recourse 
against the relatives in the descending or ascending line, the spouse, and direct relatives by marriage of 
the insured, or against persons living in its houselhold, its guests, and members of its domestic staff. In 
the case of intent of a minor, the King can limit the right to subrogation by an insurer of personal 
liability insurance. However, the insurer may exercise its right to subrogation against the 
aforementioned persons in as far as their liability is actually covered by an insurance contract.’ (My 
translation.) 
379 The Legislature has limited the extent of the right to subrogation by an insurer of personal liability 
insurance (‘verzekeraar BA-privéleven’) against minors. See s 7(2) of the Royal Decree of Jan 1984, as 
amended, on the minimum conditions regarding personal liability insurance (‘tot vaststelling van de 
minimumvoorwaarden BA-privéleven’). For further detail on loss caused intentionally by a minor to a 
third-party plaintiff, and whether the liability insurer may be subrogated to the parents’ rights as 
insured, see Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 27-28 para 1.3.5.3 and Meurs & Thiery 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 83-85 paras 15-16.  
380 Section 95(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 41(3) of the LIC Act). 
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5.3 THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE AND SETTLEMENT OF 
CLAIMS BY THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST THE 
INSURED DEFENDANT381  
5.3.1  The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Insured Defendant  
5.3.1.1 Conduct of the Defence (‘Leiding van het geschil’):382 The Insurer’s 
Duty383 and Right to Defend384 
 
As mentioned previously,385 the primary obligation of a liability insurer under 
Belgian law is to protect the insured’s patrimony. Fontaine explains the liability 
insurer’s dual obligation to the insured: The liability insurer conducts the insured’s 
defence against third-party claims,386 and then indemnifies the insured defendant’s 
estate against proven liability for third-party loss.387  
                                                 
381 As noted previously, the Belgian chapter contains more detail than the British and South African 
chapters as regards the conduct of the defence and settlement, due to the liability insurer’s statutory 
duty to defend, as opposed to a mere contractual right of the insurer to choose to defend. In writing this 
section, the following works on Belgian insurance law were consulted: Van Schoubroeck 
‘Aansprakelijkheids-verzekering’ 11-12 para 1.2.3, 18-19 para 1.3.2, 23-25 para 1.3.4.1, 25-26 para 
1.3.4.2, and 28-29 para 1.3.5.4; Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 673, 713-722, 728-730, and 
767; and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 705-707, and 708-
711. For further detail, see Kruithof ‘De leiding van het geschil’ 1-95; Van De Sype ‘Leiden en lijden 
van de verzekeraar’ 33-51; and Cousy ‘De waarborg in de (professionele) aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 64-67.  
382 Or, ‘zich achter de verzekerde te stellen ... hem te verdedigen tegen de aanspraken van de derde’. 
The conduct of the defence of the dispute that is referred to here, is the dispute between the insured 
defendant and the third-party plaintiff. See Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor 
Privaatrecht para 65.1. The insurer conducts the defence in the insured’s name. 
383 ‘Verplichting van de verzekeraar om zich achter de verzekerde te stellen’. 
384 ‘Recht van de verzekeraar om het geschil te leiden’. 
385 See para 5.2.2.1 above. 
386 The conduct of the defence is the focus of this discussion. The conduct of the defence on behalf of the 
insured originated from trade usage. Before the conduct of the defence became a statutory obligation on 
and right for the insurer, liability insurers merely had a contractual right to conduct the defence. See 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) pars 673 and 714. For an historical perspective on the insurer’s duty 
and right to defend, see Vandeputte ‘Inleiding tot het verzekeringsrecht’ 134-138; Fredericq (1969) 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 66; and Fredericq, Cousy & Rogge (1981) 18 Tijdschrift voor 
Privaatrecht para 84 (note that these texts predate the LIC Act). Also see Kruithof ‘De leiding van het 
geschil’ 10-13 paras 13-17. 
387  Fontaine ibid explains as follows in para 673: ‘De aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen dekken het 
vermogen van de verzekerde tegen de aantastingen die het bedreigen ingevolge de aansprakelijkheden die 
hij zou kunnen oplopen. Het betref dus een schadeverzekering … op de ongeschondenheid van het 
vermogen in zijn geheel. Dit is het wesenlijke. Het andere luik van de bewoordingen van artikel 77 [now s 
141 of the Insurance Act of 2014], met betrekking tot de dekking tegen de vorderingen tot 
schadevergoeding, is een bijzaak van de hoofdzakelijke functie van de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen, 
die in het verleden door het praktijk zelf werd ingevoerd en op heden een verplichting voor de 
verzekeraar is geworden … De aanspreeklijkheidsverzekeraar biedt dus een verdediging in rechte aan, die 
gevolgd wordt door een eventuele dekking van de aansprakelijkheidsschuld.’ (Emphasis added.) 
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In Belgian law, there is also a dual system as to the conduct of the defence. The 
liability insurer has both a duty388 and a right389 to conduct the defence of third-party 
claims against the insured defendant.390  
Sections 141 and 143 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 77 and 79 of the LIC 
Act) are relevant here and correlate with one another.  
Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 77 of the LIC Act) provides as 
follows with regard to the conduct of the defence: 
Dit hoofdstuk is van toepassing op de verzekeringsovereenkomsten die ertoe 
strekken de verzekerde dekking te geven tegen alle vorderingen tot vergoeding 
wegens het voorvallen van de schade die in die overeenkomst is beschreven, en zijn 
vermogen binnen de grenzen van de dekking te vrijwaren tegen alle schulden uit een 
vaststaande aansprakelijkheid.391 
 
Liability insurance contracts defend the insured against third-party claims for 
compensation based on the occurrence of loss provided for in the contract,392 and also 
                                                 
388  Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 26-29 para 1.3.5 summarises the liability 
insurer’s duties as follows: to intervene in the third-party claim in support of the insured defendant (as 
discussed in para 5.3.1.1 below); and to indemnify the insured against the loss, interest and costs (as 
discussed in paras 5.2.2.3(a) above and 5.3.1.1(d) below). 
389 Van Schoubroeck ibid 26-29 para 1.3.5 summarises the liability insurer’s rights as follows: the 
conduct of the defence (as discussed in para 5.3.1.1 below); intervention in proceedings in several 
instances (see para 5.2.3.1 above and para 5.3.1.1(b) below); subrogation to the rights and legal claims 
of the insured defendant against third parties responsible for the loss (see paras 5.2.3.2 and 5.2.4 
above); and the right of recourse against the insured defendant (see para 5.3.1.1(c) below). 
390  See Van Schoubroeck ibid 23-25 para 1.3.4 and 26 para 1.3.5.1 for an explanation. Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 714 underlines that the origin of the conduct of the defence by the insurer 
was aimed at the protection of the insurers’ interests. He explains as follows: ‘Een verzekeraar die er 
zich toe zou beperken om de schadevergoeding te betalen eens de aansprakelijkheid van de verzekerde 
bewezen is, zou het gevaar lopen om vaak en op gulle wijze te moeten tussenkomen: de aansprakelijke 
[insured defendant] die weet dat hij verzekerd is, is geneigd om zich zonder te veel strijdlust te 
verdedigen, ja zelfs om al te gemakkelijk zijn schuld jegens het slachtoffer [the third-party plaintiff] te 
erkennen. De aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar verkiest de zaken zelf in handen te nemen, temeer daar 
zijn ervaring in dit soort van geschillen hem een zeker voordeel verschaft.’ He also describes the 
benefits of the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer to the insured as follows: ‘Hoewel 
uitgedacht in het belang van de verzekeraar, vertoont de leiding van het geschil vanzelf sprekend (sic) 
ook voordelen voor de verzekerde. Zij ontlast hem van een deel van de bekommernissen die verbonden 
zijn aan het door het slachtoffer tegen hem gevoerde rechtsgeding. Er bestaan ook gevallen waarin de 
verzekerde zich verheugt om verdedigd te worden door zijn verzekeraar, bijvoorbeeld zo hij zelf 
schade heeft geleden waarvan hij de schadeloosstelling tenminste gedeeltelijk nastreeft.’ But Kruithof 
‘De leiding van het geschil’ 12 para 17 opines that the right to conduct the defence is aimed at the 
protection of the insurer’s interests (and not those of the insured). 
391 Freely translated: ‘This chapter applies to contracts of insurance which aim to defend the insured 
against any claim for compensation based on the occurrence of loss as provided for in the contract and 
to keep its estate indemnified, within the limits of cover, for any debt arising from proven liability.’ 
(My translation.)       
392 The conduct of the defence is the focus of this discussion. 
 289 
hold the insured’s estate indemnified393 within the limits of cover, for a debt arising 
from proven liability. 
Regarding the conduct of the defence, section 143 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(s 79 of the LIC Act) further provides:394 
Vanaf het ogenblik dat de verzekeraar tot het geven van dekking is gehouden en 
voor zover deze wordt ingeroepen, is hij verplicht zich achter de verzekerde te 
stellen binnen de grenzen van de dekking.395 
Ten aanzien van de burgerrechtelijke belangen en in zover de belangen van de 
verzekeraar en van de verzekerde samenvallen, heeft de verzekeraar het recht om, in 
de plaats van de verzekerde, de vordering te bestrijden. Hij kan deze laatste 
vergoeden indien daartoe grond bestaat. 396 
De tussenkomsten van de verzekeraar houden geen enkele erkenning in van 
aansprakelijkheid vanwege de verzekerde en zij mogen hem ook geen nadeel 
berokkenen.397 
The paragraphs below explain the legislation governing the liability insurer’s 
right and duty to conduct the defence. 398  There are different prerequisites and 
provisions as to the existence of the duty and right to conduct the defence, the point at 
which they arise, and their scope. If the liability insurer has a duty to the insured to 
conduct the defence – which is one of the rights a liability insured has against its 
insurer – the insurer has no option but to conduct the defence.399 When the liability 
insurer has a right towards the insured to conduct the defence, the insured has a duty 
to allow the defence: the insurer has a choice whether or not to conduct the defence, 
but the right entitles the insurer to conduct the defence even, for example, when the 
                                                 
393 See para 5.2 above. 
394 ‘Kruithof Leiding van het geschil’. See generally Colle Algemene beginselen (7 ed) 204-211 and 
Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) 600-611. 
395 Freely translatated: ‘The insurer has a duty to intervene in the third-party claim in support of the 
insured from the date on which the insurer is on risk, within the limits of cover, and provided that it is 
called upon to do so’. (My translation.) See s 143(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(1) 
of the LIC Act). 
396 Freely translated: ‘The insurer has a right to conduct the defence to resist the third-party claims on 
behalf of the insured with regard to private-law or civil interests and in so far as the interests of the 
insurer and the insured coincide. The insurer may pay the third party if there is merit in doing so.’ (My 
translation.) See s 43(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(2) of the LIC Act). 
397  Freely translated: ‘The interventions by the insurer shall not constitute any form of 
acknowledgement of liability by the insured (to the third party) and may not prejudice the insured’. 
(My translation.) See s 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(3) of the LIC Act). 
398 See paras 5.3.1.1(a)-5.3.1.1(c) below. 
399 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 18 para 1.3.2.1 explains that the liability insured 
has a statutory right to the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer. She mentions that ‘[i]n 
aansprakelijk-heidsverzekering houdt deze prestatie wettelijk in dat de verzekeraar de verzekerde moet 
verdedigen… .’ 
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insured attempts to deny the insurer that right.400 In certain instances both the duty 
and the right to conduct the defence may exist simultaneously. 
 
5.3.1.1(a)  When the Duty and Right Arises 
 Section 143(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 79(1) of the LIC Act) 401 
provides that the insurer has a duty to intervene in the third-party claim in support of 
the insured (‘zich achter de verzekerde te stellen’)402 from the date when the insurer is 
on risk,403 within the limits of cover,404 and provided that it is called upon to do so.405 
Therefore, the liability insurer has a duty to intervene and conduct the defence 
when: 406 
– the occurrence of an insured event407 within the limits of cover, has 
been reported to the liability insurer that is on risk, and  
– the insured defendant has called upon the liability insurer to intervene 
in the defence.408 The liability insurer must intervene in the third-party 
claim in support of the insured defendant from the date on which it is 
called upon to do so by the insured defendant. 
                                                 
400 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 717 comments as to the purpose of the liability insurer’s 
right to conduct the defence: ‘De erkenning van dit recht laat de verzekeraar dus toe om de leiding van 
het geschil op zich te nemen in de gevallen waarin de verzekerde hem dit willen ontzeggen’. 
401 See para 5.3.1.1 above. 
402 Namely, to protect the insured defendant against claims by the third-party plaintiff. See Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 715. 
403 Fontaine ibid para 687 explains that ‘zonder twijfel moet men hieronder verstaan dat de verzekeraar 
de verdediging moet opnemen in de gevallen waarin zijn waarborg waarschijnlijk verschuldigd is 
indien de aansprakelijkheid van de verzekerde zou komen vast te staan’. That would be the time when 
the liability insurer is on risk under the insurance contract. 
404 The dispute should relate to covered liabilities, namely that ‘het geschil betrekking heeft op een 
gedekte aansprakelijkheid’. See Fontaine ibid para 716. 
405 Fontaine ibid para 687 states: ‘Niettegenstaande de formulering van de tekst hoort de tijdsfactor 
[‘vanaf het ogenblik’] niet bij het eerste lid [‘dat de verzekeraar tot het geven van dekking is 
gehouden’], maar wel bij het tweede: ‘de verplichting om het op te nemen voor de verzekerde neemt 
een aanvang van zodra ze wordt ingeroepen’. Also see Fontaine ibid para 716 and at para 687 where he 
cautions that the first part of the section (‘dat de verzekeraar tot het geven van dekking is gehouden’) 
should not be interpreted literally to mean that the insurer’s performance will only be due at the close 
of the dispute in which it should conduct the defence.  
406  When the insurer’s duty to intervene in the claim in support of the insured arises has been 
summarised by Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 706 as 
follows: ‘De verzekeraar is slechts tot leiding van het geschil verplicht, wanneer hij dekking moet 
bieden tegen een aansprakelijkheidsvordering en voor zover de verzekerde zich op deze dekking 
beroept’. 
407 As discussed in para 5.2.2.4 above in connection with the insured defendant’s duties towards the 
liability insurer. 
408 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 616 explains as follows: ‘Geen enkel verwijt zal a posteriori 
kunnen worden gemaakt aan een verzekeraar die passief blijft wanneer het schadegeval hem niet was 
aangegeven geworden. Maar de verplichting om zich achter de verzekerde te stellen speelt van zodra 
beroep gedaan wordt op de verzekeraar.’  
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If the insured has not notified the insurer or called upon it to intervene in the 
conduct of the defence, the insurer does not have a duty to conduct the defence (but it 
may well still have a right to do so).  
Section 143(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 79(2) of the LIC Act)409 provides 
that the insurer has a right410 to conduct the defence and to resist the third-party 
plaintiff’s claim (‘om, in de plaats van de verzekerde, de vordering [van die 
benadeelde] te bestrijden’) with regard to private-law or civil interests (‘ten aanzien 
van de burgerrechtelijke belangen’),411 and in so far as the interests of the liability 
insurer and the insured defendant coincide (‘in zover de belangen van de verzekeraar 
en van de verzekerde samenvallen’).412 
 The liability insurer has a right to conduct the defence when: 
– the third-party plaintiff’s claim concerns private-law (or civil) 
interests; and 
– in so far as the liability insurer and the insured defendant’s interests 
coincide.413  
When the interests of the parties no longer coincide, there is conflict of 
interest414  and the liability insurer loses both its right415  and duty to conduct the 
defence. 
                                                 
409 See para 5.3.1.1 above. 
410 As explained earlier, the acknowledgement of the liability insurer’s right to conduct the defence is 
to provide for instances where the insured defendant does not wish to allow the insurer’s involvement 
in the conduct of the defence. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 717. The liability insurer has 
an interest in resisting third-party claims to prove that there is no liability on part of the insured 
defendant towards the third-party plaintiff, or to prove that the loss suffered was less than the amount 
claimed by the third-party plaintiff; and to avoid instances where the insured defendant would be too 
lenient towards the third-party plaintiff, eg, in the case of settlement. See Van Schoubroeck 
‘Aansprakelijk-heidsverzekering’ 23-24 para 1.3.4.1.  
411  This was also confirmed by Bergen, CA, decision of 29 Jun 2012, as referred to in Van 
Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 65.1. The liability insurer does not 
have a right to conduct the defence of the insured in criminal proceedings. 
412 The point at which the insurer’s right to conduct the defence arises is summarised by Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 706: ‘De leiding van het geschil komt aan 
de verzekeraar slechts toe op voorwaarde dat de belangen van de verzekeraar en de verzekerde 
samenvallen. Alleen dan heeft de verzekeraar ten aanzien van de burgerrechtelijke belangen het recht 
om, in de plaats van de verzekerde, de vordering van de benadeelde te bestrijden.’ 
413 Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 718, 759-766 and s 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (an 
amended version of the previous s 88 of the LIC Act). 
414 See para 5.3.1.1(c) below. 
415 Antwerpen, CA, decision of 23 Jan 2008, as discussed in Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 65.1. When the interests of the liability insurer and the insured 
defendant no longer coincide, the liability insurer loses its right to conduct the defence.  
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The duty and the right to conduct the defence may exist simultaneously. This 
arises when the cumulative prerequisites of both the duty to conduct the defence416 
and the right to conduct the defence417 have been met.  
 
5.3.1.1(b)  The Scope and Extent of the Duty and Right418 
The liability insurer’s duty to support the insured defendant in a claim by the 
third-party plaintiff is wider than mere intervention in support of the insured in 
litigation brought by the third-party plaintiff. The duty includes guiding the insured 
defendant in the prevention and reduction of loss,419 assisting it in attempts to settle 
between the third-party plaintiff and the insured,420 and conducting the defence in 
court on behalf of the insured defendant.421  
The liability insurer’s right to conduct the defence of the liability dispute 
provides the insurer with the opportunity to oversee the defence in terms of its own 
insights and enables it to conduct its insurance business effectively.422 The liability 
insurer also has the right to indemnify the third-party plaintiff if it is justified (‘hij kan 
deze laatste vergoeden indien daartoe grond bestaat’) under section 143(2) of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (s 79(2) of the LIC Act).423 
Provided that there it would not prejudice the insured defendant,424 the liability 
insurer must conduct the defence as follows:425  
                                                 
416 Section 143(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(1) of the LIC Act) discussed in para 
5.3.1.1(a) above. 
417 Section 143(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(1) of the LIC Act) discussed in para 
5.3.1.1(a) above. 
418 The scope and extent of the duty and the right to defend may also be explained by the legislative 
provisions referred to above in para 5.3.1.1(a).  
419 For example, Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 65.2 provides: 
‘Deze verplichting houdt in dat de verzekeraar de nodige maatregelen moet nemen of bijkomende 
inlichtingen moet inwinnen indien, in geval van een verkeersongeval, uit het gemeenschappelijk 
aanrijdingsformulier blijkt dat de verzekerde zijn aansprakeljikheid betwist en het deskundigenverslag 
bovendien tegenstrijdigheden bevat. De verzekeraar die deze verplichting niet nakomt begaat een fout 
en moet de schade die deze fout veroorzaakt aan de verzekerde vergoeden.’ 
420 See para 5.3.1.2 below. 
421 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 23-24 para 1.3.4.1. 
422 See para 5.3.1.1(a) on the benefits of the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer for both the 
insurer and the insured respectively. 
423 The liability insurer’s right to indemnify the third-party plaintiff in the context of the conduct of the 
defence, is additional to the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured or the third-party plaintiff 
directly. See paras 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.1 above. 
424 See the discussion of s 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(3) of the LIC Act) in 
para 5.3.1.1(c) below on conclict of interest. 
425 Kruithof ‘De leiding van het geschil’ 94 para 144. This applies to both the insurer’s right and duty to 
conduct the defence. Many other examples may arise.  
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– If the claim by the third-party plaintiff against the insured defendant 
falls entirely within the cover provided by the liability insurance 
contract, the insurer may conduct the defence focusing solely on its 
own interests as it alone will bear the outcome and consequences of the 
resolution of the dispute.  
– When the claim by the third-party plaintiff against the insured 
defendant falls entirely outside the cover provided by the liability the 
insured defendant may conduct the defence focusing solely on its own 
interests as it alone will bear the outcome and consequences of the 
resolution of the dispute. 
– If the claim by the third-party plaintiff against the insured defendant 
falls partly within the cover provided by the liability insurance contract 
and partly outside of the cover, or in so far as the insurer and insured 
both have interests in their own disputes, the insured must conduct its 
own defence and claim indemnification for its defence costs from the 
liability insurer under section 146 of the Insurance Act of 2014(s 82 of 
the LIC Act).426 
 
 Section 153 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 89 of the LIC Act) contains 
detailed provisions as to the liability insurer’s427 intervention in legal proceedings 
(‘tussenkomst in de rechtspleging’). The liability insurer and the insured defendant 
may respectively intervene voluntarily in litigation instituted by the third-party 
plaintiff against the other;428 either can join the other party in the dispute which the 
third-party plaintiff has instituted against it.429 Further analysis hereof falls beyond the 
scope of this thesis due to its procedural nature. 
  
                                                 
426 See para 5.3.1.1(d) on defence costs. 
427 There are also provisions relating to the insured defendant, the policyholder, and the third-party 
plaintiff’s intervention in the legal proceedings. Also see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 767; 
Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 747-751; and Van 
Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 19 para 1.2.3, 21 para 1.3.3, and 26 para 1.3.5.2.  
428 Section 153(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 89(2) of the LIC Act). 
429 Section 153(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 89(2) of the LIC Act). 
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Section 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 79(3) of the LIC Act) provides: 
De tussenkomsten van de verzekeraar houden geen enkele erkenning in van 
aansprakelijkheid vanwege de verzekerde en zij mogen hem ook geen nadeel 
berokkenen.430  
 
Interventions by the liability insurer in the conduct of the defence do not imply 
an acknowledgement of liability of any kind on the part of the insured defendant (to 
the third-party plaintiff) while the insurer may not prejudice the insured defendant. 
The duties of the insured defendant towards the liability insurer have already 
been discussed.431 These include the prohibition of compensation of the third-party 
plaintiff by the insured defendant without the liability insurer’s consent,432 and the 
insured defendant’s obligation to take reasonable measures to prevent and mitigate the 
loss, failure of which may result in a reduction in the performance due by the liability 
insurer.433 The insured defendant’s statutory duties towards the liability insurer – to 
transmit documents to the insurer as soon as it is notified of a third-party claim434 and 
to enter an appearance, or submit to an investigation ordered by court 435  – are 
underlined in the context of the conduct of the defence.436 Failure to comply with 
these duties may result in a claim for damages against the insured defendant for the 
loss suffered by the liability insurer – eg, if the insured’s failure impacts negatively on 
the insurer’s conduct of the defence resulting in a judgment in favour of the third-
party plaintiff and proven liability of the insured towards the third party which the 
liability insurer must indemnify.  
 
  
                                                 
430  Freely translated: ‘The interventions by the insurer shall not constitute any form of 
acknowledgement of liability by the insured (to the third party) and may not prejudice the insured’. 
(My translation.) 
431 See para 5.2.2.4 above. 
432 See s 149(1) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 85(1) of the LIC Act). 
433 See ss 75-76 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 20-21 of the LIC Act). 
434 Or as soon as a document relating to the third-party claim has been delivered to, or served on, the 
insured defendant. Section 144 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 80 of the LIC Act).  
435 Section 145 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 81 of the LIC Act).  
436  These are coherent duties for the insured (‘samenhangende verplichtingen ten laste van de 
verzekerde’) in respect of the liability insurer’s duty and right to conduct the defence. See Fontaine 
Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 714 and 721-722. 
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5.3.1.1(c)  Conflict of Interest437  
In practice, liability insurers may have interests which conflict with those of the 
insured defendant so that it is not always advisable or possible for the insurer to 
conduct the defence against the third-party plaintiff rather than the insured.438 Conflict 
of interest between the liability insurer and the insured defendant are also relevant 
where the liability (or not) for the payment of defence costs by the liability insurer 
arises.439 
The following examples of conflicting interests, 440  and instances when the 
insurer does not have the right or duty to conduct the defence of the third-party 
plaintiff’s against the insured, may be mentioned:441  
– when the sum insured is insufficient to cover the damages claimed by 
the third-party plaintiff and the insured defendant is liable to pay a 
portion of the damages itself; 442 
– if the insured is summoned by the third-party plaintiff on the basis of a 
covered liability under the insurance contract or a potential non-
covered liability;443 
– when the insured defendant and the third-party plaintiff have 
contracted with the same insurer;444  
                                                 
437 Conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the insured defendant in the conduct of the 
defence are discussed here in a somewhat different sequence than in the chapter dealing with English 
law (Chapter 3) owing to the content of the Belgian law and for the sake of clarity. 
438 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 24 para 1.3.4.1. 
439 See para 5.3.1.1(d) below. 
440 There is a distinction between conflict that arise from the actions of the insured and those that do 
not. The distinction is relevant to the allocation of defence costs. See para 5.3.1.1(d) below. 
441  Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 706 and Van 
Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 24-25 para 1.3.4.1. 
442 This is so-called ‘under-insurance’ and an example of a conflict that is not due to the insured 
defendant, save in so far as the insured under-insured intentionally. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 
ed) para 729. But see Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid. The coincidence of the interests of the 
liability insurer and the insured defendant does not necessarily imply a complete congruence of these 
interests – eg, when an insured is under-insured, its uninsured interest may be greater than the financial 
interest of its insurer under the insurance policy. The interests of the insurer and the insured are indeed 
distinct, but do not invariably conflict as, eg, the defence of the third-party plaintiff’s claim by the 
insurer also benefits the insured who is under-insured as regards the uninsured part of the claim. 
443  It has been decided that, ‘deze belangen niet samenvallen wanneer de benadeelde [third-party 
plaintiff], zelfs in ondergeschikte orde, de verzekerde aanspreekt op grond van een aansprakelijkheid 
die niet gedekt is’. See the decision by the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 7 Jun 2013, as referred 
to by by Jocqué (2013) 286 Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad para I.C.3.23. 
444 Although in different capacities. For example, where the insured defendant’s insurer in its capacity 
as liability insurer, acts as first-party insurer for the third-party plaintiff we see a conflict that is not due 
to the insured defendant. See, eg, further detail on legal expense insurance para 5.3.1.1(c) below. 
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– when there is a difference of opinion between the liability insurer and 
the insured defendant on whether the matter should be resolved by 
settlement with the third-party plaintiff, or by litigation;445 
– when the liability insurer has a right of recourse against its insured 
under section 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 88 of the LIC Act in 
a slightly amended form);446 or 
– when the liability insurer may raise a defence based on the insurance 
contract. 
 
The following two matters require further discussion: legal expenses insurance; 
and the liability insurer’s right of recourse against the insured defendant. 
First, legal expenses insurance may give rise to a possible conflict of interest in 
liability insurance. It is undesirable that the same liability insurer which, for example, 
refuses to conduct the insured’s defence, must foot the bill for the expense incurred in 
the insured’s legal defence due to conflicting interests. Further, where an insured’s 
liability insurer (the defendant, party X) is also the legal expenses insurer of the third 
party (the plaintiff, party Y) in the same dispute, it may also be in the interests of the 
insurer to frustrate party Y’s claim against party X, or X’s defence against Y.  
Belgian law deals with legal expenses insurance (‘rechtsbijstands-
verzekering’)447 in sections 154-157 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 90-93 of the LIC 
Act). Section 154 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 90 of the LIC Act) expressly states 
that the provisions regarding legal expenses insurance448 do not apply to the defence 
of the insured undertaken by the liability insurer. 449  Legal expenses insurance is 
generally not relevant in the conduct of the defence in liability insurance, save where 
                                                 
445 This is an example of a conflict that is not due to the insured defendant. 
446 For example, when the event is caused by the insured’s ‘zware fout’ (as stated in para 5.2.2.3(b)(ii) 
the Dutch term is used for clarity). This is an example of a conflict due to the insured. In the event that 
the liability insurer exercises its right of recourse without merit, the conflict is not due to the insured. 
See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 729 and for further detail, see para 5.3.1.1(c) below.  
447 It may be defined as, ‘een verzekeringsovereenkomst waarbij de verzekeraar zich verbindt diensten 
en kosten op zich te nemen om de verzekerde in staat te stellen zijh rechten te doen gelden, als eiser of 
als verweerder, hetzij in een gerechtelijke, administratieve of andere procedure, hetzij los van enige 
procedure.’ See Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 662. For 
further detail on the distinction between liability insurance and legal expenses insurance under Belgian 
law, see Fontaine ibid paras 82 and 768-770. 
448 Sections 155-157 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 91-93 of the LIC Act). 
449 Under ss 143 and 146 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 79 and 82 of the LIC Act). 
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there is a conflict of interest between the parties and the insured conducts its own 
defence. 450 
Conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the insured defendant may 
be avoided by a statutory measure that expressly regulates the relationship, where 
both liability and legal expenses insurance are provided by a single insurer to the 
same insured. 451  The EC, for example, adopted the Legal Expenses Insurance 
Directive in 1987 for this purpose, 452  that was in part replaced by the so-called 
‘Solvency II’ Directive.453 The contents of these directives are substantially similar 
when it comes to legal expenses insurance.454  
Second, the conflict of interest which arises when the liability insurer has a right 
of recourse against its insured (‘recht van verhaal van de verzekeraar op de 
verzekerings-nemer en de verzekerde’) under section 152 of the 2014 Insurance 
Act455 (s 88 of the LIC Act in a slightly amended form) requires further explanation. 
Section 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 now provides as follows: 
De verzekeraar kan zich, voor zover hij volgens de wet of de 
verzekeringsovereenkomst de prestaties had kunnen weigeren of verminderen, een 
recht van verhaal voorbehouden tegen de verzekeringsnemer en, indien daartoe 
grond bestaat, tegen de verzekerde die niet de verzekeringsnemer is, ten belope van 
het persoonlijk aandeel in de aansprakelijkheid van de verzekerde.  
                                                 
450 Also see para 5.3.1.1(d) below on defence costs. 
451 For further detail see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 768-784 and Schuermans & Van 
Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) paras 662-676. See also para 4.3.1.1(d)(iii) above on 
English law. 
452  EC Directive 87/344EEC of 22 June 1987 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative proceedings relating to legal expenses insurance.  
453 EC Directive 2009/138EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance.  
454 European case law on the topic revolves around when an insured’s right to appoint its own legal 
council commences in legal expenses insurance (see, eg, Erhard Eschig v UNIQA Sachversicherung 
AG [2010] 1 CMLR 5 (ECJ) 130-214). Due to the procedural issues involved, further detail falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
455 This is also known as the liability insurer’s ‘regresrecht’ or ‘regresvordering’. See Schuermans & 
Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 738 n 537. However, the liability insurer’s 
right of recourse against the insured defendant should not be confused with the its claim against its 
liability insurer (and the prescription of that claim as dealt with under s 88(1)(iii) of the Insurance Act 
of 2014, previously s 34(1)(iii) of the LIC Act as discussed in para 5.2.2.1(d) above). It should also not 
be confused with the liability insurer’s right to subrogation (under s 95 of the Insurance Act of 
2014previously s 41 of the LIC Act; see para 5.2.3.2 above). This right of recourse allows the liability 
insurer to recover the indemnification paid to the third-party plaintiff from the insured defendant and 
differs from the insurer’s subrogation right which allows it to recover expenses incurred from liable 
third parties. See Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 85-86 para 17. In Belgian law the 
liability insurerʼs right of recourse differs from subrogation as the former has a contractual basis. Van 
Schoubroeck 28 para 1.3.5.4 explains that, ‘[d]e grondslag voor het verhaal is zuiver contractueel en 
vloeit niet rechtstreeks voort uit de wet’. For further detail see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 
759-766; Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck ibid paras 738-740; and Van Schoubroeck 
‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 28-29 para 1.3.5.4. 
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De verzekeraar is, op straffe van verval van zijn recht van verhaal, verplicht de 
verzekeringsnemer of, in voorkomend geval, de verzekerde die niet 
verzekeringsnemer is, kennis te geven van zijn voornemen om verhaal in te stellen 
zodra hij op de hoogte is van de feiten waarop dat besluit gegrond is. 
De Koning kan het recht van verhaal beperken in de gevallen en in de mate die Hij 
bepaalt.456 
 
As discussed earlier,457 section 151 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 87 of the 
LIC Act) provides detailed provisions in regard to the defences which the liability 
insurer may or may not raise against the third-party plaintiff. To summarise again: in 
the instances where the liability insurer cannot raise the defences that it has against its 
insured against the third-party plaintiff, it will be liable to indemnify the third-party 
plaintiff. The liability insurer will then attempt to exercise its right of recourse against 
the insured under section 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 88 of the LIC Act).458  
The liability insurer’s right of recourse has been limited to the insured’s 
personal liability to the third-party plaintiff. There are two further conditions for the 
liability insurer’s right of recourse:459 it must have reserved its right of recourse and 
the grounds therefor against the insured in the insurance contract; and the insurer must 
notify460 the insured of its intention to seek recourse as soon as it is informed of the 
facts justifying such a decision. The Legislature may limit the insurer’s right to 
recourse. As regards the prescription of a claim for the liability insurer’s recourse 
against the insured, section 88(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 34(3) of the LIC 
Act) provides: 
De regresvordering van de verzekeraar tegen de verzekerde verjaart door verloop  
                                                 
456 Freely translated: ‘The insurer may reserve a right of recourse against the policyholder and, if 
appropriate, against the insured other than the policyholder, to the extent that it could have denied or 
reduced the benefit pursuant to statute or under the insurance contract. The liability insurer’s right of 
recourse is limited to the insured’s personal liability to the third party. On pain of losing its right of 
recourse, the insurer shall notify the policyholder or, as the case may be, the insured other than the 
policyholder, of its intention to seek recourse as soon as it is informed of the facts justifying such a 
decision. The King may limit recourse in such cases and to an extent he may determine.’ (My 
translation.) 
457 See para 5.2.3.1 above. 
458 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 28 para 1.3.5.4; Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijk-
heidsverzekering’ 85-86 para 17; and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 
ed) para 738. 
459 Strict compliance with these conditions is required. Failure to comply results in the extinction of the 
right of recourse so that it is no longer possible for the liability insurer to exercise its right of recourse. 
460 See the decision of the Belgian Supreme Court, Cass, dated 4 Oct 2013, as discussed by Meurs & 
Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 87 para 19.  
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van drie jaar, te rekenen vanaf de dag van de betaling door de verzekeraar, 
behoudens bedrog.461 
This recourse by the liability insurer prescribes three years after the date on 
which the insurer pays the third-party plaintiff directly, save in cases of fraud. 
 
5.3.1.1(d)  Defence Costs462   
Sections 146(3) and 146(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 82(3) and 82(4) of 
the LIC Act) provide as follows in regard to defence costs:463 
De verzekeraar betaalt, zelfs boven de dekkingsgrenzen, de kosten betreffende 
burgerlijke rechtsvorderingen, alsook de honoraria en de kosten van de advocaten en 
de deskundigen, maar alleen in zover die kosten door hem of met zijn toestemming 
gemaakt, of in geval van belangenconflict dat niet te wijten is aan de verzekerde, 
voor zover die kosten niet onredelijk zijn gemaakt.  
Voor de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen, andere dan die bedoeld in de wet van 21 
november 1989 betreffende de verplichte aansprakelijkheidsverzekering inzake 
motorrijtuigen, kan de Koning [de intresten en] kosten ... van dit artikel beperken.464 
 
As previously noted,465 the liability insurer will generally conduct the defence in 
claims against the insured and it will bear the defence costs it incurs in doing so. The 
insurer must pay, even in excess of the sum insured, the costs in connection with civil 
proceedings as well as the fees and costs of lawyers and experts (‘the defence costs’) 
to the extent that such costs are either incurred by the insurer or with its consent. The 
liability insurer loses its right and duty to conduct the defence under section 143 of 
                                                 
461 Freely translated: ‘The right to recourse by the insurer against the insured prescribes three years 
after the date on which the insurer pays (the third party), save in cases of fraud’. (My translation.) 
462 Note that s 154 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 90 of the LIC Act) expressly states that 
the provisions regarding legal expenses insurance in ss 155-157 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(previously ss 91-93 of the LIC Act) do not apply to the defence of the insured undertaken by the 
liability insurer under ss 143 and 146 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 79 and 82 of the LIC 
Act). For further detail on the distinction between liability insurance and legal expenses insurance 
under Belgian law, see Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 82 and 768-770.  
463 The heading of s 146 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 82 of the LIC Act) reads: ‘Betaling 
door de verzekeraar van de hoofdsom, de interest en de kosten’ freely translated as: ‘Payment by the 
insurer of the principal sum, the interest, and the costs’. (My translation.) The focus falls on defence 
costs in this paragraph. See ss 146(1), 146(2), and 146(4) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously ss 
82(1), 82(2), and 82(4) of the LIC Act) and para 5.2.2.3(a) above for further detail on the payment of 
third-party damages and interest by the liability insurer.  
464 Freely translated: ‘The insurers shall pay, even in excess of the sum insured, the costs in connection 
with civil proceedings as well as the fees and costs of lawyers and experts, but only to the extent that 
such costs are incurred by the insurer or with its consent or, where there is a conflict of interest which 
is not attributable to the insured, provided that such costs are not incurred unreasonably. With regard to 
liability insurance other than motor-vehicle liability insurance regulated by the Act of 1989 on Motor-
Vehicle Liability Insurance, the [interest and] costs referred to in … of this section can be limited by 
Royal Decree.’ (My translation.) 
465 See paras 5.3.1.1, 5.3.1.1(a), and 5.3.1.1(b) above. 
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the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 79 of the LIC Act) if there is a conflict of interest 
between the parties.466  
Where there is a conflict of interest467  between the liability insurer and the 
insured defendant, the defence costs will generally be incurred by the insured. The 
insured may then claim these costs from the liability insurer if the conflict of interest 
is not due to the actions of the insured,468 and if the costs have not been incurred 
unreasonably. As discussed earlier, 469  the liability insurer’s obligation to pay the 
interest and costs due on the principal amount, even in excess of the sum insured in 
the liability policy, is not unlimited. Section 6ter of Royal Decree of December 1992, 
as amended, provides for the contractual limitation of the interest on third-party 
damages and the defence costs with regard to liability insurance, other than motor-
vehicle liability insurance regulated by the Act of 1989 on Motor-Vehicle Liability 
Insurance.470  
Neither the LIC Act, nor Part 4 of Insurance Act of 2014 provides when the 
liability insurer should pay the defence costs. A demand must first be made by the 
insured before interest accrues on the insurer’s debts (such as the defence costs).471  
 
5.3.1.1(e)  Waiver by Conduct (‘Gewekte Schijn’)472  
In view of the statutory requirements discussed earlier,473 the liability insurer 
that has a right to conduct the defence on behalf of the insured, has a choice whether 
                                                 
466 See para 5.3.1.1(c) above. 
467  An example of unreasonable expenditure is where the insured appoints senior counsel in an 
uncomplicated matter. See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) para 729.  
468 See para 5.3.1.1(c) above for examples of conflict due to the insured and for examples of conflict 
not due to the insured. 
469 See para 5.2.2.3(a) above; Fontaine ibid para 730; and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische 
Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 711.  
470 For example, a conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the insured defendant may arise 
if the damages claimed by the third-party plaintiff exceed the sum insured under the insurance policy. 
Such a conflict is not due to the insured and the insurer will be obliged to pay the defence costs, even in 
excess of the sum insured, provided that the costs have not been incurred unreasonably and are within 
the limits as laid down in s 6ter of Royal Decree of Dec 1992, as amended. 
471 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 712. Also see art 1146 of 
the Civil Code. 
472  From the sources consulted on Belgian law, ‘estoppel’ (as referred to in paras 3.3.1.1(e) and 
4.3.1.1(e) above) does not appear to be known under Belgian law. Belgian legal sources appear to 
suggest that ‘gewekte schijn’ by the liability insurer may be regarded as waiver by a liability insurer of 
its rights, eg, waiver of its right to decline to indemnify the insured (‘afstand van het recht om dekking 
te weigeren’). The phrase ‘gewekte schijn’ may be translated into English as ‘a created impression’ or 
‘impression by conduct’. For legal certainty, the Dutch phrase ‘gewekte schijn’ is used in conjunction 
with the English phrase ‘waiver by conduct’. See, eg, Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift 
voor Privaatrecht para 65.1 and Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) 
para 706.  
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or not to conduct the defence. On the one hand, the insurer may exercise its choice 
and conduct the defence in accordance with its own insights and interests, but then it 
may be held accountable to indemnify the insured.474 On the other hand, the insurer 
may prefer to have an option to decline to indemnify the insured or to be able to 
exercise its right to recourse against the insured.475 In the latter instance the liability 
insurer must: 
– abstain from conducting the defence in the claim by the third-party 
plaintiff against the insured defendant; 
– fully inform the insured defendant of its position, pointing to the 
possibility476 that the insured may ultimately bear a part of the third-
party claim itself; and 
– advise the insured defendant to conduct its own defence against the 
claim of the third-party plaintiff and to obtain legal advice in doing so. 
 
It has already been mentioned477 that intervention by the liability insurer in the 
conduct of the defence does not imply an acknowledgement of liability of any kind on 
the part of the insured defendant (towards the third-party plaintiff) and the insurer 
may not prejudice the insured defendant.478 
Commentators agree that the liability insurer should take a stance as to the 
conduct of the defence, or not, as soon as it becomes aware that there may be a 
conflict of interest between itself and the insured defendant.479 If the insurer does not 
do so, it may be taken to have created the impression (‘dan kan de schijn gewekt 
worden’)480 that it will, for example, not rely on any contractual exclusion. Should the 
liability insurer then indeed attempt to rely on a contractual exclusion, that may be 
                                                                                                                                            
473 See para 5.3.1.1 above. In summary: When the liability insurer has a right to conduct the defence, 
the insured has a duty to allow the defence. This is in contrast to when the liability insurer has a duty 
towards the insured to conduct the defence; the liability insured then has a right against its insurer and 
the insurer has no choice whether but to comply with its obligation to conduct the defence. 
474 See para 5.3.1.1(e) below on waiver by ‘schijn gewekt’. 
475 For example, in instances where the liability insurer considers indemnifying the third-party plaintiff 
or would like to enter into settlement negotiations with the latter, but it foresees that it may be able to 
exercise its right of recourse against the insured defendant. See para 5.3.1.1(c) above for further detail 
on the liability insurer’s right of recourse against the insured defendant. 
476 Again, note that Kruithof ‘De leiding van het geschil’ 95 para 145 n 451 is of opinion that it is the 
possibility, not the certainty, that the insured may have to bear a portion of the third-party claim on its 
own, that is relevant here. See para 5.3.1.1(a) above. 
477 See para 5.3.1.1(b) above. 
478 Section 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(3) of the LIC Act). 
479 Schuermans & Van Schoubroeck Belgische Verzekeringsrecht (3 ed) para 706. 
480 Ibid.  
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regarded as an abuse of its contractual rights and that it acted against the principle of 
good faith – the insurer waived its rights by conduct (‘gewekte schijn’) and then 
attempted to undo the waiver.481 In such an instance, the remedy in favour of the 
insured will be to deny the liability insurer its right to rely on the exclusion to deny 
liability to the insured.482 
When the liability insurer takes charge of the conduct of the defence, this does 
not conclusively mean that the insurer will be held liable to indemnify the insured in 
respect of the insured event.483 For example, the fact that the liability insurer initially 
assumed the conduct of the defence does not prevent it from relying on the allegedly 
‘zware fout’484 of the insured to deny liability after having been informed of the 
findings of an expert investigator.  
In practice, the theory of waiver by conduct (‘gewekte schijn’) is often used by 
the insured in an attempt to hold the liability insurer liable to indemnify the insured 
defendant. For example, in one instance the insured alleged that the liability insurer 
had conducted the defence ‘without reservation of its rights’ (‘voorbehoudloos’).485 
The insured further alleged that the liability insurer had created the impression that it 
would indemnify the insured, and that it had waived its right to rely on a contractual 
exclusion (‘hiermee schijn heeft gewekt dekking te zullen verlenen, zodat de 
verzekeraar moet worden geacht afstand te hebben gedaan van het recht zich te 
beroepen op een contractuele uitsluiting’). 486  The court found 487  that the liability 
insurer was entitled to await the outcome of the findings of the expert investigator488 
before making its decision on whether or not to conduct the defence.  
 
 
                                                 
481 Ibid: ‘Misbruik maken van zijn contractuele rechten en in strijd met de goede trouw handelen’. 
482 Ibid para 706 explain it as follows: ‘Een abusievelijke rechtsoefening kan in dat geval enkel op 
passende wijze worden hersteld door aan de verzekeraar het recht te ontzeggen zich op de uitsluiting te 
beroepen.’ 
483 See Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 65.1 on the judicial 
decisions and opinions of commentators in this regard. 
484 As stated in para 5.2.2.3(b)(ii) above, the Dutch term ‘zware fout’ is used for clarity. 
485 See Ghent, CA, decision of 9 Dec 2009, as discussed in Van Schoubroeck et al (2016) 2 & 3 
Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht para 65.1. 
486 Ibid. 
487  Ibid: ‘Vanaf het ogenblik echter dat de verzekeraar kennis nam van het rapport van de 
gerechtsdeskundige, waaruit bleek dat zijn belangen en die van de verzekerde niet meer gelijklopend 
waren, had de verzekeraar aan de verzekerde moeten melden dat hij geen dekking zou verlenen … en 
dat hij niet langer de verdediging van diens belangen op zich zou nemen’. 
488 For further detail in regard to waiver by the insurer’s conduct of defence, eg, where an insurer 
participates in ‘l’assureur a l’expertise’ (expert investigation, which is a part of the defence), see De 
Rode & Dubuission ‘L’expertise et l’assurance’ paras 28 and 45. 
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5.3.1.2 Settlement of Claims and Related Matters 
The liability insurer’s duty to support the insured defendant in a claim by the 
third-party plaintiff may include that the insurer assist the insured to negotiate a 
settlement between the third-party plaintiff and the insured.489 
The Insurance Act of 2014(and previously the LIC Act) sets out a number of 
duties peculiar to liability insurance which the insured must fulfil as regards the 
liability insurer, and vice versa.  
The liability insurer and its insured’s duties towards each other have already 
been discussed in the context of the conduct of the defence.490 The most important 
principle is that their behaviour in conducting the defence or negotiating a settlement 
should not prejudice one another.  
For example, section 149 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 85 of the LIC Act) 
also provides that compensation, or a promise of it, to the third-party plaintiff by the 
insured without the insurer’s consent does not bind the insurer.491 Under a liability 
insurance contract an insured may also not admit liability towards the third-party 
plaintiff without the insurer’s consent.492 Section 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(s 79(3) of the LIC Act) contains a corresponding duty on the liability insurer to its 
insured, namely that interventions by the liability insurer in the conduct of the defence 
do not imply an acknowledgement of liability of any kind by the insured defendant 
(towards the third-party plaintiff) while the insurer may not prejudice the insured 
defendant. 
 
5.3.2  The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the Third-
Party Plaintiff 
 
This relationship has already been discussed.493 Section 151 of the Insurance 
Act of 2014 (s 87 of the LIC Act) provides for detailed provisions in regard to the 
defences that the liability insurer may or may not raise against the third-party plaintiff. 
                                                 
489  Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 24 para 1.3.4.1. Also see s 143(2) of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (s 79 of the LIC Act). 
490 See para 5.3.1.1(b).  
491 See Fontaine Verzekeringsrecht (2 ed) paras 737-739 and Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheids-
verzekering’ 16 para 1.3.1.3 for further detail on compensation by the insured defendant. 
492 See para 5.2.2.2.4 for further detail on the insured defendant’s duties towards the liability insurer. 
493 See 5.2.3.1 above on the third-party plaintiffs’ direct right against the liability insurer, and the 
liability insurer and the third-parties’ rights and obligations towards each other. The third parties’ rights 
against the liability insurer, eg, as to the free disposal of damages paid by the insurer and as to receipts, 
may again be relevant here.  
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This may be particularly important in the context of the defence of the third-party 
claim by the liability insurer. To summarise again: where the liability insurer cannot 
raise the defences that it has against its insured, against the third-party plaintiff, the 
liability insurer will be liable to the third-party plaintiff. The liability insurer will then 
attempt to exercise its right of recourse against the insured.494 
The liability insurer’s right of subrogation against a responsible third party has 
also already been discussed.495 Such a claim for subrogation may be instituted as part 
of the conduct of the defence by the liability insurer. 
  
5.3.3 The Legal Relationship between the Insured Defendant and the 
Liability Insurer’s Legal Representatives  
 
The liability insurer’s legal representatives must take particular care that their 
conduct of the defence does not prejudice the insured defendant.496 
 
5.3.4 The Legal Relationship between the Liability Insurer and the 
Third-Party Plaintiff’s Insurers: Litigating against Each Other in 
the Names of Their Insured 
  
The insured’s liability insurer and the third party’s first-party insurer may 
litigate against each other in the names of their respective insured: the first-party 
insurer by enforcing the third party’s claim by exercising its right of subrogation; and 
the liability insurer by defending the third party’s claim. No contract or legal 
relationship exists between the respective insurers. 497 
We have already seen498 that the third-party plaintiff must institute its direct 
claim against the liability insurer (where applicable) before the claim prescribes, and 
further that section 88(2) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 34(2) of the LIC Act) 
governs the prescription period within which the third-party plaintiff may institute its 
claim. However, should the third-party plaintiff’s first-party insurer be subrogated to 
                                                 
494 Under s 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 88 of the LIC Act). See para 5.3.1.1(c) 
above on this conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the insured defendant. 
495 See para 5.2.3.2 above. 
496 Section 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 79(3) of the LIC Act). Also see para 
5.3.1.1(b) above on the liability insurer and the insured’s duties towards each other in the context of the 
conduct of the defence, as well as para 5.3.1.2 above on settlement. 
497 It is a consequence of s 95 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously s 41 of the LIC Act) on 
subrogation in indemnity insurance See ss 141 and 143 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (ss 77 and 79 of 
the LIC Act) on the liability insurer’s duty and/or right to defend its insured against third-party claims. 
498 See para 5.2.3.1 above. 
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the third-party plaintiff’s rights against the liability insurer, such a party’s rights be 
will be no greater than those of the third-party plaintiff. 499 
 
5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS500 
In the first instance, the main source of Belgian liability insurance contract law 
is legislation as Belgium follows a codified or civil-law system. The Insurance Act of 
2014 is a relatively recent piece of legislation (although the majority of its provisions 
on liability insurance from the LIC Act have been repealed and re-enacted without 
amendment in the Insurance Act of 2014). 
Belgian insurance legislation creates a useful structure and division: liability 
insurance is dealt with separately in Part 4, Title III, Chapter 3 of the Insurance Act of 
2014 (Title II, Chapter III of the LIC Act). Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(s 77 of the LIC Act) further describes the scope of application of liability insurance 
contracts. Some of the other provisions relating to indemnity insurance (in other parts 
or chapters) also apply to liability insurance. Belgian insurance legislation provides an 
example of workable legislation which incorporates rules pertaining specifically to 
liability insurance contract law. 
Legal terminology in Belgian law is not always clear to a South African 
audience (eg, the term ‘zware fout’ in s 62 of the Insurance Act of 2014; s 8 of the 
LIC Act) and caution should be exercised in translating terminology. 
The EC Directive 93/13 on Unfair Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts has 
been incorporated into Belgian law. But it is especially relevant that Belgian 
insurance law also provides for rules on unfair contract terms for all insurance 
contracts – not only insurance contracts concluded with consumers. 
                                                 
499 Van Schoubroeck ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 30 para 1.4.2 explains the position as follows: 
‘Wordt een derde [the third-party plaintiff’s first-party insurer] gesubrogeerd in de rechten van de 
benadeelde [the third-party plaintiff], … , oefent de indeplaatsgestelde derde [the first-party insurer], de 
vordering van de benadeelde [the third-party plaintiff] uit met al haar kenmerken en toebehoren. 
Daaruit volgt dat de verjaringstermijn van de rechtstreekse vordering van de indeplaatsgestelde [the 
first-party insurer] tegen de aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar aanvangt op het ogenblik waarop de 
verjaringstermijn van de vordering van de benadeelde [third-party plaintiff] begint te lopen.’ For 
further detail, see Meurs & Thiery ‘Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ 108-109 para 46.  
500 This para 5.4 is a concise summative conclusion of the survey conducted on selected aspects of the 
law of liability insurance under Belgian law. Belgian law may assist in the development of the law of 
liability insurance in South African law, but the conclusions and recommendations reached in Chapter 
6 go beyond those of para 5.4. Some parts of the law were reviewed to provide a complete overview of 
the law of liability insurance under Belgian law, but they may not offer an appropriate solution for 
South African law in all instances. 
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Secondly, as regards the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured, and 
the scope of cover of the insured defendant’s liability, Belgian insurance legislation is 
concise but clear. Section 141 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 77 of the LIC Act) 
provides that the liability insurer must indemnify the insured’s estate within the limits 
of the cover agreed upon, for a debt arising from proven liability (ie, the insured’s 
proven liability to the third party for the latter’s loss). The liability insurer becomes 
liable to the insured only once the latter’s liability to the third-party plaintiff has been 
established (by way of judgment, arbitral award, or settlement). The time at which the 
liability insurer becomes liable to indemnify the insured is rather late in the judicial 
process.  
As to the ways in which the insured defendant’s liability towards third-party 
plaintiffs should be proven, there appear to be fewer judicial decisions, and less legal 
doctrine or uncertainties, in Belgian law than in other systems researched in the thesis 
for the purposes of a comparative study. This may be ascribed to the clear legislative 
provisions relating to the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured under the 
more advanced Belgian insurance contract law. 
Section 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended) 
provides at least a partial solution to the uncertainty surrounding the duration of 
liability cover. This involves the event which brings the matter within the scope of a 
particular liability policy. The duration of liability cover is provided for by a dual 
system in section 142 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 78 of the LIC Act, as amended). 
Apart from occurrence-based liability cover as the general rule, under certain 
circumstances the section allows for hybrid claims-made policies which provide 
protection to the insured and insurer in different ways. Prescribed minimum cover by 
way of legislation benefits the insured, but excessive contractual freedom in adapting 
the insurance cover may create gaps and uncertainty in cover which is to the 
disadvantage of the insured. Legislative amendments to the LIC Act, and a recent 
decision by the Belgian Supreme Court have resolved some of the challenges as to the 
duration of liability cover. Care should be taken that terminology as to the duration of 
liability cover under Belgian law is not simply equated with similar terms in Anglo-
American legal systems. 
As to the sum insured, under section 146 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 82 of 
the LIC Act) the liability insurer may be liable to pay costs and interest on the 
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damages claimed by the third-party plaintiff which may even exceed the sum insured. 
This benefits the insured. 
The Insurance Act of 2014 (and previously the LIC Act) has clarified many 
legal uncertainties. Section 88 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (a slightly amended 
version of s 34 of the LIC Act), for example, contains detailed provisions as regards 
prescription periods (for the insured’s recourse claim against its insurer, the third-
party’s direct right to claim from the liability insurer, and for the liability insurer’s 
recourse claim against its insured). Contractual clauses which reduce or extend the 
prescription period, or provide for a different starting or completion date for the 
period, are void. But there are still some interpretation issues as to prescription – eg, 
in the case of fraud and fault involving minors.  
Liability insurance gives rise to a multitude of legal relationships. Extensive 
protection is provided to the respective parties involved in liability insurance – eg, by 
way of the direct right of the third-party plaintiff to claim against the liability insurer 
in section 150 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 86 of the LIC Act) which is not limited 
to instances of insolvency or sequestration. The liability insurer’s rights are protected 
by detailed procedural provisions – eg, the defences which the liability insurer has 
against the insured defendant and which it may or may not raise against the third-
party plaintiff are addressed in section 151 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 87 of the 
LIC Act); and the recourse claim that the liability insurer has against the insured if it 
is unable to institute defences against the third-party plaintiff as provided for in 
section 152 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 88 of the LIC Act, in a slightly amended 
form). There are also detailed provisions as to intervention in legal proceedings by the 
liability insured, the insured, and the third-party plaintiff in section 153 of the 
Insurance Act of 2014 (s 89 of the LIC Act) that prove to be valuable. The third 
parties’ direct right against the liability insurer may be in the interest of third parties 
which suffered loss attributable to the insured. Some of the procedural aspects relating 
to the liability insurer’s defences and its recourse claim against the insured, as well as 
the provisions relating to intervention in legal proceedings, fall beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
Thirdly, the Belgian insurance legislation provides extensive protection to both 
the liability insurer and the insured by providing for a liability insurer’s statutory duty 
and right to conduct the defence under certain specified conditions (see ss 141 and 
143 of the 2014 Insurance Act; ss 77 and 79 of the LIC Act, as amended). Belgian 
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insurance legislation provides that the liability insurer has a duty to conduct the 
defence when it has been notified of the occurrence of the insured event (within the 
limits of cover) that is on risk, and the insured defendant has called upon the insurer 
to intervene in the defence. The liability insurer must intervene in the third-party 
claim in support of the insured defendant from the date on which the insured 
defendant calls upon it to do so. The liability insurer has a right to conduct the 
defence when the third-party plaintiff’s claim concerns private-law or civil interests; 
and in so far as its interests and those of the insured defendant coincide. There are 
also detailed provisions as to the scope and extent of the duty and/or right to conduct 
the defence, as well as to conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the 
insured.  
Section 146 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 82 of the LIC Act) also obliges 
liability insurers to pay the insured’s defence costs, even when these exceed the sum 
insured under certain circumstances. This benefits the insured that may be unable to 
pay high defence costs. Some conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the 
insured defendant may be avoided by regulating the provision of liability insurance 
and legal expenses insurance to an insured by a single insurer by statute. The EC, for 
example, adopted the Legal Expenses Insurance Directive in 1987 which was 
subsequently replaced by the so-called ‘Solvency II’ Directive. 
The majority of rights and duties of the parties involved in liability insurance – 
the liability insurer, the insured, and the third-party plaintiff – are clearly specified 
under the Insurance Act of 2014 (previously the LIC Act). The most important duty as 
far as the liability insurer and the insured are concerned, is that their behaviour in the 
conduct of the defence or settlement, should not prejudice either party. For example, 
section 149 of the Insurance Act of 2014 (s 85 of the LIC Act) provides that 
compensation or a promise of it, to the third-party plaintiff by the insured without the 
insurer’s consent will not bind the latter. Section 143(3) of the Insurance Act of 2014 
(s 79(3) of the LIC Act) contains a correlating duty on the liability insurer to its 
insured that its interventions in the conduct of the defence will not imply an 
acknowledgement of liability of any kind in respect of the insured defendant (towards 
the third-party plaintiff), and will not prejudice the insured defendant. To provide for 
the parties’ duties by statute may avoid disputes between the parties and create legal 
certainty.  
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Lastly, although Belgian law is foreign law and may only be used for 
comparative purposes in our law, South African insurance law could learn from and 
adopt some of the provisions on liability insurance contract law in Belgium’s 
Insurance Act of 2014 (previously the LIC Act) and its interpretation in court 
judgments and law doctrine.501 
This chapter has analysed the relevant principles of the law of liability insurance 
under Belgian law, a codified or civil-law system. The next and final chapter, Chapter 
6, contains the conclusions and recommendations on how the South African liability 
insurance contract law can develop in future and benefit from the current position in 
both the United Kingdom and Belgium. Taking cognisance of the laws of other 
jurisdictions could provide the South African legislator and the Financial Services 
Conduct Authority with some guidance when consideration is given to codify 




                                                 
501 For further detail, see Chapter 6 on the South African law of liability insurance and the conclusions 






SUMMARY OF FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
  
 This thesis argues that there are gaps, impracticalities, and unique challenges 
facing South African insurance law specifically when it comes to liability insurance. 
Issues arise in respect of the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured and in 
relation to the liability insurer’s conduct of the defence and settlement of third-party 
claims against the insured defendant.1 Legal uncertainty may span the entire lifetime 
of the contract, including the pre-contractual process, the actual negotiation, and the 
nature of the cover procured, and claims management both before and after the expiry 
of the contract. 2  Some of these legal challenges can be addressed by novel and 
creative applications of the national law not yet pursued, 3  and by implementing 
potential solutions from the other jurisdictions reviewed in this thesis.4 
 The thesis presents critical summative comments, conclusions, and 
recommendations throughout5  which address how to promote the law of liability 
insurance and advance legal certainty on specific aspects analysed in the preceding 
chapters. 6  This final chapter is a concise summary of the final conclusions and 
recommendations for purposes of the development of the law of liability insurance in 
South Africa.  
 The principal sources of liability insurance contract law are the common law, 
and a limited number of judicial decisions, as well as general insurance law statutes 
and legislative instruments to a lesser degree.7 These sources to some extent provide 
broadly for fairness, transparency, and consumer protection under the general 
principles of the law of contract and general insurance law. But I argue that the 
                                                 
1 This is the thesis. See para 1.7 above. 
2 See para 3.2.2.2(b) above on the duration of liability cover and Chapter 3 passim. 
3 See Chapter 3 on South African law above.  
4 See again Chapter 4 on English law and Chapter 5 on Belgian law above. 
5  See, eg, the summative critical comments and the conclusions and recommendations on South 
African law in Chapter 3 above. See also the summaries and concluding remarks in Chapters 4 and 5 
above on the survey conducted on selected aspects of the law of liability insurance under these foreign 
systems. These provide a basis for the final conclusions and recommendations in this chapter.  
6 See again the research statement and objective in para 1.5 above. 
7 See para 3.1 above on the sources of liability insurance contract law. Although legislation is of 
increasing importance, it has had limited effect on the contractual aspects of liability insurance. See 
para 3.1.2 above. See also para 3.1.5 above on the application of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the ‘Constitution’) to civil obligations and liability insurance contracts. 
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primary development of the law of liability insurance should be by way of the 
enactment of specific legislation. Development by way of judicial activism is less 
certain, and will probably be fragmented and take a considerable period before it 
enjoys general application. 
 There is no specific statute on insurance contract law in force in South Africa at 
present,8 or any statute specifically regulating liability insurance contract law.9 The 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 does not apply to insurance contracts, and the 
proposed Conduct of Financial Institutions Bill,10 which may potentially address the 
inclusion of unfair contract terms, has not yet been finalised. The approach of South 
African law to introduce more statutory regulation, such as the COFI Bill, appears to 
indicate a shift from rule-based to principle-based (but mandatory) regulation.  
 The Replacement of the Policyholder Protection Rules 11  emphasise the 
importance of fair treatment of the insured and regulate the use of plain language, 
transparency, and disclosure to an extent, but only in principle and only in general 
terms. The PPRs apply to all forms of insurance contracts, and although they may 
appear to be detailed, there is scope for their further expansion and application to 
liability insurance in particular.12 It has been questioned whether the new, generic 
disclosure duties placed on insurers under the current PPRs will result in a fairer 
dispensation for the insured. Specifically as regards the unique nature and challenges 
posed by the character and structure of liability insurance, it is concluded that it will 
be far more prudent for the legislator to develop specific rules for liability insurers, 
and potential insured,13 to ensure compliance with tailor-made rules and processes.14 
To promote legal certainty, consumer protection, and industry standards, these rules 
                                                 
8 Section 156 of the Insolvency Act 2 4  of 1936 (the ‘Insolvency Act’) provides for a statutory 
exception which applies in the event of sequestration of the insured defendant under liability insurance. 
See para 3.2.3.2 above. 
9 See para 3.1 above.  
10 The ‘COFI Bill’. The Bill was published on 11 December 2018 and invited comments by 1 April 
2019. 
11 The ‘PPRs’; in terms of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 (the ‘SIA’) promulgated as GN 
1433 in GG 41329 of 15 December 2017 and in force from 1 January 2018, unless provided otherwise. 
A few amendments were made to the PPRs. The amendments were promulgated as GN 996 in GG 
41928 of 28 September 2018 and came into effect from 1 October 2018. Previous versions of the PPRs 
fall beyond the ambit of this study. 
12 The same applies to the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Service Providers and 
Representatives (the ‘GCC’) under the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
(the ‘FAIS Act’), BN 80 of 2003 as amended, in that more specific aspects regarding liability insurance 
should be described as mandatory disclosures. See rules 3 and 7 of the GCC. See also para 3.2 above. 
13 Again, the term ‘insured’ is used consistently in preference to ‘policyholder’. 
14 As is the case with microinsurance. See below for further detail. 
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should include greater specificity on mandatory disclosures to be made by both 
parties.  
Most importantly, this study has attempted to drill down through the various 
layers of general principles and requirements for all forms of insurance, with the 
specific aim of identifying only those current issues in insurance contract law and 
insurance practice relevant to liability insurance cover and related claims 
management.  
 
A. The thesis has identified and developed a check list of some of the most 
important disclosure duties for liability insurance contracts, their operation, and the 
eventual claims processes. 15  The thesis recommends that the Financial Service 
Conduct Authority16 enact specific statutory provisions that require liability insurers 
and their insured to disclose, as a minimum, the following specific issues expressly to 
one another before and during their relationship.17 
 
– A clearer and simpler explanation of the nature and purpose of the 
liability insurance contract,18 its complex features specifically during 
the existence of the product lifecycle and claims processes, 19  and 
explanations of its challenging terminology.20 These disclosures should 
be illustrated by the incorporation of simple tables and descriptive 
examples.   
                                                 
15 The purpose of this list is to indicate the most important information that must disclosed by an 
insurer to an insured in liability insurance. This is not intended as a closed list as the study has focused 
only on selected legal aspects of liability insurance. Some information will have to be disclosed 
repeatedly as there are different times and instances of disclosure by the insurer required under the 
PPRs. That detail may be found in Chapter 3 above and in the PPRs 11, 17.6 and 17.8.3(c).  
16 The ‘FSCA’, as established under the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (the ‘FSRA’). 
17 Chapter 3 contains a synopsis of the current disclosure duties under the PPRs, including when and by 
whom disclosure is required.  
18 The insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured (para 3.2 above), and the conduct of the defence and 
settlement by the liability insurer of third-party claims brought against the insured should also be 
explained (see para 3.3 above). 
19 Complex features that should be explained include: liability insurance as third-party insurance (para 
3.2.1 above); ‘loss’ under liability insurance (para 3.2.2.1 above); prescription in the context of liability 
insurance (para 3.2.2.1(d) above); and the duration of liability cover (para 3.2.2.2 above).  
20 For example, as to the ‘loss’ under liability insurance: ‘legal liability’ towards third parties, its scope 
and the time and the way in which the insured defendant becomes legally liable towards the third party 
(para 3.2.2.1 above). As to the ‘insured event’ and the duration of liability cover: ‘occurrence-based’ or 
‘claims-made’ policies, or variations thereof (‘hybrid’ policies), whichever are relevant (para 3.2.2.2 
above).  
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– An insuring or cover clause that clearly defines the types of legal 
liability covered, 21  including details on the time when and way in 
which the insured defendant becomes legally liable to the third-party 
plaintiff.22 
– The duration of the liability cover,23 amplified by specific reference to 
the trigger for cover, namely whether the liability insurance contract is 
occurrence-based, claims-made, or a hybrid form of liability insurance. 
The insurance contract should clearly describe the insured event, 
identify the specific trigger and duration of liability insurance cover for 
that specific product in plain language, and attempt to illustrate the 
challenges and complexities surrounding these issues with the aid of 
tables and examples as mentioned earlier.24 Information disclosed must 
be tailor-made according to each individual type of liability policy.25 
As the rules of prescription as applied to the different liability policies 
are also very complex, the insured must be informed in detail and in 
advance of the termination of its rights.  
– An insured should further be fully informed of the scope of its 
disclosure duties towards the liability insurer.26 Legislative measures 
should contain a list of mandatory facts that must be disclosed in 
addition to those required under general insurance law. These facts 
should be explained in detail by the insurer to the insured. As specific 
disclosures by the insured are particularly relevant for claims brought 
under claims-made policies, the insurer should, for example, inform the 
insured of these and describe the rationale for the insurer to gain access 
to the specific information. 
– Exceptions to, exclusions from, and limitations on liability cover 
should be disclosed by the insurer in simple language to the liability 
                                                 
21 See para 3.2.2.1(a) above. 
22 Potential legal liability by the insured defendant to the third-party plaintiff is the default position 
under South African law and is recommended, but the effect should be explained clearly (paras 
3.2.2.1(b)(ii) and 3.2.2.1(c) above). 
23 See para 3.2.2.2 above. 
24 Ibid. 
25 For example, to occurrence-based, claims-made or hybrid forms of liability insurance, as well as to 
general liability cover and specialised forms of liability cover. 
26 See paras 3.2.2.2(b) and 3.2.2.4 above. 
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insured.27 These include: (a) exclusions such as contractual liability for 
performance; (b) limitations on the sum insured (including 
aggregations and event limits); and (c) exclusions or limitations 
applicable to the conduct of the insured. Significant exclusions or 
limitations for an individual policy should be prominently disclosed,28 
clearly and in full. It is recommended that all of the former examples of 
prescribed or recommended disclosures are significant (or should be 
considered as such) and they should be prominently disclosed in any 
event. 
– The application of prescription and time-limit provisions have to be 
explained and disclosed to the insured.29 Again tables and examples 
can be incorporated to explain their effect under different types of 
liability policy.30 
– The insured should be informed of the insurer’s rights to subrogation, 
defence,31 and settlement. These should be explained in detail to the 
insured with specific emphasis on the conduct required by the insured 
to avoid prejudice to the insurer’s rights thereto or in connection 
therewith.32 
– An insurer should advise an insured of any circumstance that could 
give rise to actual (or potential) conflict of interest between the insurer 
and the insured.33 An insured should be informed when it is entitled to 
insist on its own legal representative and on how defence costs 
operate.34 
                                                 
27 See paras 3.2.2.1(a) and 3.2.2.3 above. 
28 Rule 10.15 prescribes rules on prominence of certain communications to the insured. See para 
3.2.2.1(a) above. 
29 See para 3.2.2.1(d) above. These should also be regarded as significant exclusions or limitations that 
require prominence in communication, or should be treated similarly. 
30 See paras 4.2.2(b)(iv) and 5.2.2(b)(iv) above for the application of prescription to the different types 
of policies under English and Belgian law. 
31 The possibility of a reservation of rights by the insurer when it conducts the defence should be 
highlighted as a mandatory duty in communications between the parties to advance the interests of the 
insurer and provide legal certainty as to the positions the parties. See para 3.3.1.1(e) above. 
32  For example, the insured defendant should not admit liability towards the third-party plaintiff 
without the prior consent by the insurer. See paras 3.2.4 and 3.3 above. The insurer should equally not 
prejudice the rights of the insured in its communication and contact with third-party plaintiffs. 
33 For example, when there is legal liability towards the third party in excess of the policy limits, where 
liability cover is uncertain, or where the liability insurer is also the legal expenses insurer. See paras 
3.1.1.1(c), 4.1.1.1(d) and 5.1.1.1(c) above on possible conflict of interest.  
34 See para 3.3.1.1(d) above on defence costs. 
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–  To ensure transparency in the insurance claims processes, and when an 
insurer makes a final payment or offer of settlement to the insured, the 
insurer should disclose and explain the payment and settlement 
processes and their effect on the insurance relationship to the insured.35 
In liability insurance the same applies when the liability insurer makes 
a final payment or settlement offer to the third-party plaintiff on behalf 
of the insured defendant. 
There are concerns that insureds generally do not read (insurance) documents; 
and that some insured are not financially literate enough to understand their contents. 
However, the extensive insurance consumer education being developed by the new 
FSCA may gradually assist in addressing these concerns. 
 The study proposes that the development of the law of liability insurance may 
best be accommodated by amendment of the existing PPRs, which are also part of the 
suite of legislative instruments that regulate the insurance industry.36 Although the 
PPRs are aimed at insurance contracts in general, 37  they contain separate rules 
specifically for microinsurance products.38 The latter was necessary to protect the 
insured under microinsurance cover due to the increased vulnerability of that category 
of insured. For this reason, it appears to be possible to tailor some PPRs for a specific 
type of insurance cover. From this study it is clear that a liability insured suffers from 
vulnerability in the liability insurance relationship due to the special and composite 
nature of liability insurance, as compared to other forms of insurance cover. This 
thesis proposes the incorporation of liability insurance PPRs specifically for purposes 
of regulating liability insurance contracts and liability insurance practice.39 
Given the complexities and unique intricacies of liability insurance cover, either 
a complete separate set of rules in the existing PPRs that apply to liability insurance, 
or alternatively even a completely separate set of PPRs enacted exclusively for 
                                                 
35 See para 3.3.1.2 above. 
36 The PPRs were enacted under s 55 of the SIA, as amended by the (South African) Insurance Act 18 
of 2017 (the ‘Insurance Act of 2017’). Insurance regulatory and supervision regimes fall beyond the 
ambit of this thesis. The regulation that is at issue here concerns aspects relevant to liability insurance 
contract law. 
37 Namely ‘short-term insurance’ contracts and ‘long-term insurance’ contracts respectively, which are 
now known as ‘non-life insurance contracts’ and life insurance contracts’ in the (South African) 
Insurance Act of 2017. See para 3.1.2 above.  
38 Rule 2A. 
39 If liability insurance is part of a comprehensive policy, these will apply to the liability section of the 
policy.  
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liability insurance, are recommended. These will ensure greater consumer protection 
and improved legal clarity in the negotiation, conclusion, and execution of liability 
insurance contracts. Although the PPRs at present prescribe some measures to 
improve fairness, these are so generic that they are, in the main, insufficiently specific 
to address what is required for specific types of insurance. Bearing in mind the unique 
challenges posed by liability insurance, the most efficient vehicle to introduce such 
rules would be for the incorporation of a set of tailor-made PPRs. It is recommended 
that these specialised PPRs should prescribe the minimum disclosure duties as 
denoted above40 for liability insurance contracts, their operation, and the eventual 
claims processes. The specialised PPRs should further address the specific issues as 
recommended below for future enactments.41 
 At present the PPRs only apply to limited categories of insured. 42  It is 
recommended that the development of these separate rules applicable to liability 
insurance cover should not be limited to specific categories of insurance consumer. 
The insured – eg, corporations in the commercial sector – which also face catastrophic 
events liability insurance challenges (like those that arose from the US 9/11 
catastrophe, or in environmental liability claims such a liability claims for asbestosis 
and silicosis) equally require protection and remedies for the legal challenges posed 
by liability insurance cover.   
The solution proposed will benefit not only the insured, liability insurers too can 
only benefit as improved legal certainty will limit the number of claims, and the time, 
expense, and reputational damage that comes with the pursuit of insurance disputes at 
the Ombuds or in courts alike. The protection of the insurance consumer as well as the 
economic stability of the insurer are at issue.  
 
  
                                                 
40 See again the check list (para A). 
41  See paras B and C below. If the PPRs are repealed or amended by the COFI legislation, the 
minimum standards may be incorporated in that legislation to apply to liability insurance contracts. 
42 Note again that they only apply to a limited category of insured – natural persons and some juristic 
persons – s 1 of the PPRs sv ‘policy’. Some of the rules also apply to potential policyholders, albeit 
insured. 
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The main legal challenges in regard to liability insurance that would be 
addressed by future extended statutory regulation, and the recommendations proposed 
in this regard, are briefly summarised below. 
 
B. Recommendations as to the liability insurer’s duty to indemnify its insured: 
 
1. In South Africa, far less judicial authority exists on the extent of the insured 
defendant’s legal liabilities towards a third-party plaintiff covered under the liability 
insurance contract, when compared to authority available in English law, which has 
strong persuasive authority in our law. South African law may find valuable guidance, 
for example, from how English courts have dealt with the interpretation of the term 
‘legal liability’.43  To clarify the extent of the insured defendant’s legal liabilities 
towards the third-party plaintiff that is covered under the liability insurance contract, 
it is recommended that the insurance contract should in clear terms provide exactly 
which type of legal liability is covered, and what is excluded.44 
 
2. In essence the time that the legal liability of the insured defendant to the third-
party plaintiff arises under South African law is when the third party has a prima facie 
cause of action against the insured, which is when all the events have occurred 
which render the insured liable to the third party, even though the amount of its 
liability has not yet been quantified or paid. As explained, this position favours the 
insured which offers a benefit other jurisdictions do not.45 
 
3. As to the insured event and the duration of liability cover,46 guidance may be 
found in the English law on the interpretation of terminology under the different types 
of policy and their triggers.47  
Prescribed minimum liability cover, as is found in Belgian law, is clearly to the 
advantage of the insured and may also resolve some of the legal uncertainties through 
                                                 
43 See para 4.2.2.1(a) above. 
44 See the example developed in the summative critical comment of para 3.2.2.1(a) above. 
45 See paras 3.2.2.1(b)-3.2.2.1(c) above. 
46 See para 3.2.2.2 above. 
47 See para 4.2.2.2 above. 
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detailed statutory provisions which eliminate the need for judicial interpretation of 
uncertainties.48  
 
4. As to duty of notice by the insured of the occurrence, claim, potential claim, or 
related matters, some authors under English law suggest that conditions that impose 
unreasonable time limits on the insured may in future be regarded as unfair. 49 
Similarly, some notice clauses, or ‘claims-made and notified’ policies might in time 
be found to be unfair under South African law, whether under statute or common law, 
and specifically regarding public policy.50 It is recommended that the issue be pre-
empted by following the introduction of a rule on reasonable time periods as foreseen 
in English law. 
 
5. Belgian legislation prescribes detailed mandatory provisions relating to the 
prescription and limitation of claims for liability insurance contracts.51 It provides 
legal certainty for the most part, and prescription in the context of liability insurance 
in South Africa should ideally be detailed in legislation, or in the PPRs, to provide for 
the start of a prescription period and minimum periods, regulated in the same way as 
time-limit provisions.52 
 
6. As to the legal relationship between the liability insurer and the third-party 
plaintiff: The third-party plaintiff may claim directly from a liability insurer under the 
exceptional circumstances of section 156 of our Insolvency Act. 53  It is uncertain 
whether section 156 will withstand a constitutional challenge based on equality in 
section 9 of the Constitution as it appears that third-party rights enjoy preference over 
the rights of other creditors under section 156. It does not appear that this type of 
discrimination is directly held to be unfair in current legislation. It is also unsure 
whether and when section 156 will be amended when the proposed update of South 
African insolvency legislation gets under way. In order not to delay the introduction 
                                                 
48 See para 5.2.2.2 above. It is not recommended that the same types of policies under Belgian law 
should be implemented in South Africa mutatis mutandis, eg, the ‘hybrid claims-made’ policy and the 
‘sunset clause’ in particular are tailor-made for the Belgian system and extremely complex and 
detailed. 
49 Under the (English) Consumer Rights Act of 2015. See paras 4.1.2 and 4.2.2.4 above. 
50 See para 3.2.2.4 above. 
51 See para 5.2.2.1(d) above. 
52 Note again the distinction between prescription and time-bars. 
53 See para 3.2.3 above. 
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of such an amended provision, the matter should be addressed in the unique PPRs or 
rules for liability insurance claims as proposed, rather than in general insolvency law 
legislation. Lessons may be learnt from the expanded provisions on the direct claim of 
the third-party plaintiff against the liability insurer under current English law.54  
However, the most comprehensive and beneficial position for the third party can 
be found in Belgian law, where the third-party plaintiff has a statutory right to a direct 
claim against the liability insurer which is not limited to the insolvency or 
sequestration of the liability insured.55 Yet, the constitutionality of such an approach 
may be open to question, as in the case of section 156 under the South African 
Insolvency Act. It is doubted whether a third-party plaintiff under liability insurance 
will be awarded a direct claim against the liability insurer which goes beyond the 
sequestration of the liability insured. Our law has not yet evolved to the stage where it 
readily recognises such extended rights of the third party under liability insurance. 
These third-party rights under Belgian law go beyond the third-party rights currently 
provided under section 156 which are already under fire for being unequal, and may 
discriminate unfairly between a third-party plaintiff and other of the liability insured’s 
creditors.  
 
C. Recommendations as to the liability insurer’s defence and settlement of third-
party claims brought against the liability insured:  
1. Under South African law, 56  unless the insurance contract provides for the 
insurer’s duty to defend the insured,57 an insurer can generally secure a contractual 
right which allows it to choose to defend its insured against the third party’s claim. 
The right to decide to defend the insured generally arises simultaneously with the 
insurer’s duty to indemnify. Under English law, too, the insurer only has such a right 
if it has been agreed upon contractually.58 In Belgian law, however, a liability insurer 
has a statutory right, and even a statutory duty, to defend its insured.59 
                                                 
54 See the English Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act of 2010 that was enacted and came into 
operation long after its predecessor of 1930. See also para 4.2.3.3 above. 
55 See para 5.2.3.1 above on the third-party plaintiff’s direct right against the liability insurer. 
56 See para 3.3.1.1 above. 
57 A contractual duty to defend is not practice in South African law. 
58 There is more judicial authority in English law that may be consulted to develop our law. See para 
4.3.1.1 above. 
59 See para 5.3.1.1 above on Belgian law and the extensive protection that Belgian insurance legislation 
provides to both the liability insurer and the insured. 
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Growing consumerism and rising litigation, and right of access to justice are 
some of the reasons for calling for an insurer’s statutory duty to defend, as opposed to 
merely a contractual right to choose to defend. Minimum cover may be prescribed in 
the PPRs.  
 
2. In addition to the inclusion of rules on the issues mentioned above in separate 
PPRs or separate rules in the existing PPRs, it is recommended that the regulators 
pursue a project on quantitative research.  The purpose of the project should be to 
establish the need for and the viability and cost-effectiveness of providing liability 
cover that includes the increases in the cost of honouring a statutory duty by the 
liability insurer to defend, as opposed to the contractual right of defence that is 
prevalent in liability insurance cover in South Africa. Belgian insurance legislation 
provides an example of how the costs and processes for the defence and settlement of 
a claim by the liability insurer may be developed under South African law. 60  
 In this regard legal expenses insurance could serve as an alternative to cover 
defence costs, as opposed to the liability insurer conducting the defence, although 
defence by a liability insurer that is a specialist in the field may be preferred by the 
insured. There are also advantages to having only a single policy rather that a number 
of separate policies – one for the liability itself and another for related legal costs.  
 
3. Some conflict of interest between the liability insurer and the insured defendant 
may be avoided by regulating the provision of liability insurance and legal expenses 
insurance to an insured by a single insurer by statute, as in both English and Belgian 
law.61 
 
4. Furthermore, if a liability insurer conducts the insured’s defence, it should 
conduct the defence expressly under reservation of rights to avoid uncertainty if it 
later denies liability to the insured which then leaves the latter without rights of 
redress.62 
 
                                                 
60 See para 5.3.1.1 above. 
61 See paras 4.3.1.1(d)(iii) and 5.3.1.1(c) above. 
62 See para 3.3.1.1(e) above. 
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5. In the development of the South African liability insurance law, the legislator 
may take cognisance of the English law on principles for the settlement of third-party 
claims by the liability insurer which are as yet undeveloped in South African law.63 
 
6. Any development of the law of liability insurance in South African law, should 
take account of the transboundary or supra-national nature of liability insurance, and 
the universal aims of liability cover.64  The first forms of liability insurance were 
aimed at indemnifying (and in some legal systems like the Belgian, also defending) 
the liability insured against third-party claims. There is a growing emphasis on 
protecting the interests of the third-party plaintiff in jurisdictions such as Belgium, to 
ensure that these plaintiffs benefit from the insured defendant’s liability cover and that 
damage does not simply rest where it falls.65 In view of our national aim of increased 
consumer protection, the interests of the liability insurance consumer (the insured or 
policyholder), the third-party plaintiff, and the insurer who offers a liability insurance 
cover product, must be considered and can be effectively regulated by product-
specific rules. Such rules will provide increased protection for all three parties, 
increase financial stability and solvency, and ensure a developed liability insurance 
regime that will be attractive to foreign investors and consumers alike. 
                                                 
63 See paras 3.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.2 above. 
64 See Chapter 2 above. It has further been observed that liability cover aims to indemnify the liability 
insured before it is required to pay the third-party claim.  
65 For example, the direct claim of the third party against the liability insurer in para 5.2.3.1 above. See 
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